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Abstract
This thesis explores the progress in, and the obstacles obstructing, the building of 
comprehensive security between Russia and South Korea since diplomatic relations were 
established in 1991. It focuses on oil and natural gas projects, linking the Trans-Siberian 
and Trans-Korean Railroads, industrial development in the Nakhodka Free Economic Zone, 
fishery cooperation, and the arms trade, and examines whether these five aspects of 
cooperation serve to contribute to building Russian-South Korean bilateral and regional 
economic security.
The study pays particular attention to three aspects of security: definitions of 
economic, comprehensive and regional economic security, the security building process 
between states, and security threats. The thesis argues that in order to establish a 
favourable bilateral and regional economic security environment, bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation is essential because it generates trust and confidence between nation states.
Although Russia and South Korea have emphasized both traditional and non- 
traditional security cooperation, the focus of the security building process has gradually 
changed from traditional military and strategic concerns to non-traditional economic . 
dimensions. The two countries have been engaged in enhancing bilateral and regional 
economic security in the regions of the Russian Far East and the Korean peninsula since 
1991.
The thesis argues that energy, transport networks, the Free Economic Zone project, 
fishery cooperation, and the arms trade all have the potential to enhance comprehensive 
bilateral security and further regional economic security in Northeast Asia. However, 
Russian-South Korean economic cooperation has been hampered by a number of obstacles, 
including domestic factors on both sides, and external factors such as the unresolved North 
Korean nuclear issue. In each of the five projects studied, the obstacles have been greater 
than the progress that has been made. In sum, the obstacles have prevented Russia and 
South Korea from fulfilling their potential for creating a cooperative comprehensive 
security relationship.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
The objective o f this thesis is to examine the progress that has been made and the 
obstacles to the establishment of comprehensive security cooperation between Russia and 
South Korea since the inauguration of diplomatic relations in 1990. Bilateral relations 
between Russia and South Korea are examined from the point of view of multi-dimensional 
security, focusing on regional economic security cooperation. The thesis focuses on six 
aspects of cooperation between Russia and South Korea: oil and natural gas projects, 
linking the Trans Siberian Railroad and the Trans Korean Railroad, industrial development 
in the Nakhodka Free Economic Zone, fishery cooperation, the arms trade, and the North 
Korean factor. Russian-South Korean bilateral relations illustrate three important aspects 
of security studies: states’ perceptions of security, security cooperation between nation 
states, and security threats to further security cooperation.
The thesis employs the term “comprehensive security,” encompassing regional 
economic security, as the main conceptual framework to examine security cooperation 
between Moscow and Seoul, since “comprehensive security” includes both the traditional 
political and military dimension, and the non-traditional regional economic dimension. It 
applies these concepts to the six case studies and also aims to identify what the security 
threats are.
Specifically, the thesis explores how the focus of the regional security cooperation 
building process between Russia and South Korea has evolved since the establishment of 
diplomatic relations. I argue that the two countries have put equal emphasis on both 
traditional and non-traditional security cooperation. However, the focus has gradually 
changed from the traditional to a non-traditional dimension. In other words, in recent years, 
both countries have been engaged in enhancing regional economic security in the regions of 
the Russian Far East and the Korean peninsula respectively, specifically focusing on energy 
security, fishery, constructing a transport network, creating a free economic zone, and 
nuclear proliferation issues. Moreover, the chapter on the arms trade between Russia and 
South Korea illustrates that even in this field, non-traditional security, that is, enhancing 
national economic security interests, has been paramount. The role of North Korea in 
Russian-South Korean bilateral security relations also provides an interesting perspective
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within the comprehensive security framework, since it is viewed not only as a traditional 
security threat, but also as an economic security enhancing factor in the long term.
This thesis illustrates that in order to establish a favourable regional security 
environment, bilateral and multilateral cooperation among nation states is essential because 
regional economic security cooperation provides an opportunity to generate trust and 
confidence between nation states.1 However, I argue that bilateral relations between 
Moscow and Seoul have developed quite slowly because both have underestimated the 
importance of regional economic security. As a result, the two countries have failed to 
cultivate full trust in each other, and neither side has had the motivation to deal with 
existing domestic obstacles such as the inherent economic difficulties of the Russian Far 
East, and the reluctance of the South Korean government and private sector to invest in the 
long term. I also contend that bilateral security cooperation between the two countries has 
been hampered by external factors such as the North Korean nuclear issue and the 
dominating role the US has been playing in the Northeast Asian region.
A case study of Russian-Korean bilateral relations is relevant to the fields of both 
comparative politics and international relations. Despite their geographical proximity and 
their geo-strategic importance to each other, the study of Russian-South Korean relations 
has been superseded by relatively more important relationships such as Russia-China, 
Russia-Japan, US-South Korea, Japan-South Korea or China-South Korea, in the past few 
decades. However, their bilateral relations should not be underestimated, considering 
Russia’s desire to be part of the Northeast Asian regional community, and the complexity 
of the relations among major states in Northeast Asia.
The study of Russian-Korean bilateral relations also reveals how Moscow and Seoul 
have redefined their security policy objectives, and how their perceptions of each other 
have evolved. When Gorbachev normalized relations with the South in the late 1980s, it 
was a great departure from previous Soviet foreign policy. Prior to this, North Korea, as a 
member of the socialist world, was viewed as a natural ally of the Soviet Union. Moreover, 
the Soviet leadership appeared to believe much of its own propaganda that South Korea 
was merely a puppet of Washington. Gorbachev’s “New Thinking” concerning the Korean
1 Ralph A. Cossa and Jane Khanna, “East Asia: Economic Interdependence and Regional Security,” 
International Affairs (Royal Institute o f  International Affairs), Vol. 73, No. 2, April 1997, pp. 219 and 234.
2 Gilbert Rozman, Mikhail G. Nosov, and Koji Watanabe, Russia and East Asia: the 21st Century Security 
Environment (London: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), p. 217.
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peninsula demonstrated that Soviet foreign policy would no longer be conducted on the 
basis of ideology, but on the basis of economic considerations.
Bilateral Russian-South Korean relations also show how Russia is redefining its 
foreign policy priorities. Trade talks and a number of long term economic projects between 
the two countries suggest that economic security concerns have become a major priority of 
Russia’s foreign policy in the region. Furthermore, Moscow-Seoul rapprochement has 
more far-reaching implications in international relations. A study of Russian-South Korean 
relations also provides insight into the broader forces shaping the formative stages of 
Russia’s international behaviour towards other great powers in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Throughout history, the Kremlin has played ‘the Korean card’ to put pressure on Japan and 
China, or the United States, and it has clearly displayed an interest in a greater political role 
for East Asia. On the other hand, South Korea looked to the Russian connection as a 
counter-balance to American, and Chinese and Japanese influence in the Korean peninsula, 
and as an instrument for deterring North Korea. In this sense, bilateral relations should be 
viewed within the context of a regional security framework.
In this chapter, I shall give a brief historical overview of the relationship between 
Russia and South Korea since history provides clues to the direction of Russian-South 
Korean multi-dimensional security cooperation. This chapter also examines the strengths 
and weaknesses of the existing literature on Russian-South Korean relations, and explains 
how my analysis builds on, and at times diverges from previous studies, offering a new 
interpretation. The final section of the chapter sets out the structure of the thesis.
1. Historical overview
The establishment of diplomatic relations between South Korea and the Soviet 
Union in September 1990 signalled a turning point in the history of East Asian international 
relations at the end of the twentieth century. The hostility that had existed between the two 
states for forty-five years disappeared in a brief span of time. In the Soviet-South Korea 
rapprochement in the late 1980s, the figure of Gorbachev, combined with structural factors 
such as the Sino-Soviet and American-Soviet rapprochements, played a significant role, 
although it is often hard to separate one factor from another. This section gives a brief
13
historical account of the approach towards the Korean peninsula of Gorbachev, Yeltsin and 
Putin.
1.1. Gorbachev’s South Korean policy
Gorbachev created many possibilities for radical change in Soviet-Korean relations 
since he gave Korean policy very special attention. According to Alex Pravda, “the 
perestroika years [saw] some movement towards co-operation and even embryonic 
partnership on regional and global problems to strengthen general international security.”3 
Gorbachev’s attempt to revitalize Soviet foreign policy included the adoption of a set of 
principles which he called the ‘New Political Thinking’. As Margot Light notes, “although 
they primarily concern relations between the superpowers, they include a new emphasis on 
interdependence and on the need for flexibility in foreign policy. The Soviet leadership has 
also declared that the Soviet Union should diversify its foreign relations, in particular so 
that they are not seen through the prism of Soviet-American relations.”4 To accomplish 
this, Gorbachev paid particular attention to Korea. His New Thinking on the Korean 
peninsula comprised of an acceptance of the reality that there was a powerful state in the 
south of the peninsula, which possessed its own political weight in the Asia-Pacific 
community; recognition that the dangerously escalating tension on the Korean peninsula 
should be reduced; and the determination to seek resolutions to the national problems of the 
entire Korean people.5 Prior to Gorbachev, South Korea had been vilified as a repressive 
dictatorship and a puppet of the United States. Contacts with South Korea were banned, 
and any objective information that might portray it in a favourable light was discouraged. 
Gorbachev was the first Soviet leader to acknowledge that South Korea’s rise to regional 
power status was sustained by its rapid economic growth.6 After meeting South Korean 
President Roh Tae Woo in San Francisco on 4 June, 1990, Gorbachev stated that 
we could not, for obsolete ideological reasons, continue opposing the 
establishment of normal relations with his country, which showed an
3 Alex Pravda, “Conclusion,” in Alex Pravda and Peter J. S. Duncan, eds., Soviet-British Relations Since the 
1970s (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 245.
4 Margot Light, “Anglo-Soviet relations: political and diplomatic,” in Alex Pravda and Peter J. S. Duncan, 
eds., Soviet-British Relations Since the 1970s (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 120.
5 Speech by Mikhail Gorbachev in Vladivostok, 28 July 1986 (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing 
House, 1986), pp. 35-36.
6 Oleg Davidov, “Soviet Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula in the 1990s,” paper presented at the 10th 
international conference on “New Changes in International Order and the Roles o f South and North Korea,” 
organized by the Korean Association o f  International Relations, Seoul, August 1990, p. 6.
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exceptional dynamism and had become a force to be reckoned with, both in the 
Asia-Pacific region and in the wider world.7
Gorbachev’s decision to improve relations with South Korea can be explained by 
Soviet domestic economic needs. As in the case o f his Western policy, the Soviet 
economic crisis was the main incentive for improving relations between the Soviet Union 
and South Korea. The Soviet Union badly needed consumer goods and managerial skills, 
and it targeted the newly industrialized countries in an effort to promote the integration of 
the Soviet Far East and the Siberian region into the Asia-Pacific economy.8 South Korea’s 
economic dynamism attracted Gorbachev’s attention and was the most crucial factor in his 
re-evaluation of South Korea’s standing in Soviet foreign policy priorities.
Gorbachev’s New Thinking toward the Korean peninsula was also influenced by 
traditional security concerns. From Moscow’s perspective, changing Soviet policy toward 
the Korean peninsula could enhance Soviet national security in the Asia Pacific region by 
reducing tension on the peninsula, and lowering the probability of a direct Soviet-American 
clash in the event of a crisis. Ever since the Korean War, the peninsula had been 
considered a potential hot spot that could draw the superpowers into direct confrontation.9
South Korea’s Nordpolitik was clearly also a turning point that accelerated the pace 
of Gorbachev’s changing policy toward South Korea. As South Korea’s domestic politics 
changed during 1987 and 1988, a whole set of new opportunities for the society emerged. 
Newly elected president Roh Tae Woo’s Nordpolitik foreign policy attracted Soviet 
attention towards South Korea. It aimed at improving South Korea’s economic and other 
ties with communist countries, while at the same time bringing North Korea out of isolation. 
The main purpose was to enhance South Korea’s security while potentially undercutting 
North Korea. It stemmed from Roh’s short-term goal of staging a successful 1988 Seoul 
Olympics without the North’s interference.10 Roh’s declaration was well received by
7 Mikhail Gorbachev, Memoirs (New York: Doubleday, 1996), p. 702.
8 Yoke T. Soh, “Russian Policy toward the Two Koreas,” in Peter Shearman, ed., Russian Foreign Policy 
Sincel990  (Boulder: Westemview Press, 1995), p. 184.
9 Charles E. Ziegler, Foreign Policy and East Asia: Learning and Adaptation in the Gorbachev Era 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 110.
10 In June 1983, Korean Foreign Minister Lee Bum Suk declared that normalizing relations with the Soviet 
Union and China was a formal objective o f  South Korean diplomacy. It was called Nordpolitik, after the West 
German Ostpolitik policy with the USSR and Eastern Germany. See Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas 
(Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1997), p. 187.
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Moscow. In his September 1988 Krasnoyarsk speech, Gorbachev expressed a willingness 
to develop economic relations with South Korea. In addition, he proposed multilateral 
discussions on reducing the threat of military confrontation in areas adjacent to the shores 
o f the USSR, China, Japan, and the two Koreas.11 In short, Soviet-South Korean 
rapprochement in the later 1980s was the successful consequence of both Gorbachev’s New 
Thinking and Roh’s Nordpolitik.
From the South Korean perspective, rapprochement with the Soviet Union was a 
development of immense importance. First, Seoul gained wider international recognition. 
Previously, with the Soviet veto in the UN Security Council and Korea divided, it had been 
very difficult to improve South Korea’s standing in the international community. Once the 
Soviet veto was removed, Seoul was admitted into the UN. Even when Pyongyang 
declared that the entry o f South Korea into the UN would perpetuate the division of Korea, 
the Soviet position remained firm: South Korea’s entry would not prevent Korean 
reunification. Moreover, with the participation of Soviet and Chinese athletes in the Seoul 
Olympics, they turned out to be even more successful than the 1980 Moscow and 1984 Los 
Angeles Olympics. Thus Seoul received more attention and gained a great deal of prestige 
in the eyes of the international community.
Second, the establishment of Soviet relations with South Korea clearly deprived 
North Korea of the undivided support of its original sponsor, its most important source of 
economic and military assistance and guarantor against American power, as provided by 
the 1961 Soviet-North Korean treaty. Moreover, the meeting of the General Secretary of 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union with the President of South Korea meant the 
legitimization of the Seoul government virtually everywhere and “the final collapse of 
North Korea’s long-standing effort to wall off the southern regime from communist 
nations.”12
From the Soviet perspective, among other benefits that the Soviet Union received 
from improving relations with South Korea, economic aid was the most significant.
Whether or not the need for economic assistance was his primary incentive, Gorbachev did 
receive a $3 billion loan from President Roh. South Korea was becoming the Kremlin’s 
most valuable partner. Apart from the aid, the Soviet Union was the first great power to 
establish diplomatic relations with both Koreas and this enabled it to play a potentially
11 HakJoon Kim, 1991, pp. 68-85, and p. 74.
12 Oberdorfer, p. 210.
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mediating role between the two Koreas. Gorbachev successfully turned South Korea’s 
imperialistic and brutal image of the Soviet Union into the perception of a close neighbour.
In my opinion, the pace of the rapprochement was too rapid. The Korean 
government, in particular, was in a hurry. President Roh’s pressing goal was to host the 
Seoul Olympics successfully during his presidential term without any North Korean 
interference. To accomplish that goal, cooperation with the North’s allies such as the 
Soviet Union and China was essential. Hence, the Soviet Union participated in the 
Olympics and two years later, after establishing diplomatic relations, it received a $3 billion 
loan. According to one later criticism, Seoul bought diplomatic relations with Moscow for 
$3 billion.13
Once both sides had achieved what they intended, the further development of 
relations was quite slow because their foreign policy objectives were virtually exhausted, 
especially on the Korean side. Moreover, the unresolved, and perhaps the most acute issue 
-- the shooting-down of the Korean Air Lines aircraft — continued to haunt discussions 
between the two sides. South Korea demanded public apologies and additional information 
on the fate of deceased passengers. Moscow did not want to apologize for incidents that 
had occurred during past regimes and no new facts seemed to be available. Moreover, the 
reluctance of the South Korean private sector to invest in the Soviet Union and anti-Soviet 
sentiment among South Koreans frustrated and disappointed the Kremlin leaders. In the 
end, the absence of further foreign policy initiatives, the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
the deep domestic crisis in Russia created new uncertainties to relations between Moscow 
and Seoul.
13 Interview with a visiting Korean Russian specialist in Washington, DC, 20 December, 1997; Pyongyang 
responded with a bitter denunciation in Nodong Sinmun, under the headline, “Diplomatic Relations Sold and 
Bought With Dollars.” Citing past promises from Gorbachev and Shevardnadze not to recognize South Korea, 
the article declared that “the Soviet Union sold o ff the dignity and honour o f  a socialist power and the 
interests and faith o f  an ally for $ 2.3 billion (the amount o f  a reported South Korean economic cooperation 
fund for Moscow.) The article was written under the by-line o f  “commentator,” a designation given only to 
the most authoritative statements from North Korea’s ruling hierarchy. In January 1991, Soviet Deputy Prime 
Minister Yuri Maslyukov’s mission to Seoul resulted in an agreement to supply a further $ 1.5 billion in loans 
to finance Soviet imports o f Korean consumer goods and industrial raw materials, and $500 million for the 
financing o f plants and other capital goods. Together with the $1 billion bank loan obtained by Deputy 
Foreign Minister Igor Rogachev, the total was $ 3 billion, all o f which was to be repaid. See also Oberdorfer, 
p. 217, and pp. 225-227.
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1.2. Russian-South Korean relations during the Yeltsin presidency
During 1991 and 1992, Yeltsin’s foreign policy toward the Korean peninsula leaned 
heavily towards South Korea. Since the failed coup in 1991, Russian relations with North 
Korea had deteriorated steadily, partly as a consequence of Russia’s growing ties with the 
South and partly as a result of Pyongyang’s covert nuclear programmes. In fact, Russia 
joined with the international community in pressuring North Korea to open up its nuclear 
programme to inspection.
In November 1992, Yeltsin paid a state visit to Seoul to formalize and strengthen 
links between the two countries. He emphasized his support for peaceful reunification 
through North-South dialogue and claimed that Russia had already stopped supplying 
offensive arms to the North. Yeltsin and Roh signed the Treaty on Basic Relations between 
the Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation14 proposing to base their bilateral 
relations on the common ideals of freedom, democracy, and commitment to a market 
economy.15 During his address to the South Korean National Assembly, Yeltsin claimed 
that the 1961 Soviet-North Korea Friendship and Mutual Assistance Agreement would 
either be abolished or greatly revised. With regard to the 1961 Treaty, when the then new 
Korean President, Kim Young Sam visited Moscow in June 1994, Yeltsin assured him that 
amendments to the Treaty would no longer oblige Russia to side with North Korea in the 
event of a conflict.16
Since 1996, however, Moscow’s policy toward the Korean peninsula has changed 
dramatically. Yeltsin discovered that his pro-South policy, following Gorbachev’s 
approach, produced no real further enhancement of relations with South Korea, while it 
incurred the loss of relations with Russia’s previous ally, North Korea. The Kremlin 
decided to balance relations between Seoul and Pyongyang, and to restore old ties with 
North Korea. This clearly suggests Russia’s attempt to regain regional power status on the 
peninsula, while manoeuvring between the two Koreas. In reality, Yeltsin’s new policy 
proved to be rather difficult because Moscow discovered itself in the awkward position of 
projecting its image toward the two hostile Koreas simultaneously.
14 Treaty on Basic Relations between the Republic o f  Korea and the Russian Federation, 19 November, 1992, 
published by the Ministry o f  Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic o f  Korea, 14 June, 1993
15 Rossiskaya Gazeta , 20 November, 1992, pp. 1 and 3; and Vasily Koronenko, “In Seoul, Yeltsin Proposes 
23 projects for Economic Cooperation with South Korea,” Izvestiya, 19 November 1992, quoted in The 
Current Digest o f  the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. 44, No. 46, 1992, pp. 15-16.
16 Chikahito Harada, Russia and Northeast Asia  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 65-66.
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In contrast to the period of honeymoon relations between the Soviet Union and 
South Korea under Gorbachev, Russian-South Korean relations under Yeltsin were quite 
difficult. Although a degree of mutual understanding and friendship between the states was 
retained, especially before 1996, there was considerable uncertainty in the political 
relations between Russia and South Korea. The main reason was that there was no long­
term substance to their friendly relations.17 For both sides, there were no serious and urgent 
problems or issues of concern. Once the immediate short-term political and economic 
goals had been achieved, Seoul-Moscow relations stagnated. Presidents Kim Young Sam 
and Boris Yeltsin had to arrange “the interface of the two nations to have it pay off, that is, 
to have the relationship rise high enough to benefit both sides,”18 and they found this very 
difficult to accomplish.
The Russian domestic political crisis also had a significant impact on Russian-South 
Korean relations. The new Russian government was too preoccupied with internal 
problems, and any energy left for diplomacy was devoted to relations with the other 
successor states and with the West. It was believed that the future of the democratic, anti­
communist, Russian state depended on the West for disarmament, aid, models of 
development and investment, access to international organization like G-7, and help in 
fighting organized crime. As a result, Russia’s policies toward Korea (and Asia as a whole) 
lost their momentum.
From the South Korean perspective, once the Soviet Union disintegrated in 
December 1991, President Roh’s Soviet policy, and particularly, his decision to provide $3 
billion in credits to an unstable government, came under attack in Korean domestic politics.
Russia’s economic crisis also undermined Russian-South Korean relations. Despite 
Yeltsin’s hope that relations with South Korea would help to transform the Russian 
economy, trade and economic activities between the two countries remained limited 
throughout Yeltsin’s term.19 South Korean businessmen complained about the harsh 
conditions of the Russian market in terms of the extremely slow reshaping of property 
relations, ambiguous legal provisions concerning the rights of foreign investors, widespread 
organized crime, the unsettled political situation, weak infrastructure, and the taxation
17 Andrew A. Bouchkin, “Russia’s Far Eastern Policy in the 1990s,” in Adeed Dawisha and Karen Dawisha, 
eds., The Making o f  Foreign Policy in Russia and the New States o f  Eurasia (New York: M.E.Sharpe, 1995), 
p. 74.
18 Ibid.
19 For example, although Russian trade with South Korea increased by 30 % from $0.95 billion in 1992 to 
$1.25 billion in 1995, it accounted for only 1 % o f  Russia’s total trade turnover in 1995. See Harada, p. 66.
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system. They were particularly concerned about Russia’s inconsistent application of 
exchange rates to trade, and arbitrary restrictions on exporting natural resources.20 While 
South Korean investors were supposedly more willing to take risks than their cautious 
Japanese counterparts, there were many better investment opportunities than Russia, such 
as Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. In short, as far as direct capital investment in the Russian 
Far East was concerned, it turned out to have no immediate value for Korean investors 21 
Moreover, Seoul’s IMF economic crisis in 1997-1998, which was considered the second 
largest turmoil in its history since the Korean War, made economic cooperation between 
the two countries even more difficult. Following the economic crisis, as Ferdinand notes, 
many Korean banks became insolvent and Korean business sectors did not have sufficient 
capital to invest in Russia.
One of the main reasons for the slow development of Russian-South Korean 
economic cooperation was Russia’s inability to pay its international debt. Moscow’s 
decision to postpone the payment due for its $3 billion loan produced a negative reaction in 
the Korean government and business community. Despite requests and explanations from 
the Russian government, Seoul froze the remaining half o f the loan, and the opposition in 
Russia used the opportunity to attack the ruling party in Russia for tremendous 
miscalculations in its foreign and economic policy. “Russians, in turn, showed displeasure 
at fluctuations in Seoul’s behaviour in the economic sphere, its unreliability, and the 
dishonesty of some Korean businessmen.”23 After seemingly endless talks on this issue, 
the two sides finally agreed in April 1995 that Moscow would pay, over a four-year period, 
$450.7 million in overdue principal and interest in the form of deliveries of various raw 
materials, including nonferrous metals, as well as civilian helicopters and military 
hardware,24
In short, Russia’s image in South Korea was severely affected by its political 
instability and poor socio-economic conditions. More importantly, after the disintegration 
of the Soviet Union, Russia’s weakness in international affairs and its inability to influence 
North Korean behaviour reduced its political value in the eyes of the South Koreans. Seoul
20 Korean Statistical Yearbook, (Seoul: National Statistical Office, Republic o f  Korea, 1993), pp. 300-301.
21 Bouchkin, pp. 75-76.
22 Peter Ferdinand, “South Korea,” in Peter Burnell and Vicky Randall, eds., Politics in the Developing World 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 380.
23 Evgeniy Bazhanov and Natasha Bazhanov, “The Evolution o f  Russian Korean Relations,” Asian Survey, 
Vol. 34, No. 9, September 1994, pp. 789-791.
24 Maeil Kyongje Shinmun, 22 April, 1995, p. 5.
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discovered that Moscow had lost practically all leverage with Pyongyang. For example, 
Moscow was excluded from a number of higher-level negotiations in the Korean peninsula. 
In the spring of 1996, the joint South Korean-US announcement of proposed four-power 
talks with North Korea and China to deal with ongoing problems on the peninsula came as 
an insulting slap in the face to Moscow.
Due to these factors, the cordial atmosphere of Russian-South Korean bilateral 
relations deteriorated. Both governments complained about a number o f problems and 
overall attitudes toward each other. Contention grew over the Russian moratorium on 
fishing in the central part of the Sea of Okhotsk. In 1993 the Russian Foreign Ministry 
rejected demands by certain South Korean officials that Moscow renounce the military 
clauses in the Soviet-North Korean alliance treaty of 1961. South Koreans were also 
disappointed with the conclusion of a special state committee in Russia that Moscow could 
not be held responsible for the shooting down o f KAL007 in 1983. The South Korean 
media called it a Cold War position, and Seoul demanded partial material compensation for 
“the unforgivable destruction” of the airliner. Yet the Russian government limited itself to 
expressing apologies. South Koreans also complained about the discharge of nuclear waste 
by Russia in the Far Eastern seas, and Seoul was distressed by the Kremlin’s sudden 
cancellation of a high level economic meeting in May 1994.25 Moreover, the diplomatic 
relations between the two sides were further exacerbated by the reciprocal expulsion of 
diplomats on espionage charges in 1998, a dispute over the relocation of the Russian 
embassy in Seoul, and Russia’s decision to return North Korean migrants to China.26
25 Bazhanov, E., and Bazhanov, N ., pp. 790-791.
26 In July 1998, a South Korean counsellor at the South Korean Embassy in Moscow was expelled from 
Russia on espionage charges. South Koreans immediately reciprocated by expelling a Russian counsellor in 
Seoul. This incident highlighted tense relations between Moscow and Seoul intelligence agencies over 
collecting intelligence activities. Indeed, this incident along with several other issues created the worst 
diplomatic crisis in the late 1990s between the two sides in the history o f  their relationship. It also well 
illustrated a widening gap, in terms o f perception and interests, between the two sides. See Elizabeth 
Wishnick, “Russian-North Korean Relations: A New Era,” in Samuel S. Kim and Tai Hwan Lee, eds., North 
Korea and Northeast Asia (Lanham: Rowman &Littlefield Publishers, 2002), pp. 150-151. See also Seung- 
Ho Joo, “Russia and Korea: The Summit and After,” The Korean Journal o f  Defence Analysis, Vol. 13, No. 1, 
Autumn 2002, p. 115.
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1.3. Putin’s policy towards South Korea
After a decade o f drift, Putin has made some substantial progress in developing 
relations with South Korea, and the Korean peninsula has become a higher priority issue in 
Russian foreign policy than in the half a century since the Korean War.27 There are two 
differences between his policy towards the Korean peninsula and that of his predecessors: 
he has improved Russia’s relations with North Korea and he has used the energy card in the 
Russian Far East.
Putin’s overall foreign policy concept reflects his policy toward the Korean 
peninsula. His emphasis on both economic security and multipolarism has had an impact 
on his policy towards the Korean peninsula.
First, economic priorities emerged as one of the most distinctive and important 
features of Putin’s foreign policy. Bobo Lo maintains that although Gorbachev and Yeltsin 
claimed that Russian foreign policy should be directed principally at promoting the wealth 
of the nation and the well-being of its citizens, “this message appeared increasingly 
formalistic and devoid of meaning.”28 On the other hand, “Putin has demonstrated the 
interest and commitment to transform a rhetorical allegiance into a genuine economization 
of Russian attitudes towards the world.”29 In other words, Putin has emphasized the 
importance of Russia’s economic integration in the two most dynamically developing areas 
in the world — Western Europe and Northeast Asia. According to Lo, the economic 
dimensions of Putin’s foreign policy concept comprise the following four key elements:
1) a direct linkage between an active foreign policy and domestic socio­
economic transformation and prosperity
2) a campaign to integrate Russia into ongoing international processes
3) the profit motive
27 On 20 April, 2005, during a meeting with the new South Korean envoy to Russia Kim Jae-sup and several 
other diplomats, Putin stated that South Korea was a top diplomatic priority for Russia in the Asia-Pacific 
region. See Georgi Toloraya, “President Putin’s Korean Policy,” The Journal o f  East Asian Affairs, Vol. 17, 
No. 1, Spring/Summer 2003, p. 33, and Yonhap News Agency, 20 April, 2005.
28 “Konseptsiya vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, 2 July, 2000, p. 6; and see also 
Bobo Lo, Vladimir Putin and the Evolution o f  Russian Foreign Policy (London: Blackwell, 2003), pp. 51-52.
29 Lo, pp. 52-53.
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4) the interrelationship between geo-economics and geopolitics, between 
Moscow’s pursuit of economic objectives and its continuing ambitions to 
project itself at a regional and global level.30
Putin’s emphasis on regional economic issues made it convenient for Russia to deal 
with both Koreas simultaneously. Moreover, energy diplomacy became an important 
instrument to promote economic recovery, to participate in the global economy, to maintain 
Russia’s geo-strategic influence, and to improve the international security environment. 
Putin has used Russia’s energy resources as an instrument in relations with both Koreas, 
suggesting that “Russia’s natural resources can become the linchpin of large projects and 
sinewy networks of pipelines in Northeast Asia.”31
Second, Shearman notes that the term multipolarism has been frequently used by 
Russia’s foreign policy community during Putin’s period. Although it can be traced back 
to when Andrei Kozyrev was foreign minister, it is most often associated with Russia’s 
more recent foreign policy decisions. In Shearman’s account, “this term has symbolized a 
more hard-line stance in Russia, indicative of a move away from a western-oriented 
approach.”32 Putin appears to use the term to denote his balance of power perspective, and 
in its relations with Northeast Asia, particularly with China, Russia has opposed US 
hegemony in this region. At the same time, “multipolarism also reflects more recognition 
of Russians weak stance in the overall global distribution of power.”33
Putin’s effort to maintain balanced relations with both Koreas indicates that Russia 
is once again seeking to influence a region of strategic importance. Putin wants to upgrade 
Russia’s image, and to exercise influence in the region. Specifically, he is clearly hoping to 
promote Russia’s role as an objective mediator in the Korean peninsula, this time 
emphasizing more of the regional economic security dimension. He has encouraged both 
Koreas to participate in trilateral economic cooperation, focusing on specific long-term 
economic projects such as the oil and gas pipeline building projects, the establishment of an 
industrial park in the Nakhodka FEZ, and linking the TSR and the TKR projects.
30 Ibid., p. 53.
31 Gilbert Rozman, “When Will Russia Really Enter Northeast Asia?” in Wolfgang Danspeckgruber and 
Stephen Kotkin, eds., The Future o f  the Russian State: A Sourcebook (New York: Columbia International 
Affairs Online, 2003), p. 2.
32 Peter Shearman, “Personality, Politics and Power: Foreign Policy under Putin,” in Vladimir Tikhomirov, 
ed., Russia After Yeltsin (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), pp. 236-237.
33 Ibid., p. 237.
23
Putin was the first Russian leader to pay an official visit to North Korea. His 
renormalization policy with Pyongyang should be seen in terms of his balance of power 
perspective, and an effective demonstration of multipolar diplomacy.34 It clearly gives 
Russia some influence and leverage over the Korean peninsula. The North Korean leader 
Kim Jong IPs Trans-Siberian rail journey across Russia in August 2001 dramatized the 
intensifying ties between Pyongyang and Moscow.
Although Putin has normalized relations with Pyongyang, he did not want to risk 
losing his political and economic ties with the South. And, surprisingly, his radical concept 
of trilateral cooperation was well received by both the North and the South. He aimed not 
only to achieve economic benefits through trilateral relations, but also to bring North Korea 
into the Northeast Asian regional society and maintain stability in the Korean peninsula. 
Amid the uncertainty o f inter-Korean affairs, Putin used the strategically effective energy 
instrument, as well as offering other economic incentives for cooperation. It is important to 
note, however, that Putin’s balanced approach towards both Koreas was only possible 
because the two South Korean leaders, Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun, pursued their 
“sunshine policy”36 toward North Korea. In short, Putin’s new foreign policy, the 
Moscow-Pyongyang rapprochement, and improved inter-Korean relations all contributed to 
favourable circumstances for Russia’s influence and cooperation vis-a-vis the two Koreas.37
Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun were willing to enhance relations with Russia.
As a result, bilateral Russian-South Korean relations have become more important in the 
last few years. Russia and South Korea have aimed not only at dealing with the North 
Korean nuclear issue, but also at working through high and low level contacts in the hope 
of improving the flow of information and reducing the chance of misunderstanding between 
the two countries.
Putin and the South Korean President Kim Dae Jung gradually improved the 
estranged and stagnant relations between the two countries, engaging in political activities
34 The former Russian foreign minister Kozyrev is reported to have told the BBC that Putin’s visit to North 
Korea was a very good diplomatic move. See Ibid., pp. 237-238.
35 Toloraya, p. 42.
36 The Sunshine Policy is the mainstay o f  the Republic o f  Korea's North Korea policies aimed at achieving 
peace on the Korean Peninsula through reconciliation and cooperation with the North. It is not a simple 
appeasement policy in that it pursues peace on the basis o f  a strong security stance. The Government 
recognizes reality—the reunification o f two Koreas will not be achieved in the near future as the two sides 
have been facing o ff in conflicts and confrontation for more than half a century. The Government believes 
that settlement o f  peace and coexistence is more important than anything else at the present time.
37 Ibid.
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such as an exchange of high government officials as well as parliamentary delegations.38 
Putin’s visit to Seoul on 26-28 February, 2001 confirmed that Moscow’s relations with 
Seoul was given one of the highest priorities in Russian foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific
•  39region, and resulted in a joint statement that primarily aimed at encouraging economic 
cooperation between the two countries. The two sides also agreed that the 1992 joint 
Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and the 1994 Geneva Agreed 
Framework should be implemented to remove the nuclear threat on the Korean peninsula 
and the heads of state vowed to cooperate on projects which would continue to ease inter- 
Korean tensions.40 After the new Korean President Roh Moo Hyun was elected, bilateral 
relations improved even further.
Putin and the two Korean leaders laid out two aspects of security cooperation 
between the two countries: 1) regional economic security cooperation focusing on long 
term economic projects; and 2) the traditional security aspect of the stability of the Korean 
peninsula, primarily the solution to North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons. With 
regard to the latter, during the Moscow summit between Putin and Roh on September 21, 
2004, the two leaders agreed to cooperate closely in multinational talks to persuade North 
Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons programmes. They also confirmed that they would 
cooperate in the fight against international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction 41
According to a 10-point joint statement in Moscow,42 Roh and Putin aimed at 
facilitating bilateral economic projects including linking railways, building oil and gas 
related projects, the creation of a Russian-Korean industrial complex in the Nakhodka Free 
Economic Zone, and the transfer of Russian space technology. In addition, a dialogue on 
energy cooperation has been particularly active under Putin and Roh.
The enhanced diplomatic relations between Putin and the two Korean leaders have 
clearly contributed to projecting a favourable image of Russia among the South Korean
38 The Embassy o f  Russia in Republic o f  Korea, Briefing on Political Cooperation, on 
http://wwvy.russianembassv.org/english/political.html. accessed on 28 April, 2005; The Korea Herald, 12 
June, 2001; and see also Seung-Ho Joo, “ROK-Russian Economic Relations, 1992-2001,” Korea and World 
Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 3, Fall 2001, p. 391.
39 The Korea Herald, 12 June, 2001; and see also Joo, 2001, p. 391.
40 Korea-Russia Joint Declaration by Kim and Putin, Seoul, 27 February 2001, released by The Ministry o f  
Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic o f  Korea.
41 Yonhap News Agency, 21 September, 2004; Korea-Russia Joint Declaration by Roh and Putin, Moscow, 21 
September 2004, released by The Ministry o f  Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic o f  Korea; and Korea Times, 
17 February, 2005.
42 Ibid.
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business community. In 2003, for example, the volume of bilateral trade was the highest in 
the 14 years of Russian-South Korean diplomatic relations. The growth in the volume of 
trade in 2003 was 27.3 percent and reached $4,181 billion.43 In 2004, trade turnover was 
even higher, reaching a record high of $6 billion 44 In fact, many South Korean private 
enterprises have actively pursued the development of their business in Russia 45 An 
agreement dealing with the problem of Russian debt to South Korea reached during the 
2004 summit was another important step in improving bilateral trade and economic 
relations. This agreement created the basis for resuming cooperation in the banking sector. 
As a result, the South Korean Export-Import Bank began financing South Korean exporters 
through Russian commercial banks.46
Nevertheless, despite the efforts by Putin and Roh to upgrade relations between the 
two countries, there still remain a number of obstacles that hamper multi- dimensional 
security cooperation. The six chapters following Chapter 3 will provide an analysis of 
these obstacles. But first we need to examine existing studies of the Russian-South Korean 
relationship and the next section of this chapter will attempt to demonstrate their strengths 
and weaknesses and to indicate how my thesis will build upon and enhance them.
43 “South Korean Ambassador Predicts Record Trade with Russia,” Interfax News Agency, Diplomatic 
Panorama, 29 December, 2004. It is interesting to note that although the combined value o f  South Korean 
investments to Russia was not that large ($205.7 million), in 2003 there was a steep increase in investment.
In 2003, the Russian economy received $44.6 million in direct investments from South Korea, compared with 
$3.6 million in 2002. See also Agence France Presse, 19 August, 2004.
44 Ibid.
45 For example, one o f  the South Korean conglomerates, LG and the First Deputy Chairman o f the Moscow  
regional government, Alexei Panteleyev agreed to establish an electronics factory in Russia. The LG group 
also began constructing an oil chemical plant in Tatarstan worth more than $1 billion, while another South 
Korean conglomerate, the Lotte group, started construction on a $300 million big business-hotel center in 
M oscow. It was reported that LG also set up two electronics research centers in St. Petersburg Engineering 
University and the Moscow State University. See Digital Times, 21 April, 2005; and Hankook Ilbo, 21 
September, 2004.
46 Ibid.
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2. Previous studies of Russian-South Korean relations
The study o f Russian-South Korean relations is a relatively recent phenomenon 
in the International Relations literature. Although Soviet and Russian foreign policy 
studies began to grow in the early 1970s and developed further in the late 1980s, much 
of the work relies heavily on secondary materials. Books on Russian policy toward 
Korea are generally introductory, and articles are mostly policy-oriented descriptive 
studies containing little International Relations theory or, indeed, any conceptual 
framework. One reason for this is that few Korean specialists on Russia have a 
background in International Relations theory. Moreover, Soviet studies is relatively 
new in South Korea because the study o f Communist states was, for many years, 
discouraged for ideological reasons in South Korea. In addition, following the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, Korean academics’ interest in Russia declined dramatically. 
Moreover, since South Korea was never a high priority in the Soviet foreign policy 
agenda (even in Northeast Asia, the Korean peninsula has always been a lower priority 
in Soviet and Russian policy than China or Japan), western political scientists paid little 
attention to the relations between the two countries. Western studies o f Russian foreign 
policy change have focused primarily on relations with the United States and Western 
Europe, or the Near Abroad.
There is, nevertheless, a small body of work devoted to the subject, primarily in 
the form of chapters in edited volumes, or small sections of chapters on Russian policy 
toward Northeast Asia. A common tendency in these works is to examine South Korean 
and Russian objectives in pursuing rapprochement, to offer a chronological account of 
their relations and to speculate about future prospects. What is lacking is an analysis o f 
why relations have developed so slowly. More importantly, few scholars base their 
studies on an explicit conceptual framework. However, a few collections o f essays have 
attempted use International Relations theory, and in the survey that follows, I shall 
divide the works that I examine into historical, international relations theory, regional, 
trilateral and security approaches.
2.1. Descriptive historical narrative approaches
Perhaps the commonest approach to the study of Russian-South Korean relations 
is the use o f a descriptive historical narrative account. Several scholars have examined 
how Russian-Korean relations fluctuated historically from the late Korean Choson 
Dynasty and Czarist Russia in the nineteenth century to the recent Putin period. For
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example, Shipaev analyzed the Soviet decision-making process under Gorbachev 
concerning rapprochement with South Korea, focusing on the change in Russian 
perceptions o f South Korea from viewing it as America’s puppet regime to accepting it 
as a legitimate foreign policy partner. He argued that the beginning o f economic 
relations between Russia and South Korea was a direct consequence, and clear evidence, 
o f the change in Russian perceptions, but he neither provided a theoretical framework 
nor a deep analysis for the study of those perceptions.47
Vladimir Li offered an historical account o f Russian diplomatic efforts toward 
the Korean peninsula, covering the history of Russian-Korean relations, the plight o f the 
Korean minority in Russia, and current foreign policy issues. He argues that Russian 
attitudes towards Korean issues have had profound implications for the region for more 
than a century. In particular, his discussion o f the history of ethnic Koreans in Russia 
adds a new dimension to the study of Russian policy toward Korea by underscoring the 
historical roots o f Russia’s role in Northeast Asia as well as the domestic importance of 
the Korean question. Li believes that it makes no sense for Russia to develop relations 
with South Korea at the expense o f North Korea, given that the North Korean borders 
and its stability are o f critical importance for the Russian Far East.48
Yoke T. Soh’s account of Moscow’s evolving policy toward the two Koreas is 
confined to the period from July 1990 to July 1994. He argued that the Russian stance 
towards Korea was directed towards a complete break with the communist dogmas that 
had previously influenced Soviet decision-making. Russian foreign policy makers 
increasingly began to focus on the growing domestic economic and political crisis. As a 
result, most o f the foreign policy issues with which they were concerned involved 
efforts to acquire aid and investment from technologically advanced capitalist nations 
such as South Korea.49
In a recent conference presentation, Alexander N. Fedorovsky, divided a decade 
of Russian experience with the Korean peninsula into three periods: 1) under 
Gorbachev; 2) the beginning of reforms in Russia from 1991-1995; and 3) the period of 
balanced foreign policy under Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Primakov from 1996-
47 Viktor I. Shipayev, “A N ew  Russian Perception o f  South Korea,” in II Yung Chung, ed., K orea  and  
Russia Toward the 21st Century (Seoul: The Sejong Institute, 1992), pp. 113-142.
48 Vladimir Li, Rossiya i Koreya  v geopolitike Evrazeiskogo Vostoka (Russia and Korea in the Geopolitics 
o f  the Eurasian East), (Moscow: Nauchnaia Kniga, 2000.)
49 Yoke T. Soh, “Russian Policy toward the Two Koreas,” in Peter Shearman, ed., Russian Foreign Policy  
Since1990 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 181-200.
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1998.50 While this work illustrated each of the three stages well and compared Russian 
objectives, it lacked a conceptual framework and offered more o f a trend analysis.
In general, these historical approaches lack both a comparative analysis between each 
period, and a conceptual framework through which to study the subject.
2.2. International Relations theory approaches
A small minority o f academics, including Eun Sook Chung, Charles E. Ziegler, 
Amy Goldman and Hongchan Chun, have attempted to apply International Relations 
theory to the study of Russian-South Korean relations. Chung attempted to identify the 
overall policy implications for South Korea o f Russian policy by examining the 
domestic roots of Russian foreign policy in transition.51 Chung’s analysis uses a 
conceptual framework of a nexus linking domestic politics and foreign policy. However, 
she fails to explain exactly how the Russian domestic situation is related to its policy 
toward Korea.
Chung also approaches Russian foreign policy toward South Korea in the 
context o f national identity questions. She applies one o f Russia’s most popular 
national identity debates in the mid 1990s, the Eurasian vs. Atlantic debate, to the case 
o f Russian-South Korean relations. The debate, according to Chung, culminated during 
the December 1993 election campaign, in which a significant number of candidates 
criticized the existing foreign policy for being unduly subservient to the United States 
and advocated a balanced approach that paid more attention to the East. She sees the 
call for a shift in emphasis in Russia’s foreign policy as a trend moving away from 
“Atlanticism” to “Eurasianism.” In my opinion, however, there are weaknesses in 
interpreting Russian policy towards South Korea as an example o f Eurasianism. In 
geographical terms, Eurasianism is only indirectly connected to the Asia-Pacific region. 
When critics o f Russia’s Atlanticism used the term to denote their preferred policy 
orientation, they mainly had in mind the “near abroad,” that is, the newly independent 
states that emerged from the former Soviet Union. They also argued that it would not 
be desirable for Russia to be drawn into a North-South and anti-Islamic confrontation, 
which broadly designates the developing areas in Russia’s backyard. While in the past,
50 Alexander N . Fedorovsky, “Russian Policy and interests on the Korean Peninsula,” Stockholm  
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Conference presentation paper for “Russia and Asia- 
Pacific Security,” International House o f  Japan, Tokyo, Japan, 19-21 February 1999.
51 Eunsook Chung, “Russia’s Foreign Policy in Transition: Policy Implications for South Korea,” in II 
Yung Chung, ed., Korea and Russia Toward the 21s1 Century (Seoul: The Sejong Institute, 1992), pp. 
287-327.
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the term Eurasianism was used to denote extreme anti-Western trends in Russian 
thinking, in the current debate it is not primarily directed against the West, but appears 
to call for a more realistic policy, rather than a strategic change. We should not, 
therefore, necessarily expect that Russia’s foreign policy priority would shift to the 
Asia-Pacific region as a result o f this debate.
Ziegler’s work, Foreign Policy and East Asia, highlights the dynamics of Soviet 
Policy toward both Koreas in the 1980s, and he uses the concept of learning in foreign . 
policy by exploring the link between Gorbachev’s domestic reforms and the radical 
transformation o f Soviet relations with Korea in the 1980s. According to Ziegler, Soviet 
policy toward North and South Korea offers a useful case study of learning in foreign 
policy because although international factors may have played a role, it was pressure for 
domestic change, and economic reform in particular, which had had the greatest impact 
on new Soviet thinking. He briefly traces the history o f Soviet relations with Korea, 
highlighting the extent to which ideology impeded foreign policy learning under Stalin, 
Khrushchev, and Brezhnev. He argues that Soviet relations with North and South Korea 
exhibited a unique facet of foreign policy learning in that Moscow’s stubborn support 
for the rather uncooperative Kim Il-Sung regime was dictated less by ideology than by 
other foreign policy failures, namely, the Sino-Soviet split and the East-West conflict. 
Soviet Korean policy was also conditioned in large part by simple bureaucratic inertia. 
This position became increasingly untenable in the 1980s as South Korea’s economic 
development far outpaced that o f the North. With economic cooperation* replacing 
military confrontation as the centrepiece o f Soviet foreign relations, Seoul emerged as 
both a model and a potential partner for the Soviet Union, whereas Pyongyang’s value 
further diminished as the Soviet Union and China moved toward normalization.
Goldman, on the other hand, focused on the political pressures and economic 
incentives behind South Korean policy in Russian-Korean bilateral relations. According 
to her analysis, the cooperative business-govemment structure, with its synergy of state 
and entrepreneurial goals, has been the primary factor in South Korea’s aggressive 
moves to strengthen relations with the Soviet Union and Russia. She argued that South 
Korean economic policy toward the Soviet Union was predicated on political goals, and 
implemented by a cooperative business-govemment structure. A wide range of 
enterprises and industrial corporations representing various political goals and economic 
interests engaged in a lively debate over the national advantages to be gained from
52 Charles E. Ziegler, Foreign Policy and East Asia: Learning and Adaptation in the Gorbachev Era,
1993.
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increased ties with the Soviet Union as a whole or with its various republics. She 
maintains that in dealing with the Soviet Union, “ChaeboF or South Korean 
conglomerates acted in unison with the state, partly due to the controls imposed on trade 
and investment. South Korean private sectors also had positive incentives to pursue 
Soviet contracts ~  in addition to the short-term profit motive, companies saw an early 
entrance into Soviet markets as a shrewd long-term strategy. Her analysis is particularly 
useful in providing clues to the future direction o f economic relations between South 
Korea and the post-Soviet states.53
The work of Chun and Ziegler lies firmly within the framework o f realism: both 
emphasize that Russia’s national interests were driving foreign policy decision-making. 
Although these national interests were not clearly stated, and perhaps were not 
thoroughly understood by many in Moscow, they represented the outlines o f a third 
route between the old Soviet foreign policy and the policy preferred by Washington. 
Pride in Russian distinctiveness, as neither European nor Asian but somehow superior to 
both, seems to have emerged as a central element o f Russian foreign policy. Moreover, 
they noted that Moscow’s Korean policy reflected broader trends that were influencing 
Russian foreign policy. Russia was clearly not returning to the former Soviet policy 
style since it did not have the military capability for such policies. But, more 
importantly, Russian officials realized that little would be gained by a heavy-handed 
approach in East Asia. Chun and Ziegler suggested that the best strategy seemed to be a 
more flexible combination o f political and economic instruments while maintaining 
sufficient military strength to preserve control of Russia’s historical frontier regions. 
Russia’s recent Korea policy, that is, restoring ties with North Korea while expanding 
links with the South, indicates that Moscow has a strong desire to be accepted as a 
major power in Northeast Asia.54
2.3. Regional approaches: Russian policy toward Northeast Asia
A few scholars approach the subject from a regional aspect, discussing Russian 
relations with South Korea as part o f Russian relations with Northeast Asia more 
broadly. In my opinion, the regional approach may help to understand Russia’s overall
53 Am y Rauenhorst Goldman, “The Dynamics o f  a N ew  Asia: The Politics o f  Russian-Korean Relations,” 
in Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Jonathan Haslam, and Andrew Kuchins, eds., Russia and Japan: an unresolved  
dilemma between distant neighbours (International and Area Studies, University o f  California at Berkeley, 
1993), pp. 243-275.
54 Chun, Hongchan and Charles Ziegler, The Russian Federation and South Korea, prepared for 
presentation at the 27th National Convention o f  the American Association for the Advancment o f  Slavic 
Studies, Washington, DC, 26-29 October, 1995.
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policy toward the region, but since Russian objectives toward China, Japan, and the two 
Koreas are different, a region-wide account suffers from over-generalization of Russian 
policy.
Leszek Buszynski examined Russian policy towards Northeast Asia as the 
interplay between the aspirations expressed by government leaders, parliamentary 
figures, prominent academics, and journalists, and actual results. He distinguishes 
between three levels o f Russian interests —  global, regional, and bilateral. In terms of 
global interests, the Russian leadership has sought diplomatic balance against the US; at 
the regional level, it has pursued economic and security integration, while at the 
bilateral level, it has sought specific benefits from its relations with China, Japan, and 
South Korea. He argues that at the regional level policy aspirations have been frustrated 
by Russia’s difficult economic conditions and the tendency to treat it as an outsider. 
Although Russia has benefited from an improvement o f bilateral relations with China, 
Japan, and South Korea, these gains do not yet translate into an improved position at the 
regional level.55 Although he provides interesting insights, Buszynski fails to suggest 
any specific reasons for Russia’s unsuccessful diplomacy in this region. Furthermore, 
his discussion o f Russia’s bilateral relations with each of the Northeast Asian countries 
is simply a chronological description of events, without linking them to the reasons for 
Russia’s weak status.
Duckjoon Chang similarly explains Russian relations with South Korea within 
the framework o f the possibilities and constraints o f cooperation between the Russian 
Far East and the Northeast Asian countries. He set out three reasons for the Russian Far 
East’s difficulty in cooperating and integrating further with other Northeast Asian 
countries, and considers the future prospects for cooperation. First, foreign investment 
and other cooperative measures between the Russian Far East and its neighbours have 
never been satisfactory. Second, economic difficulties in the Russian Far East have 
aggravated racist and xenophobic attitudes, which in turn have been exploited by local 
politicians, much to the chagrin o f potential foreign investors. Third, the recent 
financial problems in Japan and South Korea have had a negative impact on the Russian 
Far East’s efforts to integrate further. While he criticizes the Russian Far East’s 
irrational business practices and excessive bureaucratic red tape, he contends that if  the 
Russian Far East launches international cooperation projects centred on selected areas—
55 Leszek Buszynski, “Russia and Northeast Asia: aspirations and reality,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 13, 
No. 3, 2000, pp. 399-420.
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such as a triangular type o f economic cooperation between Russia and both South Korea 
and North Korea—the prospects for success would increase.56
Han-ku Chung also maintained that a democratic Russia on the one hand, and 
regional stability in which the United States maintained a moderate level o f superiority 
on the other, constitute the two pillars essential for continued cooperation between 
South Korea and Russia. He reviewed what prompted each side to make overtures to 
the other and what objectives they would continue to pursue in their relations. He also 
examined whether these objectives could be achieved amidst the changes that have been 
taking place in Russia and the international environment in East Asia.57
Ziegler’s work “Russia and the Emerging Asian-Pacific Economic Order,” also 
examined Russia’s cooperation with the Northeast Asian regional economy, particularly 
the efforts made by the Russian Federation towards establishing closer ties with the 
Asian-Pacific economic order. He argues that very little has been accomplished in 
terms of Russian participation in Asian-Pacific multilateral organizations. Although a 
few bright spots exist in Russia’s bilateral economic ties, most notably with China, 
Taiwan, and South Korea, he believes that Russia’s chaotic domestic situation will 
seriously constrain efforts to integrate into the Asian-Pacific economic order.58 This 
work includes only a few sentences about Russian-South Korean bilateral relations. 
Furthermore, it offers a broad analysis and does not provide a detailed explanation of 
what hinders Russia’s integration intro the regional economy. All o f the authors 
mentioned in this section make valuable and interesting points about bilateral Russian- 
South Korean relations but, given the edited volume format, there is not enough space 
to deal with the issue in depth.
2.4. T rilateral approaches: Moscow, Pyongyang, and Seoul
In recent years, in parallel with the renormalization o f Russian-North Korean 
relations, several academics, including Alexandre Y. Mansourov, Seung-Ho Joo, Jae- 
nam Ko, Alexander N. Fedorovsky, Jeoungdae Park and Jaeyoung Lee, have focused on 
trilateral relations between Moscow, Pyongyang, and Seoul. Mansourov notes that the 
best way to characterize the evolution of Russian policy towards the Korean peninsula
56 Duckjoon Chang, “The Russian Far East and Northeast Asia: An Emerging Cooperative Relationship 
and its Constraints,” Asian Perspective , Vol. 26, No. 2 ,2 0 0 2 , pp. 41-75.
57 Han-ku Chung, “The Future o f  Russo-Korean Relations,” in II Yung Chung, ed., Korea and Russia  
Toward the 21st Century (Seoul: The Sejong Institute, 1992), pp. 411-434.
58 Charles E. Ziegler, “Russia and the Emerging Asian-Pacific Economic Order,” in Ramesh Thakur and 
Carlyle A. Thayer, eds., Reshaping Regional Relations: Asia-Pacific and the Former Soviet Union 
(Boulder: W estview Press, 1993), pp. 85-100
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under Putin is to look at triangular relations among Moscow, Pyongyang, and Seoul.59 
In his recent article, “Russia and Korea: The Summit and A fte r” Joo provided a rather 
optimistic view regarding future multilateral cooperation between Russia and South 
Korea, emphasizing the importance of trilateral economic relations between Moscow, 
Pyongyang, and Seoul. His work explored Putin’s new foreign policy goals and 
principles toward the two Koreas, focusing on the Putin-Kim Jong II summit and Putin’s 
diplomatic initiatives toward Korea. He also concluded that if  Russia and the two 
Koreas jointly pursue projects such as the Iron Silk Road project, the Nakhodka 
industrial complex plan, and the Irkutsk gas pipeline project, the remnants o f the Cold 
War on the peninsula are likely to melt away.60 He fails, however, to define the specific 
elements that are delaying current economic cooperation.
The same is largely true o f Ko’s “Pyongyang’s Opening and North-South- 
Russia Cooperation,” and Fedorovsky’s “Russian policy and interests on the Korean 
Peninsula.” Both provide rather optimistic views o f trilateral economic cooperation, 
arguing that trilateral cooperation will not only promote the national interests o f all 
participating countries but also significantly contribute to ensuring peace and stability in 
Northeast Asia. According to Ko, North Korea’s policies toward South Korea and the 
settlement o f major issues in the Korean peninsula are the decisive factors for successful 
trilateral cooperation. Fedorovsky emphasizes the importance o f economic reforms in 
Moscow, Pyongyang, and Seoul, since the realization of market reforms in Russia, the 
transformation of North Korea’s administrative economy in the direction o f a market 
economy, and the liberalization of the South Korean economy could provide the basis 
for long-term efficient cooperation, and contribute to regional stability. On the other 
hand, political and economic stagnation or regression in any o f the countries would 
undermine political and security stability in the region.61 Yet, although both academics 
warn that there are formidable obstacles hindering the implementation of these trilateral 
economic cooperative projects, neither offers a detailed analysis o f these obstacles.
Park and Lee give a relatively detailed assessment of the present state o f 
industrial cooperation between Moscow and Seoul, in terms o f mutual investment, 
technological cooperation, cooperation in resource development, and transport 
cooperation. They highlight several reasons for the decreased industrial cooperation
59 Alexandre Y. Mansourov, “Russian President Putin’s Policy Towards East Asia,” The Journal o f  East 
Asian Affairs, Spring/Summer 2001, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 59-62.
60 Joo, 2002, pp. 103-127.
61 Jae-nam Ko, “Pyongyang’s Opening and North-South-Russia Cooperation,” K orea Focus, Vol. 9, No. 
3, May-June, 2001, pp. 63-81; and Fedorovsky, “Russian Policy and interests on the Korean Peninsula”.
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f t )between the two sides, stressing the importance of trilateral economic cooperation.
Their approach is business oriented and takes no account of foreign policy analysis or 
International Relations. In general, all the works based on trilateral approaches lack a 
deep analysis o f the specific elements that threaten trilateral relations.
2.5. Security Approaches
Several scholars apply the concept o f security to bilateral relations between 
Moscow and Seoul. However, few o f them either define or analyze the term. For 
example, Peggy Falkenheim Meyer’s article, “Russia’s post-Cold War Security Policy 
in Northeast Asia” deals with Russia’s security relations with Northeast Asian countries. 
She examines the debate between traditional security and economic concerns, yet she 
merely sets out descriptions o f the political and military events and does not establish a
f \ \link between security and Russia’s relations with China, Japan, and the two Koreas.
Moreover, most security approaches focus on the traditional concept of security 
and they are still firmly within the paradigm o f Cold War analysis, in spite o f the fact 
that as the importance o f relations between Moscow and Seoul gradually waned, the 
two countries had extreme difficulty in finding shared diplomatic interests especially in 
relation to traditional security concerns. Indeed, the traditional security concept has 
been mentioned less and less during bilateral talks, especially since South Korea 
adopted its sunshine policy toward North Korea in the late 1990s, in conjunction with 
the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, most academics fail to clarify whether they are 
referring to traditional or non-traditional security.
For example, Suck-ho Lee examined Russian relations with South Korea from 
both the historical and the geo-strategic perspective, while discussing security 
cooperation and security goals from the late 19th century. He maintained that security 
cooperation between Russia and Korea has never been successful or satisfactory. 
Although he uses the concept of security, his analysis is mostly based on traditional 
security concerns rather than non-traditional security concerns, separating economic 
cooperation from traditional security aspects. On the other hand, he recognizes that 
economic difficulties on both sides represent major threats to their national securities.
He argues that while Moscow expects Seoul to help the Russian economy, Seoul does
62 Jeongdae Park and Jaeyoung Lee, “Industrial Cooperation between Korean and Russia,” Journal o f  
Asia-Pacific Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 2, February 2002, pp. 47-71.
63 Peggy Falkenheim Meyer, “Russia’s Post-Cold War Security Policy in Northeast Asia,” Pacific Affairs, 
Vol. 67, No. 4, Winter 1994-1995, pp. 495- 512.
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not want the burden of Russia’s economic problems.64 In short, the literature based on 
the concept of security lacks proper definitions of security and it fails to identify the 
constitutive elements of security cooperation with reference to Moscow-Seoul relations.
3. Limits of the existing literature and the contribution of this thesis
It is interesting to observe that, in terms of Russian and the Korean foreign 
policy objectives, despite the different approaches taken by different scholars, they 
virtually all reach the same conclusions. First, from the traditional security point o f 
view Moscow has been eager to obtain influence on the Korean peninsula, while South 
Korea wants Moscow to help ease the tensions in the relations between the two Koreas. 
In the economic sphere, Moscow wants closer cooperation with Seoul in order to obtain 
capital investments, while Seoul is interested in accessing Russian natural resources and 
expanding its current export markets.
Moreover, most of the studies interpret the improvement in Russia’s bilateral 
relations with all the countries in Asia as part o f one overall Soviet/Russian objective in 
East Asia. When it achieved detente with the United States, the Soviet Union/Russia 
began to mend its relations with other Asian countries as well. A further objective is 
considered to be increasing Soviet/Russian economic cooperation with, and 
involvement in, the dynamic Asian economy. The Soviet Union/Russia was badly in 
need of foreign capital and technology to keep Gorbachev’s economic reforms moving. 
Situated close to the Russian Far East, South Korea was an excellent potential economic 
partner for Moscow.
It is also clear that very few scholars use a theoretical approach to understand 
Russian-South Korean relations; it seems that theory and the case of Russian foreign 
policy toward Korea have not been integrated with each other. In most cases, 
International Relations theory and the empirical detail o f Russian-South Korean 
relations have been treated as separate areas o f study. Moreover, scholars rarely define 
the terms that they apply in their studies. One reason why scholars have not been 
tempted to apply International Relations theory to their study of Russian-South Korean 
relations may be Russia’s inherently weak situation in Northeast Asia, and the
64 Suck-ho Lee, “Korea and Russian Security Cooperation: Incentives and Obstacles,” in II Yung Chung, 
ed., Korea and Russia Toward the 21st Century (Seoul: The Sejong Institute, 1992), pp. 235-286.
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comparative low priority each country’s foreign policy agenda assigns to the other. 
Eunsook Chung points out that
after examining changing trends of new Russian foreign policy over the 
several years, the study o f Russian foreign policy implications for the 
Russian-South Korean relations is a rather difficult job, because without any 
concrete substance in Russian-Korean diplomacy, it seems that there is 
virtually no indication that the changes in the new Russian strategy have any 
direct impact on Russia’s relations with South Korea.65
She argues that when scholars speak of “accommodation” or “assertiveness” in Russian 
diplomacy, they usually have in mind Russia vis-a-vis the US and NATO, or Russian 
policy towards Japan and China. And “for those Russians who express strong feelings 
o f anti-Westernism, South Korea was considered to be a country with which to 
cooperate as long as it was beneficial to Russia’s national interests vis-a-vis the West.”66
We have also seen that Russian-South Korean relations are often only briefly 
mentioned within the context of Russia’s overall policy toward Northeast Asia. This is 
primarily due to the fact that Russia’s thinking about, and its policy towards, the Asia- 
Pacific area are to a large extent in flux at present. Russian policy analysts and decision 
makers have been slow to adapt and respond to the unprecedented transformation of the 
international environment and, by and large, still deem the Russian presence in Asia as 
mainly designed to affect the balance with the West—especially in view o f the 
perceived need to counteract NATO’s drive eastwards or US hegemony in global 
politics— by securing closer ties with major Northeast Asian powers such as China. As 
Baranovsky notes, assessing the Northeast Asian region still remains a formidable task 
for Russia, particularly because “perceptions and concepts developed for the realities of 
Euro-Atlantic politics are simply inadequate for understanding the intricacies o f the
c n
Northeast Asian landscape and its Russian component.” Moreover, the analysis of
65 According to her, Paul Kennedy at Yale University expressed a similar view during his lecture in Seoul 
on “Korea in the 21st century” co-sponsored by The Korea Economic D aily and Institute fo r  G lobal 
Economics, 5 January, 1994; and see also Eunsook Chung, “Russia in a Changing International 
Environment,” in II Yung Chung and Eunsook Chung, eds., Russia in the Far East and Pacific Region 
(Seoul: The Sejong Institute, 1994), p. 392.
66 Eunsook Chung, “Russia in a Changing International Environment,” p. 392.
67 Vladimir Baranovsky, “Russia and Asia: challenges and opportunities for national and international 
security,” conference paper prepared for Russia and Asia-Pacific Security initiated by Stockholm  
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Tokyo, 19-21 February, 1999, p. 1.
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Russia’s geopolitical interests and strategy in the region has been based on immediate 
pressures and responses. This means that the problems of Russia’s security relations 
with the Northeast Asian countries have been viewed in the short-term rather than from 
a longer term perspective.68
In short, there remains much work to be done in bridging the gap between our 
understanding of the bilateral relations between Russia and South Korea, and the study 
o f International Relations. Scholars need to provide a detailed analysis o f the 
fundamental problems in the relationship, and they also need to formulate a relevant 
conceptual framework. In an attempt to bridge this gap, this thesis seeks to explain 
bilateral relations within the framework o f comprehensive security cooperation, 
analyzing the elements of shared common interests. Accordingly, this thesis seeks to 
show how important the concept o f comprehensive security is, especially regional 
economic security, with regard to a proper understanding o f bilateral relations between 
nation states in the Northeast Asian region. Second, it seeks to provide a detailed 
analysis o f what hinders further security cooperation, investigating specifically the 
major economic projects that have been proposed since the establishment o f diplomatic 
relations in 1991. Finally, as will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2, this security 
approach, and specifically broadening the concept o f security, seeks to provide a way of 
linking areas o f theory and analysis within International Studies that are normally 
isolated from each other, including international relations theory, international political 
economy, area studies, and strategic studies.69 The structure o f the thesis is set out in 
the following section.
4. Structure of the thesis
Chapter 2 deals with the concept of multi-dimensional security cooperation and 
its relevance to bilateral Russian-South Korean relations, offering a critical examination 
o f the main theories of comprehensive security with the intention of showing that 
regional economic security is the core o f the concept. Specifically, this chapter argues 
that bilateral Russian-South Korean relations reflect three important aspects o f security 
studies at the regional level: states’ perceptions o f security, security cooperation 
between nation states, and security threats that disturb security cooperation. The final
68 Ibid.
69 See the definition o f  comprehensive security in Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1991), p. 372.
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section of the chapter illustrates specific features o f comprehensive security cooperation 
between the two countries, focusing on regional energy security, linking transportation 
networks, the Free Economic Zone, fishery as a part of natural resource management 
security, the arms trade, and the North Korean factor.
Chapter 3 charts the development o f energy security cooperation between Russia 
and South Korea from the regional perspective, focusing specifically on the Kovykta 
gas pipeline project and the Sakhalin oil and gas project, and their implications for 
Northeast Asian energy security and each nation’s economic security. This chapter 
illustrates how diverging political goals and complementary economic interests have 
driven Russian and South Korean bilateral energy cooperation and focuses on the 
obstacles to the development of energy cooperation between the two countries.
The aim o f Chapter 4 is to examine the development and the problems of the 
Trans Siberian Railroad (TSR) and the Trans Korean Railroad (TKR) linking project 
from the aspect o f regional economic security, focusing specifically on the debate 
regarding the obstacles and opportunities o f the project. The chapter begins with a brief 
examination of the historical background o f the TSR. To fully understand the 
importance of this project for bilateral Russian-South Korean relations, the chapter 
assesses the political, economic, and regional implications o f transportation linkage.
The chapter contends that this project has the potential to enhance bilateral regional 
economic security cooperation between Russia and South Korea because economic 
synergy can be created by transportation links, by eliminating barriers, and promoting 
cross border interactions.
Chapter 5 analyzes how the Russian-South Korean industrial park project in the 
Nakhodka Free Economic Zone (FEZ) has developed in the last 15 years, examining 
specifically why it has been so slow to develop. The chapter demonstrates that the 
troubled economy of the Russian Far East and the Russian FEZ’s overly politicized 
structure are the chief factors that delayed the project. This chapter argues that the 
Nakhodka FEZ cooperation has the potential to promote bilateral Russian-South Korean 
economic security and facilitate regional economic security in Northeast Asia, 
particularly since the Nakhodka area has recently become more o f an energy and 
transportation hub in the Northeast Asian regional economic integration process.
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Nevertheless, the reality is that the project has stalled due to the scepticism and 
obstacles.
The aim o f Chapter 6 is to examine progress and problems o f fishery 
cooperation between Moscow and Seoul as an aspect o f regional economic food 
security. The chapter examines the importance o f Russian Far East fishery to South 
Korea, focusing primarily on the pollack quota dispute, and cuttlefish and saury fishing 
zone disputes. It examines the fundamental causes of illegal fishery in the Russian Far 
East and explains why illegal fishing is becoming a problem that hinders fishery 
cooperation between Russia and South Korea. The final section of the chapter assesses 
the implications o f fishery diplomacy for bilateral and regional economic security.
Chapter 7 reviews the development and obstacles to military security 
cooperation between Russia and South Korea, primarily focusing on the arms trade. It 
offers a unique perspective of the arms trade, departing from the traditional political and 
military security interpretation and seeing it instead from a non-traditional economic 
security approach. It begins with a general discussion o f the Russian arms trade in the 
post Soviet period, and then focuses on the two arms trade projects called “Brown Bear” 
projects. The chapter considers the implications o f the arms trade for bilateral Russian- 
South Korean relations and illustrates how the arms trade can enhance both the 
traditional and non-traditional national security of Russia and South Korea.
In Chapter 8, the North Korean factor in bilateral Russian-South Korean 
relations is considered from the multi-dimensional security perspective. To examine 
whether the North Korean issue is a threat to security cooperation threat or a security 
enhancing factor, this chapter pays particular attention to the evolution of Moscow’s 
approach toward Pyongyang under the three different Kremlin leaders, Russia’s stance 
on North Korea’s nuclear aspirations, and Moscow’s views about Korean reunification. 
The final section of the chapter highlights why the Pyongyang factor is a pivotal 
question in bilateral Moscow- Seoul security relations and concludes that North Korea’s 
ambition to build nuclear weapons hinders economic security cooperation between 
Moscow and Seoul from a traditional security perspective. Conversely, however, 
trilateral economic cooperation involving North Korea can strengthen the economic 
security o f all three states.
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The final chapter assesses the utility of the concept o f multi-dimensional 
security cooperation as a framework for studying bilateral relations and the prospects 
for Russian-South Korean bilateral relations.
In respect o f transliteration, I have used the British Standards Institute system, 
except for personal and place names which have an established usage in English, or 
where the sources I have cited use a different tranliteration system.
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Chapter 2. Comprehensive security
1. The concept of security
The term “security” is generally ambiguous in content and in format: is it a goal, 
an issue-area, a concept, a research programme, or a discipline? There is no single 
concept o f security; “national security”, “international security”, and “global security” 
refer to different sets of issues and have their origins in different historical and 
philosophical contexts.1 Accordingly, the field of security studies has been the subject 
o f considerable debate in recent years. Attempts to broaden and deepen the scope of the 
field beyond its traditional focus on states and military conflict have raised fundamental 
theoretical and practical issues. Critics who oppose broadening the concept of security 
to include new parameters, such as environmental problems and criminal and similar 
activities, have argued that doing so creates conceptual confusion, and that the term 
insecurity becomes a grab-all category into which just about every human ill, from war, 
to environmental degradation, to AIDS, becomes indiscriminately lumped together. 
Although they admit that these issues are o f critical importance, they “see no 
compelling analytic rationale for discussing them under the rubric o f security.” At the 
same time, even scholars who defend traditional security studies against those who wish 
to broaden the concept, increasingly recognize the need for closer links between non- 
traditional issues such as political economy and security studies. Stephen Walt, for 
example, highlights economics and security as an important area of new research for
-i
security scholarship after the Cold War.
Harris and Mack note that Northeast Asian states tend to conceptualize security 
more broadly than has traditionally been the case in the West. They argue that Western 
security analysts have too frequently ignored non-Western security theory and 
practices.4 Ramesh Thakur also believes that in the post-Cold War era, East Asian 
states frequently implement broad conceptions of security that have new economic and 
environmental dimensions in addition to the more traditional military and political
1 Helga Haftendom, “The Security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Discipline-Building in International 
Security,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 1, March 1991, p. 3.
2 Stuart Harris and Andrew Mack, “Security and Economics in East Asia,” in Stuart Harris and Andrew 
Mack, eds., Asia-Pacific Security: The Economics-Politics Nexus (Canberra: Allen & Unwin Australia 
Pty Ltd, 1997), p. 4.
3 Walt, 1991, p. 227, quoted in Michael Mastanduno, “Economics and Security in Statecraft and 
Scholarship,” International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4, Autumn 1998, p. 853.
4 Harris and Mack, p. 4.
42
concerns.5 According to Krause and Williams, the concept o f national security does not 
simply represent a reaction to objective conditions: “It is built on a series o f political 
and epistemological choices that define what is considered security.”6
The objective of this thesis is to broaden the concept of security, and apply it to 
the case o f bilateral relations between Moscow and Seoul. I argue that the concept of 
comprehensive security, and, more specifically, bilateral and regional economic security, 
might most appropriately describe the current bilateral relations between Russia and 
South Korea. However, whereas in previous studies on security, academics have 
concentrated primarily on the institutional approach, or the formal framework of the 
security structure, this thesis focuses on the security building processes between two 
nations. Moreover, instead of looking at the link between economic dependence and 
security threat, as previous security analysts who have treated them as separate issues 
have tended to do, this thesis seeks to approach the security concept as a mixture of the 
two factors. In this chapter I shall primarily focus on the following three aspects of 
security: nation states’ perceptions of security, the security building process, and 
potential security threats.
The chapter begins by defining comprehensive security and economic security 
and indicating their relevance to the thesis topic, concentrating on the regional 
economic aspects of comprehensive security. It then deals with comprehensive security 
and economic security at two levels: the Northeast Asian regional level and the level of 
bilateral Russian-South Korean relations. The final section o f the chapter highlights the 
specific features o f the comprehensive security cooperation between Moscow and Seoul 
which will be examined in detail in the following six chapters.
2. The relevance of Comprehensive Security
Although security has traditionally been viewed in military and political terms, 
the rise to prominence o f new global issues has led to a broadening o f the concept.7 As 
Buzan points out, “national security...cannot be properly comprehended without 
bringing in the actors and dynamics from the societal, economic and environmental
5 Ibid.
6 Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, “Broadening the Agenda o f  Security Studies: Politics and 
Methods,” Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 40, No. 2, October 1996, pp. 233-234.
7 Alan Dupont, The Environment and Security in Pacific Asia  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 
Adelphi Paper 319, Introduction part.
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o
sectors.” This means that traditional geo-strategic considerations no longer dominate 
the foreign policy agenda and arguments about ensuring security through economic 
arrangements are now gradually gaining strength.9 In short, the notion of security has 
acquired a more comprehensive, multi-dimensional character. To quote Buzan again,
The concept of security binds together the individual, regional and system 
levels and various sectors so closely that it demands to be treated in an 
integrative perspective. Some sense can be made o f individual, national and 
international security, and of military, political, societal, economic and 
environmental security as ideas in their own right. Yet a full understanding 
of each can only be gained if  it is related to the others. Attempts to treat 
security as if it was confined to any single level or any single sector invite 
serious distortions of understanding.10
In Northeast Asia, in particular, the military dimension is increasingly supplemented by 
issues o f economic and environmental security. Although the western media often 
argues that the North Korean nuclear crisis might cause military confrontation in this 
region, there has been no military conflict in the region since the Korean War in 1950.11 
The North Korean nuclear crisis cannot be considered without paying some attention to 
other aspects of security. It can be argued, for example, that one reason why North 
Korea has attempted to acquire nuclear capability is in order to resolve its domestic 
energy crisis and to receive economic assistance from the US. Comprehensive security, 
combining traditional political and military aspects, and non-traditional economic and 
environmental security, might be the most appropriate term to explain the current 
security cooperation between nation states in the Northeast Asian region. Other similar 
terms that have been used to describe comprehensive security are multidimensional
19security and total security. The concept o f multidimensional security should be
8 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), p. 363.
9 Kosuke Oyama, “Japanese Energy Security and Changing Global Energy Markets: An Analysis o f  
Northeast Asian Energy Cooperation and Japan’s Evolving Leadership Role in the Region,” prepared in 
conjunction with an energy study sponsored by The Center for International Political Economy and The 
Petroleum Energy Center and The James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, May 
2000, p. 3.
10 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear, p. 363.
11 J. Mohan Malik, “Conflict Patterns and Security Environment in the Asia Pacific Region— The Post- 
Cold War Era,” in Kevin Clements, ed., Peace and Security in the A sia  Pacific Region (Tokyo: United 
Nations University Press, 1993), p. 51.
12 Desmond Ball, Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific Region (With Some Implications fo r  Regional 
Security Cooperation), Working Paper No. 270, Canberra, April 1993, pp. 16-17.
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distinguished from that o f multilateral security, which simply means security 
cooperation among more than two countries.
The concept of comprehensive security was first officially introduced as the 
major instrument o f national security planning by the Japanese government in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, and was also elaborated by ASEAN. “In contrast to the strong 
military orientation of the Western-derived concept of traditional security, 
comprehensive security stresses non-military means of achieving and maintaining 
security.” 13 As Alan Dupont notes, the concept of comprehensive security particularly 
emphasizes the economic aspects of national security in addition to traditional political 
and strategic dimensions.14
According to the Japan Defence Agency, the promotion of diplomacy for 
peaceful purposes and measures to ensure energy and food supplies are indispensable to 
the existence of any country. Therefore, in order to achieve national security, it is 
necessary to incorporate every measure, both military and non-military, in a 
comprehensive and coordinated way.15 The Japanese approach towards comprehensive 
security highlights that good relations with neighbouring states are central to a state’s 
comprehensive security policy. Moreover, for states like Japan which are highly 
dependent on the outside world for key resources, the security o f access to such 
resources has long been a central objective of state security planners. Accordingly, 
Japan seeks to maintain a favourable international environment. Yet, “since the peace 
constitution prevents the possibility of using military power as an instrument of 
statecraft, Japan can only pursue its security goals by political, diplomatic and economic 
means.” 16 In this sense, a state’s trade and foreign direct investment policies, which 
create regional interdependency, and official development aid policy (notably in Japan’s 
case), have a security dimension.
Several ASEAN states including Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, along with 
Australia, have also subscribed to a comprehensive view of security. In fact, the 
ASEAN approach goes further than the Japanese approach in emphasizing the non­
13 Pauline Kerr, Andrew Mack and Paul Evans, “The Evolving Security Discourse in the Asia-Pacific,” in 
Andrew Mack and John Ravenhill, eds., Pacific Cooperation: Building Economic and Security Regimes 
in the Asia-Pacific Region  (Canberra: Allen & Unwin, 1994), p. 252. Kerr, Mack and Evans refer to this 
traditional security approach as ‘common security.’
14 Alan Dupont, “N ew  Dimensions o f  Security,” in Denny Roy, ed., The New Security Agenda in the 
Asia-Pacific Region  (London: Macmillan Press, 1997), p. 35.
15 In order to give effect to the concept o f  comprehensive security, the Japanese government established a 
Council o f  Ministers Concerned with Comprehensive Security within the Cabinet in December 1980 for 
the purpose o f  holding consultations on economic, diplomatic and other measures requiring 
comprehensiveness and coherence from the standpoint o f  national security. See Defense o f  Japan 1985, 
(Japan Defense Agency, Tokyo, 1985), p. 58.
16 Kerr, Mack and Evans, p. 254.
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military aspects of security policy. For example, in contrast to the conventional concept 
that equates security with a nation’s capability to defend its territory against external 
threats, Indonesia’s experience since independence has shown that the term security 
indicates all aspects o f national life including ideology, politics, the economy, religion,
17society, culture, and the military.
The ASEAN concept of comprehensive security operates at three levels: intra­
state, intra-ASEAN, and between ASEAN and the rest of the region. The strong 
domestic focus in ASEAN’s comprehensive security thinking is not surprising. Both 
Malaysia and Indonesia, for example, are ethnically and culturally divided societies and 
each has endured years of civil strife. For them, a “comprehensive security policy at the
1 finational level promotes national resilience, nation building and political stability.”
The goal is to secure the state against dissident sectors of civil society. While the 
military plays a role in this process, political, social, and economic policy is far more 
important. However, the intra-ASEAN and regional levels o f ASEAN’s comprehensive 
security approach are more relevant to my thesis than the domestic level.
Comprehensive security plays an important role in enhancing intra-ASEAN security.
The non-military approach is particularly important to ASEAN because there are 
unresolved conflicts between ASEAN states, which national defence planners must take 
into account. Kerr, Mack and Evans argue that many o f these issues are so sensitive 
that it would be unthinkable to place them on the agenda o f any military security 
dialogue. Therefore, whereas “NATO defence planners could engage their adversaries 
in frank debate about fundamental security concerns, in ASEAN this is almost 
impossible— and is certainly avoided.” 19 They argue that “the need to avoid discussion 
of sensitive military issues suggest another reason why ASEAN’s comprehensive 
security approach is so different from the military oriented approaches of the West.”20 
Comprehensive security minimizes the military dimension of security in intra-ASEAN 
relations, while putting more emphasis on non-military factors such as political dialogue, 
economic cooperation, and interdependence. This has been a successful strategy over 
the past three decades. While many old tensions remain, they are now relatively
17 Ball, p. 17.
18 Kerr, Mack and Evans, p. 252.
19 For example, Kerr, Mack and Evans point out that prudent Singaporean defense planners have to take 
seriously the possibility that one day they could be involved in military hostilities with Malaysia— and 
vice versa. Their military contingency planning will reflect this fact. But these are issues, which, for 
obvious political as well as military reasons, security planners cannot openly discuss with each other. See 
Kerr, Mack and Evans, p. 252.
20 Kerr, Mack and Evans argue that non-sensitive military issues can certainly be discussed and military 
cooperation can take place to a certain level. What cannot be dealt with are such issues as the military 
contingency plans o f  the ASEAN states. See Ibid., p. 253.
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marginal in comparison with the webs o f cooperation and the bonds o f common interest 
which have been built up over the years. Moreover, as cooperation and interdependence 
within the sub-region increase, the costs of military conflict increase— creating a further 
incentive to avoid it.21 The case o f ASEAN also illustrates that economic growth in the 
region enhances regional security. According to Wanandi, “a link between national
development and security has some parallels with the argument that democracies do not
00go to war with each other.”
Comprehensive security tends to be complex, multidimensional, and 
transnational in form and impact. It stretches the boundaries of traditional thinking 
about security to include economic and environmental issues. According to Dupont, it 
ranges “from concerns about international financial flows and market access, to food 
scarcity, resource depletion, global warming, transnational crime, illegal migration, 
virulent new strains of diseases, and a host of other issues not previously associated
0*Xwith security and foreign policy.” These issues together form the core o f what Fred 
Halliday calls the new security agenda.24
3. Economic Security
It can be argued that economic security is the core o f the comprehensive security 
concept. However, economic security means different things to different people with 
the consequence that there are a number o f different approaches and different 
definitions. This makes the concept so broad as to be somewhat unmanageable. Buzan, 
for example, notes that economic security seems to refer to “some concrete condition, a 
state o f being that could actually be achieved, and which therefore represents a realistic 
and rational political goal.” Yet, “with the exception of the basic requisites for 
individual survival, this perception is false. The idea that economic security represents 
an absolute value with wide application is an illusion, and the pursuit o f it is the pursuit 
o f a chimera.”25 In fact, economic security is relative and it involves contradictions and 
trade-offs. “Almost nothing can be gained without something o f comparable
21 Ibid.
22 Jusuf Wanandi, “Security Issues in the ASEAN Region,” in Karl Jackson and M. Haidi Soesatro, eds., 
ASEAN Security and Economic Development (Berkeley: Institute o f  East Asian Studies, University o f  
Berkeley, 1984), quoted in Kerr, Mack and Evans, p. 253.
23 Dupont, pp. 35-36.
24 Fred Halliday, “International Relations: Is There a N ew  Agenda?”, Millennium Journal o f  International 
Studies, Vol. 20, N o. 1, Spring 1991.
25 Buzan, People, States and Fear, p. 235.
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importance being lost. Distinctions between threatening and normal behaviour are 
exceptionally difficult to draw... .”26
Traditional security analysts have tended to separate traditional political and 
military security from economic issues, even when they recognize that these two areas
97are inherently connected. According to Cossa and Khanna, it is practically impossible 
and may even be dangerously naive, to try to separate economic, political, and security 
issues in East Asia. Almost all political and security decisions have some economic 
implications, and economic considerations increasingly influence political and security
951decisions. This thesis attempts to combine the two concepts.
In short, economic security is a complex mixture o f economic and security
90concerns. It can, for example, refer to those aspects o f trade and investment which 
directly affect a country’s ability to defend itself: freedom to acquire weapons or related 
technology, reliability of supplies of military equipment, or threats o f adversaries 
acquiring a technological advantage in weapons. The main objective of economic 
security is to protect domestic supplies, technologies, and markets.30 Achieving it 
requires the maintenance of economic growth; open sea lines of communication; free 
and fair trade practices; and access to finance, markets, and natural resources.31
Buzan’s analysis of economic security at the state level, which includes the 
nation state’s ‘survival’ and ‘adaptability,’ is particularly useful in understanding the 
objectives o f economic security. Buzan emphasizes that the key concept for economic 
security is “survival.”32 “If the economic criteria for security are raised beyond that, 
then complex issues arise about the impact o f reduced vulnerability on economic 
efficiency, and thus in the longer term about the state’s ability to improve, or even hold, 
its position in the international system.” He argues that the national equivalent of 
basic human needs has two elements. The first is that like individuals, states require 
ready access to the means necessary for their survival. Unlike individuals, states may 
contain much or even all o f what they need to sustain themselves in terms of 
agricultural production sufficient to supply essential industry. If states like Japan and 
South Korea do not possess sufficient resources, then access to trade becomes an
26 Ibid.
27 M ing Wan, “Wealth and power,” H arvard International Review, Vol. 18, No. 2, Spring 1996, p. 20.
28 Ralph A. Cossa and Jane Khanna, “East Asia: Economic Interdependence and Regional Security,” 
International Affairs (Royal Institute o f  International Affairs), Vol. 73, No. 2, April, 1997, p. 223
29 Vincent Cable, “What is international economic security,” International Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 2, April 
1995, p. 308.
30 Ibid., p. 305.
31 Malik, p. 51.
32 Buzan, People, States and Fear, p. 241.
33 Ibid.
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essential part o f their basic economic security concerns. Like individuals, their survival 
depends on interaction with a wider environment. Under these circumstances, 
disruption o f supply threatens the power, welfare, and possibly the political stability of 
the state. Thus “the logical security strategies are to ensure continuity of supply by 
expanding the state to incorporate the necessary resources, or by cultivating stable 
trading systems, and to buffer vulnerabilities by stockpiling essential goods.”34 Buzan 
also emphasizes the importance o f states’ adaptability to the international system at the 
regional level and cooperation between states. He contends that the internal physical 
construction of states is highly variable and continuously changing. Therefore, “the 
survival o f a state depends on adapting towards the most advanced and successful 
practices elsewhere in the international system. Failure to adapt, or even relative 
slowness at doing so, means a steady loss of power, and a steady rise in vulnerability for 
those that have been more successful.”35
Most conventional treatments o f economic security have concentrated on the 
degree to which national security is threatened by dependence on external sources of 
technology, raw materials, food and fuel.36 In my opinion, however, most security 
analysts have approached the problem from the standpoint of relations which have 
already been established between countries and have interpreted disruptions to existing 
supplies as threats to economic security. I argue that economic security means more 
than simply protecting the existing domestic economy from disruption of supplies. I 
intend to stretch the definition of economic security to the processes o f discovering new 
economic opportunities through establishing a new transportation network infrastructure, 
diversifying energy resources, expanding fishery zones, and importing advanced 
military and space technology. Perhaps these issues are not necessarily immediate 
threats to states, but they are clearly important economic security concerns in the long 
term.
Economic security is an important concept because governments do not treat 
national economies only as a means of enriching their citizens. Hawtrey points out that 
“the major concern o f the state is prestige. The means to prestige is power. Power is
34 According to Buzan, for stockpiling arguments, see Richard H. Ullman, “Redefining Security,” 
International Security, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1983, pp. 139-150; and see also Buzan, People, States and Fear, p. 
242.
35 Buzan, People, States and Fear, p. 242.
36 Cable, p. 313.
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*xneconomic productivity capable of being applied as a force.” Buzan also argues that 
economic factors play a role in determining the power o f states and their domestic 
stability and cohesion. Moreover, “they can affect the prospects for regional integration, 
which can influence how a given security complex evolves.”38 Huntington goes further 
and suggests that “economic activity... is perhaps the most important source o f power 
and, in a world in which military conflict between major states is unlikely, economic 
power will be increasingly important in determining the primacy or subordination of
IQstates.” For this reason, gaining access to vital raw materials has long been an 
important item of the agenda for national security planners.
The interdependent nature o f the global economy is closely related to the 
emergence o f the concept of economic security. According to Buzan, “the international 
economy as a whole is .. .powerfully tied together by patterns o f trade, production, 
finance, communication and transportation.” It is part of the complex pattern o f 
interaction among states. Buzan adds that economic activity becomes an important 
factor because it forces states to interact with each other, and thus provides a major 
behavioural force within the international relations.40
In this sense, perhaps the key to economic security relations between nation 
states is the market network, which, in Buzan’s words, “comprises a complicated 
interlacing of transportation, communication, credit, and contracts.”41 When it 
functions smoothly, some actors will do well, and others badly, depending on what 
leverage their assets afford them, and how efficiently they play their hand. But if  the 
market network itself is disrupted, then nearly all the actors in the system end up worse 
off.42
4. Comprehensive security and regional economic security in Northeast Asia
Regional economic security was a relatively unknown concept to Northeast 
Asian countries, including South Korea, until quite recently. In fact, in the past the 
Northeast Asian region has tended to be resistant to collective security schemes. To 
quote Robert Manning,
37 Charles Kindleberger, Power and money (London: Macmillan, 1970), quoted in Vincent Cable, “What 
is international economic security,” International Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 2, April 1995, p. 308.
38 Buzan, People, States and Fear, p. 202.
39 Samuel Huntington, “Why international primacy matters,” International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4, 
Spring 1993, p. 72.
4 Buzan, People, States, and Fear, pp. 230-232.
41 Ibid., p. 249.
42 Ibid.
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Unlike in Europe, in this region, the United States and the Soviet Union, 
while dominant factors, were part of a larger equation that included China,
Japan, and Korea. Nor has there ever been a single common threat. Instead, 
there were myriad (largely separate) security concerns varying from country 
to country and sub-region to sub-region.43
According to Buzan, although the Northeast Asian states grew to be considerable 
economic powers during the Cold War, their international relations were constrained 
and shaped by the Cold War. Even though these constraints have almost disappeared, 
the Northeast Asian states have no real experience o f relating to each other on terms 
defined largely by the local dynamics of regional relations and it remains to be seen 
what the regional patterns o f security relations will be. Buzan thinks that traditional 
regional rivalries will probably reassert themselves among the great powers of the Asia- 
Pacific,44 and, in contrast to the situation in Europe, “the resulting conflicts will be 
unmediated by traditions and institutions of cooperation.”45 I would argue that the 
latent suspicions are strongly associated with nationalism and historical experiences. 
Past conflicts o f interests and balance o f power relations between neighbouring states 
clearly hinder the idea o f a regional security structure in Northeast Asia. Buzan points 
out that it is quite rare to find two adjacent states within the region that do not have 
either serious unresolved issues between them or active processes of securitization. 
There is “no shared cultural legacy, few traditions o f international cooperation, and a 
worrying number of strong nationalisms.”46 These factors are reflected in the current 
regional security concerns in the region: disputes over territory and control of sea-based 
resources.47
As Young-sun Song notes, there is no experience of multilateralism except that 
imposed through Chinese or Japanese hegemony and there has been relatively little 
multilateral security cooperation among Northeast Asian countries until quite recently.
43 Robert Manning, “The Asian Paradox: Toward a N ew  Architecture,” W orld Policy Journal, Vol. 10, 
No. 3, 1993, p. 56.
44 Barry Buzan, “The Post-Cold War Asia-Pacific Security Order: Conflict or Cooperation?” in Andrew 
Mack and John Ravenhill, eds., Pacific Cooperation: Building Economic and Security Regimes in the 
Asia-Pacific Region  (Canberra: Allen & Unwin, 1994), p. 145.
45 Andrew Mack and John Ravenhill, “Economic and Security Regimes in the Asia-Pacific Region,” in 
Andrew Mack and John Ravenhill, eds., Pacific Cooperation: Building Economic and Security Regimes 
in the Asia-Pacific Region  (Canberra: Allen & Unwin, 1994), p. 13.
46 Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers: The Structure o f  International Security, p. 174.
47 Jonathan D. Pollack, “The Evolving Security Environment in Asia: Its Impact on Russia,” Stockholm  
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Conference presentation paper for “Russia and Asia- 
Pacific Security,” International House o f  Japan, Tokyo, Japan, 19-21 February 1999.
In fact, Northeast Asian states have generally preferred to resolve their problems 
through bilateralism rather than multilateralism.”48
However, the importance o f regional economic security has been evident in 
Northeast Asia since the end of the Cold War. As we have seen, in the Asia Pacific 
region security tends to be defined in much broader and more comprehensive terms. 
Non-military security threats, including economic and environmental threats as well as 
challenges to national integrity and internal stability, are regarded as being at least as 
important as military threats. As a result, as Ball states, “security planning involves the 
coordination o f various aspects of national policy, including economic and diplomatic 
aspects as much as military capabilities and plans, into a more comprehensive or multi­
dimensional posture for protecting and enhancing national security.”49
The role of economic development as a major contributing factor to security has 
been a particular focus in this region. Economic development has been pursued by 
states in the region as a means o f reducing perceived threats to regime stability.50 The 
region’s economic success also contributes to ameliorating potential inter-state conflicts, 
and it has become a major unifying factor in the region, while reshaping the interests, 
outlook, and conceptions of security o f a new generation o f decision makers. Manning 
notes that
The new logic of geo-economics, and the imperatives flowing from the 
paramount importance attached to commercial and technological 
capabilities, is pitted against the traditional logic o f geopolitics: new 
requirements for partnership versus lingering suspicions and old ideas of 
nationhood.51
Almonte adds that “the success o f the regional economies creates a situation in which 
mutual security no longer depends on arms and alliances but on peaceful commerce and 
integration in the East Asian community.” In other words, the logic of geo-economics 
expands the definition of “comprehensive security,” beyond the military balance to
48 See Young-sun Song, “Prospects for U.S.-Japan Security Cooperation,” Asian Survey, Vol. 35, No. 12, 
December 1995, pp. 1096-1097, and Gerald Segal, “Keeping East A sia Pacific,” Korean Journal o f  
Defense Analysis, Vol. 5, No. 1, Summer 1993, pp. 23-24.
49 Ball, p. 16.
50 Stuart Harris, “Conclusion: The Theory and Practice o f  Regional Cooperation,” in Andrew Mack and 
John Ravenhill, eds., Pacific Cooperation: Building Economic and Security Regimes in the Asia-Pacific 
Region  (Canberra: Allen & Unwin, 1994), pp. 259-260.
51 Manning, p. 60.
52 Jose T. Almonte, “A strategic framework for policymakers in Asia,” Keynote address to the Defense 
Asia Forum 1997, Singapore, 15 January 1997, quoted in Cossa and Khanna, p. 224.
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include other issues such as economic development, the environment, and refugee 
flows.53
In more specific terms, as the final section o f this chapter will show, energy 
issues, control of sea-based resources, the establishment o f Free Economic Zones, and 
transnational transportation linking projects all provide the basis for comprehensive 
security cooperation between states in the Northeast Asian region. These regional 
economic projects also clearly minimize potential military confrontation in the region, 
while boosting each state’s national economic security. For example, as will be 
illustrated in chapter 7, trilateral economic cooperation among Russia, North Korea, and 
South Korea clearly has the potential to contribute to reducing the potential for a nuclear 
crisis in the region.
5. Russia’s approach to comprehensive security in Northeast Asia
Regional security is not a new preoccupation of Russia; it was also the concern 
o f the Soviet Union. As Duncan notes, “the principal aim of the foreign policy of the 
Soviet Union was to seek to guarantee the security o f the state.”54 The political and 
strategic importance o f Asian countries stemmed from their geographical position, near 
to the frontier o f the USSR.55 Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the weak 
status o f Russia and the lack of diplomatic initiatives in the Northeast Asian political 
environment have meant that that the only way that Russia can raise its profile in 
Northeast Asia is to be integrated into the dynamic Northeast Asian economy. Russia’s 
several energy projects, fishery cooperation—whether operating on a legal or illegal 
basis— and other transportation network building projects provide seemingly attractive 
incentives to Northeast Asian countries.
Although regional security in the Russian Far East region was a concern to the 
Soviet government, they perceived the problem in terms of military security. Since the 
collapse o f the Soviet Union, however, there have been few traditional security threats 
in the region except for the potential North Korean nuclear crisis. Nevertheless, Russia 
is faced with enormous non-traditional security threats in the region. Economic crisis 
has been perceived as a serious threat, for example, and so has the large influx of 
Chinese migrants into the Russian Far East. In other words, Russia’s current major
53 Manning, p. 60.
54 Peter J.S. Duncan, The Soviet Union and India (London: The Royal Institute o f  International Affairs, 
1988), p. 3.
55 Ibid.
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concern in the Far East is regional economic security and it will remain a concern for 
the foreseeable future. As Rozman, Watanabe, and Nosov note, without economic 
recovery and development, there can be no lasting security in Russia, and without the 
integration o f the Russian Far East and eastern Siberia into the regional economy of 
Northeast Asia, any recovery in Russia would be limited and unsustainable.56
Despite its vast natural resources and economic potential, the region has 
remained an economically and socially troubled part of Russia. This is primarily due to 
the fact that for many years Russia’s foreign, economic, and trade policies were oriented 
towards Europe. The Russian Far East was mostly considered a source of raw materials 
for industry located in the European part of Russia. During the Soviet period and up 
until the early 1990s, as Supian and Nosov note, the economic security of the region 
was mostly provided by government allocations aimed at strengthening the military 
potential o f the Far East. “The most populated parts of the huge territories o f the region 
remained special military zones: their economy was not integrated into the economic 
activity o f the region, and was subject to no economic laws whatsoever.”57 But as 
federal control began to weaken, there came a drastic reduction in the economic ties 
between the Far Eastern and European parts o f Russia. Russia as a whole, and Russia’s 
Far East in particular, had not been involved in the process o f integration into the Asia- 
Pacific region.
Russian leaders now realize that Russia’s integration into the Northeast Asian 
economy is essential for the future security of this region. They emphasize the fact that 
Russia has two-thirds of its territory in Asia and that the Russian Far East conducts 90 
percent o f its trade with China, Japan, and Korea. Despite the fact that the region is 
very rich in deposits of mineral resources, as Sato, Tian, and Koh note, the cost of 
development is much higher than in other regions, and Moscow alone is not capable of 
providing the Far East region with the necessary development funds. In other words, 
Russia’s proposed Far East development programme has been in serious danger due to 
insufficient financing. Moreover, the continuing outflow of population threatens the 
region’s future developmental potential. The population is expected to decrease by 8.9 
percent in 2010, compared to the 1996 figures. This situation appears even more 
serious when it is compared to the situation in neighbouring regions o f China, where 
economic development has been quite active. Such a contrast in development has
56 Rozman, Nosov, and Watanabe, p. 224.
57 Viktor B. Supian and Mikhail G. Nosov, “Reintegration o f  an Abandoned Fortress: Economic Security 
o f  the Russian Far East,” in Gilbert Rozman, Mikhail G. Nosov, and Koji Watanabe, eds., Russia and  
East Asia: the 21st Century Security Environment (London: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), p. 69.
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clearly generated an unfavourable environment for the economic security of Russia’s 
Far East.58
The key to development in Russia’s eastern regions is massive foreign 
investment in natural resources, which demands a particularly high level of trust and a 
secure institutional framework. Only the joint efforts of neighbouring Northeast Asian 
countries can facilitate the process o f restructuring the regional economy, and create the 
conditions for the involvement of the Far East in the dynamic economy of Northeast 
Asia. Specifically, the implementation of a number o f huge economic projects—  
including oil and natural gas pipeline projects, the Nakhodka Free Economic Zone 
project, the Trans-Siberian Railroad (TSR), and Trans-Korean Railroad (TKR) linking 
project—  is only possible with the active participation o f the Chinese, Japanese, and 
South Korean governments, as well as private sector investment. Multilateral 
cooperation is an essential instrument for lowering political tensions between the states 
in this region. In other words, as Supian and Nosov note, the creation of a solid and 
long-term base for economic cooperation will clearly help to solve political problems 
between Russia and other countries.59 The bilateral relations between Moscow and 
Seoul are best viewed in this regional context.
However, although traditional security concerns, which focused on protection 
against external military threats, have declined in importance and economic concerns 
have gradually begun to influence Russian security policy, the Russians are not ready 
yet to integrate fully into the Northeast Asian regional economic community. Indeed, 
there has been a growing concern about protecting Russian autonomy. This has resulted 
in a lack o f consensus regarding the direction in which Russia should be heading.60
It is fair to add that the foreign direct investment environment in the Russian Far 
East has been hampered not only by Russia’s ambivalence about economic security, but 
also by its patchy reform. As Sato, Tian, and Koh note, the Soviet belief in the 
importance of economic autarky still tends to prevail among some Russian policy 
makers. In other words, foreign economic relations are still sometimes perceived on the 
basis o f traditional security considerations rather than o f economic efficiency.61 Despite 
the urgent need for foreign direct investment, for example, the Russians have been
58 Tsuneaki Sato, Chun-Sheng Tian, and U-Dong Koh, “Homemade Risks”: The Economic Security o f  
Russia in East Asia,” in Gilbert Rozman, Mikhail G. Nosov, and Koji Watanabe, eds., Russia and East 
Asia: the 21s' Century Security Environment (London: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 110-111.
59 Supian and Nosov, p. 97.
60 Peggy Falkenheim Meyer, “Russia’s Post-Cold War Security Policy in Northeast Asia,” Pacific Affairs, 
Vol. 67, No. 4, Winter 1994-1995, p. 495.
61 Sato, Tian, and Koh, p. 120.
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worried about the increasing influence of foreign capital. The Russians fear that 
neighbouring Asian states will take advantage o f Russia’s weakness, by purchasing land 
and natural resources, gaining ownership of Russian companies, seizing Russian jobs, 
and manipulating terms o f trade. However, Russian protectionism undermines Russia’s 
economic security.62 Moreover, both Russians and foreigners admit that the rule of law 
does not operate in the region of the Russian Far East. Illegal activities by local 
criminal gangs and arbitrary and prohibitive tax policies clearly threaten the investment 
environment.
In short, the Russians have been slow to develop the Russian Far East even 
though they have publicly announced that they welcome Northeast Asian investment in 
the region. For example, the Northeast Asian energy specialist, Paik Keun Wook, 
points out that a new energy and natural resource nationalism is prevalent in the Russian 
Far East and East Siberia. This delays the implementation o f oil and gas pipeline 
projects in the Asia Pacific region. Although the Russians realize that joint energy 
projects could be the pivotal instruments for developing the Russian Far East in the long 
term, they are cautious about implementing these projects. In effect, they appear to be 
confused about whether to put their traditional security concerns first or whether to 
make the new non-traditional security concerns a priority.
6. Comprehensive security and economic security in bilateral Russian-South 
Korean relations
The economic interdependence of the Northeast Asian region as a whole has 
increased and become more important as the economies o f the individual states have 
grown and their demand for new sources of energy and food increases each year.64 The 
bilateral relations between Moscow and Seoul form part o f this interdependent regional 
system. The main goal of their bilateral relations is to enhance their common regional 
economic security interests. Since “security dynamics are inherently relational,” as 
Buzan and Waever point out, they need to establish patterns of partial or temporary 
cooperation.65
62 Rozman, Nosov, and Watanabe, p. 224.
63 Interview with Keun-Wook Paik, Associate Fellow, Sustainable Development, The Royal Institute o f  
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64 Gerald Segal, “How insecure is Pacific Asia?,” International Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 2, 1997, pp. 241-242.
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In fact, however, economic security cooperation between Moscow and Seoul has 
already faced a number o f obstacles. Buzan identifies economic security cooperation 
threats as emanating from either “external forces attacking the interaction flows o f trade, 
investment and finance” or “internal instabilities arising from the operation o f the 
market itself.”66 As each of the following chapters demonstrates, the main threats to 
Russian-South Korean economic security cooperation stem from the following three 
factors: Russian domestic problems, particularly the problems that have arisen in 
relation to the transition in the Russian Far East; a lack of political will on the part of 
South Korea; and external factors such as the North Korean problem and the policy of 
the United States.
As we have seen, Russia’s security perceptions of the Korean peninsula have 
been evolving, but the change has not sufficed to overcome the obstacles to economic 
cooperation with South Korea. From the South Korean perspective, the main obstacles 
to developing regional economic security cooperation with Russia stem from South 
Korea’s general perception o f Russia as an insignificant regional actor and its 
inexperience with the concept of regional economic security. As will be illustrated in 
the chapter on the North Korean factor, the major diplomatic incentive in establishing 
relations with the Soviet Union stemmed from traditional security concerns: that is, it 
was intended to check and isolate North Korea in Northeast Asia. In other words, while 
the primary Soviet concern was to improve economic relations with South Korea, 
particularly in the form of a substantial hard currency loan, South Korea put more 
emphasis on its political and strategic interests. However, after discovering that Russia 
no longer had any substantial leverage over North Korea, South Korean political leaders 
no longer perceived Russia as an important foreign policy priority. As a result, South 
Korea’s overall interests in Russia diminished significantly.
Therefore, although the South Koreans perceive that Russia, with its massive 
natural resources, particularly oil and natural gas, in the Russian Far East, could be an 
important long-term economic partner, they have been reluctant to take any risks in 
return for immediate short-term benefits. For example, compared to the active Japanese 
and Chinese lobbying for access to Russia’s oil and natural gas pipeline routes in the 
last few years, both the South Korean government and private sectors have pursued an 
extremely passive policy. In short, the inexperience of both Russia and South Korea in 
regional comprehensive security cooperation has been a major obstacle to further 
economic cooperation.
66 Buzan, People, States and Fear, p. 250.
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There is a further potential threat to regional security in Northeast Asia and that 
is North Korea’s pursuit o f nuclear weapons. It is interesting to note, however, that 
rather than threatening regional economic security cooperation, the North Korean factor 
may enhance it. As the chapter on North Korea will demonstrate, even though in the 
short term the North Korean nuclear crisis has acted as an obstacle by delaying 
economic cooperation between Moscow and Seoul — including the TSR and TKR 
linking project, and the natural gas pipeline project — in the long term, once the nuclear 
issue has been settled, North Korean cooperation could turn out to be a crucial factor in 
eventually facilitating economic security cooperation between Moscow and Seoul. 
Given the fact that in recent years the interests of Russia and South Korea have not 
necessarily been in conflict over North Korea, and that economic cooperation between 
Russia and North Korea has already taken place with regard to the borders between the 
two countries, North Korea’s role in the regional economic security building process is 
much more significant than it currently appears to be.
7. The specific features of comprehensive security and regional economic security 
cooperation between Moscow and Seoul
7.1. Energy Security
Energy security is an important element of bilateral and regional economic 
security today. It is a strategic factor in ensuring the economic development and 
stability o f states. Because of the “increasing importance o f traded energy, increasing 
dependence on Middle East Oil, no sign o f slackening demand rise, continuing volatility 
o f oil prices, and environmental and sustainability concerns,” energy issues are an 
increasingly important part o f the security agenda in international relations in general.
Energy security is defined as the securing o f reliable and affordable energy 
supplies that are sufficient to support social, economic, and military needs, while at the 
same time being environmentally sustainable. More specifically, “in a state which
67 Philip Andrews-Speed, “Energy Security in East Asia: A European V iew ,” presentation material at the 
Symposium on Pacific Energy Cooperation 2003, Tokyo, 12-13 February, 2003.
68 Hyun Jae Doh, Perspectives and Measures fo r  Energy Security in the 21st Century, Abstract, published 
for Korea Energy Economics Institute, December 2003. Willrich defines energy security as, first, the 
guarantee o f  sufficient energy supplies to permit a country to function during a war; and second, and 
more broadly, the assurance o f  adequate energy supplies to maintain the national economy at normal 
levels. He argues that the first definition is too restrictive, and the second too permissive and expansive. 
Therefore, he proposes that for most purposes, the definition o f  energy security as the securing o f  reliable 
and affordable energy supplies that are sufficient to support social, econom ic, and military needs, while at 
the same time being environmentally sustainable is the most plausible approach. See Mason Willrich, 
Energy and W orld Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1975), p. 66.
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enjoys energy security consumers and their governments are able to believe that there 
are adequate reserves from sources at home or abroad, and production and distribution 
facilities available to meet their requirements in the near future, at costs that do not put 
them at a competitive disadvantage or otherwise threaten their well-being.”69 In other 
words, energy security requires the ability to obtain reliable supplies o f essential natural
70resources at affordable prices. Energy insecurity arises when the welfare o f citizens or 
the ability of governments to pursue their other normal objectives are threatened, either 
as a result o f physical failure of supplies or as a result o f sudden and major price
71 •changes. In this sense, it can be argued that energy security constitutes an important 
part o f economic security because it is the core prerequisite for sustainable
77development.
One way to estimate the level o f energy security is to measure the extent to 
which a country is dependent on particular types of energy and whether these can be 
obtained within its territory or must be imported. In the latter case, a second question 
emerges relating to the level of the dependency, the diversity of foreign sources, the 
relative vulnerability o f the source areas to political turmoil, and hostile control.
Similar questions apply to transportation routes and carrying systems. In the end, the 
energy security o f a state is evaluated by its level o f self sufficiency and its ability to 
adapt to temporary and prolonged supply interruptions without serious economic and 
military consequences.73
A useful distinction can be made between energy importing and exporting 
countries. An importing country is primarily concerned with the security of its energy 
supplies. However, each importing country tends to view foreign energy supplies as 
more or less vulnerable to interruption.74 Although interruptions, disruptions, and 
manipulations of existing supply arrangements can be caused by accidents and natural 
disasters, they are more vulnerable to potential political instability, economic coercion,
69 Robert Belgrave, Charles K. Ebinger and Hideaki Okino ed., Energy Security to 2000  (Boulder: 
W estview Press, 1987) p. 2.
70 Robert J. Lieber, “Energy, Economics and Security in Alliance Perspective,” International Security,
Vol. 4, No. 4, Spring 1980, p. 141, and for a more detailed discussion and definition, see also David 
Deese, “Energy: Economics, Politics, and Security,” International Security, Vol. 4 No. 3, Winter 1979/80, 
pp. 140-142.
Belgrave, Ebinger and Okino, p. 2.
72 Doh.
73 Paul B. Stares, “Introduction and Overview,” in Paul B. Stares, ed., Rethinking Energy Security in East 
Asia  (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2000), p. 22.
74 Willrich, p. 66
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military conflict, and terrorist acts.75 These concerns apply not only to the source of 
energy supplies but also to the routes and means by which they are transported.76
Energy exporters, on the other hand, are preoccupied with access to markets and 
security of demand. An exporting country may view energy security as national 
sovereignty over its energy resources, or it may view it more broadly as sovereignty 
over resources plus guaranteed access to foreign markets.77 Moreover, an exporter may 
view security as sovereignty plus market access plus financial security for the assets it 
receives in exchange for energy raw materials. An exporter may adopt, as a result o f 
sovereignty over its basic raw materials, a concept o f energy security that includes 
guaranteed access to foreign markets. In short, demand security may be as important to 
energy exporters as supply security is to importers. As Willrich notes,
This raises possibilities for mutually beneficial negotiations between 
exporters and importers, based on overlapping areas o f interest in stability 
and equilibrium. In addition to sovereignty and market access, an exporter 
may extend the concept o f energy security to cover financial security for the 
investments made with its export earnings. This scenario may seem 
exaggerated but energy resources below ground are a precious national 
heritage. Once extracted, that heritage can easily be lost by an improvident
7ftgovernment or eroded by inflation.
In Northeast Asia, new security concerns are emerging with regard to energy use, 
energy security, and the sustainability o f economic growth. At present, China, Japan, 
and the two Koreas are desperately searching for economically rational, diversified, and 
reliable supplies to support their energy needs. Russian oil and natural gas in the Far 
East region represents a potential new source o f supply to the Northeast Asian states, 
providing them with the opportunity to diversify their energy supplies both 
geographically and in terms of energy mix, thereby promoting competition and
70protecting the environment. In particular, Russia’s natural gas could provide an
75 See both Daniel Yergin, “Energy Security in the 1990s,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 67, No. 1, 1988, pp.
111-132; and Stares, p. 22.
76 Stares, p. 22.
77 Willrich, p. 94.
78 Ibid., p. 95.
79 Vladimir I. Ivanov and Mitsuru Hamada, Energy Security and Sustainable Developm ent in Northeast 
Asia: Prospects fo r  U.S.-Japan Coordination , Article for Economic Research Institute for Northeast Asia, 
Niigata, Japan, p. 6, on http://gsti.miis.edu/CEAS-PUB/200013Ivanov-Hamada.pdf. accessed on 4 
December, 2004.
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alternative to coal and oil for power generation. As a fuel, it is cleaner than oil and coal, 
since it produces no sulphuric discharges and much less carbon dioxide.80 Thus the oil 
and natural gas pipeline projects on which Russia is currently engaged in Northeast Asia 
have great strategic importance for enhancing not only Russia’s economic security, but 
also that o f South Korea, and of Northeast Asia as a whole. Regional energy 
cooperation would facilitate a reconfiguration of political and economic ties, with 
Russia moving into a position of advantage.
From the Russian energy security perspective, the export of oil and natural gas 
resources to its Northeast Asian neighbours constitutes a potentially important engine 
for Russia’s economic development and foreign policy goals. Russian foreign policy 
goals in the energy sector include attracting foreign investment to help stabilize and 
develop Russian energy resources, increasing Russian investment in foreign exploration 
and development projects, and providing various services for Russia’s foreign energy 
sectors. Ivanov suggests that Russian energy diplomacy generally tends to envisage 
three broad areas o f activity: bilateral and multilateral relations with other countries, 
participation in international organizations, and selective cooperation with transnational
o 1
corporations. President Putin, in particular, views energy diplomacy as an important 
means to promote economic recovery, to participate in the world economic system, to 
maintain Russia’s geo-strategic influence and to improve the international
JOenvironment. From the Russian perspective, energy diplomacy represents a tool to 
restore Russia’s international status. But justifying the development o f vast sources of 
energy is difficult without linking feasibility assessments to large neighbouring markets 
and investment funds from external sources. In the past, the Russian gas sector has put 
great emphasis on its European markets and has been meticulous about maintaining 
Russia’s image as a reliable partner o f the West. Improving relations with Northeast 
Asian countries in energy resource development might be a realistic way to secure 
capital investment and credits from the interested Northeast Asian governments and 
private sectors, and from the international financial institutions in the future.
In particular, Russia’s export of energy could facilitate the investment of 
Japanese and South Korean capital and technology in Russia’s oil and gas sector.84 As
80 Ibid.
81 Vladimir I. Ivanov, The Energy Sector in Northeast Asia N ew Projects, D elivery Systems, and  
Prospects fo r  Co-operation  North Pacific Policy Papers 2 (Vancouver: Program on Canada-Asia Policy 
Studies, Institute o f  Asian Research, University o f  British Columbia, 2000), p. 32.
82 Feng, Ding and Li, p. 1.
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84 Am y Myers Jaffe and Robert A. Manning, “Russia, Energy and the West,” Survival, Vol. 43, No. 2, 
Summer 2001, p. 143.
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far as South Korea is concerned, access to Kovykta and Sakhalin oil and natural gas is 
crucial for enhancing its economic security, given that the demand for oil is increasing 
steeply, as is the dependence on overseas sources. The CIA lists South Korea as the 
world’s fourth largest oil importing country after the USA, Japan, and Germany.85 
South Korea has a vested interest in diversifying its energy supply sources, and its 
proximity to the Russian Far East would lead to a drop in the cost of transporting energy 
sources.
Nevertheless, a number o f problems and obstacles still hinder energy security 
cooperation in the region. As Ivanov and Hamada note, the competing interests of 
energy producers, national regulations, and contending energy projects present 
numerous challenges to the concept of energy security. However, I argue that the 
main obstacle to energy security cooperation in the Northeast Asian region is the lack of 
confidence between Russia and the Northeast Asian states, including South Korea. For 
example, the proposed Kovykta gas pipeline project remains uncertain because the 
Russian government has been indecisive about what route to choose and whether 
Kovytka gas should be used for export or for domestic purposes. This makes it very 
difficult to bolster the confidence o f Northeast Asian investors in the Russian
87government.
In Northeast Asia, moreover, concerns have been raised about the potential 
vulnerability o f the extensive network o f oil and gas pipelines that are either under
QO
development or still in the planning stage. As Kent Calder notes, some pipelines are 
likely to pass through areas now considered to be politically volatile. Besides the risk 
o f short-term dislocations from terrorist attacks and other threats, the pipelines will also 
give the countries that host them the potentially vital leverage to disrupt or cut them
QQ
entirely in crisis and war. For example, the unresolved North Korean nuclear issue as 
well as territorial disputes among Northeast Asian countries, such as the dispute over 
the Kuril Island, may interrupt supplies. This makes creating an institutionalized
85 See The CIA World fact book, Global oil consumption and production, www.MarkTaw.com, on 
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multilateral energy cooperative structure necessary in Northeast Asia. Moreover, I 
argue that Russia’s refusal to build the Kovykta gas pipeline project and its delayed oil 
pipeline route decision between China and Japan can be viewed as contributing to 
energy insecurity in the Northeast Asian region.
7.2. Linking Transport Networks as an element o f regional economic security
As Buzan, Waever, and Wilde note, the low cost of transportation and 
communication provides an incentive for regional economic security cooperation.90 
Economic growth is enhanced by trade, and hence by physical access to large markets 
for products and raw materials.91 In this sense, by integrating markets and improving 
resource allocation through production and trade, the linkage o f railroads ensures 
regional economic security. In fact, “without an efficient inter-local transportation, 
production and sales remain restricted to the immediate vicinity o f the individual 
settlements and cannot surpass the subsistence level.”92
Border regions represent spatial discontinuities. In many cases, the border 
functions as a barrier to communication, thereby disrupting the smooth flow o f 
information in space. “Border regions have also induced a fragmentation o f market 
areas, along with a duplication o f services, resulting in diseconomies o f scale and scope 
that reduce the region’s development potential and efficiency.” Accordingly, 
transport links play a crucial role in eliminating barriers and promoting cross-border 
interaction. They also contribute to promoting states’ international expansion and 
prestige, as reflections or expressions o f broader national economic and political 
capabilities.94 Transport links are, as John Ross notes, pivotal to a nation’s market at 
both the national and global level. In the last several decades, globalization and 
intensified competition in world trade have not only emerged from the liberalization of 
trade policies in many countries, but also from major advances in communication,
90 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework fo r  Analysis (London: Boulder, 
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countries, but also from major advances in communication, transport, and storage 
technologies.95
According to Frybourg and Nijkamp, “railroad linkage is not just a sum of links 
and nodes, but an infrastructure configuration that is operated to provide services 
through one or several operators.”96 In other words, railroad functions include not just 
the purely physical shipment o f goods and persons but are a “value added process”
• 07where economic values are added. White points out that, “the construction of railways 
may be accompanied by a dramatic change of attitude and a reorientation of economic 
activity towards the market, because railway construction and operation stimulate 
competitive activities and mobility of factors o f production.”98
However, the positive impacts of transportation infrastructure do not derive from 
the creation o f physical facilities, but from the services generated by operators.99 For 
many shippers and passengers, perhaps the most important criteria for the choice of 
transport are travel costs and time. Travel costs, regardless o f distance, primarily 
depend on volume as a result o f scale advantages, while travel time depends on distance, 
speed, and frequency. There is a natural tendency to seek transport routes and methods 
that ensure large volumes at both the least cost and most speed.100
The nature o f railway linkage operations tends to make it an attractive area of 
foreign investment and such investment enables foreign investors to familiarize 
themselves with the opportunities for other investment in the country.101 In short,
“there are links between transport supply and the resultant openness o f a region.”102 
Most importantly, from the regional economic security perspective, as Frybourg and 
Nijkamp argue, “investment programs in a transport network should not be based on 
individual projects, but on the economic synergy created by network operators in an 
interconnected infrastructure.” In other words, railroad linking projects in general must 
be viewed as “a cohesive set of links between population concentrations or economic
95 Frybourg and Nijkamp, p. 17.
96 Ibid., p. 15.
97 Ibid., p. 20.
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activity centres (the so-called nodes), which serve to provide all services that are 
necessary for an efficient transport of persons, goods, or information between nodes.”103
In Europe, “rail links [played] a key role in transcending boundaries, solidifying 
the European market and fostering pan-European cooperation.”104 In a similar way, the 
project to link the TSR and the TKR could become a vehicle for the economic 
development of the areas through which it runs. The social and economic situation in 
the Russian Far East, in particular, very much depends on the level of technical and 
economic development o f the transportation network. The regional transport system is 
thus considered one of the basic elements of the economy of the region and can 
contribute to the development o f the Russian Far East economy.105 Moreover, both 
Russia and South Korea would gain from railroad linkage; South Korea by gaining 
access to Europe via the link and Russia by gaining access to the Northeast Asian 
economic community.
7.3. The Nakhodka Free Economic Zone and economic security
The creation of the Nakhodka Free Economic Zones (FEZ) is relevant to 
building up national and regional economic security in the region. The FEZ is an 
innovative and effective method o f attracting foreign investment and, as such, it is one 
of the most significant institutional innovations in international economic relations in 
the past few decades.106
The term ‘Free Economic Zone’ can be traced back to medieval ‘city-states’ and 
‘free merchant cities.’ More traditionally, FEZ refers to “a part o f sovereign national 
territory designated in which goods o f foreign origin can be stored, sold, or bought free 
of usual customs dues, such as duty-free marketplace or a warehouse situated within
107national borders but regarded as being outside the frontier for fiscal reasons.” In a 
modem sense, the term is used widely and often loosely, becoming confusing because
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i  A n
of its various statuses and objectives. Perhaps the most accurate definition of the 
term FEZ is a territory, where there are favourable conditions for the economic 
activities o f foreign investors, joint ventures, and for domestic enterprises and citizens.
‘Free economic zone’, ‘industrial free zone’, ‘special economic zone’ are used 
interchangeably to name various forms of economic zones such as ‘customs free zone’, 
‘banking zones’, ‘export processing zones’, ‘free trade zones’.109 The term ‘special 
economic zone’ is the most common and accurate definition because it literally explains 
that a certain territory enjoys a special status. Yet, in the Russian context, the term FEZ 
is the most commonly used. During the Soviet period, up until 1990, the term ‘zona 
svobodnogo predprinimatel ’stva ’ (zone of free entrepreneurship) was used.110
The main features o f FEZ include “tariff free imports, bilateral foreign trade 
regulations, tax incentives, minimal bureaucratic requirements, moderate trade union 
activities, favourable industrial relations and an infrastructure that meets the 
requirements o f internationally operating firms.” 111 Countries seek to achieve the 
following economic security objectives through a FEZ:
1) to support the export oriented industrialization o f a country;
2) to attract foreign capital;
3) to create employment;
4) to generate new sources o f foreign currency income;
5) to promote the transfer of technology and know-how;
6) to develop economic links with its own domestic economy such as the 
improvement o f the branch structure o f production and regional 
socioeconomic development;
1197) to train skilled technical and managerial personnel.
There are reportedly more than a thousand FEZ in the world today. The world’s 
first modem FEZ appeared in the Irish city of Shannon in 1959 and it was created to 
overcome the economic crisis following the closure of the international airport at
108 Ibid.
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113Shannon. Until recently, it has been regarded as one o f the most effective zones in 
terms o f both attracted investments and the number o f operational businesses and 
several developing countries copied the Shannon FEZ in the 1960s.114 The creation of 
the Chinese FEZ in the late 1970s highlights a significant new stage o f FEZ 
development. China was the first communist country to establish the FEZ and it was 
adopted as an instrument o f market transformation and the opening up o f the Chinese 
command economy. More importantly, the Chinese version was much more 
comprehensive than previous FEZ in that it was aimed not only at the development of 
manufacturing but also at agriculture, tourism, commerce, and real estate development. 
By the early 1990s, four special economic zones with an overall territory o f 526 square 
km were attracting about 20 percent o f the foreign instrument inflow to China, and they 
produced over 7 percent o f the country’s export value.115 Stimulated by the success of 
China’s economic reform with the aid o f special economic zones,'the Soviet leadership 
decided to create similar zones in the Soviet Union. Many different types of FEZ 
evolved in the Soviet Union and then Russia in the last few decades such as free trade 
zones, enterprise zones and technological parks, export producing zones, and special 
economic zones. Each type had its own logic o f development.116 The Nakhodka FEZ 
was planned to consist o f technological parks, free customs and export oriented 
industrial production zones, and joint ventures, as will be discussed in chapter 5 in 
detail.
As Sato, Tian, and Koh note, Russia needs both to stop the increasing structural 
distortion toward the production of petroleum and natural resources and to prevent the 
disintegration of its scientific- technological potential. The development of a South 
Korean industrial park in the Nakhodka Free Economic Zone could help it do this, by 
attracting foreign direct investment from the South Korean private sector, particularly in
117the manufacturing sector.
From the South Korean regional economic security perspective, the FEZ is a 
promising means to expand South Korea’s new export markets. This would decrease 
South Korea’s current dependence on Chinese markets in the region. Above all, the
113 “Free Economic Zones in Russia,” the Voice o f  Russia, 14 October, 1999 (Russian Economy and 
Business Online), on http://www.vor.ru/Russian Economv/excl next48 eng.html. accessed on 1 May, 
2004.
114 Between 1966 and 1970 Puerto Rico, India, Taiwan, the Philippines, the Dominican Republic, M exico, 
Panama, and Brazil established FEZ. See Faltin, pp. 111-142.
115 Sergei Manezhev, “Free Economic Zones in the Context o f  Economic Changes in Russia,” Europe- 
A sia Studies, Vol. 45, No. 4, 1993, p. 610.
116 Kuznetsov, pp. 48-49.
117 Sato, Tian, and Koh, p. 120.
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successful operation o f the Nakhodka FEZ would create more than 30,000 new jobs for 
Russians and South Koreans in the region, and could even attract North Korean labour.
The Nakhodka FEZ project is also very important for regional development and 
international cooperation in Northeast Asia. It would encourage the three factors ~  
foreign investment, cross-border movement, and social trust -  that Gilbert Rozman
1 1 ftidentifies as being key to regional integration. South Korea’s industrial park project 
in the Nakhodka FEZ would link Russia with its neighbours while attracting many more 
Asians to work on the Russian side of the border. Russia’s abundant natural resources 
and land, Chinese and North Korean labour and South Korean and Japanese capital and 
technology are excellent ingredients for multilateral cooperative action.119
7.4. Fishery and regional economic security concerns
The relationship between fishery and security is relatively new, and it might be 
contested by traditional security scholars. In fact, fishery issues are becoming a part of 
the security agenda in international relations. There is a steadily growing tendency in 
international relations to recognize the key role that fisheries play in economic 
development, food security, poverty alleviation, human health, and the national security
190agenda in a wider sense.
The fishery security agenda includes fish stocks, the size of catch quotas, the 
identification of areas and species that can support continued fishing, and consideration
191of appropriate regional measures. In particular, illegal fishing is rising to the
forefront of national and regional security concerns. According to the FAO, illegal
fishing is defined as illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing (IUU fishing). Indeed,
IUU fishing and its impact on resource sustainability is a matter o f great international 
122concern.
In other words, fishing is a larger issue than purely fishing, and fishery 
diplomacy requires a regional approach. First, a basic characteristic o f all wild stock 
fisheries is that they are a common-property natural resource to be managed collectively.
118 Gilbert Rozman, “When Will Russia Really Enter Northeast Asia?” in W olfgang Danspeckgruber and 
Stephen Kotkin, eds., The Future o f  the Russian State: A Sourcebook , N ew  York, Columbia International 
Affairs Online, 2003.
119 Tetsu Sadotomo, “Cooperation for Peace and Development in Northeast Asia: Functionalist 
Approaches,” The International Journal o f  Peace Studies, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1994, on 
http://www.gmu.edu/academic/iips/vol 1 2/Sadotomo.htm. accessed on 15 May, 2004.
120 The State o f  W orld Fisheries and Aquaculture, Food and Agriculture Organization o f  the United 
Nations (FAO), Rome 2002.
121 Johnston and Valencia, p. 147-148.
122 D. Doulman, FAO Fisheries Department, in The State o f  W orld Fisheries and Aquaculture, FAO,
Rome 2002.
68
Many fish stocks cannot be managed by a single state. Like other common-property 
resources such as water and air, they can also be used without cost by economic 
enterprises. Many ocean resources and activities such as fish, fishing, pollutants, 
environmental protection, sea lanes and shipping are both transnational and 
transboundary in character. Moreover, there are many areas that can be claimed by two 
or more countries, such as the high seas.
Second, it is extremely difficult to solve fishery disputes simply on the basis of 
bilateral negotiations. In the case o f Northeast Asia, there is an interplay among the 
various bilateral fishery relations in the Northern Pacific. For example, Russian- 
Japanese relations have implications for Russian-Korean and Japan-Korean fishery 
relations. Any bilateral arrangement may affect other relations and interests because 
they share the same area and use the same pool of marine living resources.123
Fishery is a also a regional economic security concern in Northeast Asia because 
conflict more than cooperation has often been the characteristic of fishery diplomacy in 
the region. For example, as fishery diplomacy between Russia and South Korea,
Russia and Japan, and Japan and South Korea has illustrated, the issue in dispute has 
often been the ownership of a stock or fishing area. In short, “a fishery dispute is a 
conflict o f interest, and conceptions o f rights and prestige fuel the controversy.” 124 
Moreover, the lack o f open conflict does not necessarily mean that states in the area are, 
or will remain, totally satisfied with the compromises that sustain the stability o f the 
fishery regime. Nor does the status quo suggest that states do not perceive gains in 
fishery policy and management that could be obtained at acceptable costs.125
Throughout the Asia-Pacific region, economic security concerns are broadening 
to include food scarcity and access issues, most notably with regard to fishery resources. 
For an estimated one billion Asians, fish is the main source o f protein and fishing 
supports more people in Asia than in any other region o f the world. Over half the 
world’s fish catch is taken in Asian waters, and five o f the top ten fishing nations are in 
Pacific Asia. For most states in the region, therefore, the relationship between food 
security, ecological damage, and conflict is most evident at sea.
During the 1990s, illegal fishing, territorial or Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 
encroachments, and maritime incidents in Northeast Asia became increasingly common.
123 Zou Keyuan, “Sino-Japanese joint fishery management in the East China Sea,” Marine Policy, Vol. 27, 
No. 2, March 2003, pp. 125-142.
124 Arild Underdal, The Politics o f  International Fisheries Management: The Case o f  the Northeast 
Atlantic (Universitetsforlaget: Oslo, 1980), pp. 41-42.
125 Johnston and Valencia, p. 152.
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The risk o f significant political and military confrontation over competition for 
diminishing fish and other marine resources emerged as a genuine security issue for 
China, Japan, Russia, and the two Koreas. Each of these countries relies heavily on 
other countries for the supply of food, natural resources, energy, and many other 
materials indispensable to national existence. If interruptions in fish supply caused by 
reducing the size of the fish catch quota result in fishing zone disputes, this could
19 Aseverely disrupt their national economies. To ensure their security o f supply, each 
country has established a requirement to secure the safety o f maritime traffic through 
surveillance and escort operations to an extent o f 1,000 nautical miles.127
However, this region has shown signs of environmental degradation caused by 
coastal pollution, overfishing, and the unsustainable exploitation of other forms of 
living marine resources. As Dupont asserts, “food is destined to have greater
190strategic weight and import in an era of environmental scarcity.” The problem is that 
ensuring the continued supply of fish involves increasing the protection o f fish stocks 
and other marine resources. The depletion o f fish species is a major concern. Fish 
stocks in the Yellow Sea, and the South and East China Seas, for example, fell 
significantly during the 1990s.130 As traditional fishing grounds are exhausted, 
competition for remaining stocks intensifies. In the later 1990s, countries which once 
welcomed foreign fishing fleets restricted their access and quotas, while fishing nations 
became much more protective of their own resources. For example, the fishing quotas 
o f countries such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, which rely heavily on fish as a 
dietary staple, were cut significantly by a new international fishery agreement. 
Consequently, their trawlers have been forced to travel to the South Pacific to make up 
the shortfall.131
As fishing fleets grow and venture further into the Pacific, the area o f ocean 
open to international fishing is shrinking. A large percentage of the marine resources of 
the Western Pacific are either claimed or contested. Consequently, “the frequency and
126 Cable, p. 313.
127 Desmond Ball, “Arms and Affluence: military acquisition in the Asia Pacific Region,” International 
Security, Vol. 18, No. 3, Winter 1993-1994, pp. 90-91.
128 Dupont, The Environment and Security in Pacific Asia, p. 50.
129 Ibid., pp. 56-57.
130 Ibid.
131 For example, Japan, which relies heavily on fish as a dietary staple, was allowed to catch 1.2m tons’ 
worth in the 200-m ile US FEZ in 1981; by 1988, quotas had been cut virtually to zero. South Korea and 
Taiwan have suffered similar reductions, and their trawlers have been forced well in to the South Pacific 
to make up the shortfall. See Dupont, The Environment and Security in Pacific Asia, p. 51.
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seriousness o f incidents at sea have steadily increased as foreign trawlers have illegally
encroached into other countries’ EEZs and territorial waters. Gun battles have broken
out between the navies of regional states intent on defending the activities o f national
1fishing fleets or preventing perceived territorial violations.” Russia, China, Japan, 
and South Korea are highly concerned about the increasing number o f illegal activities 
in the North Asia Pacific, such as piracy, smuggling, and unlicensed fishing. Indeed, 
“this concern has generated new requirements for maritime surveillance capabilities and
1 Hmaritime constabulary operations.”
The Russian Far Eastern fishing zone and Okhotsk sea area are o f major 
importance to South Korea. Marine products from the Russian fishery zone, 
particularly pollack, saury and cuttlefish, comprise an important national dietary 
supplement for South Korea and ensuring future supplies is an important aspect of 
South Korea’s economic security.
7.5. Arms trade and economic security
Although the arms trade is usually considered as simply a military issue, Chapter 
7 will show that it is related to the maintenance o f national economic security in the 
case of Russian-South Korean bilateral relations. As Desmond Ball explains, recent 
trends in military acquisition in the region demonstrate that “some of the most 
significant factors are entirely non-military, such as the availability o f economic 
resources, or the perceptions of prestige attendant upon high-technology aerospace 
programs.”134
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the arms export trade was perceived 
as the means not only to enable financially troubled Russian military-industrial 
complexes to survive, but also to facilitate the revival of the entire national economy. 
Many Russian specialists had been concerned about the impact of the collapse of the 
defence industry sector on Russian politics, the economy, and society. The impact o f 
the expected loss of jobs would be especially severe in Siberia and the Russian Far East 
where defence enterprises were often the sole industry. Defence ministry officials were 
also concerned that the closing of plants and design bureaux would affect the research 
and development of new technologies, which would exacerbate the decline o f the
132 Ibid.
133 Ball, pp. 90-91.
134 Ball, pp. 16-17.
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Russian military. Few of Russia’s specialized production facilities were amenable to 
conversion to civilian use, and restructuring those that were would require enormous 
funds.136 Military and industry specialists emphasized that the only way to avert this 
possible disaster would be by means of a systematic effort to rebuild the volume of 
Russian arms exports on a commercial basis. Therefore, the Russian government 
established a central trade organization to handle and promote the export o f military 
weapons, and it considered measures that would allow enterprises to market their 
military hardware abroad independently. For example, a draft directive allowed 
Dementiev Moscow Aircraft Production Enterprises to market MiG-29s in 1992.137
Moreover, given the enormous state budget deficit, exports of military products 
could serve as an important source o f financing the structural reorganization o f the 
Russian economy. Russian weapons, which incorporate the latest scientific and 
technical advances, are one of the few Russian industrial products that are in high 
demand abroad and can earn hard currency. Akshintsev notes that “arms 
exports.. .serve as an important indicator o f the competitiveness o f the Russian defence
1 78industry’s products.”
Thus Russia’s arms exports not only generate hard currency revenues for various 
economic contingencies, but also help to slow down the painful process o f dismantling 
military-industrial complexes. But like Russia’s oil and gas exports, they are also 
important Russian revenue-generating export items in the current Russian economy.
The arms trade, along with oil and gas exports, has become a significant source of hard 
currency for Russia, while sustaining employment and the continued existence in the 
military industrial infrastructure. In the case of Moscow and Seoul, the arms trade has 
been used primarily as part of the Russian debt repayment scheme to South Korea.
7.6. The North Korean factor
North Korea plays an important role in the multi-dimensional security 
cooperation between Moscow and Seoul. This thesis examines whether North Korea 
represents a threat to their security cooperation, or whether it is a security enhancing 
factor in Russian-South Korean relations and argues that although it is a traditional
135 Robert H. Donaldson and John A. Donaldson, “The Arms Trade in Russian-Chinese Relations:
Identity, Domestic Politics, and Geopolitical Positioning,” International Studies Quarterly, 2 003 ,47 , p. 
713.
136 S. Akshintsev, “Eksport rossiiskogo vooruzheniya: problem y ip u ti ikh resheniya  (Russian Arms 
Exports: Problems and Ways to Resolve Them),” Voprosy ekonomiki, 1994, No. 6, pp. 92-103.
137 “Arms export agency forming,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, Vol. 136, No. 22, 1 June, 1992, p. 
17; and “Russia may allow weapon market to export products independently,” Aviation Week & Space 
Technology, 15 June, 1992, Vol. 136, No. 24, p. 34.
138 Akshintsev, pp. 92-103.
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security threat, it also has the potential to boost regional economic security. North 
Korea’s refusal to fully enter the international framework of nuclear nonproliferation is 
an urgent traditional security concern for both Russia and South Korea. In this regard, 
the main security objectives o f the two sides with regard to the North Korean issue 
coincide; they are the prevention and deterrence o f a nuclear threat.
Nevertheless, as will be discussed in detail in chapter 8, the North Korean 
question involves much more than nuclear proliferation. On the one hand, North 
Korea’s own economic insecurity has contributed to its attempts to develop nuclear 
weapons, while on the other hand, economic security cooperation between Russia and 
South Korea is hampered by North Korea’s domestic economic crisis. North Korea’s 
willingness to participate in the railroad and natural gas pipeline projects would 
undoubtedly strengthen the national and regional economic security o f both Russia and 
South Korea. It would also improve North Korea’s economy, increase the stability of 
the Korean Peninsula and facilitate the reunification o f Korea.
As the past experience o f ASEAN’s relations with then non-members Cambodia 
and Vietnam suggests, a pariah state such as North Korea in Northeast Asia, has the 
potential to act either as a deterrent to, or as an incitement for greater bilateral and 
regional economic security in Northeast Asia. Further, the participation of North Korea 
could contribute to the development of a regional comprehensive security system. For 
example, in the case o f ASEAN, the Vietnam-Cambodia conflict made the development 
o f ASEAN very difficult. Despite many attempts on the part o f ASEAN to mediate, the 
conflict remained stalemated. Indeed, Vietnam viewed ASEAN as a party to the 
conflict. When the war ended, what preoccupied ASEAN most was securing the 
membership of Cambodia and Vietnam in the organization. This would realise its goal 
of creating 'one Southeast Asia' with both the tangible and symbolic benefits this 
entailed for a common identity, market and security. Having Cambodia and Vietnam in 
the organization, it was thought, would allow ASEAN to help manage any problems 
which might eventually arise. The promise o f membership in a Northeast Asian 
regional economic security system could similarly be used as an incentive to bring some 
influence to bear on events in North Korea. In other words, North Korea could play the
1IQsame role in Northeast Asia as Cambodia and Vietnam did in relation to ASEAN.
The chapters that follow offer a detailed analysis o f the cooperation between 
Russia and South Korea in these areas.
139 See Conciliation Resources, http://www.c-r.org/accord/cani/accord5/peou.shtmn. accessed on 28 
December, 2005. I am grateful to Margot Light for drawing my attention to this site.
73
Chapter 3. Energy Security Cooperation
Introduction
Energy cooperation is one of the important aspects of Russian-South Korean 
relations. This chapter deals with the progress and obstacles o f Russian-South Korean 
energy cooperation. The chapter also examines whether these energy projects could 
contribute to building Russian-South Korean economic security on a bilateral and 
regional basis. Bilateral energy cooperation between the two countries is deeply rooted 
in Northeast Asia’s traditional and imperative energy demands and security issues. The 
Sakhalin and Kovykta Gas projects show both how seriously Russia and South Korea 
deal with their energy security issues, and the potential for energy trade between the two 
countries.
Russian-South Korean energy relations are complementary in the sense that 
several ongoing energy projects in the Russian Far East have the potential to enhance 
their bilateral economic security. These projects could help Russia become a regional 
player in the Northeast Asian community, while at the same time they could also help 
South Korea to solve its domestic energy shortage and to diversify its energy market. 
Moreover, energy cooperation extends beyond simple bilateral relations. Multilateral 
energy cooperation could contribute to building regional economic security, by 
promoting Northeast Asian regional economic integration. Accordingly, the chapter 
argues that energy diplomacy issues should be dealt with within a multi-cooperative 
framework which includes China, Japan and North Korea, as well as South Korea and 
Russia.
However, the development of energy projects has been extremely slow and there 
have been no substantial benefits or concrete outcomes. Further, some of the progress 
such as the LNG gas trade in Sakhalin has not met the energy requirements for South 
Korea or Northeast Asia. Most o f all, the Kovykta gas pipeline project is stalled at this 
stage. And other obstacles continue to hamper building bilateral and regional energy 
security in the region.
The chapter begins with a discussion o f the overall energy situation in Northeast 
Asia. It goes on to assess Russia’s energy export potential in the Russian Far East, 
focusing on the Kovykta and Sakhalin gas projects, and examining Russia’s possible 
role as an energy provider to Northeast Asian countries. And then it deals with the 
obstacles obstructing the energy cooperation between Russia and South Korea. The
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final section of the chapter assesses the implications o f energy cooperation for bilateral 
and regional economic security cooperation.
1. The energy situation in Northeast Asia
1.1. The demand for natural gas
Northeast Asia has been one of the fastest growing energy markets over the past 
30 years. As a result o f population and income growth, the demand for energy has risen 
rapidly in recent years in the region, and this trend will persist in the foreseeable future, 
with demand growing at a higher rate than in other parts o f the world. Accordingly, “the 
energy sector in the region continues to change rapidly in response to increasing 
demand, resource availability, environmental concerns, changing technology, the need 
for regulatory reform, and sector restructuring to attract investment capital to fund 
supply infrastructure.”1
Currently, most of Northeast Asian oil imports come from the Middle East and 
Asian dependence on Middle East imports is expected to increase in the future. Long 
term projections for China’s economic growth, the possible unification o f Korea, and 
the increase in energy consumption more generally, lead Northeast Asian countries to 
consider that diversification of their energy supplies is essential. The development of 
energy projects in Central Asia and the Russian Far East, therefore, provide Northeast 
Asian states with good options for increasing and securing their energy supplies.
The extensive environmental deterioration that will be caused by coal burning in 
China provides the incentive to look for nearer and more competitive sources o f natural 
gas in the Russian Far East. Regional demand for this efficient, plentiful, and clean- 
burning fuel is increasing the momentum to produce, trade, and utilize natural gas. 
Demand is increasing in the region for cross-border supplies via both pipelines and 
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) ships. For example, demand for natural gas has been 
rising by 9.3 percent per year since 1970. Northeast Asia is a net importer o f gas, and 
imports could increase sharply in the 2010-20 period.4 For example, Japan, South
1 APEC ENERGY DEMAND AND SUPPLY OUTLOOK 2002, Asia Pacific Energy Research Center,
2 Peter Ross, “Gas Pricing,” Workshop by Director, Wimbledon Energy for 11th Annual Seminar on Gas 
Pricing at Kuala Lumpur, 8-10, December 2003.
3 This has not only been the product o f  the rapid economic development o f  the region, but also due to a 
desire to diversify away from oil following the shocks in the 1970s and a growing appreciation o f  the 
economic and environmental benefits o f  natural gas. See Peter Cleary, “Development o f  East Siberian 
Gas for Export to China and Korea Markets,” Presentation by President, BP Gas Power & Renewables 
Korea for Sakhalin & North Asia Oil, Gas & Pipelines 2003, Seoul, Korea, 12-13 November, 2003.
4 APEC, p. 5.
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Korea, and Taiwan accounted for 68 percent o f global LNG imports in 2002.5 Many 
experts predict that the demand for gas will grow particularly strongly in China and 
Korea, increasing from 25bcm in 2003 to almost 50bcm by 2020 in Korea, and from 
30bcm in 2003 to more than 160bcm by 2020 in China.6 In Korea, moreover, natural 
gas and heat consumption is expected to increase almost 2.5 fold over the forecast 
period, while the consumption of oil, at present the main fuel used in Korea, is expected 
to decline from 47 percent in 1999 to 20 percent in 2020.7 It is estimated that gas 
reserves and undiscovered resources will be sufficient to meet consumption needs.8 The 
International Center for Information on Natural Gas (CEDIGAZ)9 estimates that natural 
gas reserves and resources are approximately four times the cumulative world 
consumption forecast until 2020.10 This means that a huge volume o f natural gas has 
yet to be discovered.11
Russia, as the world’s first natural gas and second oil exporting country, is the 
obvious energy supplier to satisfy Northeast Asian demand. Although natural gas 
reserves are distributed more evenly across regions than oil, the majority of gas reserves 
are located in the former Soviet Union and the Middle East, which have 72 percent o f 
total remaining reserves. There are also reports that o f undiscovered resources, 50
1 *7percent are expected to be in these regions. Yet Russia currently exports almost all o f 
its gas and much of its oil to non-Asian economies, mainly to Europe. For the most part, 
this is due to the lack of a hydrocarbons transportation infrastructure in Northeast
13Asia. In order to meet growing demand for natural gas, infrastructure development 
requiring massive investment is crucial.14
1.2. The development of Natural Gas in Northeast Asia
There are relatively well-developed facilities for reception, re-gasification, and 
distribution o f LNG in Northeast Asia, particularly in Korea and Japan, which are
5 “Global Liquefied Natural Gas Markets: Status and Outlook/ LNG Importers,” Energy Information 
Administration (EIA), on http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/analvsispaper/global/importers.html. accessed on 9 
September, 2005.
6 Cleary.
7 APEC, p. 42.
8 Ibid., p. 64 and BP Statistical Review o f  W orld Energy 2001.
9 International Center for Information on Natural Gas, a Paris-based gas industry information agency
10 CEDIGAZ Natural Gas in the World: 2001 Survey.
11 U.S. Geological Survey, World petroleum Assessment 2000, Washington, DC., 2000, quoted in 
International Energy Agency (IEA)(2000) and Energy Information Administration (EIA).
12 APEC, p. 64.
13 Konstantin V. Simonov, “Projects o f  Eastern Siberia Development,” Speeches by Deputy Director, The 
Center for Current Politics in Russia for International Seminar on Policies and Strategies toward Korea- 
Russia Energy Cooperation, Vladivostok, 7 October, 2003.
14 APEC., p. 51.
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heavily dependent on imported LNG supply. Since demand for natural gas will 
continue to grow, more LNG facilities are planned. For example, it is reported that in 
Japan new storage tanks capable o f holding 3.8 million m3 of LNG are to be built by 
2006, and Korea is planning to build additional capacity for 3.7 million m3 by 2010.15 
Securing shipping and LNG terminal capacity are essential, particularly for the growing 
short-term and spot trades.16 It appears that the LNG market has begun developing into 
a spot delivery market and spot LNG trade is expected to grow rapidly in the Asia- 
Pacific market, with the majority o f gas trade still anchored on long term contracts.
Compared with the well-developed trans-border transmission lines and local 
distribution networks in North America and Europe, the Northeast Asian region lags far 
behind in the development o f pipeline infrastructure. The natural gas market in Asia is 
largely restricted to LNG. However, since the end o f the Cold War, and especially in 
the 2000s, serious plans have been developing to construct a natural gas pipeline 
connecting Japan, China, Korea, and possibly Mongolia and North Korea with Sakhalin
17and eastern Siberia. A great deal of investment has already been made and is being 
considered by major global oil companies including Exxon Mobil, Royal Dutch Shell, 
and BP, with the additional participation of the Japanese, Korean, Chinese, and Russian 
private sectors. For example, the Kovykta project, if  completed (a feasibility study is 
still being carried out), will be the largest single project in the world with an estimated 
development cost o f US $23 billion on the Russian side. Another major plan is the 
Sakhalin project that will supply gas and oil to Japan and Korea and potentially to other 
Asia Pacific markets.18
2. The energy situation in Korea
In the last few decades, Korea has been one o f Asia’s fastest-growing and most 
dynamic economies. South Korea has very few indigenous energy resources and the 
gap between its petroleum consumption and production is particularly wide. It imports 
a great proportion o f energy products (and all o f its oil needs). Since 1999, for example, 
Korea has consistently been the world’s fourth or fifth largest importer of crude oil and
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Tsutomu Toichi, “Energy Security in Asia and Japanese Policy,” Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 10, No. 1, 
2003, p. 47.
18 APEC, p. 66.
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the second largest importer o f liquefied natural gas.19 Natural gas continues to be the 
fastest growing energy source because it is both convenient to use and environmentally 
friendly.
Table 1 South Korea’s Projected Long-term Energy Demand by Source
(Unit: 1,000 tonnes)
2001 (Actual) 2011 2020
Coal 45.7 60.2 62.6
Petroleum 100.4 125.4 139.6
LNG 20.8 33.2 48.0
Hydro 1.0 1.2 1.2
Nuclear 28.0 43.5 52.0
Total 198.3 259.3 311.8
Source: Ministry o f  Commerce, Industry and Energy, Seoul Korea, October 2003zu
As Table 1 shows, LNG demand is projected to grow by 4.5 percent per annum. 
According to APEC’s report, its industrial use will rise by 6 percent per annum, while 
its residential and commercial use will rise by 4.4 percent up to 2020.21 The annual 
growth in natural gas use reached as high as 47 percent in the 12 years from its 
introduction to 1999, and is expected to expand by 5 percent per year. Accordingly, the 
share o f gas in South Korea’s energy demand increased to 7.4 percent in 1999 from a 
mere 0.2 percent in 1987 and is anticipated to reach over 10 percent by 2020.22 The 
rapid expansion o f South Korea’s natural gas industry from 1987 to 2002 stemmed from 
two factors. First, South Korea established a nationwide trunk pipeline network, and 
second, the Korean government gave price incentives to encourage expansion o f the use 
o f gas in Korean cities.23
At the same time, oil dependency is projected to fall from 55 percent in 1999 to 
45 percent by 2020. The use of oil as a source of energy is still expected to grow 2.4 
percent annually, but at only one third of the pace o f the increase from 1980 to 1999. In 
other words, natural gas has been and will remain the fastest growing energy source. As 
Figure 1 demonstrates, natural gas will expand faster in the transformation sector than
19 In 1999, South Korea was the fourth, and in 2004 the fifth largest importer o f  crude oil after the USA, 
Japan, China and Germany. It was the ninth largest oil consuming country after the US, China, Japan, 
Germany, Russia, India, Canada and Brazil. The largest LNG importer is Japan. See “Top World Oil 
Producers, Exporters, and Importers 2004” Infoplease on, http://www.infoplease.com/iDa/A0922041 .html. 
accessed on 8 September, 2005; and APEC, p. 171.
20 Jung-Gwan Kim, “Korea-Russia Energy Cooperation,” presentation material at Ministry o f  Commerce, 
Industry and Energy, South Korea, 7 October, 2003.
21 APEC, p. 172.
22 Ibid.
23 Keun-Wook Paik, “Natural Gas Expansion in Korea,” in Ian Wybrew-bond and Jonathan Stem, eds., 
Natural Gas in Asia: The Challenges o f  Growth in China, India, Japan and Korea  (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), pp. 226-227.
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for final use, with annual growth rates of 5.4 percent and 5.0 percent, respectively, and 
will maintain a share of well over 40 percent in the next 20 years or so.24
Figure 1 South Korea’s Natural Gas Demand 2003-2017
South Korea's Natural Gas Demand 2003-2017
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Source: Ministry o f Commerce, Industry and Energy (Seoul Korea, December 2004)
Energy cooperation between the two Koreas has often been discussed by the 
South Korean government, because its primary goal in the energy dimension appears to 
be an integrated system across the Korean peninsula. Korea has also actively 
participated in Northeast Asian energy cooperation, which combines the interests of 
both energy-consuming and energy-producing economies in the region while raising the 
possibility of interconnecting power and gas networks. In creating a Northeast Asian 
economic multi-framework, perhaps including North Korea, the Korean government 
can fulfil its goal of constructing an energy system linked to the Asian continent.25
South Korea has diversified its energy sources in recent years to enhance its 
energy security. It introduced a natural gas plan in the late 1980s to promote the use of 
natural gas.26 In these circumstances, it is clear that Russia’s natural gas in Siberia and 
Sakhalin is an attractive source for the South Korean natural gas market.
24 South Korea’s Annual Natural Gas Report, December 2004, Ministry of Commerce, Industry and 
Energy, Seoul Korea; and APEC, p. 173.
25 APEC, p. 175.
26 Ibid., p. 176.
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3. Russia’s role in the Northeast Asian energy market
Russia has abundant natural energy resources, and possesses almost the largest 
o f the world’s proven reserves of natural gas (33 percent o f the world total), 4.7 percent 
of the world’s proven oil reserves and 16 percent of the world’s coal reserves.27 The 
energy industry accounts for approximately 30 percent o f Russia’s GDP.28 Being more 
than self sufficient in all hydrocarbon fuels, Russia exports substantial volumes of 
natural gas and liquid hydrocarbons to areas outside the former Soviet Union.29 Oil and 
gas exports comprise 55 percent o f total merchandise exports in 2005. In 2001 Russia 
became the world's second-largest oil exporter after Saudi Arabia. According to 
RosStat figures, in 2004 Russia exported 56 percent (257m tons, or 5.2m b/d) of its 
crude oil production. The relative weight of the energy sector in the national economy 
will be maintained in the next two decades.
Russia’s energy policy aims to strengthen the position of Russia in international 
energy markets, to gain non discriminatory access to international markets and 
advanced technologies, and to stimulate foreign investment.31 The creation o f a 
favourable investment climate for domestic and foreign investors is a prerequisite to 
achieve these aims. The Russian Energy Strategy estimates investment needs in the 
order of US $40 to $70 billion over the period from 2001 to 2020.32
Energy exports, especially in natural gas and liquid fuels, with special emphasis 
on petroleum products, will be maintained at a high level. Russia can diversify its 
energy exports by penetrating East Asian energy markets and increasing its supply o f oil 
and products to the United States.
Russia is particularly interested in developing its Eastern Siberia and Sakhalin 
natural gas fields. Whereas the oil sector has become increasingly competitive since 
privatization in the early 1990s and the onset o f consolidation after 2000, the gas sector 
continues to be dominated by the state-controlled gas giant Gazprom. Although 
Gazprom controls one-third of the world's natural gas reserves, it has not faced the kind
27 Ibid., p. 211.
28 2005 Russian Report, The Korea Export-Import Bank (EXIM Bank), 9 August, 2005.
29 Eugene M. Khartukov, “Russia,” in Paul B Stares, ed., Rethinking Energy Security in East Asia  
(Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2000), p. 152.
30 “Russia: Business: Industry overview, Russia: Energy provision,” Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) 
V iew s Wire, 20 April, 2005, on
http://www.viewswire.com/index.asp?lavout=displav article&doc id=488217648. accessed on 10 
September, 2005.
3'Alexey M. Mastepanov, “O perspektivakh osvoeniya gazovykh resursov Vostochnoi Sibiri I D al’nego 
Vostoka,” Presentation by the Deputy Head o f  Gazprom for International Seminar on Policies and 
Strategies toward Korea-Russia Energy Cooperation, Vladivostok, 7 October 2003.
32 “Russian Energy Survey: 2002,” International Energy Agency (IEA), Paris, 2002.
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o f market pressures that have prompted the recovery in oil output. Gas output peaked at 
643bn cu meters in 1991 and then fell gradually to 561 cu meters in 2002. It has been 
rising since then, reaching 591 bn cu meters in 2004, and the government plans to 
increase gas output to 950bn cu meters in 2005, backed by US$4.5bn investment 
spending on prospecting and expansion.33
Gazprom exported 181bn cu meters in 2004, with a year-on-year rise o f around 
15 percent in exports to Europe, its largest and most lucrative export market. It uses its 
export earnings to subsidize loss-incurring domestic sales, at around 20 percent of world 
market prices. Since cheap gas powers much of Russia's industrial sector and keeps 
household energy bills low, the government has been reluctant to liberalize domestic 
gas prices. This has starved Gazprom o f the investment capital needed to replace its 
declining west Siberian fields with new ones in the far north and east, and to build new 
storage and transportation facilities.34
Russia aims to increase its oil exports to the Asia Pacific region from 3 to 30 
percent, and its gas exports from 0 to 15 percent in the future. Yet given the existing 
transportation infrastructure, energy exports are still mostly designed for Europe and as 
such can only indirectly influence Northeast Asian energy markets. In the longer term, 
however, Russia can play a very important role in shaping cooperative energy schemes 
in Northeast Asia. Several existing and planned energy projects in the Russian Far East 
and eastern Siberia will enable Russia to increase its supplies of fuel and electricity to 
Northeast Asia.
The Russian Far East (RFE) has about 30 percent of Russia’s coal deposits, half 
o f which can be mined in open pits. Oil, natural gas and hydropower sites are abundant 
and widely dispersed, capable of producing annual exports o f crude oil to 15 million-25 
million tons (Mt), and providing 30 billion-50 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas
•JO
a year to neighbouring Asia Pacific countries. East Siberia contains 20 percent of 
proven natural gas reserves in the world today. The natural gas supply from this basin
33 Although Gazprom has access to foreign borrowing to fund its capital expenditure, its investment plans 
are affected by high levels o f  debt and continued uncertainty about gas market reform. The government 
hopes that the removal o f  the “ring-fence”— which limits foreign share ownership in the company— will 
finally allow Gazprom to raise much-needed investment capital. See “Russia: Business: Industry 
overview, Russia: Energy provision,” EIU, op. cit.
34 Ibid.
35 Mastepanov.
36 Khartukov, p. 152.
37 Ibid.
38 Billion Cubic Meter (bm3)= BCM. See Stephen White, “Is Russia a Country in the Globalization Era? 
(With special reference to the Far East),” Presentation prepared for a conference: The Regional 
Cooperation o f  Northeast Asia and Russia’s Globalization for the 21st Century, Seoul, Korea 22-24 June 
2003; and Khartukov, p. 141.
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could potentially be as much as 130 bcm in 2020, which is equivalent to the level o f 
Russian exports to Europe today.39 Moreover, over 3 million tons of oil was produced 
in Sakhalin in 2002, and up to 45 million tons are forecast to be produced annually after 
30 years. Oil production development in East Siberia and the Russian Far East would 
increase Russia’s production level up to 95 million tons of oil annually after 30 years.40
So far, the most successful upstream developments in the Russian Far East are 
the Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2 projects, which will be discussed in detail in the later part 
o f this chapter. Overall crude oil production levels for Sakhalin are estimated at 0.7 
million barrels per day (Mb/d) in 2020, with corresponding export volumes o f about 
0.5Mb/d. Production figures for East Siberia are estimated at 0.8 Mb/d in 2020 with 
probable export figures of 0.4 Mb/d. The eastern part o f Russia as a whole could supply 
the Asia-Pacific market with up to 0.9 Mb/d in 2020 under favourable pricing 
conditions. Natural gas production is expected to start around 2010, though transport 
remains the main problem to be overcome.41 At the beginning o f 2002 the state oil 
transport company, Transneft, announced a plan to build a 3,765km oil pipeline on an 
Angarsk-Khabarovsk-Nakhodka route with a capacity of one Mb/d by 2008-2010, 
which could carry oil from the West Siberian fields and the prospective deposits in East 
Siberia.42
In short, the Russian Far East has the potential to reshape energy flows in 
Northeast Asia and also to redefine the region’s geopolitical relationships. Russia 
cannot be ignored in the “new geopolitics of energy” because of its current enormous 
energy production and export potential.43 From the Korean perspective, as long as 
Russia’s natural gas projects provide competitive terms and guarantee stability of 
supply, Russia is clearly an extremely attractive potential energy supplier.44
39 Cleary.
40 Simonov.
41 APEC, p. 215.
42 Ibid.
43 John V. Mitchell, The New Geopolitics o f  Energy (London: Royal Institute for International Affairs, 
1996), p. 61.
44 Hong Shik Jeon, “Review o f  Gas Industry in Korea and requirements from future LNG contracts,” 
Speech by V ice President for LNG Purchase Division, Korea Gas Corporation, for International Seminar 
on Policies and Strategies toward Korea-Russia Energy Cooperation at Vladivostok, 7 October, 2003.
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4. The development of Russian-South Korean energy cooperation
4.1. The Kovykta Gas Field (Irkutsk)
The Kovykta natural gas field in Eastern Siberia has proven reserves o f 2,000 
billion m 3 per year production for 30-40 years. As the frontrunner among the three 
energy projects (the other two projects are the Sakha Republic Chayandinsk gas and 
Sakhalin Island offshore gas fields), the development o f this field could become the 
keystone in energy cooperation with East Asian economies in the next two decades.45
The Siberian gas development plan between Russia and South Korea dates back 
to the late 1980s. In January 1989, Chung Ju Young, founder of the Hyundai Group 
(Korean Conglomerate), proposed running a gas pipeline from Sakha to South Korea 
through North Korea. Following a November 1992 summit between President Yeltsin 
and President Roh Tae Woo, a South Korean consortium was set up, and the South 
Korean government authorized the Korean Gas Corporation (KOGAS) to negotiate the 
project. At the end of 1995, Moscow and Seoul completed a preliminary study o f the 
technical and economic feasibility of Sakha gas development. Under the agreement, a 
6,600 km (4,125miles) natural gas pipeline would extend from Sakha through 
Khabarovskii and Primorskii krais. It was expected that the annual output o f gas would 
total 30 to 45 billion m3, 15 to 28 billion m3 of which would be exported to the Korean 
peninsula. This project was supposed to be shared between Russia (70 percent) and 
foreign investors (30 percent). The North Korean government approved the transit of 
the gas pipeline through its territory because the project would be economically 
beneficial. The total cost of the project was estimated at between US $17 and $23 
billion, with supplies to last fifty years.46 South Korea, however, decided not to 
continue with a full feasibility study because the project did not seem to produce much 
profit. Instead, South Korean interest shifted to the Kovyktinskii gas field near Irkutsk.
The Kovyktinskii gas condensate field, containing an estimated 870 billion m3 
of gas and 400 million barrels of condensate, was discovered in 1987.47 The Russian 
company Sidanko is the main shareholder, along with Irkutsk oblast, Irkutskenergo,
45 Keun-Wook Paik, “Pipeline Gas Introduction to the Korean Peninsula,” Report Submitted to Korea 
Foundation, Korea Foundation Project ‘Energy and Environmental Cooperation in the Korean Peninsula, 
January 2005, p. 1 and APEC, p. 215.
46 Rossiskaya gazeta  ([Ekonomicheskii Soyuz Supplement), 30 March, 1996, 11 in Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service (FBIS), Daily Report/ Soviet (DR/SOV) (96-084-S).
47 Seung-Ho Joo, “ROK-Russian Economic Relations, 1992-2001,” Korea and W orld Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 
3, Fall 2001 Research Center for Peace and Unification o f  Korea, p. 383.
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Angarsk Refinery, and East Asia Gas Co (EAGC).48 In July 1996, the EAGC, a 
subsidiary o f the Hanbo Group, announced that it had purchased 27.5 percent (US $25 
million) o f Russia Petroleum (RP)’s equity shares and that it would promote early 
development o f East Siberia’s oil and gas reserves.49 As a result, the Hanbo group 
became the largest shareholder of RP (46.1%). UNEXIM bank (United Export Import 
bank) and Sidanko were the other two other major shareholders (25%), the latter having 
acquired by that time a 46.1 percent stake in the Angarsk Petrochemical Company’s 
(APC), one of RP founders.50
After the Hanbo Group went bankrupt, it sold off a large part o f its equity share 
in RP to Sidanko, which then sold it to British Petroleum (BP) as part o f a deal between 
BP, Sidanko, and UNEXIMbank. In 1997, BP renewed its interest in the Kovykta 
project by becoming a shareholder o f Sidanko. In November 1997, Sidanko and BP 
established a strategic alliance to develop this project.51 Meanwhile, EAGC now has 
just a 7.5 percent share o f a potential project to deliver natural gas from Siberia to 
China. The South Korean consortium conducted an eight month preliminary 
feasibility study on the Kovykta gas field starting in December 1996 which proved that 
the project would be economically profitable to South Korea.53 In December 1997, 
Korea, Russia, Japan, China, and Mongolia agreed to develop natural gas fields in 
Siberia. In February 1999, Russia Petroleum and the Chinese National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC) signed a general agreement on carrying out a feasibility study on 
the Kovykta gas project. In November 1999, KOGAS joined the agreement.54 In 
November 2000, RP signed a new trilateral agreement with CNPC and KOGAS over a 
feasibility study in Beijing. Total gas output and exports to China and South Korea 
were to amount to 30-35 bcm and 10 bcm respectively. South Korea also proposed 
North Korea’s participation in the project.55
It is expected that it will to take about 5 to 6 years to develop the gas fields and 
construct the 4,100 km gas pipeline, which may link Irkutsk in Russia, Ulaanbaatar in
48 Keun-Wook Paik and Jae-Yong Choi,” Pipeline Gas Trade between Asian Russia, Northeast Asia Gets 
Fresh look,” Oil and Gas Journal, August 18, 1997, pp. 41-45.
49 Ibid.
50 Nodari Simonia, “Russian Energy Policy in East Siberia and the Far East,” The Energy Dimension in 
Russian G lobal Strategy, Report Paper (The James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice 
University, October 2004), p. 5.
51 Ibid.
52 Chongbae Lee and Michael J. Bradshaw, “South Korean Economic Relations with Russia,” Post-Soviet 
Geography and Economics, Vol. 38, No. 8, 1997, pp. 463-464.
53 Korea Gas Corporation (KOGAS), “The Irkutsk Natural Gas Project,” January 2000, on 
http://www.kogas.or.kr/homepage/news.htm. accessed on 15 February, 2004.
54 Joo, “ROK-Russian Economic Relations, 1992-2001,” p. 384.
55 N ezavisim aya Gazeta, 9 September, 2000; Vedemosti, 3 November, 2000; and Simonia, p. 9.
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Mongolia, Beijing in China and Pyongtaek near Seoul. However, the Mongolian route 
was ruled out by the Chinese authorities in 2002, even though it appeared the most 
competitive price option.56
As South Korean-North Korean relations improved, South Korea also proposed 
that the pipeline should pass through North Korea. In February 2003, Gazprom chief 
Alexei Miller visited Seoul to discuss KOGAS’s proposal to build the China-North 
Korea-South Korea pipeline to Pyongtaek.57 However, TNK (Tyumen Oil Company) 
and BP, which had merged in 2003 giving the new company TNK-BP a 62.89 percent 
stake in RP, strongly opposed the route through North Korea because o f high costs and 
political risks. South Korea eventually abandoned the idea and stuck to the original 
plan to lay the pipeline on the bottom of the sea between China and South Korea.58
South Korea’s total investment in this project is projected to be approximately 
US $12 billion: US $5 billion for developing the gas fields and US $7 billion for the 
pipelines. Once completed, the Kovykta gas field will be able to provide a total o f 20 
million tons o f natural gas to China, Russia, and Korea annually for 30 years, possibly 
beginning in 2008.59 South Korea will receive 7 million tons of gas annually, a third o f 
its total national gas demand. It would also mean that Korea would purchase natural 
gas at a price 22 to 25 percent lower than the current import price for liquefied 
petroleum gas (LPG).60
Nevertheless, although the project was initiated in 1995, it is still awaiting 
approval from the Russian government. According to Paik, the main obstacle is 
Gazprom’s reluctance to sell gas to Northeast Asian nations and this stems from new 
Russian nationalist views about protecting its natural resources in the region.61 He adds,
If Gazprom changes its stance and agrees to pursue the earliest pipeline gas 
supply to China and Korea, the earliest introduction will be between 2010 
and 2012. If Gazprom fails, however, to make a compromise on its plan of 
directing the gas pipeline to Nakhodka, the earliest introduction will be
56 Interview with Keun-Wook Paik, London, 12 June, 2005.
57 Kom mersant-Daily, 27 February, 2003.
58 Simonia, p. 11.
59 South Korea is seeking to bring 7 million tons o f natural gas a year while China is planning 14 million 
tons. See Yonhap News Agency, 17 September, 2004.
60 Seung-Ho Joo, “Russia and Korea: The Summit and After,” The Korean Journal o f  Defense Analysis 
Vol. 13, No. 1, Autumn 2001, Korea Institute for Defense Analysis (KIDA), Seoul, Korea, pp. 124-125.
61 Interview with Keun-Wook Paik, Chatham House, London 21 February, 2005.
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closer to 2020, as the LNG expansion in the region will not save a large 
proportion of the gas market for the pipeline gas easily [sic].62
Gazprom, which does not participate in the Kovykta project, clearly has less incentive 
to develop this field, whereas it strongly advocates foreign participation in the Sakhalin- 
2 project in which it recently acquired 25 percent of the assets o f Shell, the main 
shareholder o f Sakhalin-2. Gazprom responded negatively to the Kovykta gas field 
feasibility study agreement that RP, CNPC and KOGAS signed in Moscow on 14 
November 2003, arguing that priority should be providing gas to Russian consumers. 
And in January 2004, during a meeting with Viktor Vekselberg, TNK Board Chairman, 
Alexei Miller, declared that Gazprom would not permit the field to be developed 
outside its control. It maintained that instead of building an export pipeline, it was 
necessary to build gas and chemical facilities first and then to export the final products 
to Asian markets.63
4.2. Sakhalin Project
The Sakhalin oil and gas projects are based on decades o f Russia-Japan 
exploration efforts. South Korea has not participated in any of the Sakhalin projects 
until recently. The total resources o f Sakhalin, including both inland deposits and those 
of the continental shelf, are 3,360 billion m3 of natural gas and 1,285 Mt o f oil and gas 
condensate combined, along with 935 Mt of oil.64 As Michael Bradshaw notes, it is 
difficult to count the number of Sakhalin projects because their status varies, ranging 
from Sakhalin-2 which is currently producing oil offshore, to speculative acquisition of 
offshore acreage from companies without the technical capacity to develop offshore 
fields.65 Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2, which are the first generation of Sakhalin projects, 
have declared commerciality and are now at the development and delivery stage.66 
Proven reserves o f Sakhalin-1 include 324 Mt of oil condensate and 420 billion m3 of 
gas condensate. And reserves o f Sakhalin-2 include 600 Mt (4.5 billion barrels) o f
62 Paik, “Pipeline Gas Introduction to the Korean Peninsula,” January 2005, p. 1.
63 Simonia, p. 11.
64 Vladimir I. Ivanov, The Energy Sector in Northeast Asia New Projects, D elivery Systems, and  
Prospects fo r  Co-operation  North Pacific Policy Papers 2 (Vancouver: Program on Canada-Asia Policy 
Studies, Institute o f  Asian Research, University o f  British Columbia, 2000), p. 16.
65 Michael Bradshaw, “Prospects for Russian Oil and Gas Exports to Northeast Asia from East o f  the 
Urals,” Presentation paper for the conference: The Regional Cooperation o f  Northeast Asia and Russia’s 
Globalization for the 21st Century, Seoul, Korea 22-24 June 2003, p. 6.
66 These two projects were the forerunner o f  Production Sharing Agreements (PSA), according to 
Bradshaw. See Bradshaw, p. 6.
67 Ivanov, pp. 16-17.
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crude oil and condensate, and gas condensate of more than 700 billion m 3.68 The total 
estimated cost for Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2 are US$15.2 billion and $10 billion 
respectively.69
Among the 6 Sakhalin projects, the Sakhalin-2 project has made most progress. 
Its fields are approximately 15 kilometres off the northeast coast o f Sakhalin in waters 
frozen for five to six months o f the year. The Sakhalin-2 project comprises two fields: 
Piltun-Astokskoye, primarily an oil field, and Lunskoye, predominantly a gas field with 
recoverable reserves of 185 million tons of oil and 800 billion cubic meters o f gas.70 
“The Sakhalin-2 oil reserves are equal to more than one year o f total crude oil exports 
from Russia at the current level of around 2.5 million barrels per day. The vast gas 
reserves represent nearly five years of Russian gas exports to Europe, or enough to 
supply current global LNG demand for four years. This proven resource base will 
supply more than 9 million tones of LNG for at least 25 years.”71 Between 1999 and 
2004, the project produced over 60 million barrels o f oil. Oil from Sakhalin-2 is 
exported to China, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and the US.72
The Sakhalin-2 project was the first production sharing agreement (PSA) signed 
in Russia and the first to go into production. The first phase of oil production took 
place in the summer of 1999, and it was the first offshore oil production in Russia. By 
the end o f 2002 more than 38 million barrels of oil had been produced and exported.
The project is operated by Sakhalin Energy and its shareholders are Royal Dutch Shell 
(55 percent), Mitsui (25 percent) and Diamond Gas Sakhalin, a subsidiary of Mitsubishi 
(20 percent).74 South Korean companies are involved in the project and it is the first 
energy project that Russia and South Korea have developed. The earliest that gas will 
be available to be sent from Russia to Korea is projected to be in either 2007 or 2008.75
68 Sakhalin Energy, April 2003.
69 Ivanov, pp. 16-17.
70 The Russian O il and Gas Report, 1 October, 2004.
71 Sakhalin Energy, April 2003.
72 Prime-Tass Business News Agency, 26 August, 2005.
73 Sakhalin Energy Investment Company (SEIC) 2002, The Road Ahead: Sakhalin Energy Re'view 2002,
?49’The Russian O il and Gas Report, 1 October, 2004; and Prime-Tass Business News Agency, 26 August, 
2005.
75 “South Korea to receive Sakhalin gas in 2008,” Business CustomWire, 16 November, 2004; and 
Abraham Bernstein, “Sakhalin II LNG Project: A Strategic Source o f  Natural Gas for Northeast Asia,” 
Presentation by General Manager, Northeast Asia Sakhalin-II LNG Marketing Services for the 
International Conference: Sakhalin & North Asia Oil, Gas & Pipelines 2003, Seoul, Korea 12-13 
November 2003.
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The Sakhalin-2 gas will be the closest source o f LNG to Korea, taking only 2 to 3 
delivery days.
In fact, South Korea’s interest in Sakhalin gas dates back to 1994 when the 
South Korean government and companies showed interest in initiating LNG supplies 
from the Lunskoye gas field, the centrepiece of Sakhalin-2 development. However, 
serious discussion o f the project only became possible in 2000. The Sakhalin regional 
governor Igor Farkhutdinov maintained that the Sakhalin region was interested in 
supplying gas to Korea and Shell, which has a 55 percent equity stake in Sakhalin 
Energy, has lobbied hard to secure an early commitment from the Korean government. 
Due to the privatization drive in Korea’s gas industry, however, the Sakhalin Energy 
Investment Corp’s (SEIC) lobbying to penetrate Korea’s gas market was not
77successful. Nevertheless, the Korean government and private sectors have continued
no
to negotiate deals with Russia for this project. Samsung Heavy Industry, for example, 
signed a contract on 29 May, 2003 for the construction and installation o f two platform 
topsides valued at approximately US $500 million. The construction o f the Lunskoye 
Platform topsides were 89 percent complete as of the end o f August, 2005.79 Another 
Korean company, Poong Lim, is engaged in infrastructure work on Sakhalin Island, 
including the building of Sakhalin Energy’s project office as a major sub-contractor.
In August 2004, KOGAS invited bids for the long-term supply o f 5.3mt/y o f 
LNG to replace its current contract with ExxonMobil for gas from Indonesia which is
OA
due to expire in 2007. SEIC’s bid was included in the short list o f five potential 
supply sources. Sakhalin Governor Ivan Malakhov81 stated that 80 percent o f the profit 
from LNG should remain at the disposal of the regional authorities. According to John 
Barry, the head of Shell Russia, SEIC’s contract with KOGAS, the largest single LNG 
buyer in the world, would be the largest contract for LNG supplies it had signed.82 
SEIC’s bid was successful and in February 2005, it won a tender to supply 1.5mt per 
annum of LNG from Sakhalin 2 for 20 years to KOGAS.83
76 The estimated distance from Prigorodnoye LNG Terminal to Tong Yong is 1062 m iles (2.2 days by 
LNG ship); and to Incheon is 1385 miles (2.7 days). See Bernstein.
77 Paik, “Pipeline Gas Introduction to the Korean Peninsula,” January 2005, p. 19.
78 Bernstein.
79 Sakhalin Energy, Archives, Project Updates, August 2005, on 
http://www.sakhalinenergy.com/news/nws updates.asp. accessed on 7 September, 2005.
80 The Russian O il and Gas Report, 1 October, 2004.
81 Igor Farkhutdinov died in a helicopter accident in 2004, and Ivan Malakhov is his successor. I am 
atefiil to Keun-Wook Paik for giving me this information.
Ibid.
83 Glada Lahn and Keun-Wook Paik, “Russia’s Oil and Gas Exports to North-East Asia,” Report from 
Sustainable Development Programme, Chatham House, April 2005, p. 5; In its tender, Korea also chose
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On 7 July 2005, Gazprom agreed to swap assets in return for entry into the 
Sakhalin 2 project.84 Gazprom would take 25 percent equity in the Sakhalin 2 project 
and, in return, Shell would take 50 percent of equity in the Zapolyamoye oil field, 
which is located in Western Siberia and is owned by Gazprom. According to Paik, this 
development strengthened the chance of SEIC’s LNG supply contract (1.5mt/y) with
o c
KOGAS. Having won the tender in February 2005, Sakhalin Energy finally signed 
the long-term Sales and Purchase Agreement for 1.5 mt per annum of LNG for 20 years 
to KOGAS in July 2005. This was the first long-term agreement between Russia and 
South Korea for the supply of energy. LNG will be supplied from Sakhalin Energy’s
9.6 mt per annum LNG plant, which is under construction at Prigorodnoye at Aniva Bay 
on the south Sakhalin Island. This will be the first LNG plant to be built in Russia and
o/
construction work on the plant is now more than 65 percent complete. It should be 
noted, however, that the price of gas from Sakhalin-2 remains high, even if it has the 
advantage that South Korea can import gas from Russia during winter from a
on
comparatively short distance.
Figure 2 Vityaz Crude Oil Sales by destination since 1999 (Status: 19 August, 2005)
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Yemen LNG and Malaysia LNG for supplies. Through the three sources, the Korean company will 
import total 5 million tons per year from 2008. See International Oil Daily, 18 July, 2005.
84 Nihon Keizai Report, 27 November, 2004; and Moscow Times, 29 November, 2004.
85 Paik, “Pipeline Gas Introduction to the Korean Peninsula,” January 2005, p. 19; International Oil Daily, 
18 July, 2005; and Interfax News Agency, 20 July, 2005.
86 Interfax News Agency, 20 July, 2005.
87 Keun-Wook Paik, Telephone Interview, 6 September, 2005, London, UK.
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Meanwhile, as Figure 2 shows, South Korea also imports crude oil from SEIC. 
SEIC has exported a total of 32 million barrels of "Sakhalin Vityaz Crude Oil" (this is 
the brand name) to South Korea since 1999. This is 45 percent o f SEIC's total sales so 
far. Korea was a foundation customer and took the majority o f oil in the first few years 
o f production. In the last few years, however, the Japanese have offered higher prices 
for the oil than the Koreans, resulting in the Japanese acquisition of larger volumes of 
oil. As Figure 2 indicates, Korea and Japan are the two main importing countries of 
Sakhalin oil due their geographic proximity to Sakhalin Island. Sakhalin oil is 
considered to be light and sweet (low in sulphur) with a high middle distillate yield, 
which means good quality for refineries for producing diesel and kerosene.88
4.3. Comparison between the Kovykta and Sakhalin projects
While LNG projects require substantial investment in liquidification and re­
gasification, they are flexible because an LNG buyer can choose between many 
suppliers. The LNG trade generally tends to be based on long-term contracts, although 
a spot market has emerged recently. It also enables customers to use existing facilities. 
On the other hand, pipelines are rather inflexible. They require substantial reserves at 
one end to sustain and fill the pipeline, and a significant market at the other to justify 
the investment. Once built, they cannot be moved and they lock the seller and buyer 
into a long-term relationship. It is evert more complicated when the pipelines cross 
international boundaries. However, LNG and pipelines projects are complementary in 
that smooth development o f the LNG could facilitate pipeline discussions too, in the 
end. In this regard, the Sakhalin-2 seems to be more attractive, more promising, and 
less vulnerable to the South Korean government at this stage than the Kovykta project. 
Nevertheless, a combination o f the Kovykta and Sakhalin projects would be the ideal 
case for the Korean energy market. If this proves impossible, however, I would argue 
that the Sakhalin LNG projects are ultimately more realistic options to the South Korean 
government and business sector than the pipeline projects in Siberia. As Paik 
emphasizes, it is highly likely that the Kovykta project would be developed only if the
O Q
delivered Kovykta pipeline gas price is competitive with that o f Sakhalin LNG.
88 Alan McCavana, Phone Interview with Export Manager, Sakhalin Energy Investment Corporation, 9 
September, 2005.
89 Keun-Wook Paik, “Natural Gas Expansion in Korea,” 2002, p. 228.
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4.4. Other energy projects
Energy cooperation has become the core of the South Korean-Russian 
diplomatic agenda in recent years. For example, President’s Roh’s trip to Moscow on 
21 September 2004 was mainly a quest for energy supplies.90 During the summit, Putin 
and Roh signed a total of US $4 billion worth of primarily oil contracts. The biggest 
was a $3 billion project between LG, South Korea’s second largest conglomerate, and 
Tatneft, Russia’s sixth largest oil producer, to construct an oil refinery and 
petrochemical complex in Tatarstan. This project involves the construction o f a new 
polystyrene and polyethylene plant in Nizhnekamsk with a throughput capacity of 7 
million tones o f oil per year. 91 According to Interfax, Export-Import Bank o f Korea 
(EXIM) signed a memorandum with the government of Tatarstan to open a $1.3 billion 
credit line. The state-owned Vneshtorgbank also signed a $50 million deal with the 
EXIM to finance acquisition of Korean equipment by Russian companies. Samsung 
also signed a $500 million, 10-year deal with Russia’s Alliance Group to modernize a 
refinery in Khabarovsk, which was partially backed by a $50 million finance deal 
between the EXIM and Sberbank. The third deal, between Rosneft and Korea National 
Oil Corporation (KNOC), was a $250 million agreement to explore Kamchatka and 
Sakhalin Island oil reserves in a 60,000-square kilometre area. The two companies plan 
to set up a joint venture by the end of 2005, and drilling at various sites will be carried 
out before August 2008. South Korea expects to secure 1.7 billion barrels o f oil
QTreserves from the deal.
Despite the numerous projects, the development o f cooperative Russian-South 
Korean energy projects has been extremely slow and there have been few substantial 
benefits and concrete outcomes so far.
5. Obstacles
As Peter Cleary, President o f BP Gas Power & Renewables Korea, outlines, 
there are four major requirements to establish energy security cooperation in the region: 
“1) political will for regional cooperation, 2) the right partnership to deliver major 
projects, 3) enormous investment in infrastructure and supply, and 4) simulation of
90 The Economist Intelligence Unit Business Asia, 4 October, 2004.
91 Itar Tass news agency, 21 September, 2004; and Interfax News Agency, 21 September, 2004.
92 Yonhap news agency, 23 February, 2005.
93 Reuters, Ap, and M oscow Times, 22 September, 2004.
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market development.”94 I would argue that Russian-South Korean bilateral and multi­
lateral energy security cooperation in Northeast Asia has been delayed because o f the 
relative underdevelopment or the absence o f these requirements, but other factors such 
as the persisting problems of the Russian Far East and the Northeast Asian energy 
pattern also present obstacles.
5.1. Bilateral problems
Most importantly, the price o f gas determines the pace and time of the 
development o f the gas pipeline and LNG project, as well as the will o f foreign 
investors. As long as the delivered pipeline or Sakhalin LNG gas price is competitive 
with that o f LNG from either the Middle East or Southeast Asia, there is a high 
possibility that Russia’s gas supplies will be developed. If it is not competitive, the 
incentive for developing the Russian pipeline gas and LNG will remain low. And the 
problem is that, despite the advantage that Sakhalin’s LNG enjoys in terms o f delivery 
distance and its winter usage potential, there is doubt that the delivered price o f 
Sakhalin gas will be competitive with gas from Yemen and Indonesia.95
The development o f the Kovykta and Sakhalin gas projects has also been 
affected by the general sluggishness o f Russian-South Korean bilateral diplomatic 
relations and trilateral relations among Russia, North Korea, and South Korea. In the 
late 1990s, the financial crisis that Russia and South Korea both suffered contributed to 
delaying energy cooperation between the two countries.96 Later one o f the possible 
Kovykta pipeline routes through North Korean territory, which was suggested by the 
South Korean government in 2003, was ruled out primarily because o f the unresolved 
North Korean nuclear crisis.
It is also clear that active government policies in favour of gas are essential for 
the market penetration of gas. The trans-border gas projects in the Russian Far East will 
not materialize unless they receive the active political support o f all the states involved. 
For example, the South Korean government has not actively promoted the use of 
Russian oil and gas, especially the Kovykta pipeline gas project or other South Korean- 
Russian projects. Governments set the rules and partly determine the costs and benefits 
of economic activities.97 State authorized third-party access or open access to essential 
facilities such as LNG terminals, pipelines, and storage allows both suppliers and
94 Cleary.
95 Keun-Wook Paik, Telephone Interview, 6 September, 2005, London, UK; and the head o f  Shell Russia 
John Barry stated that Sakhalin-2 plant w ill be able to supply more gas in winter than in spring, and this is 
what Korea needs. See also The Russian O il and Gas Report, 1 October, 2004.
96 Park and Lee, pp. 61-62.
97 APEC, p. 70.
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consumers easier access to the gas market. This facilitates the substitution o f natural 
gas for other fuels. Governments could also promote competition between gas suppliers, 
and thus force existing facilities to be used more efficiently and thus reduce gas supply 
costs. Increased competition produces higher profits for facility owners, while inviting
Q O
more participants to the market. Although a number of energy agreements were 
reached during the summit between Putin and Roh in 2003, in general, diplomatic 
relations between Moscow and Seoul have been stagnant and have not facilitated greater 
cooperation in energy projects.
Another problem is South Korea’s inexperience in doing business in Russia.
This has made South Korean policy makers concentrate on short-term deals rather than 
long-term projects and has led to reluctance among Korean business circles to invest in 
Russia. In other words, Korean business sectors have been relatively preoccupied with 
selling consumer goods and making short term profits." Thus, most o f the trade with 
and investment in Russia has been limited to very few export categories. The 
concentration on exports has meant that the possibility of effective cooperation in 
developing Russia’s great potential energy resources has been neglected until quite 
recently when KOGAS and Sakhalin Energy concluded a long-term LNG contract in 
July 2005.
The cultural dissimilarity between the two countries, the lack o f information 
about Russia among South Koreans, and the absence of South Korean experts on the 
Russian economy has further slowed down the pace of energy cooperation between the 
two countries. In Korea, energy specialists, in particular, are virtually non-existent, 
especially those capable of resolving complex government-related issues and 
administrative litigation, familiar with energy regulatory rules. South Korea’s recent 
Sakhalin oil scandal illustrates its inexperience and lack o f strategy in dealing with the 
Russians. On 30 April 2005, South Korean prosecutors issued an arrest warrant for a 
senior railway official in connection with a failed Russian oil deal which cost the state- 
run railroad agency millions of dollars. Wang Young-yong, a director at the state-run 
Korea Railroad, was suspected of pursuing the project without properly investigating its 
profitability. In 2004 Korea Railroad had agreed to invest in an oil project on Russia’s 
Sakhalin Island, and had paid a deposit o f US $6.2 million to the Russian investment
98 Ibid.
99 Korea’s investment policy in Russia is being carried out in a form characteristic o f  developing 
countries: export o f  finished consumer goods and predominance o f  small short-term investment by small 
and medium enterprises. See Jeongdae Park and Jaeyoung Lee, “Industrial Cooperation between Korea 
and Russia: Current Situation and Prospects,” Journal o f  Asia Pacific Affairs Vol. 3, N o.2, February 2002, 
Asia-Pacific Research Center, Hanyang University, pp. 60-63.
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group Alfa-Eco. The Russian government later denied approval for the project, and the 
Korea Railroad withdrew from the contract. In April 2005 Alfa-Eco announced that, 
according to the terms of the agreed contract, it would return only US $2.7 million to 
the Korea Railroad. The Board o f Audit and Inspections of Korea accused the railroad 
agency o f causing damage to the nation by jumping into the project without legal basis 
or survey o f profitability, not to mention any appropriate internal decision making 
process.100 Although this incident had nothing to do with govemment-to-govemment 
miscommunication, it fuelled a general scepticism about the energy infrastructure in the 
Russian Far East among the Korean public and the private energy sectors.
In short, South Korean investors have been sceptical about investing in Russia 
because o f the unstable political and economic situation and Russia’s patchy reform. 
Direct foreign investment is the key to developing the Russian Far East. Russia’s 
investment climate is crucial because the combination of taxes, tariffs, laws, and 
regulations determines the extent and speed of such investment flows. In general, a ' 
sound legislative and regulatory base in the energy sector promotes standardization, 
certification, and better licensing o f energy market participants, while changing 
legislation and an unstable tax regime act as disincentives to developing effective 
businesses.101 Russia has failed to provide the legal and institutional infrastructure for 
external economic transactions. It needs a more efficient cost accounting system, price
107reforms, a freely convertible rouble and a bureaucracy that is easier to deal with.
More specifically, institutional barriers such as Russia’s production sharing 
agreements concern investors. In the upstream operations of oil and natural gas, 
although a production sharing agreement law has been adopted, it is always subject to 
revisions at the Russian government’s convenience. Russia has not been particularly 
successful in energy price reform, nor has it made a dramatic improvement in corporate 
transparency and energy efficiency or in ensuring proper safeguards against the adverse 
environmental effects of increased energy production and use.104 Regulatory reform has
100 The A ssociated  Press, 18 April, 2005.
101 APEC, pp. 211-215.
102 Joo, “ROK-Russian Economic Relations, 1992-2001,” 2001, p. 373.
103 APEC, p. 116.
104 “IEA Commends Russian Efforts on Energy Security, Calls for Full Implementation o f  Reforms,” 
Russian Energy Survey 2002, International Energy Agency (IEA)/PRESS (02)05, M oscow, 6 March 
2002, on http://www.iea.org/new/releases/2002/Russia.htm. accessed on 28 September, 2003.
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also been slow and this has deterred potential investors105 In short, for long-term 
investments, political risks are still high for foreign investors.106
Most importantly, the Kremlin has recently become reluctant to encourage 
foreign participation in the Far Eastern energy projects, especially in the eastern 
Siberian gas pipeline project. Instead, it has promoted Gazprom’s involvement in every 
gas project. For example, as the suspended Kovykta project shows,
China and South Korea were highly concerned that the Kremlin had 
appointed Gazprom as coordinator o f all gas projects in the country, making 
it unclear whether business negotiations should be held with RP or Gazprom.
And the situation was aggravated by the fact that the working groups had 
not met for almost six months.107
Gazprom’s recent objection to developing the Kovykta project and its attempts to divert 
foreign investors’ attention to the Sakhalin project indicate that the Russians have begun 
to pursue a protectionist energy policy.
5.2. The limits of the Russian Far East: underdevelopment and harsh environment
The inherent problems of the Russian Far East also contribute to delaying 
energy cooperation in the region. Despite its vast energy resources, the Russian Far 
East still faces a severe energy crisis because o f its poor infrastructure and ineffective 
economic policies. The lack of a land based transportation infrastructure connecting 
this region with the country’s major fuel sources in Siberia and European Russia means 
that only summer seaborne transportation is possible. Moreover, long haul deliveries o f 
liquid and solid fuels are too costly because of high railroad tariffs and sea freight costs. 
Ever since the perestroika period in the 1980s, the Russian Far East has been considered 
Russia’s most vulnerable and least protected region in terms of energy supplies. The 
major southern cities often still experience cut offs o f electricity and hot water during
105 The transition from a regulated to a competitive market is difficult. Challenges abound, and there is 
no one size fits all remedy. The difficulty with regulatory reform is that, unless it is well planned and 
executed, it may well lead to more problems than it solves. See APEC, p. 116
106 Ibid., p. 211.
107 Simonia, p. 9.
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•  108winter. The Russian Far East has also suffered serious depopulation; since 1991, the 
region has lost nearly 1 million of its estimated 8 million inhabitants.109
The harsh environmental conditions hinder the development o f the region’s 
energy resources. Climatic and operating conditions in the Far East regions are 
extremely tough. From October to June, these conditions are characterized by an ice 
cover exceeding 2 meters (m), icebergs up to 20-m thick, frequent typhoons, currents 
with widely varying directions, and low air temperatures. Developing energy fields 
under such conditions requires technologically advanced and capital intensive ice 
resistant fixed platforms for drilling and production and underwater pipelines protected 
against icebergs.110
It is important to point out that the harsh environmental conditions often create 
an unexpectedly wide gap, in terms of project cost, between the initial feasibility study 
and the actual process. In July 2005, for example, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk executives at the 
Sakhalin-2 project announced that the project might cost US $20 billion, twice as much 
as expected, partly because o f overruns and delays caused by the failure o f the company 
to properly model the geology of the area, and to prepare for the effect of ice on the 
pipeline.111 Sakhalin Energy Chief Executive, Ian Craig, agrees that the company 
underestimated ice-related working limitations during the operational setup o f the 
platforms: “Speed is greatly reduced by sea freeze in winter... and time is cost without
119detailing the overruns.” According to Guyt, Sakhalin Energy’s pipeline manager, 
insufficient data led to a decision to reroute a subsea pipeline, leading to more overruns. 
Following a late-2003 survey, Sakhalin Energy announced in April 2004 that ice was 
formed even deeper into the seabed than previously expected. As a result, the pipeline 
would have to be buried to greater depth, which implied the use o f more powerful and 
expensive equipment. Guyt added that Sakhalin Energy had relied on old data that 
underestimated the depth. In short, the harsh climatic conditions contributed to a delay 
in gas production.
The chronic economic, social, and political underdevelopment of the region 
remains a problem affecting the development of future energy markets. Rozman lists
108 Khartukov, p. 142.
109 “Russia Demographic Trends Up to Year 2015,” M oskva Zdravookhraneniye Rossiskoy Federatsii, 2 
March-April 1999, pp. 27-32, translated in Foreign Broadcasting Information Service (FBIS) January 2, 
1999, pp. 1-8.
110 Khartukov, p. 145.
111 Benoit Faucon, D ow Jones Newswires, in “Shell Ties W oes o f  Russia Project To Lack o f  Data,” The 
Wall S treet Journal Europe, Vol. 23, No. 157, 12 September, 2005.
112 Ibid.
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five negative tendencies that hinder the area’s further economic development. They 
include:
Localism flirting with separatism, including threats to revive the short-lived 
Far Eastern Republic of the early 1920s; near domination by organized 
crime in a region already criminalized by Stalin’s labour camps; xenophobic 
paranoia about international conspiracies; dictatorship by local demagogues; 
and an economically inspired population exodus -- an inviting vacuum for
| i <3
nearly overpopulated China.
The economically depressed Russian Far East is represented by only 4 percent o f the 
Russian Duma seats but covers 36 percent o f Russia’s territory.114 The loss o f federal 
support has further eroded what was once a relatively prosperous region. Some sceptics 
believe that the future of the region is bleak. Moreover, the current Russian nationalism 
in the region, often seen in the form of anti-Chinese rhetoric or fear of Asian dominance, 
may undermine the potential for energy cooperation with Northeast Asian states.115
5.3. Regional problems
In order to keep its value as a source of energy, natural gas needs to be 
competitive against other forms o f energy, and to be accessible to consumers. In this 
regard, “supply infrastructure, technologies for utilization and supply, development of 
markets for gas products and services, and facilitating policies and regulations at both 
domestic and international levels are essential.” 116 The development of local 
distribution networks is particularly crucial for natural gas markets to form and for 
projects to proceed. However, efficient distribution networks are lacking in the region.
There is no denying that both bilateral and multilateral energy cooperation 
within Northeast Asia has the potential to bring shared prosperity. While taking 
advantage o f the diverse energy profiles of each country based on economies o f scale, 
they can advance the frontiers of cooperation in areas such as trans-boundary power 
interconnections, natural gas pipeline networks, joint use of existing supply
113 Rozman, p. 5; Viktor Larin, “‘Y ellow  Peril’ Again? The Chinese and the Russian Far East,” in 
Stephen Kotkin and David Wolff, eds., Rediscovering Russia in Asia: Siberia and the Russian Far East 
(Armond, NY: M.E.Sharpe, 1995), pp. 296-299; and John J. Stephan, The Russian Far East: A H istory 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), p. 3.
114 Tom Wuchte, “Northeast Asia’s Forgotten Worry: Russia’s Far East,” Pacific Focus, Vol. 16, No. 2, 
Fall 2001, p. 47.
1.5 Wuchte, p. 48.
1.6 APEC, p. 69
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infrastructure, transfer of technology and know-how, and joint exploration and 
development of energy resources.117 However, energy cooperation among Northeast 
Asian nations is a relatively new phenomenon. Northeast Asia has no general economic 
or institutional arrangements like the European Union, ASEAN, OPEC, the European 
Energy Charter, or the ASEAN Council on Petroleum (ASCOPE). Until recently, what 
arrangements there were, were based on bilateral relations rather than a multilateral
1 1 Rframework. Political tensions, cultural, ethnic and institutional obstacles, as well as 
economic differences among the Northeast Asian states had compelled each country to 
cope individually with its own energy problems while blocking the development o f an 
effective regional system of energy security.119 Some experts suspect that the 
competing national goals for energy projects might still lead to tension rather than 
cooperation.120 Moreover, there are currently no common legal and institutional 
frameworks for energy collaboration in Northeast Asia.121 Only Russia and Japan have 
signed the European Energy Charter and the Energy Charter Treaty122, and South Korea 
and Japan are the only members of the International Energy Agency (IEA) in the region.
Although Northeast Asian countries believe that energy projects in the Russian 
Far East could play a crucial role in integrating the Northeast Asian community and 
promoting regional energy cooperation, at the same time they also each fear that the 
access o f other Northeast Asian countries to Russian energy supplies will lead to their 
own exclusion. For example, China is clearly concerned about the possibility of 
exclusive access by Japan to future supplies from Russia, whereas Japan has a similar 
concern about China. Many of the projects under consideration are oriented to the 
Chinese market. Russia also worries that if  China becomes the monopoly consumer o f 
Russian energy resources, it will come to dictate the price o f Russian energy
171resources. As for South Korea, it is afraid o f possible disruptions in pipeline supplies
through North Korea and China. In short, Northeast Asian states are unlikely to allow 
Russian oil and gas to dominate Northeast Asia’s energy markets.124 It is more likely
1,7 Ibid., p. 116.
118 Khartukov, p. 176.
1,9 Ibid.
120 Valencia, Mark J., and James P. Dorian, “Multilateral Cooperation in Northeast A sia’s Energy Sector: 
Possibilities and Problems,” Energy and Security in Northeast Asia: Supply and Demand; Conflict and  
Cooperation, Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC) Policy Paper 3 February, 1998, pp. 41-58.
121 IGiartukov, p. 176.
122 Ibid.
123 Boris Saneev, “Kovykta, Yakutia and Sakhalin Energy Project: Barriers and Solutions,” Speech at 
International Seminar on Policies and Strategies toward Korea-Russia Energy Cooperation, Vladivostok,
7 October, 2003.
124 According to Khartukov, neither Russia’s gas exports (even at maximum possible levels o f  50 bcm/y- 
70bcm/y in the 2020s) nor its crude supplies (up to 20 Mt/y-30 Mt/y) can replace East A sia’s traditional
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that Russia will become ‘a key supplementary supplier’ able to counterbalance the
1
traditional Middle Eastern sources of Northeast Asian energy imports.
In my opinion, rather than focusing on either the supply or the demand side, it 
would make more sense to broach a multilateral energy framework in the Russian Far 
East on the basis o f the region’s energy importers and exporters, since experience 
suggests that any attempt to enhance energy security by focusing on one side turns out 
to be unsustainable in the end. Multilateral cooperative frameworks involving both 
exporters and importers are more advantageous because they reinforce stability and
1 96support economic development. As Ivanov points out, although the size o f the 
market for natural gas in the Russian Far East is not small, it is not large enough to 
justify the construction of the infrastructure for a major pipeline. A more serious 
problem is that the multi-billion dollar funds needed for such large-scale projects are
197simply not available either inside Russia or inside Korea. Therefore, it is necessary 
to diversify the export markets for Russian energy resources in Northeast Asia with the 
active involvement o f China, Japan, the United States, two Koreas, and other nations, 
possibly Mongolia.
6. Implications of energy cooperation for bilateral and regional economic security
As chapter 2 illustrated, energy issues are becoming a part of the economic 
security agenda in international relations because energy plays an important role in 
economic development and national security. Russia’s abundant oil and gas resources 
have the potential to contribute to enhancing its bilateral economic security relationship 
with neighbouring states and regional economic security more broadly because it is 
based on a long term vision of energy security interests and economic efficiency. 
Indeed, energy cooperation is regarded as one o f the most promising and most 
frequently discussed issues in diplomatic relations between Russia and South Korea in 
recent years.
Ensuring access, not only to the resource base o f oil and gas but also to the 
transport networks delivering them, has been the primary focus of energy policy and
sources o f  energy imports. Thus energy imports from the Russian Far East should not be regarded as the 
long-awaited panacea for all o f  East Asia’s energy problems. See Khartukov, pp. 176-177.
125 Ibid., p. 177.
126 Examples o f  such multilateral frameworks include the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance’s 
energy programmes and trade protocols, the Caribbean’s San Jose Pact, and the ASEAN Council on 
Petroleum and its Petroleum Sharing Agreement. See Kharutkov, p. 177.
127 Ivanov, p. 33.
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energy security in South Korea as well as other Northeast Asian nations.128 In this sense 
“a greater reliance on regional sources o f energy will insure against disruptions, serve 
competitive pricing, and help promote cleaner energy.”129 Ivanov suggests the 
following elements for bilateral and regional energy security requirements in the region:
1) the diversification o f the sources of supply to avoid disruptions and price 
shocks; 2) the promotion of market-based principles o f energy use to lower 
costs; 3) attention to environmental impacts at all stages o f energy 
production and use; 4) an integrated approach to delivery systems and 
efficiency o f energy use; and 5) multilateral cooperation to secure supply of
130energy.
For China, Japan, and the two Koreas, Russian oil and gas provide enormous 
opportunities to solve their energy shortage problems and thus diversify their existing 
energy markets. Russian energy is more attractive, particularly considering two 
geopolitical factors: the current instability in the Middle East and China’s rising demand 
for oil for its fast growing industries.
Russian oil and gas pipeline projects also have the potential to contribute to 
strengthening its own economic security and its position in the region. Since the 
dissolution o f the Soviet Union, Russia has wanted to become a pivotal regional player 
in Asia. President Putin clearly hopes to upgrade Russia’s prestige and influence on the 
Korean peninsula by promoting its role as an objective mediator. Although Russia has 
often been portrayed in South Korea as a waning political and economic force since the
1 T I
end o f the Cold War, it simply cannot be ignored in the new geopolitics o f energy.
With its enormous energy production and export potential, Russia has an economic 
interest in expanding its energy markets on the Korean peninsula as well as in the Asia 
Pacific region. It is important to understand that the energy issue is also gradually 
replacing the previous ideological confrontation that was characteristic o f the Cold War 
in the formation of a new security paradigm in the Asia Pacific. As a result, Russia, not 
the United States, is cast in the leading role in the Northeast Asian security paradigm.
128 Fereidun Fesharaki, “Energy and the Asian Security Nexus,” Journal o f  International Affairs, Vol. 53, 
No. 1, Fall 1999, p. 86.
129 Ivanov, p. 28.
130 Ivanov, p. 28.
131 Mitchell, p. 61.
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Figure 3 The Russian Oil and Natural Gas Pipeline proposals in Northeast Asia
Moreover, as Figure 3 shows, energy cooperation between Russia and South 
Korea cannot be viewed simply in bilateral terms but must be considered within the 
regional energy security framework since China and Japan are also involved in energy 
projects in the Russian Far East. Russia’s oil and gas pipeline projects in Eastern 
Siberia as well as the Sakhalin projects are aimed at attracting Chinese and Japanese 
energy import markets. Accordingly, the Chinese and Japanese governments have 
shown their economic and strategic security interests in the Russian energy sector in the 
last few years by actively lobbying for access to pipeline routes.
For example, as we have seen in section 4.2, oil from Sakhalin 2 is exported to 
China, Japan and South Korea, etc. The Kovykta project has been under evaluation 
by BP and CNPC since the mid-1990s, with the idea of transporting the gas by pipeline 
to northeast China. And the Chinese government considers it one of the most 
economically viable overseas gas projects.133 A major Russian oil pipeline is also 
planned to extend from Tayshet in the Irkutsk region to Nakhodka. As one aspect of its 
energy strategy for the period until 2020, the Russian government decided on 13 March, 
2003 to build an oil pipeline in Northeast Asia.134 The Russian government had initially 
considered three alternative routes for the pipeline: from the Eastern Siberian city of
132 Prime-Tass Business News Agency 2005, 25 August, 2005.
133 Philip Andrews-Speed, Xuanli Lao and Roland Dannreuther, The Strategic Implications o f China’s 
Energy Needs (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 63.
134 “Angarsk- Nakhodka pipeline, a priority o f Russian energy strategy,” The International Association o f 
Independent Tanker Owners for Safe Transport, Cleaner Seas and Free Competition (INTERTANKO), 23 
May, 2004, and “Japan ready to invest in Nakhodka pipeline,” Alexander’s Gas and Oil Connections, Vol. 
8, No. 9, 14 March, 2003.
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Angarsk either to the Chinese city of Daqing with a capacity of 30 million tones o f oil 
per annum, or to Nakhodka with a capacity of 50 million tones of oil per annum. The 
third option was to build the Angarsk Nakhodka pipeline with a link leading to 
Daqing.135 China and Japan both campaigned actively to win access to Russian oil 
pipelines, and in December 2004 it appeared that Japan’s bid for the Nakhodka route 
had succeeded over the Daqing China route. While avoiding dependency on a single 
market, the Nakhodka route would fit better into Putin’s plan to develop the Russian Far
1 7AEast, capable of supplying domestic markets as well as foreign buyers. However, as 
of February 2005, Putin had not completely ruled out the Chinese route option, and 
continued to negotiate pipeline route options with both countries.
Although South Korea is not currently involved in the Eastern Siberian oil 
pipeline project, future energy cooperation between Russia and South Korea, 
particularly in terms of an Eastern Siberian gas pipeline route, is affected by this project. 
It is important to understand that from the geographical perspective, none o f the 
bilateral energy agreements for new pipeline routes actually take into account the whole 
region. The problem is that it is extremely difficult to solve pipeline route disputes in 
the region simply on the basis of bilateral negotiations, because there is an interplay 
among the various energy relations in the region. For example, Russian-Japanese and 
Russian-Chinese energy relations have implications for Russian-Korean energy 
relations. Any bilateral arrangement may affect other relations and interests because 
they share the same area and use the same pool of energy resources. Therefore, a 
multilateral and regional approach is much needed in the energy diplomacy between 
Russia and South Korea.
Moreover, from a regional economic security perspective, Northeast Asian 
regional integration depends upon shared economic, political, and ideological interests. 
Given that economic interdependence is essential for regional economic security 
cooperation, the Kovykta, Sakhalin gas, and Eastern Siberian oil pipeline projects 
clearly have the potential to promote greater regional integration in Northeast Asia by 
achieving each nation’s energy security interests. For example, Russian oil and gas 
projects in the region require an expensive cross-border delivery infrastructure. This
135 Russia’s pipeline monopoly Transneft backed the Nakhodka project, while Russia’s major oil 
company Yukos supported the pipeline to Daqing. See “Japan ready to invest in Nakhodka pipeline,” 
Alexander’s Gas and Oil Connections, Vol. 8, No. 9, 14 March, 2003; and “Russia prefers oil Angarsk- 
Nakhodka pipeline with a branch in Daqing,” Informatsionno-analiticheskii tsentr <M ineral>  16 October, 
2003, on www.eng.mineral.ru. accessed on 20 June, 2004.
136 Ibid.
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means that the problem of financing the projects is complex and finding a solution will 
be closely related to the ability of governments to cooperate. Moreover, there are other 
important issues that need collective evaluation and assessment, including regional 
energy efficiency and the potentially adverse region-wide environmental impacts of 
expanding energy consumption. In short, both secure and sustainable energy use in 
Northeast Asia can be achieved only through a comprehensive and multilateral approach.
Despite the potential for contributing to bilateral and regional economic security, 
the reality is that the energy projects have not emerged as a substantial functioning unit 
o f economic activity so far. There have been many talks and proposals in the last 
decade about oil and gas pipeline routes. However, other than the Sakhalin projects, 
eastern Siberian oil and gas projects have either ceased to exist or have developed 
slowly due to Russia’s protectionist energy policy and its domestic petroleum industry 
interests, South Korea’s lack o f an energy strategy, the Northeast Asian competition for 
Russia’s oil and gas pipeline routes, the unstable situation in the Korean peninsula, 
insufficient financing for the development o f the Russian Far East, and the lack of 
multi-lateral institutional arrangements in Northeast Asia. Most o f all, the 
competitiveness o f Russia’s oil and gas prices in the Northeast Asian energy market is 
debatable. Moreover, the Kovykta gas pipeline project is stalled and, although the 
Sakhalin project is progressing, the scale of production remains insignificant at this 
stage. This means that despite its great potential, energy cooperation between Russia 
and Northeast Asia, including South Korea, has not developed as fast as anticipated. 
Although it is clear that energy pipeline issues are transnational, there is insufficient 
understanding and consideration o f the transnational and interdependent character of 
energy diplomacy. What currently passes for national, and particularly regional energy 
policy, is primitive both conceptually and analytically. The major obstacle is an 
inability to formulate and implement energy policy as an integrated whole, balancing 
the overall interests o f the nation and the region in both the short and long term. As a 
result, Russia’s oil and gas projects have so far established neither bilateral nor regional 
economic security.
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Chapter 4. Transport Network Cooperation: The 
Trans-Siberian and Trans-Korean Railroad Linking 
Project
Introduction
The project to link the Trans-Siberian Railroad (TSR) with the Trans-Korean 
Railroad (TKR)1 in which the two countries are currently engaged is one o f the key 
aspects o f Russian-South Korean relations. This chapter examines the progress, 
problems, and prospects of the TSR and TKR linking project. Its main purpose is to 
investigate whether this project could contribute to building Russian-South Korean 
economic security relations and regional economic security.
Russia has the potential to be a “great transit power” in the 21st century by 
serving as a transportation bridge between the European and Asian markets. The TSR 
is the key to fulfilling this potential. Korea’s geographical location between the 
Eurasian continent and the Asia Pacific Ocean offers a similar potential. When the 
Korean peninsula was divided, South Korea became a virtual island cut off from the 
mainland by communist North Korea, and relying on shipping to send cargo either 
around Asia and via the Suez Canal, or to the Russian Far East where it is trans-shipped 
onto the TSR.
This project fits into the concept of regional economic security and traditional 
geo-strategic security. The project envisages train shipments across North Korea with 
the goal o f providing South Korea with a rail link to Europe to transport its exports.
The project could be the overture for the development of regional economic integration 
in Northeast Asia, and the keystone to promoting economic links between Northeast 
Asia and Europe. Moreover, from a traditional security perspective, it could also serve 
to reduce tension in the Korean peninsula and, in the longer term, facilitate the Korean 
reunification process (see Chapter 8).
However, the project has been delayed and there have been no substantial 
benefits or concrete outcomes so far. The chapter concludes that despite the optimistic 
views o f the potential of this railroad link to contribute to comprehensive security, 
current obstacles clearly impede the two countries’ bilateral and regional economic
1 The Trans-Korean Railroad (TKR) means the V-shaped two tier Korean railway lines, the Kyongui Line 
and the Kyongwon Line. The Kyongui Line stretches along the regions near the west coast and is set to 
be connected to the Trans-Chinese Railroad (TCR). The Kyongwon line is located on the east coast and 
is set to be connected to the Trans-Siberian Railroad (TSR).
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security building process. I argue that the main obstacle to railroad linkage cooperation 
between Moscow and Seoul lies in external factors: namely the unresolved North 
Korean nuclear crisis.
I will begin with a brief examination of the historical background of the TSR 
before turning to the development o f the project, and the debate regarding the obstacles 
and opportunities the project presents. The final part o f the chapter examines the 
implications of this transport network for bilateral and regional economic security.
1. Background of the TSR
The completion of the TSR greatly affected the history of the Russian empire, 
the Soviet Union, and modem Russia by opening up Siberia. The TSR was built by the 
last Russian Tsar, Nikolai II, to link Russia’s eastern and western regions and it began 
to make Siberia accessible to commercial transport in the late nineteenth century.2 Its 
construction began in 1891, on the initiative o f Russian Minister o f Finance, Sergei 
Witte, and was completed in 1905. The purpose o f building it was
1) to assert the metropolitan government’s control o f its far-flung eastern 
possessions
2) to counter private initiatives and foreign influences in the borderlands
3) to restrain the aspirations of Siberia’s regionalist intelligentsia for greater 
autonomy from the centre.
Witte aimed both to unify the nation and to end Russia’s domination by European 
ideology and industry. Imperial Russia attempted to use the railway not simply as a 
means o f transportation and industrial development, but as an instrument for 
accelerating the colonization and Russification o f northern Asia, particularly in the 
newly acquired Far Eastern provinces.4 In fact, as Steven Marks asserts, during the 
tsarist Russia period the economic advantages the railroad brought to Siberia were 
questionable. From a strategic perspective, however, “the construction o f a railroad
2 Stephen White, “Is Russia a Country in the Globalization Era? (With special reference to the Far East),” 
Presentation prepared for a conference: The Regional Cooperation o f  Northeast Asia and Russia’s 
Globalization for the 21s* Century, Seoul, Korea 22-24 June, 2003.
3 Steven G. Marks, R oad to Power: The Tram Siberian Railroad and the Colonization o f  Asian Russia 
1850-1917  (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd Publishers, 1991), pp. 1-8, and 220-226; and Allan Wood, 
“Road to Power,” Business History, Vol. 34, Issue 4, November 1992, pp. 1-10.
4 Marks, pp. 1-8, an d 220-226; and Wood, p. 111.
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capable o f transporting troops to the Pacific and effecting the annexation o f northern 
Manchuria was a major contributory factor to the outbreak of war with Japan.”5 In 
short, in Imperial Russia, commerce, industry, and economic growth were not ends in 
themselves; they were subordinated to the necessity of state.6 Imperial Russia refused 
to take suggestions and financial assistance from foreign entrepreneurs, opting to use 
only its own domestic financial resources because it feared foreign influence on Siberia 
and the Russian Far East.7 It is ironic that 100 years later, the TSR has become an 
important economic instrument to attract private and foreign investment, as well as a 
tool to promote Russia’s regional integration.
5 Marks, p. 222.
6 Ibid., p. xii, and preface.
7 Sergey Sigachyov, “How Trans-Siberian Railroad Was Built,” Trans Siberian Railroad- H istorical 
Review , 31 January, 1999, on http://www.geocities.com/MotorCitv/Speedwav/4283/dates.htm. accessed 
on 25 March, 2004.
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Figure 4 Trans-Siberian Railroad in the early 20th century
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The original TSR line began at Chelyabinsk, and ran toward the east through 
Omsk, Novosibirsk, Krasnoyarsk, Irkutsk, and Chita. It also passed through Manchuria, 
before re-entering Russian territory and ending at Vladivostok. The Manchurian section 
of the line is known as the Chinese Eastern Railroad. Direct railroad connection
o
between Chelyabinsk and the Pacific Coast was established in October 1916. The 
present TSR branches off from the original line at Chita to follow, roughly, the Amur 
and Ussuri rivers and reaches Vladivostok by way of Khabarovsk; it lies entirely in 
Russian territory. The length of the Moscow-Vladivostok run is 9,310 km. The TSR 
now has several branch lines, notably the line connecting Omsk with Yekaterinburg.
An entirely new railway line, the Baikal-Amur main line (BAM), was constructed 
between 1974 and 1989 as a means of unlocking its potential and that of Siberia as a
8 Ibid.
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whole.9 A branch from the TSR to Ust-Kut connects with the BAM. TSR is also linked 
with the Turkistan-Siberia Railroad.10
More substantial development o f the TSR was done during the Soviet period and 
many o f the TSR projects implemented were devised by the Committee o f the Siberian 
Railroad. The relative importance of railways in the Soviet transportation system is 
indicated by the fact that in 1937, 90 percent of all freight was carried by rail, whereas 
only 8 percent was transported by waterway and 2 percent by truck.11
Shipment of cargo by the TSR between the Far East and Europe began in the 
1920s. The first commercial use o f low capacity containers dates back to 1933, and for 
almost forty years little changed in terms of the size and quality o f containers, or their 
uses. The turning point for containerization and delivery was during the ninth five-year 
plan (1971-75), when container shipments expanded 1.7 times to 66.5 million tons, and 
palletized ones increased 2.5 times to 170 million tons. Container shipments by the 
TSR were considerably enhanced in 1971 by the official inauguration of the Trans- 
Siberian Land Bridge for the movement of high-capacity units between Europe and the 
Far East, with Japan’s participation.12 78 percent of the total cargo to Europe from 
Japan was transported through Nakhodka port. By the end of 1981, with the addition of 
South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Thailand, and infrequent customers including 
Australia and New Zealand, the number of customers using the TSR had increased.
Total cargo volumes had increased to almost 100,000 loaded twenty ton equivalent units, 
slightly more than half of which went from Japan to Europe.13
Prior to recent developments linking the TSR and the TKR, the TSR and Korea 
shared a rather tragic history during Stalin’s purges in the 1930s. In 1937, ostensibly 
for reasons o f security, innocent ethnic Koreans were abruptly transported from 
Primorskii in the Soviet Far East to Central Asia. Under Soviet Army command,
200,000 Koreans were carried in 1,800 TSR cargo wagons, 40 people to a wagon.
During the three to four week journey, approximately 2,000 o f them are reported to
9 White, S., 2003.
10 “Trans-Siberian Railroad,” The Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia, 6th ed. 2003, Columbia University 
Press.
11 Frederick V. Field, An Economic Survey o f  the Pacific Area: Part II Transportation  by Katherine R.C. 
Greene International Secretariat, Institute o f  Pacific Relations, 1941 Shanghai, p. 20.
12 Izvestiya, 31 March, 1981; and Victor L. Mote, “Containerization and the Trans-Siberian Land Bridge,” 
G eographical Review, Vol. 74, No. 3, July 1984, p. 305.
13 Mote, p. 305.
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have died o f cold, hunger, disease, and train rollover accidents.14 Food shortage and 
sanitary conditions aggravated mortality.15 It is ironic that almost 70 years later, the 
TSR is becoming a key instrument in enhancing relations between Russia and South 
Korea while carrying Korean manufactured goods to Central Asia, Russia, and Europe.
2. The development of the project to link the TSR and TKR
The project to link the TSR and TKR was first proposed by the Russian Ministry 
o f Railways in October 2000,16 and in December 2000, Russia and South Korea agreed 
to hold an official railroad ministry meeting involving North Korea for the first tim e.17 
The plan is to connect the Khasan station on the Russian border with North Korea and 
the North-South Korean border via the 800 kilometre-long-TKR.18 Along with the gas 
pipeline projects, it is one o f the most promising areas o f discussions between Russia 
and South Korea,19 and since the gas projects require multilateral-cooperative efforts 
from China, Japan, the United States, possibly Mongolia and other multinational oil and 
gas companies, it probably has a better chance of early completion on condition that the 
North Korean nuclear crisis is resolved.
Following a feasibility study on 28 August, 2001, performed at Khasan station,
the final Russian stop on the TSR, Korean experts were apparently satisfied with the
00state of equipment and computerization on the Russian side. On 30 August 2001, a
seven-member Korean delegation also visited Novosibirsk, a major TSR station, and St.
Petersburg, through which Asian cargo transits to Finland and other northern European 
01countries. On 3 September 2001 Russian and South Korean railway officials 
discussed establishing a joint commission with North Korea to consider extending the
14 Chosun II bo, “Stalin Hanin Kang Je I Ju,” (The Tragedy o f  Stalin’s Forced Korean Immigration), 2 
February, 1992, p. 11.
15 Lenin Kichi (Ethnic Korean newspaper in Central Asia), 17 August, 1989, p. 4.
16 Svetlana Kuzmichenko, Vladivostok, The Business Information Services for the N ew ly Independent 
States (BISNIS), US Department o f  Commerce, Representative, Survey on Railroad Projects in the 
Russian Far East, on http://www.bisnis.doc.gOv/bisnis/isa/010921 rail.htm. accessed on 6 March, 2004.
17 2003 Annual Report o f  Russian-Korean Relations, The Korean Ministry o f  Commerce, Industry and 
Energy.
18 “Fadeyev says linking Trans Siberia to Korea cost over $2 bin,” Prime-Tass Business News Agency 
2 0 0 4 ,17 February, 2004.
19 Alexander Losyukov, Speech by the former Russian Deputy Foreign Minister on the eve o f  a meeting 
o f  Russian and South Korean foreign ministers on 16 November, 2003, M oscow, 15 November, 2003 
quoted in Agence France Presse, 15 November, 2003. See also Yong-kwan Yun, speech by South 
Korean Minister o f  Foreign Affairs and Trade at the opening ceremony for a new building for the South 
Korean Embassy in M oscow, 17 November, 2003, on Briefings o f  Ministry o f  Foreign Affairs and Trade 
Republic o f  Korea, 18 November, 2003, on http://www.mofat.go.kr/en/rel/e rel view.m of.
20 Anatoly Medetsky, “Russia, South Korea hold Trans-Siberian talk,” Vladivostok News, 7 September, 
2001 on http://vn.vladnews.ru/Arch/2001/ISS273/News/News02.HTM . accessed on 22 March, 2004.
21 Ibid.
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00TSR across the Korean peninsula. They agreed to develop projects for laying broad- 
gauge railways and constructing an inter-modal cargo terminal in South Korea, as well 
as an office o f Russia’s Railway Ministry in Seoul, while South Korea would assign a 
railroad expert to its embassy in Moscow. In December 2001, Seoul and Moscow set 
up a railroad cooperation committee responsible for preliminary jobs such as a 
geographical survey, the revision of tracks, the improvement o f railroads in North Korea, 
and securing enough cargo on the railroad. In July 2002, Russian Foreign Minister Igor 
Ivanov visited Seoul, and discussed the TSR and TKR linking project further.23 Russia 
and South Korea also arranged two international railroad conferences in Novosibirsk in 
November 2002 and in Seoul in December 2003. The Novosibirsk conference dealt 
with the prospects of economic, scientific, and technical cooperation between the two 
sides, as well as the importance of creating a Eurasian regional community.24 During 
the Seoul conference in 2003, Konstantin Komarov, the president of Siberia 
Transportation University, emphasized that an exchange o f experts from the three 
countries was necessary, not only at the government but also at the academic level.25
In January 2004, the South Korean Railroad invented a special maintenance free 
freight train that can survive severe cold weather up to minus 50 degrees Celsius, in 
preparation for the link to the TSR. According to Won Ki Park, manager o f the railroad 
car division at the Korean Railroad, the company is currently working on two projects: a
cargo transfer system and inventing machinery for changing tracks, since Korean and
0(\Russian tracks are different.
According to Vladimir Pechyorin, the spokesman for Russia’s Railway Ministry,
trains in North Korea travel at a speed o f no more than 30 kilometres per hour because
0 0there is no gravel to reinforce the old rail embankment. The primary task at this stage, 
therefore, is to upgrade the North Korean railroad, but this can only be achieved if  the 
relations between North and South go smoothly.
So far, perhaps the visit by the North Korean leader, Kim Jong II, to Moscow via 
the TSR in August 2001 can be regarded as one of the highlights in the railroad linking
22 One Vladivostok spokesman for Russia’s Railway Ministry said on 30 August, 2001 that South Korea 
wants to join the project extending the Trans-Siberian Railroad to its ports through the communist North. 
See Medetsky, 2001.
23 Medetsky, 2001; “S. Korea, Russia to Set Up Committee for Linking Railways,” Xinhua News Agency, 
11 October, 2001; and “Russia to continue cooperation for Korean Peninsula peace,” Xinhua News 
Agency, 26 July, 2002.
24 “Novosibirsk hosts conference on linking Trans-Siberian railroad to railways in South and North 
Korea,” Pravda. RU, 5 November, 2002, on http://english.pravda.rU/region/2002/l 1/05/39133 .html.
25 Hankuk Economics Newspaper, 17 December, 2003.
26 Joon Seok Hong, “Korean Railroad Report,” Seoul Economics Newspaper, 16 January 2004.
27 Medetsky, 2001.
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project. Following the visit, Russian Railways Minister Nikolai Aksyonenko and 
North Korean Railways Minister Kin Yong Sam signed a cooperation agreement. A 
month later a delegation of Russian railway specialists, including railway engineers, 
designers, bridge construction engineers, and land surveyors, visited North Korea to 
collect technical information for the feasibility study.30 In 2002, Russia agreed with 
North Korea to link the North Korean stretch o f the TKR with the TSR. In August that 
year Kim Jong II took another TSR trip to Russia, where he discussed with Putin the
t
need to link the TSR. In December the three countries agreed to hold a trilateral 
railway ministers meeting. During a second negotiation between North Korean and 
Russian railways officials in April 2003, the two countries failed to agree on the issue of 
rail tracks and locomotives. Nevertheless, on 23 October 2003, 100 Russian experts 
from the Far East Railroad (FER) resumed their survey o f North Korean railroads. In 
December 2003, North Korea and Russia reported that they had completed their joint 
land surveys for the modernization o f the North Korean east coast railroad, focusing 
primarily on railroad bridges and their piers.34 Finally, in July 2004, they agreed to 
modernize the railroad between Raj in, North Korea’s northeastern-most port city, and 
Khasan, the final stop on the TSR.35
Another important event was the first railroad expert conference that took place 
in Moscow on 28-30 April, 2004. This was the first meeting between representatives of 
non-government organizations from each of the three countries, and it provided a basis 
for trilateral railroad cooperation.36
On the Russian side, the Economic Development and Trade Ministry is now in 
charge o f constructing the plan for the project.37 On the South Korean side, the Korea 
Rail Network Authority, which was established in January 2004, is directing the project
28 Kim Jong U took the same train route that his father had taken more than a decade before. See “DPRK 
Top Leader Kim Jong II On Way to M oscow by Train,” Xinhua News Agency, 26 July, 2001.
29 Alla Startseva, “Work Starts on Seoul Rail Link,” M oscow Times, 16 August, 2001.
30 Kuzmichenko.
31 Sergei Blagov, “North Korean, Russian ties firmly on track 2002,” 2002 Asia Times, on 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/printN.html. accessed on 6 March, 2004.
32 Kuzmichenko.
33 Itar Tass, 20 October, 2003, quoted in Dong-A II bo (Korean Newspaper), 20 October, 2003, and 
Chosun II bo  (Korean Newspaper), 28 October, 2003.
34 “North Korea, Russia Complete Joint Rail Link Survey,” BBC M onitoring International Reports, 31 
December, 2003.
35 Hankook Ilbo, 12 October, 2004.
36 Won Yong Sung, “Nodaetongryongui Bang Ruh Uuiwa Han-Ruh Kyotong hyupryukui Kw aje (The 
Implications o f  President Roh’s visit to Russia and what is to be done for transport cooperation?)” Report 
material from seminar, Center for Logistics, Transport econom ics & Northeast Asian Studies, The Korea 
Transport Institute, 11 October, 2004, p. 34.
37 Prime-Tass Business News Agency 2004', Alla Startseva, “Yakovlev: Railways Ministry’s Days 
Numbered,” The St. Petersburg Times, 5 August, 2003, on
http://www.sptimes.rU/archive/times/890/news/b 9986.htm. accessed on 9 April, 2004.
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in collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Ministry of 
Construction and Transportation, the Korean National Railroad, and the Korean 
Railroad Research Institute. Russia and the two Koreas plan to set up an international 
consortium as the next step. Although Pyongyang and Seoul had agreed on September 
1, 2000 to reconnect the railway link between Seoul and Shinuiju in North Korea, little 
action has yet been taken to implement the project, mainly due to the unresolved North
T ftKorean nuclear crisis. In December 2004, the railroad project stopped when North 
Korea ceased negotiations on construction because the US toughened its policy toward 
North Korea.39
There are two possible connecting routes for the TSR-TKR link: Seoul- 
Pyongyang- Khasan and Seoul-Wonsan-Khasan. As Figure 5 shows, the TSR could be 
linked to either the Kyongui line (Seoul-Shinuiju) or the Kyongwon line (Seoul- 
Wonsan) in the Korean peninsula.40
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38 Financial News, 7 January, 2004; Prime-Tass Business News Agency 2004\ and Chosun II bo (Korean 
Newspaper), 28 October, 2003 and 19 February, 2004.
39 Stephen Blank, “Russia’s Ups and Downs in the Korean Nuclear Negotiations,” Jamestown Foundation 
Monitor, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 2, No. 162, 18 August, 2005.
40 Shinuiju is a city in northwestern North Korea, capital o f North P'y&ngan Province. The Kyongui line 
was constructed by Japan in 1906 to facilitate their colonial rule on the Korean peninsula and their 
advance into Manchuria; Wonsan is a southeastern North Korean port city.
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The Kyongui line leads to Europe via China and Mongolia, whereas the 
Kyongwon line connects to Europe via Siberia. Russia favours the restoration o f the 
Kyongwon line because this will create more transportation revenues and facilitate the 
economic development o f the Russian Far East.41 The railroad was initially meant to 
run from Seoul to Shineuiju, but, during his visit to Russia in 2001, Kim Jeong II 
changed the route to follow the Kyongwon line on North Korea’s eastern coast instead 
o f the western coast Kyongui line, which links directly to Russia without crossing 
China.42 If reconnected, the line would link South Korea’s eastern port city o f 
Kangnung across the demilitarized zone to North Korea’s eastern coastal city o f 
Chongjin via Wonsan in the North. The South Korean government announced in March 
2004 that it would invest US $7 billion by 2015 to develop the South Korean eastern 
coastal line to directly connect the TSR as part of its policy to “improve national goods 
distribution channel policy.”43
The Russian Ministry of Railways will invest in the reconstruction o f the 
railway in North Korea if it is guaranteed that the annual cargo volume from South 
Korea and tariffs will be equal to the transit railway tariffs in China. Russia will have to 
rebuild and electrify 930 km of railway (Russian standard-1,520 mm track width) in 
North Korea and clear a border territory near South Korea o f mines. Russia is also 
planning to build a highway along the railway in North Korea. The construction will be 
completed by the Far Eastern Railways and the estimated construction period is 2 years, 
at a cost o f about US $250 million, and a payback period of 3-5 years.44
If  the TSR passing through North Korea and linking the Korean Peninsula with 
Europe is completed, it will take approximately 17 days to transport cargo from Japan to 
Finland, compared with 30 days in the case o f maritime transport.45 The annual 
capacity o f the route is estimated at 500,000 containers.46 Only 5 percent o f 1 million 
containers, hauled yearly between the Asia Pacific region and Europe, currently travel 
by the TSR.47 Moreover, once a single road corridor connecting South Korea, North
41 Marat Abulkhatin, “M oscow, Pyongyang Contemplate Mine-Clearing Operations Near DMZ,” Itar 
Tass, October 31 ,2 0 0 0  in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Daily Report/Soviet (DR/SOV) 
(2001-1031).
42 Startseva, M oscow Times, 16 August, 2001.
43 Financial News, 2 March, 2004; and 16 January, 2004.
44 Kuzmichenko.
45 Costs would be significantly reduced. The TSR can cut the delivery time from the 30 to 40 days 
required for sea transport to 13 to 18 days. See “Foreign Investors Keen on Inchon FEZ,” Hankook Ilbo 
(Korea Times), 19 November, 2003; and Medetsky, 2001.
46 Medetsky, 2001.
47 In 2001, The TSR transported 45,000 containers from east to west. See Anatoly Medetsky, “Trans- 
Siberian link to S. Korea criticized,” Vladivostok News, 30 July, 2002; and Medetsky, 2001.
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Korea, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Europe is operational, the TSR could handle up 
to 10 percent o f all ‘Eurasian’ cargo turnover.48 According to Son Hok-rae, the director 
o f South Korea’s National Railroad Department, South Korea could also use the link to 
import natural resources from Siberia and the Russian Far East.49
3. Obstacles
Although the benefits o f linking the TSR and the TKR are clear, a number of 
obstacles are delaying the project.
3.1. Economic dimension
One o f the major problems at this stage is financing the project. Russia and 
Korean experts discussed the project’s financing and technical aspects during the first 
railroad conference in Moscow on 28-30 April 2004. The initial estimate was that it 
would cost US $250 million. However, the final estimate, which included upgrading 
the North Korean track and computerizing signal systems, turned out to be more than 
US $2.5-3 billion.50 In February 2004 Russian Railroad Minister, Gennady Fadeyev, 
announced that Russia had already spent US $13 million to repair North Korean 
routes.51 Igor Pikan believes that the project might require an additional $3 to $5 billion 
to upgrade railway equipment and to expand seaports and stations so that they can 
accommodate the expected increase in rail traffic.52 According to a Russian diplomatic 
source, Russia was expected to allocate some 4 billion roubles for the project, one 
billion roubles of which had already been spent on repairing a 28 kilometre section of 
the TSR.53 The Russian Ministry of Railways has sought investment from US 
companies, as well as reportedly establishing an international consortium for the 
reconstruction o f North Korean routes.54 The Korean Construction and Transportation 
Ministry has declared that it would cost an estimated US $236 million dollars to restore 
the Seoul-Wonsan line. The South Korean government is also considering loans from 
international financial institutions including the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and
48 “Fadeyev says linking Prime-Tass Business News Agency 2004.
49 Medetsky, 2001.
50 According to Russia’s railway ministry, it could cost more than $3.26 billion (103 billion roubles). See 
Valery Agarkov, “South Korea, Russia work on Asia-Europe transport corridor,” Itar Tass News Agency, 
27 February, 2004; and Blagov.
51 Kookmin II bo  (Korean Newspaper), 19 February, 2004.
52 Pikan is a General Director o f  the audit-consulting group Business Systems Development, which is 
working with Russian government on reforming the railways industry. See Startseva, M oscow Times, 10 
June, 2003.
53 “Russia, Korea to negotiate financing terms for railroad project in May,” Interfax News Agency, 16 
January, 2004.
54 Kuzmichenko and Kookmin II bo, 19 February, 2004.
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the United Nations (UN) Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 
(ESCAP).55 In short, the cost of this project is higher than expected.
3.2. Technical difficulties
Another obstacle is old equipment and machinery. The Russian railways, 
especially in the Far East, have a shortage o f rolling stock, and loading and unloading 
equipment. Moreover, having been built in the late 19th and early 20th century, the 
structure and facilities of the TSR are old and worn out, especially on the stretches 
crossing East Siberia and the Far East where there were fewer upgrades during the 
Soviet period. The line crosses mountainous terrain with steep inclines and small radius 
turns. In places, the track is laid over permafrost and becomes deformed as the ground 
thaws. Design limitations make modernization, such as lengthening station tracks to 
allow longer trains, difficult.56 The Russian Ministry o f Railways has estimated that it 
needs 760 billion roubles (about US $26 billion) for machinery and to modernize 
equipment.57 It is seeking domestic and foreign private investment for the project,58 and 
has designed a privatization plan which envisages a joint stock company ‘Russian 
Railways’ with corporate management. At the end o f a 3-phase reform, about 50 
percent o f the rolling stock would belong to private companies which would also be 
responsible for repair work, cargo and passenger transportation. The plan was approved 
by the Russian government in June 2004.59
On the North Korean side, the tracks need to be upgraded, and the signal 
systems need to be computerized. The North Korean region through which the railway 
runs is also very mountainous, and the tracks are in very poor condition.60 According to 
South Korean transportation experts, “even though the railway in North Korea looks 
fine, the structure is weak with huge accidents always possible due to a lack of 
electricity and aging facilities. North Korea’s railways are known to allow a speed of 
20-30 km per hour in mountainous regions.”61 In short, the North Korean railroad has 
to be completely reconstructed.
55 “South Korea, Russia Agree to Link Railways,” People's D aily Online, 10 September, 2000, on 
http://fpeng.peopledailv.com.cn/200009/10/print200000910 50195.htm l. accessed on 20 February, 2004.
56 Vladimir Kontorovich, Will the Far East Remain Part o f  Russia? Long-Run Economic Factors 
(Plainsboro, NJ: Commands Economies Research, Inc., July 1999), pp. 91-93.
57 Kuzmichenko.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid., and see also JSC Russian Railways, on http://www.eng.rzd.ru/static/index.html7he id=353. 
accessed on 1 January, 2006.
60 Vladivostok News, 30 July, 2002.
61 Hankook llbo , 12 October, 2004.
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3.3. North Korean participation
The most important factor that determines the success of this project is North 
Korea. The opening up o f North Korea is a prerequisite for the realization of the TSR- 
TKR link project. The relationships between Pyongyang and Seoul and, more 
importantly, between Pyongyang and Washington are, therefore, the key variables in 
deciding the pace o f further development o f the project. These relationships create as 
many opportunities as they do constraints. For example, the project gained momentum 
following the historic summit between the leaders of North and South Korea on 15 June, 
2000. The summit reduced tension in the Korean peninsula and created an attitude o f 
peace and cooperation. Three months later, South Korean President Kim Dae Jung and 
Putin agreed to implement the proposal to link the TSR and TKR during the UN 
“Millennium Summit” in New York.62 They also agreed to establish sub-committees on 
transportation under the existing Korean-Russian Joint Economic Commission for this 
project.63
At other times the North Korean factor has played a negative role in the trilateral 
railroad cooperation. In particular, the project has been substantially delayed by the 
inter-Korean dispute over North Korea’s nuclear programme.64 The situation in the 
Korean peninsula has been exacerbated by President Bush’s hard line policy towards 
North Korea and North Korea’s hostile response. The project came to a halt in 
November 2004 because North Korea refused to hold the second trilateral expert 
negotiation on railroad construction in Pyongyang because o f US policy.65 According 
to the Russian Railways Minister Gennady Fadeyev, “work on the Russian side is 
nearly completed, but until now it had been anyone’s guess when the mercurial North 
Korean leader Kim Jong II would allow his nation’s infrastructure to be tied to South 
Korea’s. The last major hurdle for the project was getting the Koreas to agree to 
connect their networks.”66
Moreover, it is not clear how the project will be viewed by international freight 
firms and insurers as South Korea is still technically at war with North Korea.67 When 
ESCAP conducted a feasibility test o f the various rail links from the Far East to Europe 
in 2003, it left out the TSR-TKR link because of the unstable political situation on the
62 Duckjoon Chang, “The Russian Far East and Northeast Asia: An Emerging Cooperative Relationship 
and its Constraints,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 26, No. 2, 2002, p. 55.
63 Hanky ore (Korean Newspaper), 26 February, 2001.
64 Losyukov.
65 R1A Novosti, 10 August, 2005.
66 Startseva, M oscow Times, 10 June, 2003.
67 Blagov, “North Korean, Russian ties firmly on track,” 2003.
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Korean peninsula, especially following the North Korean nuclear crisis. It may turn out 
that the proposed route is not competitive with other transport routes that can start 
marketing for international shipping companies in 2004.68
3.4. Problem s w ithin Russia
There are also a number of obstacles on the Russian side. The railroad project 
must be viewed in the broader context o f the regional development of the Russian Far 
East. As we have seen in previous chapters, since the break up of the Soviet Union the 
lack o f sound legal, socio-economic, and financial infrastructures has hindered the 
development of international trade and foreign investment in the Russian Far East. By 
the 1990s, for example, the Russian Far East had not yet developed a coherent legal 
framework with transparent rules for domestic and foreign investment or joint ventures. 
The major complaints aired by existing and potential foreign investors in the Russian 
Far East include the arbitrary and irrational tax structure, an unclear and constantly 
changing regulatory environment, and inadequate protection o f property rights.69 There 
is also a great deal o f bureaucratic red tape including complex and tricky importing 
processes and high duties, and the lack o f reliable information about the market and 
statistics and this damages economic cooperation between the Russian Far East and 
other states.70
Another serious problem is the backwardness o f financial infrastructures. Due 
to weak inter-bank ties, in the 1990s wire transfers of funds from and to the Russian Far
71East were quite often hampered or delayed. Clearly, foreign exchange and 
international financial instruments were insufficient in this region. These problems, 
coupled with the lack of security for high-value goods and high railroad tariffs, have 
discouraged foreign companies from using the TSR to transport exports bound for 
Europe. And as discussed above, aging machinery and unpredictable electrical and
77water supplies reduce the attractiveness o f the Russian Far East ports as well.
68 Hankuk Economics Newspaper, 24 October, 2003; and Bum Hee Hahm, Seoul Economics Newspaper, 
editorial, 23 November, 2003.
69 Dr. Trevor Gunn, Director o f  Business Information Service for the N ew ly Independent States (BISNIS) 
at the United States Department o f  Commerce International Trade Administration, Washington DC, USA, 
Telephone Interview, 22 April, 2004.
70 In a survey, a majority o f  South Korean companies pointed to bureaucratic red tape such as tricky 
customs inspection processes, high export-import duties, and lack o f  relevant information and 
transparency as major barriers to investment. See Segye Ilbo (Korean Newspaper), 27 February, 2001 
and Chang, p. 62.
71 Chang, pp. 62-63.
72 Judith Thornton and NadezhdaN. Mikheeva, “The Strategic o f  Foreign and Foreign Assisted Firms in 
the Russian Far East: Alternatives to Missing Infrastructure,” Com parative Economic Studies, Vol. 38, 
No. 4, 1996, pp. 85-119.
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One o f the potential problems that might slow down the pace o f the development 
o f the project is strikes, such as by the coal miners. During the country’s biggest 
miners’ strikes in 1990, coal miners blocked the TSR. And since 1998, the railway has
7*^been the frequent target of strikers.
Another important concern for the project is the potential for cargo robbery by 
railroad thieves. Transportation by railroad has often faced the danger of thieves 
elsewhere in the world.74 There is a much higher risk on the world’s longest railroad 
than anywhere else, particularly considering its remoteness in the eastern part o f Siberia. 
Theft has increased substantially on the TSR in recent years, and many shippers have 
stopped using Russian Far East (RFE) ports simply for this reason. Many Russian and 
foreign shipping companies coordinate their own cargo security in RFE ports, railway 
road, and customs. Pikan, addresses the importance of cargo safety, saying that “it is 
very important for the Russian Railways Co. to provide relevant quality and safety, 
referring to the new company that is taking over the assets of the Railways Ministry.” 
The head o f the transport committee of the Russian Chamber of Commerce, Vitaly 
Yefimov, points out that “although the TSR and TKR linking project has obvious cost 
and time advantages, most companies, especially those from Japan and South Korea,
77may still prefer the sea route because it is much safer.” Moreover, according to a 
Korea Trade Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) report, the current compensation
7 0
for cargo damages or loss has not been established in Russia. Thieves have also
70targeted railways for cable and rail tracks in Russia. A shortage o f freight cars, an
73 Anatoly Medetsky, “Siberian Coal Miners Give Malyshkin Short Shrift,” The M oscow Times, 10 
March, 2004; and “How Korea’s N ew  Railroad Will Change Northeast Asia,” Stratfor.com, 1 August, 
2000, on http://www2.gol.com/users/covnerhm/whvinterKorea rail.htm accessed on 6 March, 2004.
74 Park Jeong Kyu, Interview by the former manager o f  Korean shipping insurance company, Seoul, 
Korea, 20 July, 2004.
75 Irina Konstantinova, “Pacific Rim Countries Transit Cargo Attraction to the Primorsky Krai Ports and 
the Trans-Siberian Railroad,” Vladivostok, 17 December, 1999, U.S. & Foreign Commercial Service and 
the U.S. Department o f  State, 2000, on http://www.bisnis.doc.gov/bisnis/countrv/000118route.htm. 
accessed on 6 March, 2004.
76 For the first time in 138 years, since late 2003 the Russian Railways Ministry does not exist any longer. 
The Railways Ministry has split up the ministry’s regulatory and commercial operations to foster 
competition in the industry, with the government retaining direct control o f  the former. The Railways 
Ministry’s regulatory functions have been absorbed by the Transport Ministry since the new Russian 
Railroads Co., which took over its commercial operations, was established. See Alla Startseva, The St. 
Petersburg Times, 5 August, 2003.
77 Startseva, 2003
78 Suck Yung Kim, Cargo News, 1 August, 2002, on http://www.cargoneews.co.kr/gisa/200208/020801- 
3htm. accessed on 8 February, 2004.
79 Joseph McCann, “Russian thieves target airports, railways for cable, rail tracks,” American M etal 
Market, Vol. 108, No. 125, 29 June, 2000, p. 7.
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unpredictable rail operation system, a supertax charge for the collection of empty 
containers, are other problems on the Russian side.80
3.5. Problems within South Korea
The main obstacle to the project in South Korea is the general lack o f will on the 
part o f the government and Korean private enterprise. Whereas the Chinese and 
Japanese governments have been very active in investing in projects in the Russian Far 
East, both expertise and the will to implement the projects are lacking amongst Korean 
policy makers. Until the September 2004 Moscow summit between Putin and Roh, this 
resulted in a rather pessimistic view about investing in Russia among Korean 
government officials and the business community. Despite the impetus provided by the 
summit, both foreign policy makers and businessmen still tend to look more at short­
term benefits rather than at long-term investment when dealing with Russia. Moreover, 
the recent domestic political turmoil in Korea has further hindered the development of 
bilateral or multilateral projects between Russia and South Korea. The impeachment of 
Korean President Roh Moo Hyun in March 2004 divided South Korea and distracted
Koreans from the potentially profitable investment opportunities in the Russian Far 
81East. Since Roh actively supported a pro-North Korean policy, after his impeachment 
virtually all the negotiations between Seoul and Pyongyang came to a halt. Furthermore, 
South Korea has been experiencing political, social, and economic chaos originating 
from inherent regionalism, the ideological rift between generations, and evident societal 
divisions. Some political scientists argue that South Koreans are more sharply divided
89now than at any point since the restoration o f democracy in 1987. Since Russia has 
relatively low priority on the Korean foreign policy agenda, several Russian-South 
Korean projects which were underway have been delayed.
4. Sceptics and optimists
Sceptical and optimistic groups argue diametrically opposite things about the 
potential advantages of the railway link. As a result of all the obstacles described in 
section 3, sceptics doubt that the project will bring economic benefits or help bring 
about Korean unification. They argue that the planned link may not be cost-effective
80 Kim, Cargo News, 1 August, 2002.
81 Lee Jin Hyun, The Korean Ministry o f  Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Director o f  CIS Division, 
Interview conducted in Seoul, Korea, 28 March, 2004.
82 Anthony Faiola and Joohee Cho, “Divided S. Koreans Impeach President,” Washingtonpost, 12 March, 
2004, p. A12.
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for a number of reasons. First, South Korea is highly likely to have to move businesses 
to China or Southeast Asia to lower production costs in future years. This will make sea 
routes more advantageous than the TSR.83 In 2002 Hisako Tsuji, a senior Japanese 
economist at the Economic Research Institute for Northeast Asia, argued that the project 
was simply a political game which was used by former South Korean President Kim 
Dae Jung to maintain his regime and help his party win the presidential election in 2002. 
She predicted that Kim Dae Jung would disappear from politics after the elections, “and 
no-one knows what new scenarios there will be.” It is also interesting to note that in 
2001, Russian officials were quite pessimistic about the revival o f rail links with North 
Korea. In March 2001, for example, Railways Minister Gennady Fadeyev maintained 
that linking the TKR and TSR posed a “huge political risk” that required substantial 
investment. Later, however, he called the project the most promising one in the
85region.
Second, the cost o f sea transportation is steadily decreasing. In 2002 the rates 
charged by Russian railroads for container transit were still higher than those o f ocean
QS _
shippers. The cost of sending cargo from Busan to Finland by ship for example, was 
US$ 2,100 per 40 foot container, much lower than the $2,800 charged for the TSR
87route. According to Vladimir Kontorovich, faster delivery of goods with a high value-
88to-volume ratio may explain the higher cost of overland transport. The pessimists 
estimate that the lower cost of sea transportation may depreciate the advantage o f the 
shorter train journey o f 20 days compared with 35 days by sea. Moreover, cargo would 
travel 500 kilometres within South Korea, and South Korea’s railroad rates are more 
expensive than sea rates. It is also not clear what fee North Korea would charge.
Third, cargo would have to be transferred onto different types o f train cars in
O Q
Russia because Russian tracks are wider than the Korean tracks. As Table 2 shows, 
Russian track widths are 1,520mm, whereas both South and North Korean track widths
83 Medetsky, 2002.
84 Tsuji made the comments on the sidelines o f  an international conference in Vladivostok on 24-25 July, 
2002. The conference discussed the role o f  TSR and the project to link it with the South Korean railway 
system. See Vladivostok News, 30 July, 2002.
8 Blagov.
86 Vladimir Kontorovich, “Economic Crisis in the Russian Far East: Overdevelopment or Colonial 
Exploitation?” Post-Soviet Geography and Economics, Vol. 42, No. 6 ,2001 , p. 405. Kontorovich is a 
Professor o f  Economics at Haverford College in the USA.
87 Vladivostok News, 30 July, 2002.
88 Kontorovich, 2001, p. 404.
89 Vladivostok News 30 July, 2002; and Kuzmichenko.
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are 1,435 mm.90 The same problems occur when the cargo crosses into Europe, since it 
has to be reloaded onto European standard gauge rail cars or trucks.91
T able 2 T rack widths and Voltages
(Unit: mm, V)
S. Korea N. Korea Russia Belarus Poland Germany
Track
Width
The Standard Gauge 
(1,435)
The Broad Gauge 
(1,520)
The Standard Gauge 
(1,435)
Voltage 25,000AC 3,000DC 25,000AC 3,000DC 15,000AC
Sources: Korea Russia Friendship Express: the Ministry o f  Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Ministry o f  
Construction and Transportation, Korean National Railroad, and the Korean Railroad Research Institute,
2004.
This may cause delays and it suggests that there is no significant difference between 
the TSR and sea routes in terms o f door-to-door delivery time between the Far East and 
Europe. Another likely problem will be aggressive lobbying by shipping companies 
whose business is directly connected to sea transportation and Korean air freighters.
The pessimists estimate that the current cargo volume from the Far East to Europe via 
the TSR, 100,000 TEU,94 is barely one percent o f the 140,650,000 TEU of cargo by 
sea,95 and this suggests that there is unlikely to be a dramatic shift from sea routes to the 
TSR in the near future.
However, there are already indications that the development o f the TSR route 
has caused the decline of several ports in the southern Russian Far East. There is also a 
possibility that South Korea’s domestic seaports, particularly the Busan port, will 
decline in the longer term because, train cargo volumes will increase and the business of 
the seaports that currently handle 90 percent o f all cargo in Korea will diminish.96
Optimists argue equally strongly that the project could provide Korea and Russia 
with the perfect opportunity to become notable transit powers in the longer term. They 
maintain that, since trains can move faster than ships, and the overland route from the
90 Korean Railroad Report, Seoul Economics Newspaper, 16, January 2004.
91 Kontorovich, 2001, p. 405.
92 In the early 1990s, a train took on average 14 days to go from Nakhodka to Brest, on the western border 
o f  Belarus. A ship from Japan to Rotterdam took an average o f  26 days. However, the full door-to-door 
delivery time between Japan and Germany was estimated to be 28 days via the Trans-Siberian, and 30 
days by sea. And sea carriers are capable o f  sustaining a transit time o f  24 days from Japan to Rotterdam, 
thereby eliminating the land bridge’s advantage. See European Bank o f  Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD), Railway Sector Survey o f  Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. Summary Report, London, 
January 1993, p. 25, quoted in Kontorovich, p. 405.
93 Alla Startseva, “Korean Rail Link a Potential Watershed,” M oscow Times, 10 June, 2003.
94 Twenty-foot equivalent units (One 20 feet container).
95 Hankuk Economics Newspaper, 24 October, 2003.
96 Kuzmichenko.
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Far East to Western Europe is shorter, transit by TSR and TKR can save more time 
between supplier and consumer than by sea route.
Table 3 C om parisons between the TSR route and Sea routes (from  South Korea to W estern Europe)
Distance
(1,000km)
Transportation
(Days)
Transportation Costs 
(US$1,000)
The TSR route 12.4 18 1.2
Sea Routes 19.2 26 1.4
Saving efficiency by the 
TSR
-6.8 -8 -0.2
Sources: Ministry o f  Railway Transport o f  Russian Federation, Transsiberian Mainline in the 21st 
Century, 2001.
Table 4 Com parisons between the TSR route and Sea routes (From  South Korea to Finland)
Distance
(1,000km)
Transportation
(Days)
Transportation Costs 
(US$1,000)
The TSR route 10.9 12.5 1.2
Sea Routes 22.8 28.0 1.8
Saving efficiency by the 
TSR
-11.9 -15.5 -0.6
Sources: Ministry o f  Railway Transport o f  Russian Federation, Transsiberian Mainline in the 21st 
Century, 2001.
Depending on origin and destination, the rail route is approximately 13,400 kilometres 
(8,375 miles) long, compared to 20, 750 kilometres (13,000miles) by sea through the 
Suez Canal, 23,200 kilometres (14,500 miles) through the Panama Canal, or 27,000 
kilometres (16,900 miles) around the Cape o f Good Hope.97
Second, optimists argue that the new rail line would fundamentally change the
nature of trade and industry not only at the regional, but also at the global level. The
creation o f a greater Eurasian railway system could reshape economic relations between
Northeast Asian states as well as their relations with Russia and Europe. South Korea
has already begun to define the Korean peninsula as the hub of the region, with spokes
08leading out to Russia, China, and Japan. Faced with growing competition from China, 
the South Korean government is also seeking to strengthen its economic security by 
developing the port o f Busan as a hub for Northeast Asia for primarily sea transport and 
potentially as part of the TSR-TKR project, comparable to the role o f Singapore in
97 According to Mote, the ocean route enjoyed the advantage o f  relatively inexpensive water 
transportation from the 1930s through the 1970s, but this advantage has now been offset by other factors. 
See Mote, pp. 307-308.
98 The Korean government is also very interested in linking the TKR and the Trans Chinese Railroad 
(TCR). See Han Kyu Kim, Pressian, 17 February, 2004.
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Southeast Asia. Busan is already the world’s fifth container port and third largest trans­
shipment centre, making it an ideal trans-shipment point for cargo moving to and from 
North America and Europe. Currently, South Korea is in the process o f constructing a 
new port that will increase its container capacity by 150 percent by 2011, and also a 
FEZ in B usan."
The restoration of both the Kyongui line and the Kyongwon lines would make it 
possible to establish a V-shaped TKR running through Europe via Trans-China Railroad 
(TCR) and TSR, which could diversify Korean export markets by involving Eastern and 
Western Europe, and Central Asia. This would relieve Korea’s overdependence on the 
United States market which has almost reached its expansion limit, and the potential 
Chinese market. The period of shipment will be reduced by one-third off the current 
time if  the TSR connects with Slawkow, in southern Poland, which is the main gate to 
Western Europe by way of Katovice. Dong Shik Seo, manager o f the Eastern Europe 
and the Commonwealth Independent States (CIS) division of the Korean car company, 
Kia, claims that the TSR provides the company with a great deal of competitiveness. 
According to the estimate of the optimists (including Chang Ho Chung, manager o f 
Kia’s Polish branch), the total time of shipping from the South Korean harbour 
Pyongtaek to Poland via Hamburg is 2 months in total, whereas it will take only 20 days 
via the TSR. The optimists estimate that shipping costs via the TSR (US $1,200 per 
container) are 30 percent lower than those of the sea route ($1,600).100 In short, the rail 
link will help South Korea position itself as the vital link to connect Europe to Asia and 
via the Pacific, even to North and South America.
Third, the rail link would assist the industrial development o f a reunified Korea; 
South Korea is already developing parts of western North Korea and the rail link would 
facilitate these activities by allowing the rapid and efficient transportation of materials, 
finished goods, and equipment between South Korean businesses and their affiliates and 
factories in the North.101
Consequently, the optimists argue, all participants would gain from the project 
to some extent. South Korea would also reduce the time delivery from/to Europe by 30 
percent and the transportation cost of a 40-foot container by US $400.102 According to
99 William Armbruster, “Busan Grows Up,” Commonwealth Business Media, Journal o f  Commerce, 4 
July, 2005.
100 Hankuk Economics N ewspaper, 16 December, 2003.
101 Stratfor.com, 1 August, 2000.
102 Kontorovich, 2001, p. 404.
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the KOTRA report, the total annual TSR cargo volume is expected to be more than 5-7 
million tons, and South Korea can save from US $7.70 up to $17 million per year.103
Table 5 The TSR  Costs
(Unit: US$)
^ ^ ^ A rr iv a l
Departufe^^ Japan South Korea China
Container 
capacity (ft) 20 40 20 40 20 40
Germany (via 
Brest) 1,370 2,380 1,225 2,180 1,520 2,470
Finland (via 
Buslovskaya) 1,350 2,170 1,210 1,980 1,495 2,295
Moscow 2,080 3,520 1,990 3,510 2,075 3,220
Europe (via 
St. Petersburg) 1,570 2,460 1,410 2,270 1,690 2,590
Sources: Ministry o f  Railway Transport o f  Russian Federation, Transsiberian Mainline in the 21st 
Century. 2001.
South Korean estimates also suggest that North Korea would gain US $100 
million per year in railway fees if the connections become operational.104 The former 
North Korean leader Kim II Sung showed a keen interest in the railroad project during 
his lifetime and reportedly told a Belgium labour party leader visiting Pyongyang 
shortly before his death in 1994 that the project would bring the North much profit.105 
Optimists estimate that North Korea and Russia would receive up to 12 million tons of 
transit cargo (about 600,000 40-foot containers).106 In addition, the railroad project 
would give Northeast Asian countries’ easier access to East Siberian and Russian Far 
Eastern natural resources and markets. South Korea already ranked as the number one 
trading country in the Primorski region at US $3.7 billion in 2001, which was 21 
percent of the total trade in the region, slightly surpassing China. It is increasing its
1 07annual trade volume by 27 percent. South Korea has also shown interest in
1 ORdeveloping the eastern side o f the Ural Mountains as a potential commercial area. At 
the UN Millennium summit in New York in September 2000, President Putin 
maintained that there would be a quantum leap in many fields, including the
103 Korea Trade Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) Report, 2001.
104 Stratfor.com, 1 August, 2000.
105 “Creation o f  Silkroad o f  Iron,” K orea Times, Editorial, 8 August, 2000.
106 Kuzmichenko.
107 In the Primorskii region, the South Korean investment (US $ 12.3 million) occupied 15.7% o f  total 
foreign investment ($ 78.6 m illion) in 2001. See Kim, Cargo News, 1 August, 2002.
108 The TSR, 2003 Righters Company, CEO Report, Seoul, Korea, on http://www.ceoreport.co.kr. 
accessed on 6 March, 2004; and Kim, Cargo  N ews, 1 August, 2002.
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construction of fibre-optic cables for telecommunication, energy, and power.109 
According to the KOTRA report, the rail project would also boost shuttle trading 
activities.110 Furthermore, it would benefit tourism, once the TSR was connected to the 
new Korean Trail Express (KTX), which started to run at a speed of 300 km/h in March 
2004.111
Optimists also argue that, in addition to economic benefits, in the longer term 
the TSR-TKR linking project can ease the tension and facilitate the reunification 
process o f the Korean peninsula. The project could serve as material investment for 
unification. As Nodari Simonia, director o f the Institute of World Economy and 
International Relations (IMEMO) points out, economic homogeneity provides the basis 
for unification, as in the case of Germany and Vietnam.112 It is clear that unification 
cannot be achieved without the substantial growth o f the North Korean economy. The 
railroad project would contribute to gradually opening up North Korean society since it 
would give the North Korean population more mobility and promote changes in its 
socio-economic structure.113 Russian economists predict that North Korea would 
receive approximately US $1.5 billion per year from TSR-TKR link cargo transit, but 
apart from direct economic benefits, the project would also provide a basis for other 
industries to develop in North Korea.114
According to the optimists, the real beneficiary of the railway linking project 
would be Russia. The project could substantially alter the balance of world trade by 
allowing Russia to complete its most important transportation project since the country 
was united by the TSR more than 100 years ago.115 It would also help the 
reconstruction of the Russian Far Eastern economic infrastructure and aid it to become a 
regional economic player in the Asia Pacific.
During the Soviet period, the TSR was one o f the shortest transit routes from the 
Far East to Western Europe and it transported 100,000-150,000 containers annually. 
After the collapse o f the Soviet Union and, more particularly, during the economic crisis 
of the late 1990s, the Russian Far Eastern ports and the TSR were subject to a number 
o f severe problems. As a result, there was a decrease in the commerce with Russian Far
109 P eop le’s  D aily Online, 10 September, 2000.
110 KOTRA Report, 2001.
111 Kookmin II bo, 1 March, 2004.
112 Simonia, p. 198.
1,3 Ibid.
114 Russia in APEC and in the Asia Pacific Region (APR) (eds., I.D. Ivanov, and M.I. Titarenko), 2001, p. 
147, quoted in Simonia, p. 198.
1,5 Startseva, M oscow Times, 10 June, 2003.
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East ports and in TSR cargo volumes as many Asian consignors shifted from the TSR to 
the longer but safer sea route to Europe. Over the past decade, the TSR volume 
declined from 139,000 containers per year to 20,000 containers per year.116 The 
proportion of all container transportation from Asia-Pacific to Europe carried by the 
TSR fell from 5-6 percent to 0.7 percent in the mid-90s.117 However, Russian access 
via the TSR to Busan, a busy but relatively cheap harbour, would contribute to enabling 
TSR cargo volumes to increase.
There is some evidence to support the views o f the optimists. The Russian 
Ministry o f Transportation is reported to have invested a significant amount o f money in 
the modernization o f the TSR, namely US $2.5 billion in 2000, $3.7 billion in 2001, and 
$4.9 billion in 2002.118 Transportation time has also been reduced and the customs and 
general service system has been improved, compared with the mid 1990s.119 As a result, 
the total cargo volume from Vostochny to Europe via the TSR increased 57 percent in
1999.120 In 2000, the TSR cargo volume increased by up to 32,900 containers. 121
Table 6 Korean and Japanese Cargo Volume via the TSR 122
(Unit: TEU)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Trade
Cargo
S.
Korea
10,644 18,628 25,253 29,814 34,302 36,409 41,168 29,685 30,882
Japan 25,990 13,380 13,569 10,474 8,678 6,693 5,068 4,926
Total 36,634 32,008 38,822 40,288 42,980 43,102 46,236 34,611
Transit
Cargo
S.
Korea
15,004 10,838 12,705 12,982 26,731 21,653 11,298 14,373 27,807
Japan 55,576 44,129 31,008 16,337 8,487 8,035 7,287 7,770
Total 70,580 54,967 43,713 29,319 35,218 29,688 18,585 22,143
Total S.
Korea
25,648 29,466 37,958 42,796 61,033 56,062 52,466 44,058 58,689
Japan 81,566 57,509 44,577 26,811 17,165 14,728 12,355 12,696 10,344
Total 107,214 86,975 82,535 69,607 78,198 72,790 64,821 56,754 69,033
Sources: Korea Russia Friendship Express: the Ministry o f  Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Ministry o f  
Construction and Transportation, Korean National Railroad, and the Korean Railroad Research Institute, 
2004.
116 Konstantinova.
117 This figure for the share o f  containers that travel between A sia and Europe annually seem s to 
contradict the figure on p. 113. The discrepancy arises from the differences in viewpoints o f  the 
pessimists and optimists, as addressed at the beginning o f  the section 4 on p. 119. Jeongdae Park, and 
Jaeyoung Lee, “Industrial Cooperation between Korea and Russia: Current Situation and prospects,” 
Journal o f  Asia-Pacific Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 2, February 2002, p. 57.
118 Vedemosti, 2 May 2001 and 2 November 2001; and Simonia, p. 189.
119 Park and Lee, p. 57.
120 KOTRA Report, 2001.
121 V.I. Ishaev, International Economic Cooperation: Regional Aspect, (Vladivostok: Dalnauka, 1999), p. 
91; and S.Y. Eliseyev “Information on Trans-Siberian Trunk Line and Contemporary Trans-Siberian 
Service,” quoted in Park and Lee, p. 57.
122 The Ministry o f  Foreign Affairs, the Ministry o f  Construction and Transportation, Korean National 
Railroad, and the Korea Railroad Research Institute gives the total figure for the volume o f  Japanese 
cargo transported by the TSR in 2000, but does not differentiate between trade and transit cargo
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In 2003 TSR cargo volumes reached a peak o f almost 100,000 containers.123 In 
addition, shipment costs via sea routes and the TSR from the Russian Far East almost 
equalized. The amount o f time taken to process cargo has been reduced and customs 
payments have been equalized across Russia. The Russian Ministry o f Transportation, 
in collaboration with the Ministry o f Internal Affairs, has also implemented a cargo 
safety protection policy.124 Sergei Guriev, a railways expert at the Center for Economic 
and Financial Research in Moscow, argues that Russia will now be able to compete 
successfully against the Korea-Rotterdam-Berlin sea route by charging similar prices 
while bringing containers from East Asia to Europe in 12 to 14 days instead o f 30 to 35 
days.125
The time o f shipment via the TSR from Asia to Europe has also shrunk to 9 days 
from the previous 14-15 days due to the introduction o f express container trains.126 
Perhaps the most important issue in railroad transport systems these days is speed.127 
The railroad industry throughout the world has focused on projects such as high speed 
tracks or high speed trains. In April 1998, a project on demonstration express container 
trains that run along the Nakhodka- Eastem-Bekasovo and Nakhodka-Eastem-Brest 
routes reported running speeds of more than 1150 km/day. The demonstration train 
claimed to be able to deliver transit containers from Nakhodka-Eastern to Brest in 9 
days and 6 hours. At the same time, on the Krasnoyarsk railroad the demonstration 
container train experimented with the use of satellite control systems for establishing 
train locations (with an accuracy up to 100 m in real time). In October 2000, a new 
movement schedule for express container trains was introduced on the TSR. The 
average running speed increased to 950 km in a 24-hour period. Consequently, 
exports from the Urals Metallurgical plants are to be shipped via the Russian Far 
Eastern ports rather than via the Baltic Sea ports.129
123 Chosun II bo, 28 October, 2003.
124 According to Simonia, not a single violation has been reported in this sphere since 1999. See Simonia, 
p. 189; and Konstantinova.
25 Startseva.
126 Konstantinova and Boris Dynkin, “Comments on the Regional Railroad Network and Power Grid 
Interconnection,” Presentation at Far Eastern State Transport University, Khabarovsk, Russia, for Second 
Workshop on Power Grid Interconnection in Northeast Asia, Shenzhen, China, 6-8 May, 2002, on 
http://www.nautilus.org/energv/grid/2002Workshop/materials/Dvnkin.pdf. accessed on 6 March, 2004.
127 A.A.J. Nederveen, J.W.Konings and J.A.Stoop, “Globalization, International Transport and the Global 
Environment: Technological Innovation, Policy Making and the Reduction o f  Transportation Emission,” 
Transportation Planning and Technology, Vol. 26, No. 1, February 2003, pp. 46-47.
128 Dynkin.
129 Konstantinova.
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Moreover, the electrification o f the entire 6,000 km TSR was completed in
1 inDecember 2002. This means that it can work as a unified system with electric trains, 
while increasing the volume of traffic by up to 40 percent.131 The electrification o f the 
TSR makes it possible to transport cargo o f up to 100 million tons per annum in volume, 
including 200 thousand international transit containers from Europe and Asia.132
Russia has also carried out maintenance work on the railway stations on the 
borders with Mongolia, China, and North Korea, while modernizing container terminals 
capable o f processing 40 feet containers. In order to increase the safety o f trains, 
container terminals have been equipped with load-lifting mechanisms and special 
forklift trucks for 40-foot containers. 36 TSR stations now have terminals for 
operations with large capacity cargo containers, including 13-40 foot containers.133 
Repair and maintenance facilities have also been built along the TSR route.134
As a counter-argument to the pessimistic views o f the potential o f the TSR, 
Dynkin insists that rail transport has a number o f advantages over sea transport:
- First [it] has a higher level of ecological reliability, since railroad electrical 
thrust is much safer than any o f even the most reliable working media of 
seagoing vessels.
-Second, speed gain delivery is completely obvious: 2-3 times. There is no 
need for accumulating 20-50 thousand piece containers waiting for ship 
parties that takes 10-15 days. The distance o f transportation is shorter in 
comparison with the sea and the main advantage is that the speed o f railroad 
transport is considerable higher.
- Third, the sea and intermodal cargo transportation usually include 6-10 
loading and unloading operations. For each o f them working media and 
labour resources expenditures are required, load-lifting mechanisms are
130 The TSR main road is entirely electrified: the Bikin-Guberovo section (83km) was electrified in 2000; 
the Sibirstsevo-SViyagino section (95km) in 2001; and finally the Sviyagino-Ruzhino segments were 
completed in 2002. See Dynkin and Simonia, p. 190.
131 It took 74 years to finish installing the equipment that allows powered trains to run along the entire 
line. The last 109-mile section was finished in December 2002. See “A Buzz Across Siberia,” The 
Christian Science Monitor, 30 December, 2002, on http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/1230/p20sQ3- 
comv.html. accessed on 15 March, 2004; and “Putin in Far East to discuss energy and transport,” 
Business Custom Wire, 26 February, 2004; and “Trans-Siberian Railroad now Electrified,” United  
Transportation Union, The Voice o f  Transportation Labor, 26 December, 2002, on 
http://www.utu.org/worksite/detail news.cfm?Articlen>=4941. accessed on 17 March, 2004.
132 Dynkin
133 Ibid.
134 Khazan station, for example, was equipped with necessary mechanisms, loading/discharging 
installations, rearrangement o f  carriages o f  freight cars, etc. See Simonia, p. 190.
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necessary, and each operation of this kind possesses great probability of 
damage or loss of load.
- Fourth, the “Europe-Asian Pacific Ocean Region-Europe” connections 
concern mostly container loads; this means that the container itself more 
than comprises 50 percent of the cargo weight. The sea vessel weighs from 
20 to 50 thousand tons. Therefore the weight of transportable payload by 
sea should take approximately 30 percent, while on the railroad it is about 
60 percent.135
Most of all, the rail route is much less dependent on climatic conditions than sea routes.
According to recent estimations, the cost advantages o f shortening the delivery 
period to 17 days for one 20 foot container with a load value o f US $50 thousand from 
the countries of Northeast Asia to Europe can be US $300. Furthermore, shortening the 
period of container lease due to the decrease of load delivery time to 17 days will make 
it possible to save an additional US $100- $150.
Table 7 Times and Costs by Different routes
(Unit: US $, days)
Trans Siberian 
Railroad
Sea Routes Trans Chinese Railroad
Costs Times Costs Times Costs Times
Busan-
Warsaw
1,188 18 2,250 28-31 1,590-
1,710
36
Busan-
Moscow
1,822 15 2,130 30 1,950 31
Busan-
Tashkent
1,950 23 2.050 29 2,400 26
Sources: Ministry o f  Railway Transport o f  Russian Federation Magazine, GUDOK, 19 April, 2000.
Also, in 1998, the transit TSR tariff was US $1,460 for one 20 foot container, whereas
1 3Athe sea tariff via the Suez Canal was US $1,650 for the same container. In 2001, the 
number o f transit containers via the TSR also doubled to about 40,000 containers, in
137comparison with less than 20,000 annually in the 1990s.
From a technical perspective, a number of modernization processes including 
railroad automation have taken place since 2000. A digital communication network was 
introduced which accommodates the centralized coordination o f the entire system much
135 Dynkin.
136 Konstantinova.
137 Kuzmichenko.
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• 138more easily. New information control systems were implemented to control the 
location o f cargo. The newly introduced satellite navigation systems and fibre-optical 
cable runs allow all train movements to be monitored throughout the TSR tracks. Thus 
operators are now able to distinguish the destination and departure origins and the 
consignors o f each carriage easily, as well as the exact train location.139 To improve 
customer service quality, modernized united transportation centres and the building of 
the fibre-optic lines of communication were built.140 As a result o f this technical 
modernization, freight trains are now able to reach maximum speeds of 90 km per hour, 
while passenger and intermodal container transportation can reach over 120 km per 
hour.141 This clearly illustrates that the delivery time has been significantly reduced and 
thus transportation costs overall have also been reduced.
5. Implications of railroad linkage for economic security
As Teymuraz O. Ramishvili, Russian Ambassador to South Korea notes, along 
with the energy projects discussed in Chapter 3, the railroad project is the crucial factor 
to maintain traditional and non-traditional regional security on the Korean peninsula.142 
A regional transport system is considered one o f the most important elements of 
economic security in the region. As discussed in the chapter 2, “the construction of 
railways creates a dramatic change of attitude and a reorientation of economic activity 
towards the market, because it eliminates barriers and promotes cross-border interaction 
by stimulating competitive activities and mobility of factors o f production.”143 The 
TSR and TKR linking project has the potential to secure national economic interests and 
serve longer term regional political security purposes. Through it, both Russia and 
South Korea could become transit powers, and South Korea’s port city, Busan, could 
become the hub of Northeast Asia. North Korea would gain economically if  the project 
were to be realized, and Russia would emerge as a regional economic player as a result 
o f easier access to the Asia Pacific market.
Furthermore, the project could contribute to enhancing regional and global 
economic security because it would integrate Eurasian, European and East Asian
138 Simonia, p. 190
139 Izvestiya, 8 September, 2001; Nezavisim aya gazeta, 23 October, 2001; and Simonia, p. 190.
140 Dynkin.
141 Ibid.
142 The Embassy o f  Russia in the Republic o f  Korea Press Briefing, Yeon hap News, 4 March, 2004.
143 Colin M, White, “The Concept o f  Social Saving in Theory and Practice,” Economic H istory Review, 
February, Vol. 29, No. 1, 1976, p. 92.
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markets, and improve resource allocation through production and trade. The project 
offers a tremendous opportunity to diversify the markets of the countries through which 
the railroad passes. As the debate between sceptics and optimists suggests, estimates of 
shipping costs and journey times fluctuate according to different sources and 
destinations. Nevertheless, there is no denying that in most cases, the TSR route is 
highly likely to save transportation costs and time in the longer term. From a traditional 
security perspective, linking the railroads has the potential to contribute to the stability 
o f the Korean peninsula since it could ease the tension and further facilitate the 
reunification of Korea.
The railroad project is also perhaps the most immediately achievable cooperative 
scheme between Moscow and Seoul, considering the progress that has been made and 
the optimistic views discussed previously in this chapter. The great advantage of the 
TSR and TKR linking project is that it does not require new infrastructure, especially 
when compared with the project that Russia and Japan are currently discussing to link 
the TSR and Japan through the island o f Sakhalin using either tunnels or bridges.144
As we saw in section 3, however, despite the progress that has been made and 
optimism about the project’s potential, there are still a number o f obstacles on both the 
Russian and South Korean sides. These include Seoul’s divided policy toward 
Pyongyang, outdated TSR facilities, the questionable comparative advantage of using 
the TSR route rather than sea transportation, delays and high tariffs in cargo processing, 
and cargo theft. Above all, considering that the transport sector is subject to numerous 
political and institutional constraints,145 the difficulty o f opening the North Korean 
society turned out to be the major deterrent to economic security cooperation between 
Russia and South Korea. The project virtually ceased to make progress after December 
2004, and the unresolved issue of North Korea’s nuclear weapons continues to resurface 
and delays the realization of the project. In short, these obstacles have hindered the 
bilateral and regional economic and political security building process.
The inability to link the railroads means that not only the physical network, but 
also potential cooperation in services, has not been realized. Thus, plans to integrate 
markets, improve resource allocations, and provide low cost transportation have not 
been implemented. Without a linked land transportation route between East Asia and
144 John Parker, “Alternate Route: Russia wants Trans-Siberian Railway to be Europe’s intermodal link 
with Japan,” Traffic World, Vol. 265, No. 33, August 13, 2001, p. 29.
145 Peter Nijkamp, “Globalization, International Transport and the Global Environment: A Research and 
Policy Challenge,” Transportation Planning & Technology, Vol. 26, No. 1, February 2003, p. 2.
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Europe through Eurasia, spatial discontinuities exist, most of all, blocking South 
Korea’s potential for transit power in the region. In short, the project has not emerged 
as a regional transportation system which contributes to the economic security of the 
region. As a result, transport network cooperation between Moscow and Seoul has not 
so far fulfilled its potential to contribute to the two countries’ economic security, to 
regional economic security more broadly, or to traditional regional security in Northeast 
Asia.
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Chapter 5. The Nakhodka Free Economic Zone 
Cooperation
Introduction
The Nakhodka Free Economic Zone (FEZ project) in which the two countries 
are currently engaged has the potential to become one o f the key aspects o f Russian- 
South Korean relations. This chapter reviews the progress that has been made and the 
problems facing the Nakhodka FEZ cooperation between Russia and South Korea in the 
last 15 years. The chapter argues that the Nakhodka FEZ project has the potential to 
strengthen bilateral and regional economic security because the main objective o f 
establishing the FEZ was to promote regional development and regional economic 
integration. The successful operation o f the FEZ, as a form of “market network” 
between states which is regarded as the core of economic security, has the potential to 
enhance the common regional economic security interests o f Russia and South Korea, 
as well as o f other participating states. However, the project has been delayed and there 
have been no substantial benefits or concrete outcomes until now. The main obstacle 
hindering the FEZ cooperation is the Russian government’s tardiness in ratifying the 
project. I argue that the Russian government’s reluctance to sign the agreement stems 
primarily from the complicated Russian domestic political situation, which is 
overwhelmingly a political power struggle between centre and periphery in the Russian 
Far East. At present, the obstacles are preventing the Russian-South Korean 
relationship from fulfilling its potential as a cooperative economic security relationship.
The chapter begins with an account o f the background of the Russian FEZ. An 
examination o f the development of the Nakhodka FEZ and the obstacles obstructing the 
construction o f a Russian-South Korean industrial complex in the Nakhodka FEZ, will 
follow; The chapter pays particular attention to the reasons for the Russian federal 
government’s reluctance to ratify the creation o f the industrial complex over the past 15 
years, within the framework o f the general problems o f Russian FEZ policies. The final 
section o f the chapter assesses the implications for bilateral and regional economic 
security cooperation.
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1. Free Economic Zone in Russia
The FEZ was one o f the most popular and controversial instruments o f the 
attempted open economic policy in the former Soviet Union and then Russia. Reform- 
oriented members o f USSR President Gorbachev’s administration first began to 
promote the concept of FEZ during the late 1980s as a means of facilitating Soviet 
economic integration into the world economy.1 The primary intention of the 
establishment of a FEZ was to enhance the competitive edge of the periphery in 
attracting foreign investment, while promoting hi-tech research. Specifically, Russia 
sought to develop the FEZ for the following reasons:
1) facilitating the transfer of high technology and foreign investment
2) encouraging balanced regional development and the growth of
employment 3) promoting exports and import substitution
4) increasing foreign exchange earnings
5) developing transcontinental transit communications
6) upgrading management and training
7) initiating different approaches to transition from a centrally planned,
closed economic system to a market-type open economy.
Accordingly, in the early 1990s Russia’s regional governments began to discuss 
the establishment of FEZ in the regions with the Federal government. The regions were 
granted the authority to establish and regulate such zones on their territories. Between 
July and September 1990, the Russian Supreme Soviet, legitimized FEZ status for 11 
regions, including Leningrad, Vyborg, Nakhodka, Kaliningrad, Sakhalin, Altay, 
Kemerovo, Novgorod and Chita regions, Zelenograd, and the Jewish Autonomous 
Region. Approximately 150 different regions in Russia requested approval to create 
FEZ in their jurisdictions in 1991. The local governments viewed these zones as a way 
to overcome the economic crises in their regions, caused by the lack o f federal funding 
and subsidies. Each of these zones was granted virtually identical sets of tax benefits
1 “Free Economic Zones,” Russia-Economic & Trade Overview-Part 2 (2), Business Information Service 
o f  the Business Information Service fo r  the N ewly Independent States (BISNIS), US Department o f  
Commerce, 1996-98, on http://home.swipnet.se/~W-l 0652/BISNIS 2.html. accessed on 3 May, 2004.
2 Svobodnye ekonomicheskie zony i zony svobodnogo predprinimatel’stva v RSFSR. Sbomik 
dokumentov. M oscow, 1991 (mimeo), pp. 2 and 12, quoted in Sergei Manezhev, Post-Soviet Business 
Forum, The Russian Far East (London: Royal Institute o f  International Affairs, 1993), p. 26.
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and they seemed to symbolize a counterbalance to the centralized system of economic 
management.3
All companies registered in Russian FEZ were granted resident status and a 
generous set o f benefits. In particular, foreign goods imported to a FEZ territory were 
exempt from customs duties and quotas, and Russian goods were considered exports, 
which meant that the exporter could obtain a VAT refund. Moreover, foreign citizens 
working in a FEZ were granted simplified entry into Russia, Further, FEZ related 
amendments to the Tax Code fully exempted residents from tax on profits during the 
first three years of their operation in a FEZ. The shelved 2002 draft FEZ bill also 
provided that “regulatory acts worsening conditions for FEZ residents will not be 
enforced during the whole term of FEZ status.”4 Among the restrictions applicable to 
FEZ residents, the most prominent were a ban on the conclusion of any deals that were 
not connected to entrepreneurial activities on the territory of the FEZ and, for national 
security reasons, deals that involved the defence industry.5 All customs duties and taxes 
were payable when goods left a FEZ.6
Despite the initial enthusiasm, the majority o f Russian FEZs have not been 
successful, first because of a careless policy o f imitating foreign models, and second, 
because o f conflict between the central government and local authorities. Most o f the 
newly-established FEZs turned out to be inactive and when Part II o f the new Russian 
Tax Code came into force in 2001, FEZs lost their privileges and virtually ceased to 
function.7 Kaliningrad and Nakhodka were the only survivors o f the first group o f FEZ 
established in the 1990s.
It was on 22 July 2005 that a law on the establishment o f special economic
Q
zones was finally adopted and it came into effect on 27 August 2005. In November
3 Vladimir Samoylenko, “Government Policies in Regard to International Tax Havens in Russia,” Special 
Report, International Tax & Investment Center, December 2003, p. 4.
4 Maxim Rubchenko, Ekaterina Shokhina, and Sergei Shoshkin, “Incubators for Change or Black 
Holes?,” Economics and Finance, #28 (335) 22 July, 2002, on 
http://eng.expert.ru/economics/28incuba.htm. accessed on 1 May, 2004.
5 “The Russian Establishment o f  Free Economic Zone,” Korea Trade Investment Promotion Agency 
(KOTRA) Report 2000.
6 Rubchenko, Shokina, and Shoshkin.
7 Part two o f  the Tax Code o f  the Russian Federation No. 117-FZ o f  5August, 2000
(with the Amendments and Additions o f  29 December, 2000; 30 May; 6, 7, 8, August; 27 November, 
2001). See also Rubchenko, Shokhina, and Shoshkin.
8 Federalnyi zakon Rossiskoi federatsii ot 22 iyuliya 2005 g. N  116-OZ. Ob osobikh ekonomicheskikh 
zonakh v Rossiskoi federatsii. Opublikobano 27 Iyuliya 2005, Rossiskaya gazeta, 27 July 2005, on 
http://www.rg.ru/2005/07/27/ekonom-zonv-dok.html. accessed on 30 December, 2005. (The Russian
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2005 six regions including the Zelenograd Raion in the city o f Moscow, the city o f 
Dubna in Moscow Oblast, the city of Elabug in Tatarstan Republic, the city o f St. 
Petersburg, and Tomsk and Lipetsk oblasts, were given permission to establish FEZ.
The 2005 law defines a Special Economic Zone as a part o f the Russian Federation 
where special favourable conditions for business apply. After it took effect on 27 
August 2005, all special zones and FEZs established prior to its enactment ceased to 
exist, except for two zones in Kaliningrad and Magadan.9
The new 2005 federal law on SEZ states that the Russian government can 
establish two types of Special Economic Zone for no more than 20 years. These are 
industrial production zones and technical innovation zones. In the SEZ territories, 
foreign manufactured goods will be subject to a free customs zone, which means they 
can be imported and used without payment o f customs duties or VAT, and without 
economic restrictions applicable in Russia. Russian- manufactured goods in the SEZs 
will be subject to a special export regime, which involves paying excise tax but not 
export customs duties. Additionally, there are certain benefits in the Tax Code, the 
Customs Code, the Land Code and other legislative acts Presidential decree 855 o f 22 
July 2005 states that a new Federal Agency for management o f Special Economic Zones 
will administer the SEZs.10
2. The Nakhodka Free Economic Zone
The Free Economic Zone in Nakhodka was established in 1990. It includes 
Nakhodka city, the port of Vostochny, and the surrounding rural mining district whose 
centre is the town of Partizansk. It comprises an area o f 4,579 km2, and is enclosed by 
sea and forest. More than 4,000 enterprises and 88,600 workers are reported to operate 
in the FEZ."
Vladivostok was initially considered for the FEZ because it was the largest port 
in the Russian Far East. In a speech in Krasnoyarsk in 1988, Gorbachev announced that 
special joint enterprise zones with a preferential system for tariffs, licensing of foreign
Federation Law on Special Economic Zones in the Russian Federation, N o. 116-FZ o f  22 July 2005, 
published on 27 July, 2005). I am very grateful to Margot Light for drawing my attention to this site.
RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 9, No. 221, Part I, 29 November 2005. I am also grateful to Margot Light for 
drawing my attention to this site.
10 Rossiskaya gazeta, 27 July 2005.
11 O f these, 16,500 are employed in industry, 1,200 in agriculture, 600 in construction, and 27,900 in 
transport and communications. See Nikolai Fedorov, “The Businessman’s guide to Nakhodka and the 
Free Economic Zone,” Report by Chairman, Administrative Committee Nakhodka Free Economic Zone 
(AC FEZ), on http://FEZ.nakhodka.ru/legal.htm. accessed on 18 May 2004; and Foreign Trade List, on 
http://www.kigam.re.kr/mrc/korean/file/East/chapter9.htm. accessed on 1 May, 2004
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economic transactions, and taxation, would be created in the Russian Far East. Joint 
ventures operating in the zones would pay reduced rates for the use o f Soviet natural 
resources and labour. Although he did not mention any specific site for the zones, he 
reportedly told former Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone that Vladivostok was being 
considered for open city status. The USSR Maritime Minister Yuriy Volmer reported in 
April 1989 that preparations to open the port to foreign vessels were in progress.12 
However, the Soviet Pacific Fleet Command and the Defence Minister, Dmitry Yazov, 
strongly resisted the proposal, emphasizing that, in the event o f a FEZ being established 
in Vladivostok, the relocation of naval assets would almost certainly have an adverse 
effect on Soviet war fighting ability and reduce flexibility.13
Along the entire coast of the Russian Far East, there was no location with more 
favourable potential than Nakhodka and which could be developed at a comparable cost. 
Nakhodka’s location with easy access to both the Trans Siberian Railroad (TSR) and 
sea transportation; warehousing facilities such as four large ice free ports (as Table 8 
shows) processing 18 million tons of cargo per year; and a relatively better ecological 
situation and lower criminal levels than in the rest o f the Russian Far East made it an 
ideal gateway to the markets o f Russia and the Commonwealth Independent States 
(CIS).14
Table 8 Nakhodka’s Port Complex: four major ports
Name Tasks
Vostochny Port Handling containers, coal, metals, grain, 
and many other products
Nakhodka Commercial Port Handling timber, metals, cars, food 
products, equipment, etc.
Nakhodka Oil Trans-shipment Port Handling oil and oil products
Nakhodka Fishing Port Handling fish products and seafood as 
well as meat and butter
Source: The Businessman’s guide to Nakhodka and the Free Economic Zone, Report by Chairman, 
Administrative Committee Nakhodka Free Economic Zone (AC FEZ), on 
http://FEZ.nakhodka.ru/legal.htm. accessed on 18 May 2004.
12 “A Time for Action, a Time for Practical Work— M. S. Gorbachev’s Speech in Krasnoyarsk,” Pravda, 
18 September, 1988, p. 3; and G. Alimov, “Vladivostok Will Be Open to A ll,” Izvetiya, 4 September, 
1988, p. 2.
13 FBIS, DR/SOV, 3 November, 1988, pp. 3-4; and Scott Atkinson, “The USSR and the Pacific Century,” 
Asian Survey, Vol. 30, No. 7, July 1990, pp. 632 and 644.
14 Victor Semenovich Gnezdilov, Interview by Mayor o f  Nakhodka City, 30 October, 2002, “Where 
Russia meets Asia,” World Investment News, Multimedia Information Company 2004 , on 
http://www.winne.com/vladivostok/vi006.html. accessed on 5 May, 2004; and Atkinson, p. 633.
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Nakhodka also already possessed a considerable number o f foreign ties. The 
ports had links with 42 countries around the world, and were capable o f processing raw 
materials rather than simply transporting them. It was also linked by regular liner 
service to Niigata in Japan, and had trade links with the Japanese especially with regard 
to fishing activities. Nakhodka was one of the major ports for the Soviet Pacific fishing 
fleet, which had a series of joint ventures with Pacific countries including the United 
States.15
Until March 1994, the Nakhodka FEZ offered an impressive number of 
privileges to foreign investors and those hoping to export from various parts o f the 
world to Nakhodka. According to the Mayor o f Nakhodka, a large amount o f foreign 
investment was made and trade accelerated significantly. In 1992, there were 
approximately 540 joint ventures in the Nakhodka FEZ, which was more than in the rest 
o f the Russian Far East.16 However, on 1 July 1993, the Congress o f People’s Deputies 
and Supreme Soviet adopted a customs code that did not include the term FEZ. The 
Congress of People’s Deputies and Supreme Soviet initially considered the first draft of 
the law on FEZ, which proposed the creation o f two types of zones — free customs 
zones and export-oriented industrial production zones. However, the Russian 
government opposed the new law because it was working on a major tax reform 
proposal, which aimed at eliminating various existing tax benefits and exemptions, and 
at the same time establishing much lower tax rates applicable to all business entities 
nationwide. The government sought to eliminate FEZ and other tax havens in Russia or 
to substantially limit the economic and legal privileges enjoyed by those territories. 
Therefore, it issued new regulations aimed at de facto  eliminating zones that had already 
been established.17 In March 1994, Nakhodka was stripped o f the majority o f its 
privileges, retaining only very minor privileges. However, Nakhodka continued to
1Rreceive financing from the Russian government up to 1997. Following the 1996
15 “Nakhodka, the Free Economic Zone and the Administrative Committee,” National News Service, at 
http://www.nns.ru/gallerv/stos/nah02.html. accessed 1 May, 2004.
16 Victor Semenovich Gnezdilov, Interview by Mayor o f  Nakhodka City, 30 October 2002, “Where 
Russia meets Asia,” World Investment News, M ultimedia Information Company 2004 , on 
http://www.winne.com/vladivostok/vi006.html. accessed on 5 May, 2004.
17 See Samoylenko, p. 5.
18 Svetlana J. Vikhoreva, “The Development o f  Free Economic Zones in Russia,” The Economic 
Research Institute fo r  Northeast Asia (ERINA) REPORT , Vol. 38, February 2001, Niigata, Japan, p. 2.
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presidential election, more funds were provided for the further development o f the 
Nakhodka FEZ.19
The development of the Nakhodka FEZ was initially aimed at fulfilling the 
following three objectives:
1) Infrastructure development, in particular the supply o f water and 
electricity; household and industrial sewage and water treatment system; the 
upgrading and construction of roads, in particular on the Nakhodka-Artem- 
Vladivostok route, the route between the FEZ and the Chinese border, and 
the Nakhodka-Vostochny Port-Khavarovsk route and the routes to the 
Vladivostok International Airport in Artem and the Zolotaya Dolina airfield.
2) Enhancement of the transport/transhipment hub functions within the 
Vostochny Port Development area.
3) Establishment of industrial sites and parks in the form of Export 
Processing Zones or other specific purpose industrial estates.20
The primary resources in the Nakhodka FEZ are fish and other marine products, along 
with timber and mineral resources including granite, basalt, gold, coal and mineral 
water. This provides the Nakhodka FEZ with enormous economic opportunities to 
develop its fishing, fish processing, ship repair, shipping, and coal mining industries. 
The Partizansk district includes a large agricultural region and one can observe a trend 
of a gradual increase in the food industry, whereas timber processing is declining.21 For 
example, food industry production in the Nakhodka FEZ rose to constitute a 94 percent 
share in the total volume of products of the city in 1999.22 In the first half of the 1990s, 
services such as trading, warehousing, telecommunications, banking, and insurance 
improved markedly.23 The goods that are exported from the Nakhodka FEZ include 
fish and sea food, mineral fuel, chemical products, timber, and ferrous and non-ferrous
19 According to Mayor Gnezdilov, Nakhodka processed up to 35 million tons o f  cargo in 1991 and by 
1992 a million Japanese containers had been processed in Vostochny port. However, only 12 million tons 
o f  cargo and 30 thousand containers were processed in 1998. Things improved after Putin’s election as 
president and 25 million tons o f  cargo and 100,000 containers were processed in 2001. See Gnezdilov’s 
interview; and “Free Economic Zones,” BISNIS, US Department o f  Commerce on 
http://home.swipnet.se/~W -10652/BlSNIS 2.html. accessed on 3 May, 2004.
20 Fedorov.
21 Ibid.
22 “Industrial Sector Indexes in the Nakhodka FEZ,” 1999, Industry, AC FEZ Nakhodka, on 
http://FEZ.nakhodka.ru/industrv.htm. accessed on 17 May, 2004.
23 Fedorov.
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metals. These products are exported mainly to Japan, China, Vietnam, Hong Kong, and 
South Korea. It is interesting to observe, however, that while the volume o f exports 
increases, currency receipts diminish due to the increasing costs o f production and 
transportation. The Nakhodka FEZ imports food products, mineral fuel, chemical 
products, cars, and machinery from Japan, China, South Korea, and the United States.24 
China, Japan, and South Korea are major trading partners both for export and import.
The Nakhodka FEZ also attracted local and foreign capital before 1994. In 
addition to the 19 local industrial enterprises including Vostochny Port, Primorsk 
Shipping, and Nakhodka Commercial Port, there were more than 460 foreign 
enterprises from more than 20 countries including the United States, United Kingdom, 
Japan, China, Hong Kong, and South Korea in 1994.25 Most o f them were joint 
ventures, engaged in transport, telecommunications, construction, timber, and fisheries 
industries and their products and services were exported to 12 countries, primarily Japan, 
China, and the US. In particular, as Table 9 suggests, American, South Korean and 
Chinese investors have penetrated key strategic sectors such as industrial parks, sea 
transport, and telecommunications.
Table 9 Foreign Investment Trends
Country Strategy Sector
USA Control sea transport, in particular to the 
American West Coast
Transport, Real Estate, 
Industrial Parks
South Korea Market access to the Russian Far East, 
Russia, Northern China, and North Korea
Real estate, Telecoms, Car 
Assembly, Transport, 
Industrial Parks
China Access to the Pacific and market access to 
Russia and the Russian Far East
Trade, Hotel & 
Restaurants, Transport
Japan No clear strategy Transport, Herbal 
Medicine, Trade
Source: The Businessman’s guide to Nakhodka and the Free Economic Zone, Report by Chairman, 
Administrative Committee Nakhodka Free Economic Zone (AC FEZ), on 
http://FEZ.nakhodka.ru/legal.htm. accessed on 18 May 2004.
Since two industrial park projects were to be created, major developments were 
expected in light industrial manufacturing. The South Korean Techno-park
24 “Industrial Sector Indexes in the Nakhodka FEZ,” Industry, 2004; “Foreign Economic,” Nakhodka Free 
Economic Zone (AC FEZ), 24 June, 1999, on http://FEZ.nakhodka.ru/foreign.htm. accessed on 18 May, 
2004.
25 Vikhoreva, p. 3.
26 Fedorov.
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development project for export-oriented enterprises and the US Techno-park have been 
under negotiation for several years.27
However in the second half o f the 1990s, most of the 100 percent foreign owned 
companies found it difficult to remain in the Nakhodka FEZ due to the unstable 
investment environment and the abolition of the privileges. Thus these companies 
shifted their focus from processing to simple trading activities, or left the region. For 
example, whereas the amount of share capital that foreigners wanted to invest in 1992- 
1993 was US $640 million, the registered capital of enterprises with foreign investment 
in 2001 was only US $64 million.28 The financial crisis in August 1998 caused the 
departure o f more foreign companies from the Nakhodka FEZ, while aggravating the 
financial infrastructure of the FEZ.
Nevertheless, telecoms continued to boom in the region even in the second half 
o f the 1990s. International digital satellite communications were installed in this area as 
joint ventures including Nakhodka Telecom, a joint venture with Britain’s Cable & 
Wireless; the Russo-Japanese joint venture Vostok Telecom; and a Korean joint venture, 
Rokotel. The Russian-South Korean investment into ROKOTEL is already profitable 
with only some 5,000 subscribers. As a result, even if the Russian-Korean Industrial 
Park does not materialize, ROKOTEL will, according to company management, be able 
to operate profitably.29 In 1999, the EBRD awarded a US $17 million credit to the New 
Telephone Company (NTK), which was owned by Korea Telecom, to improve its 
ability to provide mobile and stationery phone service in the region. Korea Telecom 
began its business in this region in 1997, and is regarded as one of the most successful 
investment cases, holding 50 percent o f market share in the Primorski region.
Despite the declining trend and less promising future o f the Nakhodka FEZ in 
the second half of the 1990s, the establishment of the South Korean-Russian Industrial 
Complex in the Nakhodka FEZ continued to be considered one o f the few possible 
ongoing activities in the Nakhodka FEZ after 1994.
27 Foreign Trade List, on http://www.kigam.re.kr/mrc/korean/file/East/chapter9.htm. accessed on 1 May, 
2004.
28 Vikhoreva, p. 3.
29 Fedorov.
30 “Russia Economy: Far East’s prospects improve a little, but not enough,” Economist Intelligence Unit 
(EIU) Viewswire, 14 May, 1999, on
http://www.viewswire.com/index.asp?lavout=displav print&doc id= 1064679706. accessed on 11 
September, 2005; and “Keubbusanghanun Russia Sijangkwa Wuriui Daeeung Chunryak (Rising Russian 
Market and Our Strategy)” Report by Oh Young II, April 2005, LG Economic Institute, p. 14.
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3. The South Korean-Russian Industrial Complex in the Nakhodka FEZ
3.1. The First Stage: 1992-1996
The first agreement to consider building an Industrial Complex in Nakhodka 
was reached in November 1992 during the South Korean-Russian summit in Seoul. The 
South Korean Industrial Complex project in Nakhodka FEZ had initially been proposed 
by the South Korean government in early 1992. The main purposes o f the project were, 
first, to improve the future of ethnic Koreans who had been deported from the Russian 
Far East by Stalin in 1937 and now wanted to return to Primorski Krai, and second, to
T 1promote a long-term Korean investment strategy in the Russian Far East.
In 1992 and 1993 a working group conducted a feasibility study, and agreement 
on the creation of an industrial complex in Nakhodka was reached during South Korean 
President Kim Young-Sam’s official visit to Moscow in 1994. A basic agreement was 
signed between the state-funded Korean National Land Development Corporation 
(KLDC) and the Nakhodka Free Economic Zone Administration. Moscow and Seoul 
agreed that Russia was to grant a land lease of 330 hectares to the KLDC for 49 years.32 
Total investment was expected to reach US $0.8 billion. At the first meeting of the 
South Korea-Russia Joint Committee on May 19 1994, the KLDC announced that South 
Korea would build an industrial complex on a 330 hectare site in Nakhodka FEZ.33
On March 23, 1995, a memorandum on joint construction of the Industrial 
Complex was signed between the leaders o f the Nakhodka FEZ and KLDC. Russia 
agreed to lease the land for 50 or 70 years and to provide basic facilities, including 
electricity and water. Russia also pledged tax privileges, and promised to simplify 
customs regulations and give Seoul exclusive rights to use Vostochny Port. More than 
100 South Korean firms were expected to rent lots from the corporation, and participate
31 Leonid Vinooradov, Itar Tass, 23 March, 1995; “The Nakhodka FEZ Russian Korean industrial 
complex agreement finalized,” the Korean Ministry o f  Commerce, Industry and Energy Briefing, 31 May 
1999; and Korea Trade-In vestment Promotion Agency (KOTRA): Siberia and Russian Far East 
Investment Guide (Seoul: Sekwang Moon Wha Sa, 1995), p. 214.
32 Seung-Ho Joo, “ROK-Russian Economic Relations, 1992-2001,” Korean and W orld Affairs, Vol. 25, 
No. 3, Fall 2001, p. 381; and Seung-Jo Joo, “Russia and Korea: The Summit and After,” The Korean  
Journal o f  Defense Analysis, Vol. 13, No. 1, Autumn 2001, pp. 118-119; ARTICLE 5, Agreement 
between the government o f  the Russian Federation and the government o f  the Republic o f  Korea for the 
establishment o f  the Russia Korea Industrial Complex in the Nakhodka Free Economic Zone, 28 
September, 1995 on http://FEZ.nakhodka.ru/RKIC.htm. accessed on 1 May, 2004.
33 Jeongdae Park and Jaeyoung Lee, “Industrial Cooperation between Korea and Russia: Current Situation 
and Prospects,” Journal o f  Asia-Pacific Affairs, Asia-Pacific Research Center Hanyang University, Vol. 3, 
No. 8, February 2002, p. 56; and BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts, Part 3 Asia Pacific; W eekly 
Economic Report, 18 May, 1994.
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in the construction o f a technological park.34 KLDC also announced that South Korea 
would establish approximately 200 industries in this area (150 light industry and 
agricultural factories), and produce electronic goods, foodstuff, lumber processing, and 
light industrial products including wood products and textiles. According to Article 11 
o f the agreement between Moscow and Seoul, Korean commercial banks would be 
allowed to open in the Nakhodka FEZ in accordance with the laws of the Russian 
Federation.35
In May 1995, KLDC established its own subsidiary called the Industrial 
Complex Development Office in Nakhodka city, the main functions of which included: 
1) to conclude a long-term lease agreement; 2) to proceed with the preparation and 
development of the project; 3) to attract investors and sublease developed lots to Tenant 
Companies; 4) to construct and operate on-site infrastructure, buildings, and facilities in 
the industrial complex; and 5) to provide necessary services for the operation of the 
project. The KLDC subsidiary was allowed to participate in the financing and 
construction of the buildings and welfare facilities for the technical experts and workers 
of this complex. Moreover, it was also entitled to lease or sell the buildings or 
facilities.36
President Yeltsin signed Decree No. 365 on March 9,1996 on certain measures 
to stimulate investment activity in the Nakhodka FEZ and this further facilitated the 
project. The decree granted the construction of the Russian-Korean industrial complex 
the status o f a federal level programme. Russia agreed to finance the project and also to 
increase rail and air transit carriages o f containers along the Asia-Europe route. The 
Russian Finance Ministry allocated $25 million annually for the development o f the 
Nakhodka FEZ project in March 1996.37
The law on industrial complexes in the Nakhodka FEZ was passed by the 
Primorsky Krai Duma in September 1995. According to the law, the developers of 
infrastructure would enjoy a regional profit tax holiday for a five year period starting 
from the first declared profit, if  the Nakhodka FEZ bid was accepted by the Russian
34 Itar Tass, 23 March, 1995; World Trade N ews, Financial Times, 24 March, 1995, p. 5; Reuter Textline, 
23 March, 1995; and Akaha, 1996, p. 104.
35 Reuter Textline, 23 March, 1995, and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), 9 July, 1999, on 
http://www.rferl.org/newsline/1997/07/090797.asp. accessed on 2 May, 2004; “Korean Technopark for 
the Nakhodka Free Economic Zone,” based on the 5* associated meeting on cooperation between Far 
East and Siberia, Russia, and the Korean Republic, on http://www.zrpress.ru/97/N6/REG-T-E.HTM. 
accessed on 1 May, 2004; and ARTICLE 11, Agreement between the governm ent..., 1995.
36 ARTICLE 3, Agreement between the governm ent..., 1995; and Chosun Ilbo, 16 March, 1996.
37 Administrative Committee (AC) Free Economic Zone (FEZ) Nakhodka, Legal Base, on 
http://FEZ.nakhodka.ru/legal.htm. accessed on 18 May 2004; and Natalia Gurushina, “Nakhodka Free 
Economic Zone Gets State Support,” RFE/RL, on http://www/rferl.org/newsline/1996/03/260396.asp. 
accessed on 3 May, 2004.
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federal government. For the following five years 50 percent o f the nominal profit tax 
would be levied and after that tax would be levied at 75 percent of the nominal rate. 
Project participants would also be free from the taxes paid into the territory road fund 
and profits re-invested into the engineering and social infrastructure of the Nakhodka 
FEZ would be free from tax. The law also indicated that there would be a special 
procedure for obtaining town planning approval and acquiring licenses for construction 
works from the local FEZ administration,38
Based on this law, Moscow and Seoul agreed to establish a Supervisory Council 
on an equal basis. Its primary task would be to make appropriate recommendations to 
the KLDC and the Nakhodka FEZ Administrative Committee (AC) regarding the 
execution o f obligations within the scope of the agreement and to review the rules made 
by the Nakhodka FEZ AC. The council would include the same number o f members 
from the two countries including the federal executive authorities, local government, the 
Nakhodka FEZ AC from Russia, the Korean government, KLDC, and KLDC subsidiary 
from South Korea.39 The South Korean Foreign Ministry announced on March 16,
1996 that negotiations would focus on the establishment o f some 200 light industry 
enterprises. In May 1996, both sides agreed to finalize conditions on lease and price.40 
Despite all these agreements and plans, no construction actually took place.
3.2. The Second Stage: 1999-Present
Since 1996 little progress has been made on the South Korean-Russian Industrial 
Park project. The South Korean President Kim Dae-Jung re-instituted the project 
during his visit to Russia in May 1999, but in an altered version. In a new agreement 
"On the creation of the industrial complex in Nakhodka free economic zone", the two 
countries contracted to build a techno-park of 20 instead o f 330 hectares in nearby 
Vostochny Port. This project was expected to produce goods worth US $2 billion each 
year.41 Both parties reaffirmed that the KLDC would lease the site for 49 years and 
build the infrastructure, while the Nakhodka authorities would construct infrastructure
38 AC FEZ Nakhodka, Legal Base, on http://FEZ.nakhodka.ru/legal.htm.
39 ARTICLE 12, Agreement between the government..., 1995.
40 Among the 200 Korean light industries, wood processing and sewing industries which were already 
based on Primorski krai were expected to enter the Nakhodka FEZ. See Feodr Solomartin, Interview with 
the director o f  the Nakhodka AC FEZ, quoted in Segye II bo, 12 February, 2001. See also Chosun Ilbo,
16 March 1996; Jamestown Monitors, 18 March, 1996; and Reuter Textline Lloyds List, 24 March, 1995.
41 Park and Lee, p. 56; Leszek Buszynski, “Russia and Northeast Asia: aspirations and reality,” The 
Pacific Review, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2000, p. 414; Fedorov; Joo, “ROK-Russian Economic Relations, 1992- 
2001,” 2001, p. 382; and Joo, “Russia and Korea: The Summit and After,” 2001, pp. 118-119.
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outside the complex. The KLDC would then lease the site to Korean firms. The 
agreement also called for the Russian government to offer preferential tariffs and 
simplify administrative procedures for the construction and operation o f companies.42 
South Korea planned to complete the construction within 6 years. South Korean 
manufacturing companies in the complex would be given a 50 percent tax reprieve on 
Value Added Tax from the day o f their registration until the date of their declaration of 
the first profit. Korean companies would, however, be allowed to export only 50 
percent o f their output.43 In December 1999 the South Korean parliament officially 
ratified the construction of the Nakhodka FEZ.44
Since the Russian federal government has not yet ratified the 1999 agreement, 
the Nakhodka industrial park project has been substantially at a standstill despite all the 
negotiations and efforts made by various groups over a period of almost 15 years. So 
far, the project has been limited to cargo processing and telecommunications 45 During 
a meeting between the chairman of the International Affairs Committee o f the Russian 
Duma, Konstantin Kosachev, and the South Korean Foreign Minister, Ban Ki-Moon, in 
2004 in response to South Korea’s enquiry over the delay in ratifying the agreement 
signed in 1999, Kosachev confirmed that the government had not yet submitted the 
agreement to the State Duma.46
In fact, in public at least, Putin has shown a great deal of interest in developing 
the Nakhodka FEZ project, whereas Yeltsin had relatively pessimistic views on the 
economic benefits of FEZ. Putin has called for tax law reform and state support for 
enterprises that want to invest in the FEZ and believes that the TSR-TKR linking 
project discussed in Chapter 4 would facilitate the development of the Nakhodka project 
since it would mean that South Korean enterprises and North Korean labourers could be 
supplied much more easily and quickly.47 During talks with President Roh at an APEC 
meeting in May 2005, he also promised that he would arrange the ratification o f the 
project immediately. However, the agreement has still not been ratified by the
42 “Business in Asia Today: S. Korea, Russia to Set Up in Industrial Complex,” A sia Times, 29 May,
1999, on http://www.atimes.com/bizasia/AE29Aa07.html. accessed on 5 May, 2004.
43 Agreement on the establishment o f  Korean Russian Industrial Park in the Nakhodka FEZ between 
Republic o f  Korea and Russia (Korean version), The Korean Ministry o f  Foreign Affairs and Trade, 28 . 
May 1999; and Yonhap, 27 March, 1999 and 24 July, 2000.
44 Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements (KRIHS) Policy Brief, Vol. 68, 16 August, 2004, p. 5.
45 Ya P. Baklanov, Geography o f  Primorsky Territory (Ussuri: Pacific Institute o f  Geography, Far Eastern 
Branch, Russian Academy o f Sciences 1997), on http://www.fegi.ru/prim/geografV/naxodka.htm.
46 Itar Toss, 25 May, 2004.
47 “The Russian Establishment o f  Free Economic Zone,” Korea Trade Investment Promotion Agency  
(KOTRA) Report 2000.
48 The South Korean President R oh ’s  Speech from  the report fo llow ing  the return o f  APEC meeting, 16 
May, 2005, Ministry o f  Foreign Affairs ad Trades, Seoul, Korea.
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Russian government. As a result, the industrial park project has not yet produced any 
concrete results or benefits.
4. Obstacles
As we have seen, the establishment of a South Korean industrial complex in the 
Nakhodka FEZ, which had been agreed upon at the November 1992 summit meeting, 
was altered at the May 1999 summit. The size o f the complex was markedly reduced 
from the originally planned 330 hectares (3.3 million square meters) to 20 hectares 
(200,000 square meters).49 The number of foreigners working in the Nakhodka FEZ has 
been steadily decreasing over the past few years. Slightly over 900 foreign nationals are 
reportedly working in various branches o f the municipal services, 9 times fewer than ten 
years ago when about 8,000 foreigners were seeking jobs in Nakhodka. According to 
the Press Center of the Nakhodka Mayor’s office, about 80 percent (more than 700) of 
the foreign workers in Nakhodka at present are Chinese nationals, while about 150 
come from North Korea. Moreover, many local officials have resigned or left the 
Nakhodka FEZ Administrative Committee and its size has been significantly reduced 
since 2000.50
To understand the problems in developing Nakhodka, it is essential to look at 
the broader context of Russia’s FEZ policy since the collapse o f the Soviet Union. 
Reducing the territory of the FEZ has been a common phenomenon for each surviving 
FEZ in Russia. More importantly, the problem of the Nakhodka FEZ project has been 
caused overwhelmingly by domestic factors on the Russian side rather than by the 
international relations between Russia and South Korea. As Kuznetsov explains, the 
FEZ is a rather mature phenomenon o f the international economy and “the success of 
the FEZ depends on complex economic, social, and geographical factors in effect within 
the country and abroad.”51 In the case o f Nakhodka, the success of the FEZ depends on 
cooperation between the federal government and the local authority. Similar types of 
problem have plagued virtually every FEZ in the Russian Federation. The following
49 “The Nakhodka FEZ industrial park negotiations settled,” The Korean Ministry o f  Commerce, Industry 
and Resources Briefing, 6 April, 1999, and “The Nakhodka FEZ negotiations resumed,” The Korean 
Ministry o f  Commerce, Industry and Resources Briefing, 29 March, 1999.
50 Business newspaper “Zolotoy Rog” (Golden Horn), Vladivostok, Primorsky #24, 1 April, 2003, on 
http://www.zrpress.ru/2003/024.ecnt.htm. accessed on 30 May, 2004; and Vinogradov, 2003.
51 Kuznetsov is a fellow o f  the Leuven Institute for Central and East European Studies, Belgium. See 
Andrei Kuznetsov, “Promotion o f  Foreign Investment in Russia: An Evaluation o f  Free Economic Zones 
as a Policy Instrument, joint ventures and free economic zones in the USSR and Russia,” Russian and 
East European Finance and Trade, Vol. 29, Issue 4, Winter 93/94, originally published as the Leuven 
Institute for Central and East European Studies, Working Paper No. 24, 1993, pp. 48-49.
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section analyzes why the Russian government has been reluctant to pass the law on FEZ 
and why the FEZ policy has been unsuccessful.
4.1. Lack of a long term strategy
First, Russia simply does not have a well thought-out, long-term strategy for the 
development o f FEZ and the economic role o f the FEZ has never been thoroughly 
defined. In general, the development o f FEZ is neither a quick nor a straightforward 
process, since it requires legislation and experience. Yet, impatient for results, the 
Kremlin leadership “changed their FEZ policies frequently in response to disappointing 
outcomes o f previous initiatives, without allowing for the necessary time lag between 
FEZ policy changes and results.”54 This is very different to the Chinese FEZ policy.
For example, China’s Kunshan FEZ was set up in 1985, but its success only became 
obvious more than 10 years later. This example o f Chinese gradualism did not appeal 
to the impatient Kremlin leaders.55 Unlike the Chinese FEZ policy, which is larger and 
more comprehensive, the Russian FEZ policy has not been consistent at all. The FEZ 
privileges in Russia have been based on ad hoc policy in response to its domestic 
economic and political situation. According to Ellman, officials at all levels in Russia 
exercised the freedom they gained during perestroika to further their personal 
interests.56 Moreover, when FEZ privileges have been given to local areas or to 
particular groups, they have been used as a reward for political loyalty or to avoid a 
short-term economic crisis.
4.2. Conflict between centre and periphery
The Russian federal government has been reluctant to sign legal agreements 
with virtually all the FEZ in the Russian Federation since the early 1990s. Its reluctance 
to ratify the creation o f FEZ stems originally from the conflict between the central 
government and the periphery that was characteristic o f the Yeltsin presidency. FEZ 
was part o f the deep conflict of interest between Moscow and the local authorities, in
52 Sergei A. Manezhev, “Free Economic Zones and the Economic Transition in the Chinese People’s 
Republic and Russia,” Russian and East European Finance and Trade, March-April 1995, Vol. 31, No. 2, 
1995, p. 80, translated by Arlo Schultz.
53 See the speech by Sergei Dudnik, Chairman o f  the Administrative Committee, Nakhodka FEZ, from 
National N ew s Service, on http://www.nns.ru/gallerv/stos/nah01.html. accessed 1 May, 2004.
54 Michael Ellman, “China’s Development Zones— Learning From Their Success,” Transition, The 
World Bank/ The William Davidson Institute, Vol. 9, No. 6, December 1998, p. 7.
55 Dirk Faltin, Regional Transition in Russia: a study o f  the fre e  economic zone po licy  in the Kaliningrad  
region, Ph. D thesis (London: the London School o f  Economics and Political Science, 2000), p. I l l ;  and 
Ellman, p. 7.
56 Ellman, p. 7.
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particular with regard to the division of jurisdiction between the local authorities and the 
centre. In the past, there have also been political conflicts within the area at the local 
level between the former Primorskii Krai governor, Yevgeny Nazdratenko and 
Chairman o f the Krai Duma, Sergei Dudnik. As Manezhev stresses, “the idea o f the 
FEZ in Russia became a tool in the struggle to redistribute power and resources within 
the framework of the so-called “sovereignization” of the former union republics.” He 
notes that the creation of FEZ was actively used by both republican leaderships as well 
as by regional leaders. When they authorized the creation o f FEZ, the government and 
Supreme Soviet of Russia delegated wide-ranging and previously centralized 
governmental functions and economic rights to local authorities.57
Finding a rational balance between central coordination and local initiative has 
been particularly difficult since the early 90s. It is almost impossible to reach a 
consensus since there is a natural discrepancy between regional and central economic 
interests. In theory FEZ possesses a high degree o f economic autonomy and, therefore, 
potentially poses many threats to the national economic regime, such as “disintegration, 
the reallocation of resources at the cost o f other regions, and environmental and social
C O
problems.” The regional authorities’ demands for additional funds and for greater 
administrative and economic autonomy means a corresponding decline in the federal 
government’s economic power.59 The initial official plans to promote FEZ in Russia 
received a very favourable response from the regions since the prospect of opening up 
the regional economy within a short period o f time and obtaining additional financial 
resources through importing capital had great appeal to local leadership.
From the perspective o f the federal government, it is extremely difficult to meet 
both local and national needs, especially when it comes to redistributing centralized 
funds in favour of FEZ through state budget allocations or tax-credits.60 With regard to 
the Nakhodka FEZ, this exacerbates a larger problem. Moscow fears losing control in 
the area, given the fact that Asian influence brought about by the increase in Chinese 
migration, is becoming a possible threat to this region. The federal government is also 
rather sceptical about the potential economic advantages o f the Nakhodka FEZ and is 
cautious about transferring its authority to the local government. Perhaps, as Kuznetsov 
suggests, the central government would prefer the zones to remain technology intensive
57 Manezhev, 1995, p. 78.
58 Kuznetsov, p. 48.
59 Manezhev, 1995, p. 83.
60 Sergei Manezhev, “Free Economic Zones in the Context o f  Economic Changes in Russia,” Europe- 
Asia Studies, Vol. 45, No. 4, 1993, p. 618.
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production sites, which was their initial design, instead o f expanding further, which 
might perhaps move them beyond the control of the central government.61
The Chinese, by contrast, have been exceptionally successful in managing 
centre-periphery relations while creating the special rights enjoyed by zonal authorities 
in China to promulgate local legal acts and approve foreign investment projects 
autonomously. These special rights permit flexible variation between the scope of 
central and local managerial functions depending on the zones’ actual economic 
performance and general situation in domestic and international markets. Manezhev 
also points out that the Chinese FEZ policy makers attempted to promote ‘inland 
associations’, including every legal form of direct business cooperation between zonal
f\“Xand non-zonal enterprises both within and outside the territories of the zones.
However, Russian FEZ policies have failed to balance central-local relationships. 
For example, there is no denying that the St. Petersburg, Kaliningrad, and Nakhodka 
FEZ are important national and regional industrial centres. Yet, as Manezhev notes, 
they all lacked commitment to supply the domestic market. Moreover, they provided 
little opportunity for the central government to exercise practical influence on the 
determination o f the local development programme, or the regulation of foreign 
investors’ activities, confining the managerial role of the central government at best to 
consultancy functions alongside local and foreign entrepreneurs. Occasional 
discussions about compromising between the local administration o f the FEZ and the 
Russian federal government were limited to the development of natural resources and 
there was no attempt to implement joint decision making.64
In short, as a result o f continual conflict between the Kremlin leaders and local 
authorities, the Russian approach towards the FEZ has been too politicized. As 
Manezhev emphasizes, “the status of the FEZ has been characterized by their high 
degree o f dependence on current political conditions, the nature of which cannot be 
generally said to favour the development of FEZ.”65 At the same time, in a number of 
instances the lack o f transparency in the administrative and financial relations between 
FEZ and the federal government made the implementation o f promising investment
61 Report on Analysis o f  Economic Situation in the Russian Far East and Siberia and Russian-Korean  
Cooperation , (Seoul: The Research Project for the Globalization in Russia’s Regions at Hankuk 
University o f  Foreign Studies, December 2003), p. 63; and Kuznetsov, p. 54.
62 George T. Crane, The Political Economy o f  China's Special Economic Zones (New York: Armonk, 
1990), pp. 54-55.
63 Manezhev, “Free Economic Zones in the Context o f  Economic Changes in Russia,” 1993, p. 618.
64 Ibid.
65 Manezhev, 1995, p. 83;
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projects difficult. This contributed to the substantial underdevelopment o f economic, 
legal, and organizational infrastructures. Since the central government delayed passing 
the necessary laws, the tax privileges did not come into operation and the infrastructure 
was not constructed. This deterred foreign investment and, as a result, most o f the 
FEZ’s had to scale down their plans.
4.3. The lack of infrastructure
A clear and explicit infrastructure programme is critically essential in promoting 
the FEZ in the international arena. The host country must show evidence o f seriousness 
o f intentions through such a programme. This would reduce investment risk and hence 
lead investors, including South Korean investors, to increase their business activities. In 
the case o f Nakhodka, however, preparations for the requisite infrastructure for 
industrial parks were insufficient.66 There was very little policy coordination between 
Moscow and the local authorities. Moreover, the Russian government has failed to 
provide good services such as water, sewage, electricity, and other energy sources to the 
FEZ. For example, although the seaports, railways, and roads conditions in the 
Nakhodka area are in relatively good condition, water and power lines, as well as water 
drainage and sewage are underdeveloped. Providing good services is sometimes more 
important than tax reductions for attracting foreign investment and their absence has 
clearly reduced the attractiveness of the region. In China, the Kunshan FEZ did not 
offer superior tax concession but focused on providing good services. In the Nakhodka 
case, the Russian government was supposed to be responsible for providing the 
infrastructure outside the industrial complex and yet there have been no substantial 
improvements in this area.68
4.4. The lack of a legal framework
The successful development o f the FEZ also depends on the establishment of 
special customs and stable taxation regimes for foreign investors.69 However, Russia’s 
legislation lags behind its economy, and this had led to the abandonment o f FEZ in
66 Vladivostok News, No. 163,20 March, 1998; and Chang Duckjoon “The Russian Far East and 
Northeast Asia,” Post-Soviet Geography and Economics, Vol. 37, No. 3, 1996, pp. 175-194.
67 Park and Lee, p. 56; Judith Thornton and Nadezhda N. Mikheeva, “The Strategies o f  Foreign and 
Foreign Assisted Firms in the Russian Far East: Alternatives to M issing Infrastructure,” Com parative  
Economic Studies, Vol. 38, No. 4, 1996, pp. 85-119; and Chang, 1996, pp. 175-194.
68 Ellman, p. 7; and Ok-Kyung Jung, “Economic Cooperation between South Korea and Russia’s Far 
East,” Journal o f  Economic Policy, Vol. 2, No. 4 ,2 0 0 0 , p. 166.
69 Svetlana Kuzmichenko, Commercial News Update From the RFE- June 2003, July 2003, on 
http://www.bisnis.doc.gov/bisnis/bisdoc/0307newsvlad.htm. accessed on 1 May, 2004.
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• 70Russia. The government and the parliament issued a sequence of decrees, directives, 
and orders designed to facilitate and precipitate the establishment o f the FEZ, yet none 
of them has ever been implemented in reality. The only privilege that the zones could 
actually offer the foreign investor before 1994 was a 50 percent cut in trade tariffs.71 As 
we have seen, in the case of Nakhodka, the Russian Federal government has not ratified 
the agreement that was signed on 28 May 1999 between Presidents Yeltsin and Kim 
Dae Jung, and ratified by the South Korean parliament in December 1999.72 This 
means that a comprehensive legal framework for the functions o f FEZ in general, and 
the Nakhodka FEZ in particular, did not exist and the status and functions o f this type o f 
organization were not clearly defined until July 2005.
Despite the fact that a law on industrial complexes in the Nakhodka FEZ was 
passed by the Primorsky Duma in September 1995, nobody has been able to enjoy the 
privileges it provided. In 1996, a total o f 9 FEZs acquired the status o f industrial 
complexes, yet none o f them have begun operation. The authorities of the FEZ and 
foreign investors were hoping that a federal law on FEZ would be passed by the State 
Duma in its third reading and approved by the Council o f the Federation. However, the 
former President, Boris Yeltsin rejected the law and sent it back to the State Duma. As 
we have seen, it was only in July 2005 that the law was finally adopted and it came into 
effect on 27 August 2005. In November 2005 six regions were given permission to 
establish FEZ, but Nakhodka was not included in the list.74
Why is a law so important for the creation o f the Nakhodka FEZ? The creation 
o f a FEZ is an overwhelmingly ‘investment-intensive process.’ Providing investors 
with stable legislation is key to the success of the development of FEZ. In particular, 
the legal basis of the FEZ is directly related to the tax privileges investors can expect. 
The submission of a successful FEZ application to the Federal government is perhaps 
the most urgent and important task for the Nakhodka FEZ project at this stage.
Conversely, the lack o f legal framework leads to inconsistent tax policies.
Foreign investment has been discouraged by the federal government’s current tax policy.
70 “Free Economic Zones in Russia,” the Voice o f  Russia, 14 October, 1999 (Russian Economy and 
Business Online), on http://www.vor.ru/Russian Economv/excl next48 eng.html. accessed on 1 May, 
2004.
71 Kuznetsov, p. 54.
72 Business newspaper “Zolotoy Rog” (Golden Horn), 2003.
73 “Law on Special Economic Zones,” International Financial Law Review, November 2005, on 
http://www.iflr.com/?Page=10&PUBID=33&ISS=20856&SID=595028&TYPE=20. accessed on 30 
December, 2005. See also “Economic Zones Becom e Law in Russia,” Kommersant, July 25, 2005, on 
http://www.kommersant.com/page.asp?idr=l&id=595896. accessed on 30 December, 2005. I am very 
grateful to Margot Light for drawing my attention to this site.
74 RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 9, No. 221, Part I, 29 November 2005.
75 Manezhev, 1995, p. 80.
151
The lack of tax and custom benefits for companies involved in the project clearly 
diminishes investment incentives. Moreover, raising barriers to trade such as
7unexpected increases in tariffs leads to a significant contraction in the volume o f trade. 
From the Russian perspective, as Manezhev points out, the major problem is that the 
special tax and other benefits for foreign investors restrict profit sharing for the Russian 
side.77
Although the Russian Federation had designated the Nakhodka area as a FEZ
no
with tax breaks in 1991, the zone offered tax breaks only at the Krai level. The 
Russian parliament needed to adopt the law on FEZs before the full range of tax 
privileges could be offered. In fact, up to this point, discussions of the project between 
Russia and South Korea had been limited to infrastructure and the details such as the 
dates of construction, the rate of the lease, specific tax privileges, etc remained to be
• 70 • • •established. As Fedorov notes, prior to the commencement o f construction, it is 
essential for both Seoul and Moscow to agree to a memorandum on the interpretation of 
the three articles o f the Agreement between the government o f the Russian Federation 
and the government o f the Republic of Korea on the establishment of the Russia-Korea 
Industrial Complex in the Nakhodka Free Economic Zone which deal with “the status 
of FEZ administrative committee, or some other entity replacing it” o f the industrial 
park project. However, the Korean side will only review the three articles after the
on
Nakhodka FEZ bid has been selected by the Russian federal government. As we have 
noted, the Nakhodka FEZ was not selected among the six regions which won the right 
to create Special Economic Zones on 29 November 2005, so the project is on hold.
4.S. Crime and Local Mafias
Foreign investment in the Nakhodka area has also been discouraged by local 
criminal activities, notably around port areas. Russian mafias are involved in virtually 
every business that the FEZ is hoping to promote, including illegal trade in fishing, 
timber, and other natural resources. For example, although regional officials hoped that 
the holding of an APEC investment conference in September 2002 would call attention 
to investment opportunities in the Russian Far East in general, a number of contract
76 Bharat R. Hazari and Pasquale M. Sgro, “Free Trade Zones, Tariffs and the Real Exchange Rate,”
Open economics review  7, 1996, Kluwer Academy Publisher, p. 201.
7 Manezhev, Post-Soviet Business Forum, the Russian Far East, 1993, p. 28.
78 Vladivostok News, No. 163, 20 March, 1998, quoted in Chang, 1996, pp. 175-194.
79 Agreement on the establishment o f  Korean Russian Industrial Park in the Nakhodka FEZ between 
Republic o f  Korea and Russia (Korean version), The Korean Ministry o f  Foreign Affairs and Trade, 28 
May 1999.
80 Fedorov.
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killings o f regional officials and business people around the time o f the international 
meeting did little to enhance Nakhodka’s reputation.81 Indeed, “abundant natural 
resources, weapons depots, ports, and a thriving business in fake identity cards and 
passports have made the Russian Far East especially attractive to criminal gangs. Crime 
and corruption are interrelated problems in the region.”82 According to a report by the 
Nakhodka Prosecutor’s Office, more than 148 million roubles ($8 million) has allegedly
• O'!
been misused since 1991 in the form o f squandering and large scale fraud.
Moreover, in Vladivostok not far from Nakhodka, Chechen gangs allegedly run 
several major smuggling operations in fishing and stolen cars. It is also reported that 
Central Asian drug smugglers have begun moving their operations to Vladivostok.84 
Foreign investors are unlikely to be willing to put up with the high risks in the region 
unless substantial law enforcement efforts are made to protect their safety.
81 For example, one month after the APEC conference, in October 2002, a lawyer working for the 
Vladivostok mayor’s office and an opposition politician in Nakhodka were severely injured in attacks 
believed to be attempted murders. Moreover, Nakhodka businessman Viktori Aksinin was shot dead at 
his apartment door, and Vladimir Tsvetkov, governor o f  the gold-rich Magadan Oblast, was gunned down 
in M oscow. See Tamara Troyakova, U.S. Department o f  Commerce, “Trade and Investment Barriers in 
the Russian Far East,” January 2003.
82 James Clay Moltz, “Core and Periphery in the Evolving Russian Economy: Integration or Isolation o f  
the Far East?” Post-Soviet Geography and Economics, Vol. 37, No. 3, 1996, p. 184.
83 Vladivostok News, No. 181,4  December, 1998.
84 Troyakova.
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5. Implications for bilateral and regional economic security
The successful development of the Russian-South Korean industrial project in 
the Nakhodka FEZ is important not only for the two countries’ economic security, but 
also for regional economic development and economic integration. The Nakhodka FEZ 
project has the potential to be mutually complementary in enhancing the economic 
security of Seoul and Moscow. It could become a highly competitive site for the 
processing of wood, sea, and mineral resources where Russia’s fundamental technology, 
labour and natural resources could be efficiently utilized. Russia definitely needs South 
Korean investment for the economic development o f the Russian Far East. If  the US 
$800 million Russian-South Korean industrial complex in the Nakhodka FEZ is 
established, this region could turn into the first Russian FEZ with an export
Off
orientation. Moreover, given that Russia needs to stop increasing the structural 
distortion in its economy towards fuel and raw material production and to prevent the 
disintegration of its scientific and technological potential, the development o f an 
industrial park in the Nakhodka FEZ could provide a means o f developing the 
manufacturing sector in Russia.
The project clearly also has the potential to enhance South Korea’s economic 
security. It can help to solve present domestic economic problems such as high wages, 
shortage of labour, and high real estate prices, while becoming a geo-strategically 
important gate for exporting Korean goods to Europe, China, Central Asia, and Russia
R Ain the longer term. South Korea also wants to help its medium and small-sized 
companies advance into FEZ and then use it as a gate to move forward into other 
sectors of the Russian and Central Asian countries. The project offers a tremendous 
opportunity to diversify Korean export markets, relieving Korea’s overdependence on 
Chinese markets in the region. More importantly, apart from attracting new foreign 
investment, a Russian-Korean industrial complex would create nearly 30,000 new jobs
R7inside and outside the FEZ. For example, former coal miners from Partizansk and ex- 
servicemen from Fokino are likely to benefit from the new employment opportunities.88
85 “South Korea May Become Source o f  Big Capital Investments into Russian Economy,” RIA Novosti, 
22 September, 2004.
86 “Nakhodka,” Segye II bo , 13 February, 2001; and KOTRA, 1995, p. 214
87 “Free Economic Zones in Russia,” the Voice o f  Russia, 1999.
88 According to Dudnik, many coal miners lost their jobs when mines shut down in the Partizansk area, 
while a large number o f  servicemen have been discharged from the Russian army. See Radio Free 
Europe/ Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) Russian Federation Report, 2 June, 1999, on 
http://wwwrferl.org/reports/russianreport/1999/06/15-090699.html. accessed on 2 May 2004.
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The Nakhodka FEZ project also has the potential to contribute to regional 
economic security. As discussed in Chapter 2, Russian leaders realize that Russia’s 
integration into the Northeast Asian economy is essential for the future economic 
security of region. Balassa defines economic integration as “the creation of formal 
cooperation between states; the movement towards a free-trade area, a custom union, a 
common market, an economic union, or complete economic integration.”89 The 
Nakhodka FEZ seeks to build a region that can exploit the capital and technology of 
Japan and South Korea, the natural resources and the land o f the Russian Far East, and 
the abundant and cheap labour o f north-eastern China. Participating countries 
acknowledge that cross-border economic activities and local collective action would be 
the most efficient mechanism for building regional economic security. Since 
geographical proximity is usually expected to increase economic interaction, the 
Nakhodka FEZ is a particularly appropriate location for economic cooperation. 
Geographical proximity also minimizes transaction costs, reduces transport time, eases 
travel for executives and managers, and allows for face-to-face interactions.90
Despite the potential for contributing to bilateral and regional economic security, 
the reality is that the Nakhodka FEZ project has not emerged as a functioning unit of 
economic activity. As a result, it has generated scepticism as to the potential for further 
cooperation. As we have seen, the potential o f the Nakhodka FEZ project was hindered 
by patchy reform and the conflict between centre and local leadership over FEZ policy 
on the Russian domestic side. The short-term benefits the Nakhodka FEZ can offer to 
both countries have not yet been well defined and, at times, have been contested by the 
Russian federal government.91 Russia’s clumsy FEZ policy, together with its overly 
politicized FEZ structure, has delayed ratification of the project. I suspect that even 
when Nakhodka is given permission to create a FEZ, the agreement will have to be 
renegotiated between Seoul and Moscow.92 In the worst case scenario, Nakhodka will
89 Ballassa, Bela, The Theory o f  Economic Integration, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1961), quoted in Shaun 
Breslin and Glenn D. Hook, “Microregionalism and World Order: Concepts, Approaches and 
Implications,” in Shaun Breslin, ed., New regionalism in the g lobal po litica l economy (London: 
Routledge, 2002), p. 12.
90 Breslin and Hook, pp. 9-10.
91 Elisa Miller and Alexander Karp, eds., The Russian Far East: A Business Reference Guide, Fourth 
Edition 1999-2000 (Seattle: Russian Far East Update, 1999), p. 171.
92 Report on Analysis o f  Economic Situation in the Russian Far East and Siberia and Russian-Korean  
Cooperation, pp. 63-64.
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fail to get permission and the initial FEZ plan will disappear without being 
implemented.93
With the lack of both central support and a firm legal base, the Russian FEZ has 
been little more than a bargaining instrument in the negotiations between different 
levels of government, mostly between the centre and local authorities.94 As a result, 
having failed to establish a substantial market network between Russia and South’Korea, 
the core element of economic security, the Nakhodka FEZ project has not so far 
contributed to bilateral and regional economic security.
93 Unlike the relatively optimistic view o f  Russian officials until recently, the Korean side has been 
pessimistic for some time. See, for example, Kim Eun Chong, the manager o f  the foreign business 
department o f  KLDC and an anonymous official from the Korean Ministry o f  Industry, Commerce and 
Energy, quoted in “Nakhodka,” Segye II bo, 13 February, 2001.
94 Faltin, pp. 111-142.
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Chapter 6. Fishery Cooperation
Introduction
This chapter reviews the progress and problems of fishery cooperation between 
Moscow and Seoul. Its main purpose is to investigate whether fishery diplomacy 
between the two states could contribute to building Russian-South Korean economic 
security relations and regional economic security. Since the establishment of 
diplomatic relations in 1990 and a fishery agreement in 1991, South Korea has fished in 
Russian waters according to fishery quotas based on a bilateral fishery pact. Busan, the 
second-largest South Korean city and the country’s major port city, has become one of 
the most attractive ports to Russian fishery operators because o f its proximity to the 
Russian Far East and its marine capabilities. Most importantly, this relatively small but 
flourishing fishery trade is seen as one of the few successful aspects o f the relatively 
stagnant Russo-South Korean diplomatic relations.
Nevertheless, many problems still exist. Russia’s policy o f reducing pollack 
catch quotas, its unpredictable policy concerning fishing rights charges, its inconsistent 
policy of barring South Korean fishing boats from fishing in the Russian fishery zone, 
and illegal sales o f fish have obstructed fishery cooperation. In particular, illegal 
fishing activities and the size o f the catch quotas are becoming serious diplomatic issues 
between the two countries. The chapter argues that the criminalization o f fishery 
commerce in the Russian Far East, involving countless public officials, enterprises, and 
mafias, has generated illegal fishing and resulted in overfishing and the depletion of 
stock. To prevent overfishing, the Russian government has reduced the catch quotas 
over the last decade. Illegal fishing activities in the Russian Far East have also become 
a regional security concern.
The chapter concludes that illegal fishing activities and quota disputes stem from 
the Russian Far East’s troubled transition to democracy and a market economy. Some 
of the features of the troubled domestic fishery situation in the Far East are a decrease in 
reported fishery production, export increases, illegal trading, overfishing, incomplete 
legislation on fishery, and institutional conflict between the centre and periphery over 
control of resources. Above all, the clumsy Russian legal system, a highly politicized 
fishery quota-allocation system, a confiscatory tax regime, and the lack o f law 
enforcement agencies in the Russian Far East have all facilitated illegal fishery activities.
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More important, given that fishery issues are transnational and trans-boundary, 
the chapter also illustrates that the international and regional dimensions are not 
negligible. Since the bulk of fishery products are unloaded in the port of Busan, it is 
mainly Korean consumers that fuel this commerce and South Korea must also assume 
some responsibility for the illegal trade. Moreover, South Korea’s unsuccessful 
negotiation strategy in fishery diplomacy with Japan and China has increased its 
dependence on fishing in Russian waters. The chapter concludes that despite the 
potential o f Russia’s fishery resources to contribute to economic security, current 
obstacles clearly impede the two countries’ bilateral and regional economic security 
building process.
The chapter begins with an examination of the importance of the Russian Far 
East fishery to South Korea. It then deals with major developments in fishery 
diplomacy, focusing on the pollack quota dispute, cuttlefish dispute, and the saury case. 
In the third section, the fundamental causes o f illegal fishery in the Russian Far East are 
examined within both the Russian domestic and the regional dimension, and the 
argument that illegal fishing is the main problem for fishery diplomacy between 
Russian and South Korea is set out. The final section o f the chapter assesses the 
implications o f fishery diplomacy for bilateral and regional economic security.
1. The Importance of Russian Far East Fishery to Russia and South Korea
The Korean fishery industry has long played an important role as an exporting 
industry as well as a national food industry. Moreover, it plays a critical social, cultural, 
and economic role in Korea. Fishery products are Korea’s main protein source, which 
is essential for the nation’s food and health, as well as for the Korean food culture. 
Because of Korea’s geographic situation —  surrounded by three seas and with more 
than 3000 islands —  fishery is a core industry that supports the national economy while 
playing a critical role in developing local areas.
Nevertheless, the Korean fishery industry currently faces great challenges. They 
include debates within international institutions such as the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), the Organization for Economic Cooperation Development (OECD), and the 
UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) on the reduction or abolition o f fishery 
subsidies that provoke trade distortion and negatively influence sustainable resources, as
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well as the reform of the fishery order in Northeast Asia.1 If overseas fishing grounds 
and fishery investment are not acquired, the amount of deep-sea fishing is also expected 
to decrease as a result o f the reduction o f fishing grounds and the difficulty in securing 
fishing grounds because of the coming into effect of the UN Convention on the Law of 
the Sea. Moreover, as a result of the new Korea-Japan and the Korea-China fishery 
agreements reached during the last decade, the amount o f inshore fishery production has 
been steadily decreasing. In this regard, the Russian fishery zone provides a bonanza 
for the South Korean fishing industry because of its vast and rich marine products and 
fishery resources.
When the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia’s fishing industry was the world’s 
fourth largest, following Japan, the United States, and China. It still accounts for nearly 
25 percent of the world’s production of fresh and frozen fish and about one-third of the 
global output o f tinned fish. The Russian Far East fishery resources are particularly 
important for South Korea because the bays and islands of the area offer promising sites 
for marine agriculture, including fish farming and the cultivation of marine products.
The Russian Far East is Russia’s most important fishing region, providing nearly two- 
thirds o f the total catch o f Russia. Most fish catching and processing is carried out in 
four regions: Primorsky Krai (49 percent), Kamchatskaya Oblast (25 percent), Sakhalin 
Oblast (16 percent), and Khabarovsky Krai (7 percent). Most fish and seafood is 
harvested within a domestic 200-mile zone that includes the western Bering Sea, the 
Sea o f Okhotsk, the seas around the Kuril Islands, the waters east o f Kamchatka, and 
the East Sea. The main fish products caught in this region are Alaska pollack, 
Okhotomorskaya herring, salmon, and crab.
Fishery, timber, and fuel are the three industries that dominate in the Russian Far 
East, constituting 80-85 percent of total exports from the region. The export volumes of 
fish and fishery products increase every year. For example, they accounted for over 40 
percent o f the region’s exports in 1995, compared with about 20 percent in 1985.4 As 
Vladimir Putin argued in a speech in Vladivostok on June 24, 2004, the fishing industry
1 Myong Sop Pak and Moon Bae Joo, “Korea’s Fisheries Industry and Government Financial Transfers,” 
M arine Policy , Vol. 26, No. 6, November 2002, p. 429.
2 The import and export trends o f  Korean fishery products during the 1990s show that exports gradually 
increased in the early 1990s, but constantly decreased after 1995. On the other hand, imports o f  fishery 
products constantly increased. See Pak and Joo, pp. 429-435.
Elena Tarrant, “The Russian Far East Fishing Industry,” The Business Information Service fo r  the N ewly 
Independent States (BISNIS)Report, US Department o f  Commerce, on 
http://bisnis.doc.gov/bisnis/countrv/9902fis2.htm. accessed on 24 July, 2004.
4 Sergei Manezhev, “The Russian Far East,” in David Dyker, ed., Investment Opportunity in Russia and  
the CIS (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995), p. 242.
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in this region is a potentially very prosperous business.5 Russian fish and fishery 
products are the second largest export item to Japan and the fourth largest to South 
Korea, as Table 10 illustrates.6
Table 10 Top 5 Russian Exports to South Korea, 2003
Item Price (millions of US $)
Variation on 2002 
(%)
Composition (%)
Aluminium 303.8 19.7 13.4
Steel (Scrap iron 
and alloyed steel) 298.2 37 13.2
Oil 239.9 41.0 10.6
Fish 164.0 61.2 7.3
Nickel 147.9 283.7 6.5
Source: KOTRA, 2003
The international and regional dimensions of the Russian Far East fishery are 
even more significant. In the 1990s, the region lost many of its markets in the former 
Soviet republics and high railroad tariffs cut off western Russian markets too.7 This 
made the industry reorient itself toward foreign consumers, notably Northeast Asian 
nations. Japanese, Korean, Chinese, and American governments and private sectors 
have been more active in the fishing industry than in any other sector o f the Far Eastern
o
economy. In fact, the Japanese seafood import market, the largest in the world, has 
been dependent on output from Russia’s Far East for several decades, as has the South 
Korean seafood import market. China and South Korea also serve as centres for transit 
and reprocessing of Russian seafood. King Crab, salmon, pollack, saury, and scallops 
are also exported from this region to Asia, North America, and Europe. It is reported 
that in many cases, American fishing companies resell fishing products to Japan and
5 “Russia’s Fish Trade Has Gone to the dogs,” Business Report, 24 June, 2004, on 
http://www.businessreport.coza/index.php?fArtic1eld=2124630. accessed on 17 August, 2004.
6 The largest export from the Russian Far East to Japan is aluminium. Other items include industrial 
wood and timber, coal, oil, gold and diamonds. See KOTRA, Annual Report 2003', and Manezhev, 1995, 
p. 249.
Sectors o f  Industry: Fishing, on http://www/kigam.re.kr/mrc/korean/file/East/fishing.htm. accessed on 
29 June, 2004.
8 Allison notes that, although this is a difficult measurement to quantify because the activity is often not 
only unrecorded but also very diverse (bilateral and multilateral treaties, direct fishing, commercial and 
government credits, scientific exchanges, chartered vessels, and vessel management support are all part o f  
the picture), it is doubtful that this statement would be disputed by anyone who has tried to compare the 
situation with other Russian Far East industries. However, from the standpoint o f  foreign financial 
investment and employment, it is highly likely that the oil and gas sector on Sakhalin and in the Russian 
Far East w ill soon surpass the fishing industry, if  it has not already done so. See Anthony Allison, 
“Sources o f  Crisis in the Russian Far East Fishing Industry,” Com parative Economic Studies, Vol. 43, No. 
4, Winter 2001, p. 92.
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Korea.9 Moreover, ships with foreign flags can fish in Russia’s Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ)10, but only if the flag belongs to a country that has signed a bilateral fishing 
agreement with Russia, such as Japan or South Korea. Since the United States does not 
have a bilateral agreement with Russia and does not allow Russian ships to fish in US 
waters, some US companies team up with a Russian partner and reflag their vessels.11
Meanwhile, apart from direct fishing by foreign vessels, joint ventures have 
been the most common phenomenon to be established in the Russian Far East fishery 
arena, and they tend to be established at both the legal and illegal levels. Joint ventures 
provide good opportunities for the South Korean fishing industry. In fact, everywhere 
in Russia, including in the Far East, the fishing industry needs technical upgrading, 
better management, higher-quality products, and improved domestic and external
•  19marketing. Joint ventures with foreign firms could satisfy these needs. They provide 
Russia with foreign technology and capital markets, while giving foreign partners 
access to deep-sea processors and Russian fishery resources. In most cases, foreign 
companies often lease or sell their vessels in exchange for fish products.
Following the passage o f the Soviet joint venture law in 1987, fishery joint
ventures were established with partners in Japan, the United States, Hong Kong,
1 ^Australia, Vietnam, and South Korea. In 1998, 12 of the 120 seafood enterprises in 
the Primorskii territory were joint ventures with foreign investment. One-quarter of 
their production was exported, primarily to Japan, the United States, and South K orea.14 
Japanese and South Korean fishing companies actively pursue joint ventures in the 
Russian Far East, primarily because o f the decline o f stocks in their own zones and their 
exclusion from former fishing grounds in distant waters how under the jurisdiction of 
other countries.15 In South Korea, Busan-based companies are particularly actively 
involved in joint ventures. In most cases, they seek suppliers of live and frozen crab
9 Elisa Miller and Alexander Karp, The Russian Far East: A Business Reference Guide, Fourth Edition, 
1999-2000  (Washington, DC: Russian Far East Advisory Group, 1999), p. 115.
10 According to the widely accepted Law o f  the Sea (Maritime Law), each nation that borders the ocean 
may claim as an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which extends offshore for 200 nautical miles (370km/ 
230miles). Resources within an EEZ belong to the nation that claims it. See Encarta Encyclopedia, 
1993-2003 Microsoft Corporation.
11 Miller and Karp, p. 122.
12 Douglas M. Johnston and Mark J. Valencia, “Fisheries,” in Mark J. Valencia, ed., The Russian Far 
East in Transition: opportunities fo r  regional cooperation  (Boulder, CO: W estview Press, 1995), p. 147.
13 Tsuneo Akaha, “US-Russian Fishery Joint Ventures: A Curse in Disguise?” paper presented at the 
Monterey Institute o f  International Studies, July 1993; and Judith Thornton, “The Exercise o f  Rights to 
Resources in the Russian Far East,” in Michael J. Bradshaw ed., The Russian Far East and Pacific Asia: 
unfulfilled poten tia l (Richmond: Curzon, 2001), p. 114.
14 “Investment Opportunities in Primorsky Territory, Russian Federation,” Tumen River Area 
Development Programme, 1998 Tumen Secretariat UNDP, on http://www.tradp.org/textonlv/ioprim.htm. 
accessed on 23 November, 2001.
15 Johnston and Valencia, p. 147.
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such as snow crab opilio and blue and red king crab, and sell fishing gear and packaging 
containers. Korean companies have also been active in such services as the selection 
and supply of crab-processing equipment and plastic containers for crab cooking and 
transportation.16
2. The Development of Fishery Diplomacy between Russia and South Korea
South Korea has been fishing for Russian pollack in the Sea of Kamchatka since 
the late 1960s. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1990 and the fishery 
agreement in 1991, South Korea has also been able to fish in the Sea o f Okhotsk 
according to fishery quotas based on the South Korean-Russian fishery pact.17 South 
Korea has fished for mostly pollack, king crab, cuttlefish, cod, and saury in this region.
Meanwhile, South Korea has become a convenient place for Russian fishery 
markets and fishery operators to conduct business during the last decade. High taxes 
and duties, along with burdensome regulations and inefficient port procedures in the 
Russian Far East, have caused many Russian fishery operators to keep their foreign- 
built vessels out o f Russian Far East ports. Even crew changes are often done at sea or
| Q
in foreign locations. Foreign countries tend to offer more favourable terms of 
payment and a better infrastructure and service for the crew and vessels.
Since the collapse o f the Soviet Union, one of the fundamental economic 
changes in the Russian Far East fishery has been the new terms o f payment. While 
income and cash flow were secure during the Soviet period, the new market-based 
economy proved to be the opposite. Because of this economic situation, many of the 
land-based fish-processing companies and traders suffer from a lack of working capital. 
Nilssen and Honneland maintain that sellers have normally had to accept terms of 
payment that include, among other things, extensive credit. This is less attractive for 
the fishing companies, which have been struggling to generate and maintain an 
acceptable cash flow. None of them can afford to allow extensive credit on their sales.19
16 Russian Fish Report, Monthly Fisheries N ews From Russia, Issue No. 1 (76), January, 2003, p. 6.
17 Briefing, 10 August, 2000, International Cooperation Department, Korean Ministry o f  Maritime Affairs 
and Fishery, on http://www.kmi.re.kr/dailv update/html/alim/200008/alim200008104.htm accessed on 
28 July, 2004, and Report on Analysis o f  Economic Situation in the Russian Far East and Siberia and  
Russian- Korean Cooperation, (Seoul: The Research Project for the Globalization in Russia’s Regions at 
Hankuk University o f  Foreign Studies, December 2003).
18 Allison, p. 80.
19 Frode Nilssen and Geir Honneland, “Institutional Change and the Problems o f  Restructuring the 
Russian Fishing Industry,” Post-Communist Economies, Vol. 13, No. 3 ,2 0 0 1 , pp. 323-324.
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Moreover, a great number of active Russian fishing vessels were either 
purchased or significantly upgraded abroad, which also represents a substantial 
investment made away from Russia. What drove them toward foreign harbours was 
that the newly purchased or renovated vessels were carrying a latent tax burden to the 
Russian state on the sum of the investments. In fact, the tax burden, which is 25 percent 
of the investment value, was not activated as long as the vessel was located abroad or at 
least avoided calling at a Russian port. Thus, Russian fishing boats were highly 
reluctant to deliver their catch to Russian ports.20 This is one reason why, because o f its 
proximity to the Russian Far East and its marine service capabilities, Busan has become 
the most convenient port for Russians over the last decade. Drydocks in Busan have 
been full o f Russian vessels, and business hotels have hosted Russian fishing industry 
entrepreneurs.21
Despite rapidly developing fishery-related activities between Russia and South 
Korea, a number o f problems have arisen. Russia’s policy o f reducing the pollack catch 
quotas, o f unpredictably raising fishing right charges, o f inconsistently barring foreign 
fishing boats from fishing in the Russian fishery zone, as well as the illegal sale of fish 
by the Russian mafia are the major problems. In particular, since the late 1990s, Russia 
has continued to reduce the South Korean pollack catch quota significantly, and this has 
had a devastating impact on the Korean fishery industry. Given that pollack is one of 
the most popular fish in the Korean diet, and that South Korea depends on the Sea of 
Okhotsk for 90 percent o f its total domestic pollack consumption, it is no exaggeration 
to say that this quota dispute threatens South Korea’s national economic security.
2.1. The Pollack Quota Dispute
The Sea of Okhotsk as a whole contains perhaps the richest stock o f Alaskan 
pollack in the world. It is fished by Russia, South Korea, China, Taiwan, and North 
Korea, as well as Poland, Panama, and Bulgaria. The special fishery zone called the 
“Peanut Hole” in the Sea o f Okhotsk has been a very important area for these countries. 
The Peanut Hole is an oblong, 35-by-300 mile window in the central Sea o f Okhotsk 
lying outside of, but surrounded by, the 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone
20 Ibid., p. 324.
21 A little Russian town, the so-called “ Ulitsa Texas” was even set up in the area o f Busan, in order to 
cater to Russian fishermen and shuttle traders.
22 “Korean fishery diplomacy fails,” Editorial, Busan Ilbo, 17 December, 2001, on 
http://www.pusanilbo.com/news2000/html/2001/1217/04002Q011217.1005.... accessed on 28 July, 2004.
23 Japan also fishes in this area but not for pollack.
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(EEZ) o f Russia and Japan’s Hokkaido.24 The Peanut Hole is particularly important to 
South Korea because this is the area where most fishery conflict between Seoul and 
Moscow arises. South Korea’s pollack catch there o f 200,000 metric tons in 1993 was 
almost twice as much as its catch in the surrounding Russian EEZ for the same period 
(107,000 tons). This pollack supplied half o f its domestic demand.
The fishery conflict between the two countries over pollack in 1992 and 1993 is 
particularly important because it illustrates the key problems o f fishery diplomacy. The 
problems persist and are highly likely to occur again in the future. In May 1992, South 
Korea concluded an agreement with Russia for the acquisition of 155,400 tons of 
pollack from the Peanut Hole in 1993, a reduction of nearly 25 percent from 1992. 
However, in January 1993 a price dispute arose between the two over Alaskan pollack. 
Seoul proposed US $470 per ton for importing pollack but Moscow demanded $530. 
Negotiations failed and Seoul feared cancellation of its 155,400 ton annual fishing quota 
for pollack. In mid-February, Russia prevented not only South Korea but all other 
countries as well from catching pollack in the Peanut Hole for ecological reasons to
n r
prevent overfishing. Simultaneously, the Russian State Committee for Fisheries 
submitted a proposal to parliament that it declare the Sea o f Okhotsk should be declared 
an ecological disaster area, barring even Russians from fishing there. Seoul protested 
that Russia could not unilaterally make such a declaration, since the area was high seas 
and thus such a ban required agreement through multilateral negotiations. South Korea 
argued that a unilateral ban would be a violation o f the Law of the Sea.
In March, 1993 Russia changed its previous position and agreed to hold 
multilateral negotiations on the issue with South Korea, Japan, China, Poland and other 
relevant countries. Indeed, South Korea reportedly held unofficial meetings with other 
countries to discuss the upcoming negotiations and to propose safe fishing operations 
and conservation of fishery resources in this area. At that time, South Korea allegedly 
still had 31 fishing boats in the Sea o f Okhotsk, six more than under the previous 
bilateral agreement. South Korea indicated its willingness to remove all the boats in
24 Johnston and Valencia, p. 161.
25 Following the collapse o f  the Soviet Union, the Soviet Ministry o f  Fishing Industry was immediately 
transferred to the Ministry o f  Agriculture in 1992 and then re-established as an independent agency, the 
State Committee for Fisheries in 1996. This committee coordinated Russia’s approach to fishing at the 
federal level until 2004. The March 2004 Presidential Decree abolished this committee and transferred 
the State Committee’s functions to the Ministry o f  Agriculture. See more details in Geir Honneland, 
“Fisheries Management in Post-Soviet Russia: Legislation, Principles, and Structure,” Ocean 
Developm ent & International Law , Vol. 36, No. 2, April-June 2005, pp. 179-194. See also 
http://www.apec-oceans.org/economv%20profile%20summaries/russia-draft.pdf. accessed on 12 January, 
2006; and http://www.govemment.gov.ru/data/static text.html?he id=1052. accessed on 10 January, 
2006. I am very grateful to Margot Light for drawing my attention to these three sources.
26 FBIS-EAS, 24 February 1993, p. 26, and 26 August 1993, p. 19.
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order to make negotiations easier.27 Nevertheless, the Russian parliament again 
reversed its position on 16 April, 1993 and adopted a resolution banning all fishing 
boats inside Russia’s EEZ from June onwards. Russia also called on Japan, South 
Korea, Poland, and China to join in a three year moratorium on fishing in the Peanut 
Hole. The Russian deputy prime minister, Alexandr Shokhin, stated that Russia would 
use naval vessels to enforce the ban and would consider all foreign fishing vessels in the
area poachers. Russia set a fine o f US $400,000 dollars for poaching in the Russian sea
28zones and reportedly arrested some foreign fishing vessels, including Chinese and 
Polish trawlers, in the Peanut Hole in 1993 29
After consulting with other involved countries, South Korean Foreign Ministry 
officials criticized Russia on the grounds that its request for a moratorium was not based 
on scientific evidence. On 18 April, all o f South Korea’s vessels were still in the Sea of
A
Okhotsk. In late May and early June, following multilateral talks with China and 
Poland, South Korea agreed to resume fishing in the Peanut Hole but to voluntarily 
reduce its pollack catch by 25 percent until talks with Russia in October. This was a 25 
percent reduction of South Korea’s 1993 quota, which was already a 25 percent 
reduction o f its quota from the previous year. Russia protested against this agreement. 
Boris Yeltsin delivered a letter to President Kim Yong Sam to stop South Korea fishing 
in the area, since Russian fishermen had by then turned the dispute into a domestic 
political issue. As a conciliatory gesture, Russia offered South Korean companies
? t
permission to purchase Russian catch quotas in compensation.
In August 1993, the pollack dispute generated great political concern in the 
overall diplomatic relations between the two countries. On 6 August 1993, South Korea 
reiterated that, despite threats o f retaliation from the Russian side, it would resume 
fishing in the Peanut Hole. Russia then declared that it would withhold the repayment 
o f a US $1.47 billion loan from the South Korean government.33 Later in August South 
Korea resumed fishing in this region. Fishing was urgent for South Korea because its
27 FBIS-EAS, 9 March 1993, pp. 24-25.
28 New York Times, 1 August 1993, p. 9 and FBIS-EAS, 21 April 1993, p. 26.
29 Russian Far East Update, August 1993, p. 3; Johnston and Valencia, p. 163; New York Times, 1 August 
1993, p. 9; and FBIS-EAS, 21 April 1993.
30 FBIS-EAS, 21 April 1993, p. 26, and 26 April, 1993, p. 39; and Russian Far East Update, August 1993, 
p. 3.
31 See FBIS-EAS, 14 June, 1993, p. 8; 6 August 1993, p. 19; and 26 August 1993, p. 19.
32 A South Korean Foreign Ministry official stated at the time, “We will stick by last May’s agreement 
with other countries to reduce our catch by 25 percent, but Russia has no right to declare a unilateral ban 
because the area is outside its economic zone. We repeat that South Korea and other countries should 
make an objective joint survey to see how serious the depletion is and decide on further actions.” See 
FBIS-EAS, 6 August 1993, p. 19 and 10 August 1993, p. 23.
33 Ibid.
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quota in the Bering Sea o f 70,000 tons was exhausted by then. South Korea then 
announced that it would be willing to accept 40,000 tons o f pollack from anywhere in 
the Russian EEZ, but this proposal was also turned down by Russia. The South Korean 
sense o f urgency was heightened by the fact that August-September is the height of the 
pollack season.34
A diplomatic summit between the two countries on 27 October, 1993 did not 
produce a solution for either side. South Korea claimed that its ships had not been 
fishing in the area since April, and that it had consequently lost around $100 million, 
while Russia emphasized that foreign poaching in all its waters cost it $700 million 
annually, a figure which may be a conservative estimate. Further talks on 20 November 
also produced no results.35 Nevertheless, on 10 January 1994 South Korea was finally 
able to resume pollack fishing within the Russian EEZ, with 32 vessels from 16 
companies taking part. Moscow permitted the foreign vessels to begin fishing because 
it did not want to miss the pollack season entirely. Seoul and Moscow agreed to set the
price o f the fish. However, no actual agreement was reached over the Peanut Hole, and
■1/
Russia continued to protest foreign poaching in this area. Nevertheless, the dispute 
died down and normal fishery relations were resumed.
Another important fishery conflict between the two countries occurred during 
2002 and 2003. In November 2002, they reached an agreement on the number of South 
Korean fishing boats, time, and procedures o f catching fisheries in the Sea of Okhotsk, 
yet once again, they failed to agree on fishery catch quotas. Even though the total 
allowance catch o f pollack, cod, saury, and cuttlefish was settled, the proportion of 
private-auction quota, govemment-to-govemment quota, and domestic population 
industry quota was not finalized in Russia. It is reported that the Russian Ministry of 
Economic Development and the Russian State Committee for Fisheries debated the 
issue o f quota proportions. The Ministry o f Economic Development supported an 
increase in the private-auction quota, whereas the State Committee for Fisheries 
supported increases in the govemment-to-govemment quota and the domestic 
population quota.
Moreover, in November 2003, Russia eventually reduced the Korean fishery 
quotas by 20 percent in the Russian fishing zone. According to the annual report of the 
Korean Ministry o f Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (KMMAF) in 2004, Russia set South
34 Ibid., p. 33.
35 FBIS-EAS, 29 October 1993, pp. 21-22, and 16 November, 1992, pp. 30-31.
36 FBIS-EAS, 22 December 1993, p. 33, and Johnston and Valencia, p. 164.
37 Kukche Sinmun, 26 November, 2002, on
http://www.infofishnet.co.kr/user/nes/html/nes mns sel.isp?idx=700&ipag.... accessed on 28 July, 2004.
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Korean fishery quotas at 39,950 tons (t): pollack at 20,000t, Pacific saury at 10,000t, 
cod at 2,650t, and cuttlefish at 7,300t. The 20,000t of pollack were 2,000t less than the 
2003 quotas. These figures demonstrate that quotas for four kinds of fish had decreased 
by 22.9 percent. In particular, as the figures in the table indicate, the pollack quotas
i o
have been reduced every year since 2000.
Figure 6 South Korean Pollack Quotas in the Sea o f Russia
South Korean pollock quotas in the sea of Russia
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Source: Korean Ministry o f Maritime and Fisheries, Annual Report 2004
According to KMMAF officials, Korea claims to have reduced its number of fishing 
boats by 10.7 percent, from 168 to 150, in 2004.
Compared with the situation a decade ago, negotiations between the two 
countries no longer develop into seriously heated disputes. Even though the pollack 
quotas have decreased over the last few years, the actual numbers are not very serious, 
as one of the officials from the KMMAF has stated.39 However, many fishery 
specialists contend that as Russia raises the pollack price every year, this will have a 
devastating impact on the Korean domestic pollack market price in the long term. This 
is highly likely to be problematic given the fact that 90 percent of Korean total domestic 
pollack are fished exclusively in the Russian Far East sea zone, and the scale of the 
Korean domestic pollack industry is quite large, reaching US$1,000 billion.40 
Nevertheless, the two sides agreed to conduct joint research on pollack in the Sea of
38 Statistics, Korea Deep Sea Fisheries Association, 6 April 2004, Seoul, Korea; Kyonghyang Shinmun, 30 
November, 2003; Segye Ilbo, 30 November, 2003; and Chungang Ilbo, 30 November, 2003.
39 “Korean Fishery Diplomacy Fails,” editorial, Busan Ilbo.
40 Ibid.
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Okhotsk in 2004.41 Russia continues to award South Korea higher quotas than it awards 
to other North Asian nations, including Japan and China, in the last several years.42
2.2. The Dispute over Fishing Right Charges for Cuttlefish
South Korea began to catch cuttlefish in the Sea of Okhotsk in 1999. South 
Korean fishing boats in this region have increased from 44 boats in 2000 to 75 boats in 
2004. However, on May 9, 2004, cuttlefish negotiations came to a stalemate because 
Russia began to charge an extremely high price for cuttlefish fishing rights. According 
to the negotiation committee, Russia allegedly asked for US $140 per ton, which was 
exactly twice the 2003 price, whereas South Korea offered US $72.50. Even though 
both parties agreed to finalize a deal at US $78, Russia did not issue fishing rights to 
South Korea for a month, for no apparent reason. This led to a one-month delay for 
many Korean cuttlefish fishermen to fish in this region.43
2.3. The Saury Dispute
The case o f the saury dispute illustrates that Japan plays a very important role in 
fishery diplomacy between Russia and South Korea. The saury dispute is a political 
dispute in that Russia gave South Korea permission to fish for saury in the Kurile area, 
the sovereignty of which is disputed by Russia and Japan. The dispute became a three­
sided diplomatic wrangle and threatened to disrupt relations between the countries 
involved.
On 10 December 2000, South Korea reached an agreement with Russia to allow 
26 South Korean boats to fish for 15,000 tons of saury around the southern Kuriles 
between 15 July and 15 November 2001, for a fee of US$850,000.44 Having lost rich 
saury fishing grounds in the Sanriku area as a result o f the 1998 South Korea-Japan 
Fisheries Agreement, South Korean boats had fished for saury in the southern Kuriles 
since 1999. South Korea caught nearly 13,000 tons of saury in 1999 and more than
41 Kyonghyang Shinmun, 30 November, 2003.
42 Susan ju n  moon kookne news (Fishery Chain N ews), 24 March, 2001, on 
http://www.fishchain.eom/kr/news/d/20010327 67.asp. accessed on 28 July, 2004.
43 Hankook ilbo, 16 June, 2004, on
http://kr.news.vahoo.com/service/news/ShellView.htm?ArticleID=20040616.... accessed on 29 July, 2004, 
M aeil Shinmun, 2 July, 2004, on
http://kr.news.vahoo.com/service/news/ShellView.htm?ArticleID=20040707.... accessed on 29 July, 2004, 
and Jinju I news, 5 May, 2004, on http://jiniu.enews.co.kr/detail.php?number+254146. accessed on 28 
July, 2004.
44 Mark J. Valencia and Young Hee Lee, “The South Korea-Russia-Japan fisheries imbroglio,” Marine 
Policy, Vol. 26, Issue 5, September 2002, pp. 337-339.
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14,000 tons in 2000 in the southern Kuril area.45 In 2000, however, the Russian 
government adopted a more transparent resource-allocation procedure by converting the 
private commercial quota system into an auction system and by strengthening 
government control over the allocation of fishing rights to foreign countries. The South 
Korean fishing companies and government were concerned that this decision would hurt 
the domestic saury industry since the saury catch in the southern Kuriles consisted of 
one-third o f the total saury consumption of South Korea. During the 10th South 
Korean-Russian fisheries commission meeting in December 2000, Seoul secured an 
intergovernmental agreement on saury which would meet the goals of the domestic 
saury industries. Both Seoul and Moscow emphasized that the agreement was made on 
a commercial basis.46
Tokyo strongly resisted the agreement on the grounds that it would undermine 
Japan’s claim to the Kuril Islands and it put pressure on Seoul to abrogate the agreement. 
When South Korea refused, Japan revoked its agreement to permit South Korean saury 
boat fishing in its EEZ off the northeastern Japan-Sanriku area beginning on June 19, 
2001. After a series of negotiations between the two countries, South Korea 
discontinued its fishing contacts with Japan, as well as abandoning planned bilateral 
fishery talks, posing a threat to Japanese crab fishing. It was reported that Japan offered 
to permit the operation of South Korean boats in its waters only if  South Korea would 
officially recognize the Kuril area as part o f Japan’s EEZ and thereafter seek permission 
from Japan to fish there. South Korea refused, arguing that it did not want to be drawn 
into territorial disputes between Russia and Japan. Seoul maintained that the 
controversial areas were within Russia’s EEZ, and thus Japan had no rights in this 
region and proposed that Japan should offer an alternative fishing site in exchange for 
South Korea giving up its commercial agreement with Russia.47 Japan declined, 
contending that Seoul was trying to gain increased access to Japan’s EEZ fishery 
resources. In the course o f the debates over this dispute between Seoul and Tokyo,
Japan came to a compromise with Russia over the saury issue by offering to prevent its 
fishermen from poaching in Russian waters as a means of increasing Russian tax 
revenues. Japan also declared that it would provide financial support to protect fishery 
resources in the area.48
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 “Japan to Oppose South Korean Fishing o f  Russian Held Isles,” BBC Monitoring, Asia Pacific Political, 
19 June 2001; and “South Korea Protest Japan’s Fishing Ban,” Xinhua News Agency, 19 June, 2001.
48 “Japan: Russia Not to Give Third Parties Fishing Rights Near Disputed Islands,” BBC M onitoring Asia  
Pacific-Political, 5 October, 2001.
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In 2001, South Korea eventually had to give up saury fishing in the South Kuril 
area because of an unexpected fishery agreement between Russia and Japan. Moscow 
and Tokyo agreed to prevent other countries from fishing in the southern Kuril area. 
Because of the South Korean government’s continued protests, Prime Minister Koizumi 
and President Putin refrained from signing a formal agreement on the issue at the APEC 
summit in October 2001. Putin promised Kim Dae Jung at the same meeting that 
Russia would grant an alternative fishing zone and quotas to South Korea. Although 
South Korea received a substitute fishing zone from Russia after a series of protests, its 
productivity and profitability allegedly fell below the zones in the South Kuril.49 The 
saury incident clearly harmed the existing fishery relations between Moscow and Seoul.
In the resolution o f the dispute, each o f the three countries gained and lost both 
politically and economically. South Korea’s interest was to secure its saury supply and 
to protect its companies’ interests. Indeed, Korea was a victim of the territorial disputes 
between Russia and Japan. However, South Korea did regain its access to the Sanriku 
area, and even negotiated a deal for 20,000 tons o f saury in the northern Kuril for 2002. 
Thus even though South Korea lost to Japan in this fishery conflict, it gained more 
fishing quotas than Japan from Russia. Russia’s interest was more economic. Yet, once 
the deal with South Korea was struck, Russia was faced with the problem of national 
sovereignty and pride. Although it had not revoked the existing South Korean fishing 
quota, it accepted Japan’s condition that it should cease allocating fishing quotas to 
foreign countries in the southern Kuriles. From a financial perspective, Russia was the 
true winner, since it collected compensation of about US$3 million in fees directly from 
Japan that it would have collected from South Korea and the Ukraine. Moreover,
Russia extracted from Japan an agreement to exercise greater control over the 
smuggling o f crabs into Japan, and thus it gained significant revenue for the Russian Far 
East, not to mention the fees from South Korea for fishing elsewhere.50
In short, the saury dispute clearly illustrates that given the complicated political 
relations in Northeast Asia, fishery disputes can damage international relations. This
49 South Korea negotiated a deal for 2002 for 20,000 tons o f  saury in the northern Kuriles. Although the ' 
quota was increased from the 15,000 tons in 2001, it was not clear that there were sufficient fish there to 
fill the quota. South Korea also agreed to pay US $183 per ton for up to 25,000 tons o f  Pollack caught in 
the Bering Sea, although that fee was 10.2 percent higher than it was in 2001. See “Korean Fishermen 
Agree to Pollock Catch Fees in Russian Waters,” A sia Pulse, 1 January, 2002; Valencia and Lee, pp. 342- 
343; Moonwha Ilbo, 8 December 2004; and National Fishery Scientific Institute, newspaper briefing, on 
http://www.nfrda.re.kr/news/scrab/scrab read.php?cod=2&idx=2409. accessed on 28 July, 2004.
50 Valencia and Lee, pp. 337-343.
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ought to serve as a reminder to fishery policy makers to consider the international 
political ramifications of their decisions.51
3. Causes of the disputes in Russian-South Korean Fishery Relations
This section contends that the problems of fishery diplomacy between Russia 
and South Korea stem from the difficulties that the Russian Far East fishery has faced 
since the collapse o f the Soviet Union. These include the decrease in reported Russian 
fishery production, export increases, illegal trading, overfishing, incomplete legislation 
on fisheries, and institutional conflict between the centre and periphery over the control 
of resources.
The two main problems of fishery diplomacy between Seoul and Moscow -- the 
size o f the pollack catch quota disputes and the illegal fishing trade — are closely 
connected to the transitional and chaotic situation in the post-Soviet Far Eastern fishing 
industry. There is no denying that illegal fishery has generated overfishing in the region. 
The depletion o f fishery resources has reached dangerous levels because o f overfishing 
and, as a result, the Russian .government started auctioning fishing quotas in 2001 to 
regulate the catch. It is crucial, therefore, to examine the factors that have caused 
illegal fishing activities in this region.
3.1. Illegal Fishing
Illegal fishing in the Russian Far East falls into two general categories: illegal 
fish sales directly from Russian fishing ships and illegal fishing by foreigners in the 
Russian zone. Both foreign and domestic ships carry out two forms of illegal fishing: 
poaching and driftnetting. The environmental impact of illegal fishing, particularly 
driftnetting, in the region is extremely serious. It causes disruption of the age structure 
and genetic composition o f the stock and has a deleterious effect on marine 
ecosystems.53
In the 1990s, illegal fishing and unreported fish exports accounted for two-thirds 
of the Russian Far East’s revenue. In 2004, Putin stated that nearly 80 percent of the 
Russian fish trade is illegal, without going through and breaking internationally agreed
51 Ibid.
52 The output o f  tinned fish fell by some two-thirds in 1992-1997. The decline continued in the late 1990s, 
and in 2001, the total catch was 3.7 million tons, down 9.1 percent from 2000. See Agriculture, Country 
Profile Russia 2004, the Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2004, p. 43.
53 Natalia S., Mirovitskaya and J. Christopher Haney, “Fisheries Exploitation as a Threat to 
Environmental Security,” Marine Policy, Vol. 16, No. 4, 1992, p. 252.
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quotas. Russian police allegedly caught 500 tons o f illegal marine products between 
May and June 2004. During this period, most illegal products consisted of caviar and 
salmon.54
Illegal fishing has not only led to the depletion of marine resources in the Sea of 
Okhotsk and the northern Pacific Ocean but it has also complicated diplomatic relations 
between Russia and its neighbouring countries. In particular, illegal fishing is the most 
serious factor that affects Russian and South Korean fishery diplomacy. It clearly 
hinders the sustainable development o f a state-based fishery trade. This underground 
fishery activity also obstructs the Russian government’s collection of some share o f the 
resource charges into the central or regional budget. Furthermore, it creates incentives 
for corruption and tax evasion.
There have been several reports of Russian ships, not built or licensed for 
fishing, engaging in the illegal sale of fish to Japan, China, and Korea. There is a report, 
for example, that Russian fishermen have sold Kamchatka crab in Sapporo for 1,500 
yen per kilo, which is much cheaper than the normal price in Japan but much more than 
its price in Russia.55
Even though the technical efficiency of the Russian fleet has improved, the 
reported catch has declined since its reported peak in 1988, and the share o f high-value 
products such as salmon and crab, has decreased.56 According to Thornton,
The decline in production reflects the overfishing phenomenon, which is 
highly related to the high price o f fish catch quotas and illegal fishing. The 
decline in measured production reflects a growing volume of Russian catch, 
which is delivered offshore and goes unrecorded by Russian customs
* 7
authorities.
Indeed, official fishing data in the Russian Far East are not really reliable although they 
indicate some trends. Fish catches in Russia are underreported, some say by 50 percent 
or more. For example, a large proportion o f the fish that is transferred to foreign vessels
54 Susanmul suchul chugan ju ngbo  (Marine Products Export Weekly Information), 1 August, 2004, 
Kyungsang Namdo Fishery Production Department, on http://www.provin.gveongam.kr/-Agr- 
fish/export/sea.htm. accessed on 28 July, 2004; and “Russia’s Fish Trade Has Gone to the D ogs,” 
Business Report, 24 June, 2004.
55 Galina S. Vitkovskaia, “Lawlessness, Environmental Damage, and Other N ew  Threats in the Russian 
Far East,” in Gilbert Rozman, Mikhail G. Nosov, and Koji Watanabe eds., Russia and East A sia  (London: 
M.E. Sharpe, 1999), p. 183.
56 Ibid.
57 Thornton, p. 114.
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on the high seas is simply not reported because it is fished illegally.58 Japanese trade 
statistics report a roughly 50 percent higher catch than Russian data.59 According to an 
official estimate in 1996, the Far Eastern crab catch declined to 73 thousand tons, and in 
1997 it was reduced again to 63 thousand tons. However, the fact is that the crab catch 
in 1997 was 180 thousand tons, almost all o f which was sold, legally or illegally, to 
Japan.60 Statistics on Japanese import o f fishery products are five times higher than 
those showing Russian export o f the same to Japan. One might argue that this is 
perhaps related to strict Japanese customs rules. Yet, I would submit that a significant 
quantity o f illegal sales from the Russian side is the primary reason. The same problem 
also applies to the export o f Russian fish to Korea and China.61
There is no doubt that illegal sales o f fish and overfishing have contributed to 
the depletion of fish stocks in this region. Moreover, the consequences of overfishing 
are extremely serious since it can result in the permanent depletion of fish stocks. If 
overfishing alters predator-prey relationships or the genetic diversity o f the target 
species, it causes a long-term change in the species composition, from higher-value 
species to smaller, low-value fish. Taken to the extreme, this will result in the 
domination o f “trash fish” with little or no commercial value.62 When this happens, the 
higher-value species is considered to be driven to commercial extinction, since so few 
of the species remain that it is too expensive to fish for them.63
It appears that a number of mafias are running major smuggling operations in 
the region. This has become a serious issue that hinders smooth fishery relations 
between Russia and its Northeast Asian fishery partners. The Russian mafias consist 
not only o f gangsters but also border guards, military personnel, custom officials, 
fisheries inspectors, procurators, and fishermen and fishing firms. In October 1999, for 
example, it was reported that Russian border guards had been cooperating with fish 
smugglers for more than two years by transmitting information about the times and
58 Miller and Karp, p. 115.
59 See Viktor Tkachenko and Ernst Chemyi, “Department o f  Abuse: Fisheries Department,” Sovetskii 
Sakhalin, No. 45, 11 March, 1998, p. 2, quoted in Thronton, p. 116.
60 “Granitsa vostoka” (Eastern border), pogranichnik, March 1998, p. 15, quoted in Viktor B. Supian and 
Mikhail G. Nosov, “Reintegration o f  an Abandoned Fortress,” in Gilbert Rozman, Mikhail G. Nosov, and 
Koji Watanabe eds., Russia and East Asia  (London: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), p. 81.
61 Supian and Nosov, p. 81.
62 John R. Beddington and R. Bruce Rettig, Approaches to the Regulation o f  Fishing Effort, Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO), Fisheries Technical Paper No. 243, Rome, 1983, p. 29.
63 Gareth Porter, “The Role o f  Subsidies in the Global Fisheries Crisis,” Fisheries Subsidies Overfishing 
and Trade, United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), Switzerland, August 1998.
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zones in which patrols were to take place.64 In fact, border guards and custom officials 
are often quite impoverished because o f extremely low wages and, in the 1990s, 
because o f significant delays in payments from Moscow caused by the chronic federal 
budget deficit. Wage arrears have clearly generated general resentment within the ranks 
o f Russia’s armed forces and security organs. As Williams argues,
Under such difficult economic conditions the potential material benefits 
including cash, alcohol, valuable seafood products and women in extreme 
cases, derived from participating, either actively or passively, in this illicit 
trade have proved too tempting for the struggling members o f Russia’s 
armed forces, law enforcement agencies and even fisheries scientists.65
These criminal groups trade not only fish and marine products but also Japanese 
and Korean used cars, narcotics, weapons, women, and they even smuggle illegal aliens 
(mostly Iranians) into Japan.66 Given the wealth produced from this illegal trade, 
criminal organizations in Japan and Korea, often working in cooperation with the 
Russian mafia, are also actively involved.67 The Russian mafia is said to be influential 
in the entire process, from the distribution of quotas to the sale o f fish and marine 
products in Japan and Korea. It also has been reported that Japanese and Korean 
organized crime groups make advance payments for quotas and establish bank accounts, 
sometimes through third parties, for the laundering of profits. According to Korean 
police reports, in October 2003, 23 Korean fishery-related personnel were arrested for 
illegally transferring money to Russian mafias. In 2003, one of them allegedly imported 
17,000 tons o f marine products, primarily pollack and crab, from Russian mafias, at a 
cost o f US $200 million. There are indications that efforts to regulate fishing more 
strictly have created strong opposition from entrenched interests, sometimes leading to 
deadly retaliation.69 Without hard data, it is difficult to quantify just how widespread 
the influence o f criminal organizations actually is in this commerce. Nevertheless, it is 
undeniable that organized criminal groups in Russia, Japan, and South Korea are
64 “Border Guard Personnel Cooperating in Smuggling,” Japan Sea Network Online, 328, 13 October 
1999; and Brad Williams, “Criminalization o f  Russo-Japanese Border Trade,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 
55, N o. 5, 2003, p. 717.
65 W illiams, p. 717.
66 Jongil Kim, “Stop Korean and Russian Mafias,” K orea Financial News, 24 November, 2003; B. 
Yupychev, “Rybnye m afiozy dvukh stran nashli obshchii yazyk. Spetssluzhby Rossii I Yaponii poka net,” 
Sovetskii Sakhalin, 25 May 1994, p. 2; and Williams, 2003, pp. 712-713.
67 Andrei Belov, “Kani no Baburu (4-5), (the Crab Bubble), unpublished manuscript, p. 2, quoted in 
W illiams, p. 713.
68 Kim, K orea Financial News, 24 November, 2003; and Belov, p. 2, quoted in Williams, p. 713.
69 See footnote 81 in Chapter 5.
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involved, sometimes operating in coordination with local fishermen and sometimes 
independently.
Illegal fishing by foreign ships in Russian fishing zones is also becoming a 
serious issue. Maritime border violations by Asian fishing boats poaching in this region 
are common and often develop into political, economic, and security issues among 
Russia and the neighbouring countries engaged in these activities. Since the early 
1990s, Russia has made some efforts to resist fishing by Polish, Chinese, and South 
Korean ships in the open part o f the Okhotsk Sea. An agreement has been reached to 
halt fishing in the area by ships from China and South Korea. Yet, attempts to prevent 
Polish ships from fishing, for example by denying them the right to stock up in Russian 
ports, immediately created a situation in which private Russian companies appeared 
ready to provide the Polish fishing boats with all necessary provisions directly in the 
fishing areas, which are legally neutral waters. There has been extensive Russian 
coverage o f Japanese and Chinese fishing boats violating Russian territorial boundaries 
and provoking patrol boats to fire on them, even after agreements had been reached that 
were meant to prevent this sort of skirmish.70 In short, attempts to regulate fishing have 
led to corruption or to conflicts, both o f which are considered threats to national security.
Since illegal fishing is the primary reason for the fishery disputes between 
Russia and South Korea, it is important to analyze the fundamental causes o f illegal 
fishing activity in the Russian Far East. There can be little doubt that it results from 
post-Soviet Russia’s troubled transition to a market economy. Among the contributory 
factors, perhaps the single most important one has been the commercial legal 
framework that regulated the fishing industry. Until recently, most o f the laws and 
regulations relating to the Russian fishing industry had been formulated in the Soviet 
era. The poaching of fish and marine products and the smuggling o f these goods into 
foreign ports by fishermen virtually did not exist at that time. This means that the laws 
covering these activities were either nonexistent or inadequate. Williams points out that 
this legislative gap remained unfilled when the fishing industry and foreign trade were 
deregulated during the early 1990s. In other words, the commercial legal framework 
was simply unable to keep up with the rapid developments taking place in the 
deregulated Russian fishing industry in the early 1990s. It sometimes changed up to 10
70 Rozman, Nosov, and Watanabe, p. 214 and 220.
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times per year in an effort to catch up with reality.71 Accordingly, the legal definitions 
of poaching and smuggling differed, depending on the particular enforcement agency 
carrying out the investigation. This hindered efforts at inter-agency coordination. Fines ’ 
and other penalties could not match the financial gains to be made from this illegal
77commerce and thus failed to act as a deterrent to poachers and smugglers.
A second contributory factor is the system for allocating fishing quotas, which is 
perhaps the most frequently discussed issue in both the Russian fishery industry and 
fishery diplomacy in the Russian Far East. Since privatization, access to fish in the 
Russian 200-mile zone has been based on contracts or quotas. Access o f foreign ships, 
including Japanese and Korean ships, is negotiated annually on a bilateral basis.
Domestic allocations are determined in an administrative process. Rights have been 
supposed to reflect the size of the past catch of a firm or region. Nevertheless, lobbying 
and side payments have perhaps been the most important element in granting fishery 
contracts and quotas. The Russian State Committee for Fisheries has given itself an 
allocation. Territorial governments receive separate quotas in two forms: some 
governments, such as Chukotka, have established commercial firms to exercise their 
quotas, others resell their fishing rights to domestic or foreign bidders.
In fact, the quota distribution system is closely related to Russia’s commercial 
legal framework. By the late 1990s, the fishery quota system had gradually increased 
and evolved into a highly politicized and complicated structure. The quota allocation is 
a multi-step process. The State Committee for Fisheries in Moscow examines regional 
fishing quota applications. The quota-allocation process is as follows: first, quota 
seekers must submit applications to the Regional Administration Fishing Industry 
Committees, which consider them and then draft general quota applications and forward
n ' l
them to the Russian State Committee for Fisheries.
Harvest recommendations are decided on the basis o f data collected by the 
Russian Scientific Research Institute on the Fishing Industry and Oceanography and a 
regional fisheries science centre called the Regional Scientific Research Institute on the 
Fishing Industry and Oceanography, which are the main consultants to the Russian State 
Committee for Fisheries. Based on these recommendations, the Russian State
71 Interview with the former head o f  the Sakhalin administration’s Department o f  Foreign Economic 
Relations, Vitalii Elizar’ev, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, 23 August 2001, quoted in Williams, p. 715.
72 Ibid.
73 Quota applicants are required to specify the following items: the species o f  fish or seafood the company 
plans to catch, the quantity for every vessel, fishing gear, and the area o f  catching and terms o f  catching.
See Tarrant.
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Committee for Fisheries allocates quotas for every species in all basins o f Russia every 
calendar year. Quotas are constrained by inter-government agreements with North and 
South Korea, China, Poland, and other countries; allocations are required for regional 
institutes to make prognoses for the following year. The quota document is called the 
volume o f  permissible catch (VPC). The quotas are forwarded to the Ministry of 
Agriculture and the State Committee on Environmental Protection and approved by 
these two organizations before being sent to the prime minister for final approval.74
Following the prime minister’s approval, the recommendations are passed on to 
the regional administration for distribution among companies, sometimes through an 
intermediary industry association. Fishing vessels are finally issued with a fishing 
ticket according to a number of criteria, including the type o f vessels owned by each 
company, historical catch levels, the vessel operator’s record in tax and wage payments, 
its importance as an employer and social service provider, and any record of fishery
• • 7 c
violations. It is interesting to note that among many other factors, quota allocations 
are usually, but not always, based on the historical ability to catch fish. Disputes 
sometimes occur between regions. For example, Sakhalin sometimes accuses Primorye 
o f gaining a quota allocation greater than its fair share. Territories with ethnic 
minorities, such as the Koryak Autonomous Okrug and Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, 
receive fishing quotas regardless o f their proven ability to catch fish in an effort to
7 (\provide them with special help.
However, despite this long and complicated procedure, the formal criteria listed 
above are not substantially determining factors, since favouritism and unfair practices 
occur. Moreover, other informal factors, such as family ties, political connections, and 
bribery, appear to be more influential. As Allison argues,
Such a complex system, particularly the possibility to move between quota 
categories, or even to create new special quotas, and to treat the criteria and 
rules for each category subjectively, has created a high potential for
77corruption in the allocation process.
74 Ibid.
75 For details o f  the process, see Allison, p. 73, and Williams, pp. 715-716.
76 Miller and Karp, p. 121-122.
77 Allison, p. 73. See also Clarence G. Pautzke, Russian Far East Fisheries Management, North Pacific 
Fishery Management Council Report to Congress, 30 September, 1997, pp. 30-37, on 
http://www.fakr.noaa.gov/npfmc/summarv reports/rfe-all.htm. accessed on 25 July, 2004.
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The final arbiter for quota distribution, however, is always the State Committee for 
Fisheries in Moscow.78
In December 2000, the Russian government introduced a new quota distribution 
system, called “open auction”. There were three reasons for this change: to maintain 
complete control over the fishing industry; to resolve the problem of insufficient 
funding for fishery enforcement agencies; and to eliminate some o f the incentives for 
corruption that were inherent in the existing system. Under the new system, open 
auctions are held periodically in Moscow for different species of fish and marine 
products and the highest bidder receives the right to fish for a given quota. The first 
auction was reportedly held in February 2001.
Yet because o f the extremely high prices at which the quotas are sold, the new 
system did not put an end to poaching and smuggling. For example, the initial starting 
price for one type o f crab quota being auctioned was $2.20 per kilogram, but bidding 
escalated the price and it ultimately sold for $12.70.79 Therefore, the only way that 
many local fishermen can participate in the auctions is with financial support, either 
from foreign companies, notably Japanese and South Korean, or from local mafias. In 
the case o f foreign support, debts are typically paid with fish and marine products. 
Purchasing expensive quotas often drives local fishing enterprises into considerable 
debt. The only way they can pay off their debts is to catch more fish than initially 
allocated by their quotas and to sell these products illegally in foreign ports, mainly in
OA
Hokkaido, where they allegedly fetch a higher price. This leads to overfishing. The 
problem is aggravated by the fact that any Russian enterprise, regardless of its location
o 1
or type, can participate in the auctions as long as it is financially secure. This means 
that those who have little knowledge of the local fishing industry and the environmental 
concerns posed by overfishing are able to purchase quotas.
The third factor that causes illegal fishing and underground fish market activities 
in the Russian Far East is Russia’s confiscatory tax regime. In the past, Russian 
entrepreneurs had approximately 50 different taxes to pay, the full amount of which 
often exceeded their total profits. This not only encouraged tax evasion but also led 
local fishing enterprises to engage in poaching to remain financially viable.
78 M iller and Karp, p. 122.
79 Rybak Sakhalin, 3 May 2001, quoted in Williams, p. 716.
80 Yuzhno-Sakhalinskaya gazeta, 25 July 2001.
81 Sovetskii Sakhalin, 1 October, 2001; Gubernskie vedem osti, 15 May 2001.
82 W illiams, p. 716.
83 Ibid.
84 East Asian Analytical Unit, Department o f  Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Government, Pacific 
Russia: Risks and Rewards (Canberra, EAAU, 1996), p. 52.
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Burdensome regulations and inefficient port procedures have created a situation in 
which many Russian vessels are effectively based in South Korean and Japanese ports, 
mainly Busan and Hokkaido. From there they venture into Russian waters to catch fish 
and then sell them on the open seas. This makes it difficult for Russian authorities to
Of
apprehend them. The tendency of fishery enforcement agencies not to inspect 
Russian-registered ships has also increased illegal fishing.
A fourth, and perhaps the most direct, cause o f illegal fishing is the decline and 
poor financial Resources of Russia’s armed forces and law enforcement agencies. 
Russia’s law enforcement agencies depend primarily on the state for financial support to 
combat poaching and smuggling. Without financial assistance from the government, it 
is virtually impossible to stop illegal fishing activity. Law enforcement agencies have 
only a limited number of inspection vessels and no aircraft or helicopters. Moreover, 
because o f chronic fuel shortages and maintenance problems, patrol vessels are often
0*7
forced to remain tied up in port. Furthermore, law enforcement agencies receive their 
wages from Moscow and, in the past, the chronic federal budget deficit has led to 
significant payment delays. Given their difficult economic situation, rather than 
apprehending poachers, struggling members of Russia’s armed forces, law enforcement 
agencies, and fishery scientists have been attracted by the potential material benefits 
derived from participating in illegal trade, such as cash, alcohol, and valuable seafood 
products, to join in their activities.
The drastic decline in federal subsidies has left government regulatory agencies 
in a very difficult situation. On Kamchatka, for example, as elsewhere in the Russian 
Far East, there are reports of illegal fish trading by the agency responsible for enforcing
QQ
fishing regulations, Kamchatrybvod.
The fifth factor that has contributed to illegal fishing is the power struggle 
between the federal and local governments over fishery resources. This has clearly 
created considerable opportunities for corruption and illegal fishing. On 1 January,
1998, for example, the primary responsibility for monitoring and enforcing fishing
85 East West Institute, Russian Regional Report, 7, 13, and 3 April 2002, p. 8, quoted in Williams, pp. 
716-717.
86 Hokkaido Shimbun, 11 April 1997, p. 31.
87 According to one report, border patrol vessels receive only six tons o f  fuel per year. See The Sakhalin 
Times, 17-31 January 2002, No. 16, http://www.sakhalintimes.com; and Williams, p. 717.
88 In the autumn o f  1994, a correspondent for Russian Far East Update reported that when 
Kamchatrybvod ran out o f  money for its operations, it was allowed a quota o f  8,000 tons instead. Selling 
the fish would enable Kamchatrybvod to earn revenues to continue operations. Later it was charged with 
selling much more fish than its initial quotas to joint ventures for export, thus earning revenues that could 
easily be hidden in offshore accounts. See Josh N ewell and Emma W ilson, The Russian Far East:
Forests, B iodiversity Hotspots, and Industrial Developm ents (Tokyo: Friends o f  the Earth-Japan, 1996), p. 
167-168.
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quotas was transferred from the Moscow fishing enforcement body, Glavrybod, to the 
border guard. Members o f the industry questioned whether the border guard would, in 
fact, provide more effective enforcement, since it, too, faced wage and payment arrears 
from the federal government. Since then, sources in the fishing industry have reported 
incidents of theft of catch and other forms o f hold-up involving individuals in the border 
guard.89
In August 1998, the Russian State Committee for Fisheries announced that 15- 
20 percent o f allowable catch of certain valuable species, such as salmon, sturgeon, and 
crab, would be offered to the highest bidder at regional auctions. It promised to consult 
the statistics of trading partners to monitor the illegal export of fish. Industry observers 
countered that changes that give auctioneers a better measure of the true value of access, 
might increase rather than reduce corruption. They also pointed out that an annual 
auction would provide less incentive to undertake specialized investment in the fishery 
industry than a procedure involving the auction o f a license or long-term right to
90access.
It is important to understand that the current illegal fishery activities in the 
Russian Far East are not solely a Russian domestic problem. It would be misleading to 
suggest that it could be resolved immediately if a suitable regulatory framework were 
established in Russia, since this overlooks the international and regional dimensions, in 
other words, South Korean, Chinese, and Japanese involvement in illegal fishing and 
fish sales. It is also the case that Russian fish and its byproducts are being sold by 
poachers through intermediaries, particularly through businesses established in other 
states, mostly China.91 Moscow, local governments in the Russian Far East, and Seoul 
have taken a number o f separate, individual measures, such as arresting Korean and 
Russian mafias for illegal fishing and money laundering to prevent the poaching and 
smuggling o f fish and marine products. Yet, given the transnational nature of the 
problem, these initiatives have proved insufficient.
In fact, it is ironic that illegal fishing is one o f the few industries in the Russian 
Far East to attract significant foreign investment. In other words, the reorientation of 
the fish industry toward export markets has fuelled illegal exports. Considering South 
Korea’s dependence on Russian fishery products, it is mainly Korean consumers who 
have stimulated this commerce, and South Korea must assume some responsibility for it.
89 Thornton, p. 116.
90 Ibid.
91 “Russia’s fish trade has gone to the dogs,” Business Report, 24 June, 2004.
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3.2. Korean Fishery Diplomacy
The disputes in the Russian-South Korean fishery relationship stem, in part, 
from the Korean side. There have been a series o f failures over the last few decades in 
South Korea’s fishery diplomacy as a result of clumsy and ineffective policy. Its policy 
toward Russia has been no exception. The South Korean government lacks fishery 
information, specialists, and a negotiation strategy. Thus, its policy has always been 
passive and it has never taken the initiative in fishery diplomacy.
During the saury debate in the South Kuriles in October 2001, for example, 
South Korea did not have any information regarding what was happening on either the 
Russian or the Japanese side until Japanese newspapers announced that South Korea 
would no longer be able to fish in the South Kuriles. It was reported that the South 
Korean government trusted the Russian government entirely, and believed that Russia 
would not ban South Korean boats from fishing in the area. South Korea allegedly had 
only one consultation with Russia on the issue before the incident occurred. Compared 
with the tenacious Japanese efforts and lobbying in their negotiations with Russia,
South Korea did nothing to coax Russian permission to catch saury in the area. On the 
other hand, Japan clearly presented an economic incentive to Russia to regulate the 
illegal fishing route and cooperate in fishery resource conservation. Japan promised 
Russia that it would pay US $3.5 million for its catch quota.92
South Korea’s clumsy and ineffective fishery diplomacy can be attributed to the 
chaotic situation in its domestic politics. For example, the Minister of Maritime Affairs 
and Fishery changed six times during former Korean President Kim Dae Jung’s five- 
year term. None of the ministers had the chance to become familiar with the ministry’s 
mission before being replaced. As a result, despite the relatively advantageous 
geographic position of South Korea, KMMAF has not functioned efficiently.
Although Korean fishery policies in adjacent waters have been under a rigid 
institutional management regime over the past three decades, failures of the legal 
arrangements have led to a decline in coastal and offshore fishery resources. In 
particular, there has been a drastic decline in the stocks o f high-value species, illegal 
fishing activities, overcapacity in some fisheries, environmental degradation of fishing 
grounds, and international overexploitation on the high seas surrounding neighbouring
92 The South Korean government reportedly had five negotiation meetings after the saury incident, but it 
was too late to reverse Russia’s decision. See National Fishery Scientific Institute, newspaper briefing 
2001, on http://www.nfrda.re.kr/news/scrab/scrab read.php?cod=2&idx=2728. accessed on 28 July, 2004.
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countries. Global fishery territories have continued to shrink because of 
environmental and ecological concerns, and that most states have established strict 
regulations on foreign fishing vessels. South Korea has failed to cope with these factors.
4. Implications of fishery cooperation for bilateral and regional economic security
As Chapter 2 illustrated, fishery issues are becoming a part o f the economic 
security agenda in international relations because fisheries play an important role in 
economic development, trade, food security, poverty alleviation, human health, and the 
national security agenda.94 Russia’s large fishery zone in the Russian Far Eastern 
waters and its abundant fishery resources have the potential to contribute to its bilateral 
economic security relationship with neighbouring states and to regional economic 
security more broadly.
Ensuring the continued supply of fish and accessing and securing new fishery 
zones are directly related to South Korea’s economic security concerns. The collapse of 
the Soviet Union, a significant relaxation o f military tension in the Asia Pacific, the 
establishment o f diplomatic relations between Moscow and Seoul, and the deregulation 
o f the Russian fishing industry and foreign trade have led to the rapid growth in the 
fishery and marine product trade between the Russian Far East and South Korea. This 
relatively small but flourishing trade clearly has the potential to make a valuable 
contribution to the currently stagnant Russian-South Korean relations. Indeed, there are 
positive indications in that some consensus has been reached in the course of fishery 
negotiations, in terms of the number of fishing boats, time and procedures. Fishery 
cooperation between Russia and South Korea could be the impetus to further economic 
security cooperation.
Despite the rapid development of fishery activities between the two sides, 
however, the scale o f fishery trading between the two countries has remained relatively 
small, and there has been rather more conflict than cooperation in the fishery diplomacy 
between Russia and South Korea and among the states of Northeast Asia. Crucial 
problems, such as disputes over ownership o f a stock or fishing area, have not been 
resolved and have the potential to resurface in the future. These problems have
93 Seoung-Yong Hong, “Marine Policy in the Republic o f  Korea,” M arine Policy , Vol. 19, No. 2, 1995, 
pp. 99-100.
The State o f  W orld Fisheries and Aquaculture, Food and Agriculture Organization o f  the United 
Nations (FAO), Rome 2002.
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hindered the bilateral and regional economic security building process. Specifically, 
fishery catch quotas and illegal fishery trade have been major concerns in the fishery 
diplomacy o f the Northeast Asian region. Bilateral fishery cooperation between Russia 
and South Korea has been hampered by Russia’s reduction of the size o f South Korean 
pollack quotas and by illegal fishing. As we have seen, most o f these obstructive 
factors stem from the Russian side, and many of them are associated with Russia’s 
troubled transition to democracy and a market economy. Illegal fishing, in particular, 
has been a major threat, both direct and indirect, to the diplomatic relations between 
Russia and South Korea because it is the reason why Russia has reduced the size o f 
South Korean pollack quotas.
Moreover, fishery diplomacy between Russia and South Korea is always 
vulnerable to conflict even though their current fishery disputes have been resolved.
The lack o f open conflict does not necessarily mean that either country is, or will remain, 
satisfied with the compromises that are necessary to sustain the stability o f the fishery 
regime.95
Part o f the problem is that there is no regime in Northeast Asia to control or 
mediate fishery disputes. The roles o f international fishery organizations are quite 
limited and, in most cases, fishery diplomacy takes place on the basis o f bilateral 
negotiations. The absence of multilateral maritime regimes often leads fishery talks to 
be settled on the basis of political calculations by the participating states regarding the 
rewards and risks, or losses and benefits. It is also important to note that although 
fishery issues and disputes are clearly transnational, there is insufficient understanding 
and consideration of the transnational and interdependent character o f fishery diplomacy. 
As Miles points out, “What currently passes for national and particularly regional ocean 
policy is primitive both conceptually and analytically.”96 The major obstacle is an 
inability to formulate and implement ocean policy as an integrated whole, balancing the 
overall interests o f the nation and the region in the both short and long term. According 
to Valencia, the reason for widespread fragmentation in national policy-making 
structures and processes for the oceans seems to be the result o f the development of
0 7
ocean uses largely in isolation from each other.
In short, conflicting political considerations, limited institutional authority, 
disagreements about catch allocations, illegal fishing, problems o f enforcement, and the
95 Johnston and Valencia, p. 152.
96 Edward L. M iles, “Concept, Approaches, and Applications in Sea Use Planning and Management,” 
Ocean Developm ent and International Law, Vol. 20, No. 3, 1989, p. 215.
97 Mark Valencia, “Regional Maritime Regime Building: Prospects in Northeast and Southeast Asia,” 
Ocean Developm ent & International Law, Vol. 31, No. 3, 2000, p. 236.
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general lack of ocean policy among Northeast Asian countries, including both South 
Korea and Russia, all inhibit regional fishery cooperation in Northeast Asia.98 As a. 
result, fishery cooperation between Moscow and Seoul has not so far fulfilled its 
potential to contribute to the two countries’ economic security and to regional economic 
security more broadly.
98 William Sutherland and B. Martin Tsamenyi, Law and Politics in Regional Cooperation: A Case Study 
o f  Fisheries Cooperation in the South Pacific (Taroona, Australia: Pacific Law Press, 1992), pp. 1-3.
Chapter 7. Arms Trade Cooperation
Introduction
This chapter reviews the developments that have been made and the problems 
facing Russian-South Korean military cooperation, primarily focusing on the arms trade. 
South Korea has acquired a number of Russian weapons including battle tanks, fighting 
vehicles, helicopters, missiles, and various other weaponry since 1994. In particular, 
the two arms trade projects called “Brown Bear projects” highlight one o f the most 
promising aspects o f their relationship in recent years. This chapter argues that Russia’s 
interests in selling weapons to South Korea primarily stem from economic security 
motives. Yet this does not mean that Russia simply wants to sell its arms to South 
Korea for commercial purposes as it does to traditional customers such as North Korea, 
China, India and Iran. The arms trade was used as part o f the Russian debt repayment 
scheme to South Korea. This chapter also demonstrates that there are also traditional 
security consequences o f the Russian-South Korean arms trade.
Compared with the previous four case studies, the arms trade between Russia 
and South Korea has clearly produced more substantial outcomes, primarily through the 
realization of the second Brown Bear project, as illustrated in the latter part of this 
chapter. For example, deliveries of Russian military hardware have contributed to 
building mutual trust between Moscow and Seoul. The arms trade has led to military 
and technical cooperation, and it has securitized the economic interests o f both countries. 
In other words, as Russia’s new arms trading partner, South Korea can help to alleviate 
both the serious depression that occurred in Moscow’s defence industry after the 
collapse o f the Soviet Union, and Russia’s more immediate concern to repay its debt to 
South Korea. At the same time, the arms trade has enabled South Korea to purchase 
new hi-tech Russian weapons and space technology at very competitive prices, 
compared with the relatively expensive Western, predominantly American, prices.
Nevertheless, there are still a number of obstacles in the Russian-Korean arms 
trade which hinder the establishment o f bilateral economic and military security, as well 
as traditional regional political and military security in Northeast Asia. These include 
the lack of experience in arms trading on both sides, the bitter history between the two 
nations, harsh criticism from their respective domestic constituencies, North Korea and 
the United States, and technical difficulties.
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This chapter begins with an account of the trends in Russian arms transfers after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. An examination o f the development of military 
cooperation between Russia and South Korea will follow. The chapter pays particular 
attention to the obstacles that obstruct the arms trade between the two countries. The 
final section of the chapter assesses the future potential of the Russian-South Korean 
arms trade.
1. Russian arms transfers after the collapse of the Soviet Union
The arms trade between Russia and South Korea needs to be understood in the 
context of the Russian arms trade system more generally. For the arms trade between 
Moscow and Seoul coincided not only with South Korea’s new appetite for Russian 
arms, but also with a serious depression in Russia’s defence industry. The first and 
most obvious rationale for Russia in seeking arms exports was to secure hard currency, 
and to provide financial support to the defence industry.1 This section deals with the 
domestic dimension o f Russia’s troubled arms trade, primarily focusing on the political, 
economic, social and psychological implications o f the arms trade for Russia, a brief 
summary o f the arms trade during the Soviet period, and the reasons for the depression 
in the post-Soviet Russian arms trade.
There is no denying that the Russian arms trade clearly lost its political salience 
at the end of the Cold War. And yet it is still regarded as having the potential to 
maintain Russian national security at both the regional and the international level and, 
in the process, to consolidate economic security. Indeed, since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, arms exports have become a significant source of hard currency for 
Russia, along with its oil and gas sales.
The arms trade (arms export, or arms transfer) is important to Russia for 
political, social, economic, and even psychological reasons. From the economic 
perspective, arms exports are viewed as a way o f bringing the troubled military 
industrial complex out of its crisis and of saving Russia’s scientific and high-tech 
industrial potential. From a political perspective, they are considered an important 
political tool to promote Russia’s influence in the world, and to boost its international 
prestige. In the social context, the residents of the closed cities —  scientists, engineers, 
and labourers working in the military-industrial complexes —  are a powerful and well-
1 Alexander A. Sergounin and Sergey V. Subbotin, “Sino-Russian military-technical cooperation: a 
Russian view, in Ian Anthony, ed., Russia and the Arms Trade (Frosunda: Sipri, Oxford University Press, 
1998), p. 195.
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organized interest group. Therefore, as Pierre and Trenin note, Russia’s arms trade 
unexpectedly became a matter o f everyone’s concern and began to influence Russian 
foreign and defence policy as well as domestic policy in the industrial and social 
domains.
During the Cold War, exports o f conventional weapons played a crucial role in 
acquiring and maintaining ideological and political spheres o f influence in international 
politics. Indeed, the trade was largely driven by strategic and political rather than 
commercial interests.4 Both Russia and the US routinely provided ideologically 
motivated security assistance, while supplying their client states with heavily subsidized 
and, in many cases, free military hardware and training.
In the 1980s the Soviet Union exported weapons and military technology worth 
about US $10 billion annually. Sales reached their peak in 1986, as Figure 7 shows, 
when they exceeded $14 billion. Overall, a breakdown of military deliveries and 
services for the period from 1986 to 1990 illustrates that 40 percent were credit-based, 
27 percent were free, or provided under a discounted compensation formula, and only 
33 percent constituted transactions for cash.5
Since 1991, Russian arms exports have decreased significantly due to a number 
o f factors that are genetically related to post-Cold War and post-Soviet transitional 
phenomena. As Figure 7 shows, Russian arms exports plunged from $14.0 billion in 
1986 to $1.34 billion in 1994.6
2 Andrew J. Pierre and Dmitri V. Trenin, Russia in the W orld Arms Trade (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 1997), p. 1.
3 Ibid.
4 Baidya Bikash Basu, “Russian Military-Technical Cooperation: Structures and Processes,” Strategic 
Analysis: A Monthly Journal o f  the Institute fo r  Defense Studies and Analyses (ISDA), Vol. 25 No. 3,
June 2001, p. 1, on http://www.ciaonet.org/oli/sa/sa iuneO IbabO 1 .html. accessed on 21 November, 2004.
5 Conversion in Russia (Moscow: Interdepartmental Analytical Center, 1993), pp. 65-66, quoted in Igor 
Khripunov, “Russia’s Arms Trade in the Post-Cold War Period,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 
4, Autumn 1994, p. 79.
6 Sergei Akshintsev and Veniamin Zubov, “Exports Launch A Counterattack,” RusData DiaLine- 
BizEkon News, 4 November, 1995.
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Figure 7 Soviet/Russian Arms Exports, 1986-1995
(Unit: billions of US current dollars)
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Source: SIPRI arms transfers database, 5 December, 2005.
The Russian arms industry has been hard hit by a devastating set of circumstances, 
including:
The overall reduction in international demand for arms, the parallel 
reduction in what Russia itself can afford to buy, inefficiencies plaguing the 
transition from a state-run to a commercially run industry, strong 
competition from US and other European producers, and internationally 
sanctioned arms embargoes against some previously lucrative clients.7
One reason for the reduction in the international demand for arms was the 
improvement in East-West relations, which was accompanied by a general process of 
arms reduction in Europe. According to Russian government figures, 2.5 million of 6.1 
million employees left the defence sector between 1991 and 1995; in 1996, only 10 
percent of the industry’s capability was being utilized. A large part of the orders that 
were placed by the Russian military went unpaid; at the beginning of 1998, the 
government owed 18.5 trillion roubles to defence enterprises.
A second reason for the reduction in the international arms market was the 
negotiated settlement of a number of regional conflicts in the Third World. By 1991 the 
market for arms in the developing countries had already dropped to $28.6 billion, down
7 Stanley Sloan, US Congressional Research Service, Book reviews o f Andrew J. Pierre and Dmitri 
V.Trenin eds., Russia in the world arms trade (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment For International 
Peace, 1997).
8 Alexander A. Sergounin and Sergey V. Subbotin, Russian Arms Transfers to East Asia in the 1990s, 
SIPRI Research Report, No. 15 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 15-16.
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sharply from $61 billion in 1988. It continued to decline in the immediate post-Soviet 
years, reaching $15.4 billion in 1995, before rising again in the second half of the 
decade, to about $20 billion in 1999.9
Another reason for the reduction in arms sales is the enforcement of 
international embargoes on arms sales to Russia’s traditional large-scale purchasers of 
arms such as Iraq, Libya, and Yugoslavia. Moreover, many developing countries also 
reduced their imports of modem weapons systems because o f domestic, economic, and 
financial constraints.10 In particular, as Gennady Chufrin notes, considering that most 
o f Russia’s recent clients are located in Asia, the financial crisis in Asia in 1997 and 
1998 also partly explains the slump in the Russian arms trade in the 1990s.11 Russia’s 
debt repayment scheme, which will be discussed in the latter part o f this section, can be 
viewed as another possible cause o f the decrease in Russia’s arms exports in the 1990s. 
This scheme forced the government to cut export subsidies and subsequently caused a 
slump.
Perhaps the most plausible explanation for the reduction in Russian arms sales is 
that with the end of the Cold War, Russia lacked any ideological grounds to justify 
exporting its arms. Accordingly, Russian arms export policy shifted from ideologically 
based to commercially oriented considerations. In more specific terms, as Khripunov 
notes, the new Russian arms export policy was aimed at a cash-on-delivery approach 
and finding new markets, and that meant lifting restrictions on the export of the most
17state-of-the-art systems and technologies.
As a result, after a steep decline, Russian arms sales began to rise gradually in
the second half of the 1990s. Due to tenacious sales efforts, Russia reversed the decline,
and once again became a major contender in the international arms market. In 1995,
sales were 65 percent higher than in the previous year and Russia actually led the world
1 ^in conventional arms exports agreements in 1995. Although cash receipts in 1995 
were only about $3 billion, Moscow claimed that this was still twice the amount that 
had actually flowed into the budget in 1987, when sales were almost entirely financed
9 P. Shenon, “Russia Outstrips U.S. in Sales o f  Arms to Developing Nations,” The New York Times, 20 
August, 1996.
10 Akshintsev and Zubov.
11 Chufrin is a researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. See Simon Saradzhyan, 
“The Battle for the Weapons Trade,” The M oscow Times, 17 November, 1998.
12 Khripunov, p. 79.
13 Paul Mann, “Russians lead in arms exports, but success regarded as fluke,” Aviation Week & Space 
Technology, 2 September, 1996, Vol. 145, No. 10, p. 79.
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with soft credits.14 Arms exports were worth $3.5 billion in 1996, as Figure 8 shows, 
more than double the level of $1.34 billion in 1994.15
Figure 8 Russian arms export from 1995 to 2004
(Unit: billions o f US current dollars)
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Source: SIPRI arms transfers database, 10 January and 20 December, 2005.
Russia absorbs about 14 percent of the world arms market, more than France 
and one-third the level of the US. Moreover, the arms industry accounted for more than 
half of Russia’s manufactured exports in 1998.16 Indeed, there was a definite demand 
for Russian arms on the world market, not only from its traditional arms customers 
including Hungary, India, Slovakia, China, and Vietnam but from India and China, 
which are currently the largest purchasers of Russian arms and to whom Russia sells 
virtually everything they seek. As Figure 9 demonstrates, they account for about 70 
percent of recent arms sales from Russia.
14 It is interesting to note that despite the Soviet experience with soft credits, Russia has still not moved to 
a strictly cash and carry basis for its arms sales. Only about 60 percent o f 1996 and 1997 revenues were 
said to have been collected in convertible currencies. See Robert H. Donaldson and John A. Donaldson, 
“The Arms Trade in Russian-Chinese Relations: Identity, Domestic Politics, and Geopolitical 
Positioning,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 4, 2003, p. 713.
15 Michael Richardson, “Making Inroads in Asian Arms Market: In Switch, U.S. Allies Consider a Rival,” 
International Herald Tribune, Neuilly-sur-Seine, France, 15 March, 1997.
16 Saradzhyan.
17 Russia has sold MIG-29 fighters to Hungary, India, and Slovakia, and SU-27 fighters to China and 
Vietnam. See Akshintsev and Zubov. See also “Russia’s Arms Bazaar,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 
April 2001.
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Figure 9 Russian Arms Export to the World (1994-2003)
(Unit: Percentage)
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Source: SIPRI arms transfers database, 10 January, 2005.
However, Russia has also attempted to develop new markets in Asia, South 
America, and Europe, which in some cases used to be the exclusive domain of western 
suppliers. These new trading partners include Cyprus, Brazil, Kuwait, the United Arab 
Emirates, South Korea, and Southeast Asian nations such as Pakistan, Sri Lanka, 
Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia. Figure 9 also demonstrates, however, that 
Russia’s arms sales to new East Asian markets such as Malaysia, Indonesia, and South 
Korea have been relatively small. Between 1998 and 2002, according to the US 
Congressional Research Service, Russia signed deals worth $19.8 billion with 
developing states, which represented 22.6 percent of all their arms purchases.19
Although the major reason for Russian arms exports is to boost its declining 
military industry and increase its hard currency earnings, it is important to understand 
that Russia has not only been selling its most advanced weapons systems to countries 
that can afford to pay in hard currency. It has also used arms sales to reduce its foreign 
debts. Indeed, the arms trade between Russia and South Korea was clearly initiated in 
this context.20
18 For example, these include the sales of MIG-29 fighters to Malaysia; BMP-2/3 armoured personnel 
carriers to Kuwait; Igla anti aircraft launch systems to Brazil. See Akshintsev and Zubov; and see also 
BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts, 14 October, 1996, from Russia TV channel, Moscow in Russian
11:30 gmt, 12 October, 1996.
19 Moscow Times, 13 August, 2002, on http://dlib.eastview.com/searchresults/printarticle.jsp?art=4. 
accessed on 19 November, 2004.
20 Russia exported arms to Hungary for the same reason. The Hungarian Ministry of Defense announced 
in August 1993, for example, that 28 MIG-29 interceptor aircraft were accepted as partial cancellation of 
former Soviet debts. The cost o f the planes, US $760 million, amounted to about one half o f the former
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2. The development of military cooperation between Russia and South Korea
The first publicly acknowledged military contacts between Russia and South 
Korea occurred in 1992 when, for the first time in South Korean history, a South 
Korean military official and Deputy Chairman of the Chief Staff General Committee, 
Song Un Sob, visited Russia and agreed to develop bilateral military cooperation. In 
October 1992, a Russian military delegation led by First Deputy Defence Minister, 
Andrei Kokoshin, visited South Korea. During the visit, South Korea first mentioned 
an experimental purchase of Russian military hardware including MiG-29 planes, mines, 
torpedoes, tank ammunition, and SA-16 ground-to-air missiles.21 It was revealed later 
that in April 1991, following the establishment o f diplomatic relations, Russia had 
offered MiG-29 and MiG-31 aircraft to South Korea, the former at lower than usual
99prices, in return for consumer goods.
During 1992, Seoul considered purchasing some Russian defence firms to 
operate them as joint ventures in aerospace, advanced materials, electronics, and lasers 
and genetic engineering. Seoul proposed supplying facilities to commercialize the 
Russian defence industry. Following their visit to secret Russian defence plants, South 
Korean officials were very optimistic about joint projects, and about acquiring 
aerospace technology and composite materials for aircraft. At that time, Russia seemed
9^
willing to sell space technology and even nuclear technology to South Korea.
The first official visit o f a Russian naval squadron to South Korea led by First 
Deputy Commander Vice-Admiral of the Russian Pacific Fleet, Igor Khmelnov, 
occurred on 31 August, 1993. A South Korean naval squadron, headed by Commander 
o f the First Fleet o f South Korea, Rear Admiral Lee Su Yong, paid a return visit to 
Vladivostok in September 1993. Also in September 1993, when the Chairman of the 
South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff, Yang-ho Lee, visited Russia officially, the two sides 
agreed to hold joint naval manoeuvres for the first time.24 However, there was little 
concrete progress in Russian-South Korean military cooperation until 1994.
Substantial military cooperation started in 1994. Since then, their collaboration 
has included transfers of weapons and military technology, joint naval exercises, and
Soviet trade debt with Hungary. German officials were also quoted as saying in May 1994 that Russia 
proposed paying part o f  its debt with deliveries o f  MIG-29 fighter aircraft. Germany declined the offer. 
See RFE/RL D aily Report, 13 May, 1994.
21 Itar Tass Weekly News, 15 May, 2000.
22 Sergounin and Subbotin, p. 111.
23 Ibid.
24 Itar Tass Weekly News, 15 May, 2000.
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exchange visits of high-ranking military officers. As the two “Brown Bear” Projects 
will illustrate, the primary incentives for their military cooperation stemmed from their 
respective national economic agendas. In other words, Russia used the arms trade 
primarily in order to repay its Soviet debts to South Korea. As Figure 10 illustrates, 
Russian arms exports to South Korea peaked in 1997. The arms trade cooperation will 
continue to meet the two sides’ mutual economic and political interests for the time 
being, at least until the Russian debt to South Korea is completely cleared.
Figure 10 Russian arms exports to South Korea from 1996 to 2003
(Unit: USS million)
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Source: SIPRI arms transfers database, 10 January 2005.
The first important arms deal between Russian and South Korea was named the 
“Brown Bear” Project. It began in 1994 and lasted until April 1997.25 It stemmed 
principally from economic motives, that is, Russia’s scheme to repay the Soviet debt to 
South Korea which had been incurred in the late 1980s and the early 1990s by selling 
weapons and providing additional weapons and spare parts for cash.
In the summer of 1993, Aleksandr Shokhin, the chairman of the Commission for 
Military and Technical Cooperation, visited Seoul. He offered a package of proposals 
to sell state-of-the-art military hardware as payment for Russia’s interest on some US 
$1.47 billion in loans extended by South Korea since 1988.26 Although in January 1994, 
the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs initially rejected repaying outstanding debts to 
South Korea by means of military hardware, it accepted Shokhin’s proposal for military
25 Han-Ruh Bangsan Hyupryuk Jaryojip (Korea-Russia Military Industrial Cooperation Report: focusing 
on the first and the second Brown Bear project), South Korean Ministry o f Defense, November 2003, 
Seoul, Korea, p. 41.
26 RFE/RL Daily Report, 23 August, 1993.
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and technological cooperation with South Korea, and anticipated a favourable South 
Korean response.27
According to the Russian armed forces newspaper, Krasnaya zvezda, Russia’s 
proposal, was well received by the South Korean government at first, but the deal was 
suddenly delayed due to resistance from the US defence industry. Specifically, the US 
government was reported to be highly concerned that Russian Mig-29s and S-300 
tactical missile interceptors could successfully compete against US F-16 Ms and 
Patriots.28 North Korea, Russia’s traditional arms purchaser and its former ideological 
ally, also protested harshly to Russia that a possible deployment o f Russian S-300s by 
Seoul would threaten Pyongyang’s long-term military security.29 Finally, due to US 
pressure, the S-300 was not selected for Seoul’s new missile programme to replace the 
vintage 1950s Nike-Hercules fleet.30
Nevertheless, Moscow finally succeeded in exporting arms to Seoul. On 29 
April 1994, the defence ministers of South Korea and Russia signed a memorandum of 
understanding on bilateral military exchanges. No specific weapons deals were 
mentioned at that time, but Pavel Grachev, the Russian Defence Minister, reiterated that 
Moscow was ready for full-scale military cooperation with Seoul.31 After a series of 
talks, Russia and South Korea agreed in July 1994 that Moscow would pay $450.7 
million in overdue principle and interest over a four-year period through deliveries of 
various raw materials, including nonferrous metals, as well as military hardware.
As Table 11 shows, the first shipment of Russian weapons to South Korea, 
worth $210 million, began in September 1996. It consisted o f BMP-3 armoured 
personnel carriers, T-80U battle tanks, a METIS-M anti-tank missile, an IGLA anti- 
aircraft missile, munitions, parts, raw materials, and Ka-32T civilian helicopters. The 
T-80U tank was regarded as the most up-to-date version o f Russian armoured hardware. 
In 1999, South Korea agreed to purchase an additional 13 BMP-3 carriers and 33 T-80
27 Ibid., 26 January, 1994.
28 Krasnaya zvezda, 18 September, 1993, quoted in Khripunov, p. 79.
29 Korean Defense news, 28 February-6 March, 1994.
30 The new, SAM -X m issile programme had been delayed for many years largely due to public distrust o f  
the US Patriots system ’s capability. Instead o f  the Russian S-300, the Patriot Advanced Capability 3 
(PAC-3) was chosen. See “Defense Production and R&D, Korea, South,” J a n e’s  Sentinel Security 
Assessment, China & N ortheast Asia, 26 May, 2004.
31 RFE/RL D aily  Report, 2 May, 1994.
32 Tsuneo Akaha, “Russia and A sia in 1995: Bold Objectives and Limited Means,” Asian Survey, Vol. 36, 
No. 1, January 1996, pp. 104-105.
33 Han-Ruh Bangsan Hyupryuk Jaryojip, p. 26; Itar Tass Weekly News, 1 July, 1997, on 
http://dlib.eastview.com/searchresults/printarticle.isp?art=8. accessed on 20 November, 2004; United  
Press International (UPI), 30 August, 1999; and Viktor Linnik, “N ew  Arms Diplomacy,” The M oscow  
Times, 12 November, 1996.
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tanks worth $1.5 billion to offset part o f Russia’s debt.34 South Korea was reported to 
be the first state to purchase this armament.35 According to a South Korean defence 
ministry report, Russia was initially hoping to deliver MiG-29s, KA-50 fighting 
helicopters, S-300 antiaircraft missiles, and 54 other items to South Korea, whereas 
South Korea allegedly requested MiG-29s, SMERCH (300mm cannon), TUNGUSKA 
cannon, BMP-3 armoured personnel carriers, T-80U tanks, and 10 other items. In the 
course o f negotiations, Russia finally refused South Korea’s demand for MIG-29, 
contending that South Korea had to purchase at least 12 MiG-29 fighters as a minimum 
sales requirement.36
Table 11 Russian Arms Transfer to South Korea in the 1990s
Category Equipment
Type
Quantity Delivery Manufacturer Comments
9M115 Saxhorn 
AT-7
Anti-Tank
Missile
45 1996 Tula For technical 
evaluation
9M119 
Sniper AT-11
Anti-Tank
Missile
396 1996-97 Tula For T-80U tanks
9M U7 Bastion 
AT-10
Anti-Tank
Missile
528 1996-98 Tula For BMP-3 IFVs
T-72 Main Battle 
Tank
n/a 1997/98 State Arsenals
BTR-80 Armoured
Personnel
Carriers
n/a 1997/98 State Arsenals
T-80U Main Battle 
Tank
33 1997-97 State Arsenals
9K115/9M115 Air to Ground 
Missile
40t50 1996 Tula
Ka-32A/ Helix- 
C
Helicopter 8 1999-2000 Kamov For Maritime 
Police ( Coast 
Guard)
Mi-17 Helicopter 20 1996 Ulan Ude
BMP-3 Infantry Fighting 
Vehicles
70 1996-98 State Arsenals For marines, 
Three-man crew 
plus nine other 
infantry men
Igla-IE Portable Spy 
Aircraft Missile 
System
45 1995-96 Tula
Source: Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, China & Northeast Asia, 26 May, 2004; Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute Research Report No. 15, 1999; “Defence Products from Russia,” Military Technology (February 
1993), special advertising section; and Han-Ruh Bangsan HyupryukJaryojip (Korea-Russia Military Industrial 
Cooperation Report: focusing on the first and the second Brown Bear project), South Korean Ministry of Defence, 
November 2003, Seoul, Korea.
According to a South Korean military official, South Korea’s requirements in 
the selection of Russia’s arms were, first, that the weapons had to be those that North 
Korea was currently using and was planning to purchase in the future, second, they had
34 IPS (Inter Press Service)/ G lobal Information Network , 25 May, 1999.
35 BBC Summary o f  W orld Broadcasts, 14 October, 1996.
36 Han-Ruh Bangsan H yupryukJaryojip, pp. 26-27.
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to be newly invented, and third, there should be no difficulties in terms of their 
maintenance and operation.
Four Ka-32 helicopters were also delivered to Seoul during the First Brown Bear 
project term, as Table 11 shows. One of them was paid for in cash and the other three 
were supplied in payment o f Moscow’s debt. Among the military hardware imported 
from Russia, helicopters were the most popular item to Koreans because o f their multi­
purpose function. The Ka-32’s initial purpose was anti-submarine warfare, 
minesweeping, fire-fighting, and search and rescue operations.38 However, it has been 
used for various purposes in every sector o f the Korean government including the 
Ministry o f Defence, the Forestry Department, and the Department of Natural Disaster 
Management. Helicopters have been the chief component of Russian arms exports in 
the last decade.39
Apart from the arms trade, other forms o f military cooperation between Russia 
and South Korea include joint military exercises, participating in tender activities, 
training servicemen, mutual visits of high ranking officers, transfer o f military 
technology, and cooperation between the military industrial private sectors.
Since 1996, there have been various types o f exchange visits on a regular basis. 
In July 1996, for example, two South Korean warships, Masan and Chonju, visited 
Vladivostok to participate in the celebration of the 300th anniversary o f the Russian 
Navy. In 1997, the Russian Pacific Fleet flagship Varyag paid a friendly visit to South 
Korea.
Joint exercises of the Alpha unit of the Russian Federal Security Service and the 
special detachment-47 of the South Korean ground forces were held in Moscow in June 
1997 to practice different approaches to seizing terrorists and freeing hostages.40 In 
October 2000, Russia and South Korea held their first joint naval exercises about 50 
miles off Vladivostok. The two countries simulated the rescue of a civilian vessel in 
distress in international waters.41 In 2003, South Korea also sent two ships and
37 Ibid.
38 “Defense Production and R& D, Korea, South,” Jan e’s Sentinel Security Assessment, China & 
Northeast A sia , 26 May, 2004.
39 In 2000, Russia exported more than 7,000 Mil helicopters worldwide at an estimated profit o f  $20 
billion. According to the Russian state defense export agency, Rosvooruzhenie, one out o f  every five 
helicopters in the world was designed by Mil. See “Russia Pushing Military Helicopter Exports,” 
H elicopter News, 2000 Phillips Business Information, Inc., 11 February, 2000.
40 Itar Tass Weekly News, 5 December, 2000, on
http://dlib.eastview.com/searchresults/printarticle.isp?art=52. accessed on 19 November, 2004.
41 Interfax, 14 October, 2000; Anatoly Medetsky, “Russia, S. Korea, hold joint naval drill,” 10 March, 
2000, on http://vn.vlasnews.ru/arch/2000/iss21 l/text/txt2.html. accessed on 15 February, 2003.
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helicopters to take part in Russia’s Vostok-2003 command-post exercise.42 Joint 
exercises between the two navies over the past several years have been effective in 
enhancing military cooperation. In November 2004, the commander-in-chief o f the 
Russian Pacific fleet, Viktor Fyodorov, expressed deep gratitude to the South Korean 
navy commander for rescuing wrecked Russian fishing boats, and saving the lives of 71 
Russian civilians during a stormy night. It was reported that two South Korean navy 
ships discovered the wrecked ship, saved the entire crew and took emergency steps to 
avoid an explosion 43
Collaboration between the two countries was further strengthened by an 
exchange of high ranking military officials. The Russian Defence Minister, Igor 
Sergeyev, paid an official visit to South Korea in September 1999, for example, during 
which Moscow and Seoul agreed to conduct their first joint search and rescue naval 
exercises in 2000. They also agreed on regular mutual visits o f defence ministers and 
chairmen o f their Joint Chiefs of Staff, and to hold annual joint defence policy 
consultations.44 During Sergeyev’s visit to Seoul, South Koreans were less enthusiastic 
about purchasing additional Russian conventional weapons than in the acquisition of 
highly advanced military technologies. Seoul also encouraged Moscow to participate in 
international arms tenders in Seoul.45 In May 2000, the South Korean Defence Minister, 
Cho Song Tae, paid a return visit to Russia. He and Sergeyev agreed to establish a 
direct telephone hotline between the two ministries, to exchange visits o f warships, and 
to increase the number of South Korean military personnel training at Russian military 
educational institutions 46
In November 2002, the Russian Defence Minister, Sergei Ivanov, and his South 
Korean counterpart, Lee Jun, discussed the establishment of various forms of joint 
combat training in the Asia Pacific zone. They also reiterated that the two sides would 
cooperate on the issue o f international terrorism and the prevention of the proliferation
42 2003 Financial Times Information, G lobal News Wire-Asia Africa Intelligence Wire, BBC Monitoring 
International Reports, 11 September, 2003.
43 The South Korean M inistry o f  National Defense Briefings, 22 November, 2004.
44 FBIS (Foreign Broadcasting Information System), DR/EAS (0902, 1999); and Itar Tass Weekly News, 2 
September, 1999, on http://dlib.eastview.com/searchresults/printarticle.isp7artK35. accessed on 20 
November, 2004.
45 Itar Tass Weekly News, 30 August, 1999, on
http://dlib.eastview.com/searchresults/printarticle.isp?art=3. accessed on 21 November, 2004.
46 Pavel Koryashkin, “Russia, ROK Agree on Defense Ministries Phone Hotline,” ITAR-TASS, 16 May, 
2000 .
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of weapons o f mass destruction. Ivanov reported that more than 60 South Korean 
military officers had studied in Russian higher educational institutions since 1994.47
Russia began to participate in South Korea’s international arms tender activities. 
In 1996, the MiG designers and another Russian jet manufacturer, Sukhoi, represented 
Russia at South Korea’s air force modernization programme Expos (SAS-96) in 
Seoul.48 Sukhoi presented its Su-35, new Su-37 fighter, and Mig-29 in direct 
competition with the US F-15E fighter and France’s Rafale fighter for contracts. 
Russian officials allegedly left Su-30, Su-35 and Su-37 aircraft in Seoul for South 
Korean experts to evaluate 49
In 2000, the Russian state arms export agency Rosvooruzhenie also participated 
in the tender for South Korea’s $1 billion helicopter programme.50 The Russian KA-50 
Black Shark helicopter worth US $15-17 million, and the Mi-28N combat helicopter, 
were listed among the contenders at the South Korean tender.51 It was reported that 
South Korea might become the first country to acquire the Mi-28N.52 In 2001, there 
was another important helicopter tender in Korea, the winner o f which was supposed to 
receive orders worth $80 million for helicopters to be used by South Korean presidents 
in future years. Accordingly, Mil offered South Korea its M i-172 helicopter, an export 
modification of the modernized Mi-8 helicopter. However, during the tender, the 
Russian Mil Firm, Bell, and Eurocopter firms dropped out of the competition, and only 
the British-Italian European Helicopter Industries Company and the US Sikorsky 
remained as the final contenders. The Sikorsky finally won the tender.53
47 “Russian Federation-South Korean military cooperation developing dynamically- DM ,” Itar Tass 
Weekly News, 11 November, 2002, on http://dlib.eastview.com/searchresults/printarticle.isp?art=82. 
accessed on 19 November, 2004.
48 Elena Denezhkina, “Russian defense firms and the external market,” in Ian Anthony, ed., Russia and  
the Arms Trade (Frosunda: Sipri, Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 143.
49 More than 100 world leading firms including Lockheed, Martin Marietta, Boeing, Sikorsky, Dassault, 
British Aerospace, participated in this 7th international Air Show in Seoul, and the American F/A-18E/F. 
France’s Rafale and Russia’s Sukhoi Su-35 appeared to be the primary contenders for South Korea’s F-X 
air force modernization programme. See Linnik; and Andrei Ivanov, IPS (Inter Press Service/Global 
Information Network), 19 November, 1996.
50 Rosvooruzhenie also works with Seoul in the spheres o f  electric diesel submarines, air defense systems 
and aircraft. See Interfax news agency, 18 August, 2000; South Korea was also to purchase 
approximately 100 helicopters, a fairly large order. See also Vremya Novostei, 4 September, 2000, in 
2000 Agency WPS (What The paper Say), 8 September, 2000.
51 Interfax news agency, 11 September, 2001.
52 It was said that the Russian Armed forces did not have this craft in their armory yet. See Segodnya, 6 
September, 2000.
53 Yun Chung, phone interview with Special Assistant for Defence Policy, Office o f  Assemblyman 
Hwang Jin Ha, Republic o f  Korea National Assembly, 6 January, 2006; and “Seoul-Russia-Armaments,” 
Itar Tass Weekly News, 28 February, 2001, on
http://dlib.eastview.com/searchresults/printarticle.isp?art=43. accessed on 19 November, 2004.
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Russia also cooperated with the South Korean private sector. In October 1996, 
for example, Russia signed an agreement with the aerospace division of the South 
Korean Samsung corporations to supply civil and military versions of the Mi-26 
helicopter. The Rostvertol company was in charge o f delivering one Mi-26TS to 
Samsung Aerospace Corporation in early 1997, followed by four civil and six military 
Mi-26s in 1998. Rostvertol and Samsung Aerospace Corporation also concluded an 
agreement to cooperate on a feasibility study of the Southeast Asian market and in the 
supply o f the Russian company’s products to this region. The two companies also 
established a servicing centre for Russian helicopters in Southeast Asia, and produced a 
joint Russian-South Korean helicopter. This was allegedly the first delivery of 
helicopter equipment designed by the Mil design bureau to South Korea.54
Since 1995 a large number o f Russian defence industry scientists and engineers 
have been working on long-term contracts in South Korean private defence enterprises 
such as Samsung, Daewoo, and Hyundai. It was reported that at least 30 Russian 
specialists had worked for Samsung in 1995.55 The demand for commercial 
intermediaries o f Russian military technology has increased dramatically and their 
numbers have risen steadily in South Korea. For example, the Defence Seoul 1995 
International Arms Exhibition featured two different Russian displays. One was 
presented by Rosvooruzheniye, which successfully demonstrated the S-300V anti 
missile system. The other display was provided by the Promeksport (Industrial Export) 
firm, which was subordinate to the State Committee for the Defence Branches of 
Industry.56
Moscow’s willingness not only to supply manufactured weapons, but also to 
transfer defence high technology, is the key to enhancing its military and technical 
cooperation with Seoul. Since the late 1990s, South Korea has adopted a “strategy of 
pursuit,” according to which South Korean industry introduces foreign technologies, 
thus reducing expenditures on developing its own technologies. Seoul hopes to apply 
the same principles to high technology arms such as anti-aircraft missiles and 
reconnaissance satellites. Seoul has also shown great interest in Russia’s Su and MiG 
combat aircrafts which North Korea currently owns, S-300 air defence missile systems,
cn
anti ship cruise missiles, and reconnaissance satellites. In October 2004, the two sides
54 Ivanov, A., 1996.
55 The Current D igest o f  the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. XIVII, No. 4 1 , 8  November, 1995, p. 24; and Izvestia, 
10 October, 1995.
56 Ibid.
57 It is reported that North Korea has 30 Mig-29 and 35 Su-25, out o f  500 total combat jets. See Itar Tass, 
27 August, 2002, on http://dlib.eastview.com/searchresults/printarticle.isp?art=54. accessed on 19
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reached an agreement on the production of a rocket carrier. According to a Russian 
press release, Moscow and Seoul agreed that Russia’s Khrunichev State Research and 
Production Space Centre would create a blueprint of the rocket and South Korea would 
manufacture it. The launch of the rocket is scheduled for 2007 but the details of its 
technical features are still classified at this stage.58
Apart from selling arms, Russia also sold discarded military hardware and 
weapons to South Korea for the use o f metal scrap. In 1995, two heavy aircraft- 
carrying cruisers the Minsk and the Novorossiisk, and 32 combat ships of other classes 
were among the decommissioned Pacific Fleet warships to be cut for metal scrap in 
South Korea.59 Following a debate over whether they should be scrapped in Russia or 
in South Korea, the ships were delivered intact, and the Russian Defence Ministry 
reportedly got the full contract sum for the sale o f the Minsk and the Novorossiisk, $4.58 
billion and $4.3 billion, respectively. Nevertheless, Russian defence officials and 
analysts complained that the deal was potentially harmful to Russia, since the ships 
were relatively new and among the most sophisticated and would possibly reveal 
important military information to South Korea.60 The South Korean company that 
purchased the two cruisers was reported to be the full owner of 44 other 
decommissioned ships from the fleet. South Korea also purchased 200 decommissioned 
T-54 tanks as scrap from the Far Eastern Military District in 1995, the first contract 
valued at $600,000.61
One of the least successful aspects of Russian-South Korean military 
cooperation has been the negotiation of the possible purchase of Russian submarines by 
South Korea. In 1997, Daewoo Heavy Industries, part o f the South Korean 
conglomerate Daewoo group, sought Russian technical assistance to build a new and 
larger class o f submarines.62 In September 1998, the South Korean National Defence 
Ministry suggested the construction o f diesel-electric submarines in 2000 to parliament. 
South Korea sought to modernize its navy which already possessed nine submarines
November, 2004; and Sergei Golotuk and Yuri Golotuk, “M oscow is ready to share its military secrets 
with Seoul,” Russky Telegraf, 3 June, 1998, from Agency WPS (What The Papers Say), 4 June, 1998.
58 “Russia, S. Korea to produce rocket carrier,” Xinhua, 28 October, 2004.
59 A large part o f  the revenue from the sale o f  the ships for scrap was to be transferred to the fleet’s 
budget to build housing for families o f  servicemen. See Nikolay Geronin, “Russian Ships for Scrap Only, 
Says ROK,” Itar-Tass, 7 April, 1995; and Izvestia, 16 June, 1998, pp. 1 and 4.
60 Steve Glain, “Korea Aircraft Carrier Deal Prompts Skepticism,” Wall S treet Journal, Seoul, 5 April, 
1995, p. A 9.
61 Oleg Kruchek, “South Korea Finally Gets Minsk and Novorossiisk  Sold to Her a Year Ago,” Segodnya, 
Khavarovsk, 25 October, 1995, p. A2.
62 Richardson.
200
very similar to Russian Kilo-class submarines. Russia was willing to participate in the 
South Korean submarine project. During the Moscow foreign minister summit on 25 
January 1999, the two sides agreed that Russia would deliver three Kilo-class 
submarines worth one billion US dollars to South Korea.
However, following a detailed investigation by the South Korean navy in May 
2000 and consultations with Russian submarine specialists in August 2000, South Korea 
decided not to proceed with the contract. The Korean navy announced that the Kilo 
class submarines were outdated and had difficulty in meeting the inter-operability 
requirements o f the South Korean navy. South Korea purchased a license for submarine 
production from Germany instead of Russia.64 Even before the public announcement, 
Russia had already discovered that South Korea would decline the submarine project 
through informal channels. This incident sparked a diplomatic dispute.65
A second “Brown Bear” project was proposed by the South Korean National 
Security Council in November 2000.66 Its purpose was fundamentally different from 
the purpose of the first ’’Brown Bear” project, since it was intended primarily to make 
up for the fact that the kilo class submarine deal that had been under negotiation from 
January 1999 to August 2000 had been unsuccessful. It was also intended to 
compensate for other Russian proposals that South Korea had declined. For example, 
Russia had proposed selling SU-35 fighters, TU-334 passenger aircraft, SA-12 missiles, 
and amphibious aircraft to South Korea in 1999. Seoul declined the proposals because 
of protests from Washington. This created a diplomatic problem between Russia and 
South Korea, as a result o f which the South Korean National Security Council decided 
to resume the arms trade with Russia. Russian debt repayment played a subsidiary part 
Seoul’s decision to buy Russian arms; half the amount owed for the arms was paid in 
cash, and the remaining half was written off from the Russian debt to South Korea. The 
second “Brown Bear” project included Russian military transport and training planes,
63 An interview with Lieutenant General, Nikolai Zlenko, Deputy Director o f  the Main Directorate for 
International Military Cooperation o f  the Defense Ministry, quoted in Agency WPS (What The Papers 
Say), 11 August 1999.
64 Segodnya, 9 November, 2000; and Han-Ruh Bangsan Hyupryuk Jaryojip, p. 43.
65 Han-Ruh Bangsan Hyupryuk Jaryojip, pp. 43-44.
66 Ibid., pp. 40-52.
67 Yekatarina Titova, ‘Ko vzaimoi vygode’, Rossiskaya Gazeta, 29 May 1999; and Japan Times, 27 April, 
1999.
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air tankers, hovercraft, antitank missiles, helicopters, and various other commodities, 
including aluminium, and war materials.68
The second project provided a substantial impetus to bilateral security and 
political relations. The South Korean government’s attempts to resume military talks 
after several unfulfilled contracts suggest that the military activities also served as a 
confidence-building process.
As Table 12 shows, South Korea continued to receive $240 million worth of 
arms and military hardware from Russia, including 3 T-80U tanks, 30 BMP-3 armoured 
personnel carriers, 70 METIS-M portable tactical rocket systems, and 50 IGLA portable 
air defence systems.69 The BMP-3 and T-80U had been used for training purposes since 
their delivery in 1996. However, they were now planned to be integrated as active units 
into Korea’s 3rd Armoured Brigade by the end of 2004.70 Moreover, South Korea also 
acquired a total of 28 civilian helicopters (21 KA-32T and 7KA-32C) from Russia as
71part o f the debt repayment scheme.
Arms sales and military technological cooperation between Moscow and Seoul 
continued in 2001, when Moscow and Seoul signed a memorandum of intention 
stipulating the delivery to Seoul of Russian military hardware worth a total of $700
77million. In May 2002, a contract with the MiG Corporation was signed to supply a 
batch of training aircraft, the delivery of which was to start in 2003. In December 2002, 
the South Korean Ministry of National Defence announced that it would purchase 
additional Russian weapons including Metis anti tank missiles, 10 more T-80U, and 30 
more BMP-3s by 2006, as part of the second Brown Bear project.73
As Table 12 shows, further arms deals took place in 2003. In September 2003, 
Moscow and Seoul signed another agreement on outstanding debts of $2.6 billion, 
clearing the way for deliveries o f weapons worth $700 million. Russia has also offered 
the Ka-52K battlefield helicopter to South Korea.74 Most recently, South Korea's navy 
received the first o f three Murena-e hovercraft (air-cushion landing craft) worth $41 
million from Russia on November 11, 2005 and is due to receive two more by 2006.
68 “M oscow and Seoul agree on Russian Arms Deliveries,” ITAR-TASS, 28 February, 2001; Lyuba 
Pronina, “02 ’ Arms Sales Revenues Top $ 4 billion,” The M oscow Times, 16 December, 2002.
69 Seung-Ho Joo, “Russia and Korea: The Summit and After,” The K orea Journal o f  Defense Analysis 
Vol. 13, No. 1, Autumn 2001, Seoul, Korea, p. 118.
70 “Defense Production and R& D, Korea, South,” 2004.
71 HangukJlbo, 8 October, 1999, and Joo, 2001, p. 118.
72 Evgenii Moskvin, “Who Will Be Defense Minister?” N ezavisim oe Voyennoe Obozrenie, No. 8, 
February 2001, pp. 1-3, in 2001 Agency WPS (What The Paper Say), 7 March, 2001; and Financial 
Times, USA Edition 1, 14 March, 2001
73 Itar Tass, 12 November, 2002, on http://d1ib.eastview.com/searchresults/printarticle.isp?art=62. 
accessed on 19 November, 2004; and “Defense Production and R&D, Korea, South,” 2004.
74 Reed Business Information UK, 7 October, 2003.
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South Korea also sent 24 South Korean navy officers to Russia's Naval Education 
Center and a Khabarovsk shipping dock last May to learn how to operate and maintain 
the vessels.
Table 12 Russian arm s transfer to South Korea in the 2000s
Number of 
ordered
Category Equipment
type
Year of 
order
Year of 
deliveries
Number of 
delivered
Comments
23 11-103 Light aircraft 2002 2003 23 Deal worth $9 m 
(incl $ 4.5 m 
payment of Russian 
debt to South Korea; 
for training
7 Ka-32A/Helix-C Helicopter 2002 2003 2 Transport version; 
delivery 2003-2004
30 BMP-3 IFV 2002 2003 6 Delivery 2003-2006
3 T-80U Main battle 
tank
2002 2003 1 Delivery 2003-2006
AT-13
Saxhom/9M131
Anti-tank
Missile
2002 2003 50 Part of payment for 
Russian $209m debt 
to South Korea
Source: SIPRI arms transfers database, 10 January 2005.
3. Obstacles to Russian-South Korean arms trade cooperation
Moscow and Seoul are still suspicious and wary of each other, primarily because 
of two extremely bitter historical events: military conflict during the Korean War in 
1950 and the shooting down of a Korean civilian aircraft (Korean Air) by a Soviet MiG 
fighter in 1983. Nevertheless, in February 2001 Seoul decided to begin the Second 
Brown Bear project, to purchase US $700 million of Russian arms. Yet despite the 
promising aspects o f the bilateral arms trade, Russia faces a number of obstacles in 
expanding its arms sales to South Korea. They include technical difficulties including 
“operational failings in the systems, difficulty in acquiring spare parts, and potentially 
serious setbacks associated with non-interoperability,” lack o f experience on both 
sides, the opposition of both the US and North Korean governments, and unfavourable 
public opinion in South Korea.
75 The 105-ton Murena-e, a fast naval vessel with a maximum speed o f  55 knots per hour, w ill be used to 
salvage aircraft and ships stranded in shallow waters and on wet land and to transport personnel and 
materials. See Korea Defense Industry Association, 7 November, 2005; and Aerospace D aily and  
Defense Report, 8 November, 2005.
76 Ja n e’s Sentinel Security Assessment, China & Northeast Asia, 26 May, 2004.
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3.1. Technical difficulties
Since Russia and South Korea share neither the same arms trade procedure, nor 
the same arms systems, the two Brown Bear projects are not typical of their bilateral
77arms trade. Two sets of technical difficulties explain South Korea’s reluctance to 
import Russian military hardware. One is that the South Korean military has faced 
difficulty in converting from its US-based weapon system to a new Russian system.
The second problem is that the newly acquired Russian military hardware is frequently 
faulty.
The South Korean Defence Ministry complained about the poor quality of the 
arms purchased from Russia during the first Brown Bear project, and also about lack of 
maintenance and chronic delays in deliveries o f parts. For example, Seoul purchased 33 
T-80U tanks and as many BMP-3 battle infantry vehicles. Yet only 21 of these 
armoured vehicles were actually operating, due to their poor maintenance condition and
7 0
delayed deliveries of parts. Furthermore, South Korea was not the only customer to 
complain about Russian military hardware. It was reported that in the mid-1990s, 
Malaysia had to ground six o f the seventeen MiG-29 fighters it purchased from Russia 
due to lack o f maintenance and spares.79 Moreover, according to South Korean military 
reports, the Russian submarines purchased by China in the 1990s had to be left at 
anchor in the Yangzhou River for a significant period due to the delays in deliveries of 
spare parts. The belief that Russian hardware was generally of poor quality made the
finSouth Korean Defence Ministry sceptical about importing Russian weapons.
President Putin apparently issued a strong warning to his government in 2001 to 
improve the quality o f its military production, especially regarding maintenance service 
and timely deliveries o f spare parts to foreign customers.
The second technical problem concerns conversion. South Korea has been the 
exclusive domain of western military suppliers, predominantly American, for almost six 
decades and although some Russian experts believed that conversion differences would 
be easy to overcome, many problems remain. South Korea has experienced technical 
difficulties, especially regarding the compatibility of navigation, communications, and 
control systems of Russian and South Korean military hardware during the process of
77 Jin Sun Park, “Bulgomsaupul tonghan Kunsagishul hwakbo (Military technology acquisition through 
Brown Bear Projects), on http://www.militarv.co.kr. accessed on 15 December, 2004.
78 Ivan Safronov, “Russia May Liberalize Arms Exports,” Kommersant, 25 October, 2001; and 2001 
Agency WPS (What The Paper Say), 25 October, 2001.
79 Ibid.
80 Park, J.S.
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switching from one weapon system to another. Above all, inter-operability was a 
particular concern. For example, Russia’s anti-tactical ballistic missile system, S- 
300PMU, did not have an identification friend or foe system compatible with US and
o ?
Western technologies. The Russian weapons’ incompatibility with the existing 
American-made landing or radar equipment in South Korea was particularly difficult to 
overcome. One solution used by South Korea to minimize weapon system 
incompatibility was to install Korean-made radio systems or other electronic devices in 
BMP-3 and T-80U vehicles and Korean computers in METIS-M portable tactical rocket
83systems.
3.2. Lack of experience
Given the fact that Russian-South Korean military ties have only existed for a 
decade and the two former enemy states still do not have full confidence in one another, 
difficulties have arisen between the two sides in the course o f negotiations. While 
Seoul criticizes Russia for not releasing sufficient information about the arms, for 
example, Moscow complains about the South Korean Defence Ministry’s continual 
requests for more detailed information about the military hardware. A South Korean 
Defence Ministry official who participated in the negotiation process was quoted as 
saying that, as a result o f the legacy of Soviet arms trade policy which was used as a 
form of aid to client states, Russia was simply not used to dealing with its new selective 
customers like South Korea. However, this minor friction can simply be attributed to
84the overall lack of experience between the two sides.
3.3. US objections
The US administration’s objections to South Korea purchasing weapons from 
Russia were noticed in the mid-1990s, especially following Russia’s delivery o f T-80U 
tanks to South Korea. The former Defence Secretary, William Perry, was urgently 
dispatched to Seoul, for example, where he succeeded in substantially slowing down 
Russian-South Korean arms trade cooperation. In a public statement in April 1997 
during a visit to Japan, former US Defence Secretary, William Cohen, made it clear that 
the US strongly opposed South Korea’s plan to acquire SA-12s, Russia’s most 
modernized tactical air defence system, and S-300 PMU anti-tactical ballistic missile
81 Itar Tass news agency, 7 February, 2001.
82 “USA urges South Korea to buy Patriot over S-300V,” Jan e’s Defense Weekly, 16 April, 1997, p. 3; 
and Sergounin and Subbotin, p. 112.
83 Park, J.S.
84 Han-Ruh Bangsan Hyupryuk Jaryojip, p. 146.
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system. Cohen maintained that while it would be preferable that Russian surface-to-air 
missiles (SAMs) were not actually deployed, the US would not mind if South Korea 
purchased some S-300PMUs for testing purpose or other kinds of training.85 He argued 
that US concern was due both to the possible risk that the Russian weapons could 
threaten the US aircraft aviation system, and to US interest in selling American air 
defences. Accordingly, he urged Seoul to buy the Patriot air defence system instead 
o f the Russian SAMs. In response to US protests, Russia argued that the US policy was 
aimed at destroying Russia’s arms exports not only on the Korean Peninsula.
US objections to Russian arms sales played a more far-reaching role than just 
affecting the arms trade between Russia and South Korea. It should be viewed in a 
global context. Russians strongly believed that the rapid decline of Russian arms sales 
after the collapse o f the Soviet Union resulted from a conscious US effort to force 
Russia out o f the market and achieve dominance in the world arms trade. Russia 
constantly accused the US of adopting similar tactics to prevent it from selling arms to 
Columbia, India, Cyprus, Brazil, and Indonesia in the mid 1990s.87 The US is even said 
to have discouraged Russia from selling arms to China since China would eventually 
use the arms against Russia. Moreover, the US made serious efforts to stop Russia 
exporting arms to new markets such as Latin America. For example, in 1996 Russia 
won a tender to supply 10 M i-17 helicopters to Columbia, overcoming competition 
from a number o f US and European firms. The Americans brought political pressure to 
bear on Columbia by imposing sanctions and trade isolation, in order to persuade them 
to cancel the deal with Russia. Russians also protested that the US undertook all 
possible measures to persuade Brazilians to give up importing Russian MiG-17 aircraft 
instead o f the US made F-16 and F-18 planes in the mid 1990s.88 In early 2002, Russia 
participated in four different international tenders in South Korea, Turkey, Malaysia, 
and Brazil, hoping that the possible contracts would earn it between $4.5 billion and 
$10 billion hard currency. Russia failed to win the tenders, primarily due to US
O Q
objections and lobbying for its own defence companies.
85 “USA urges S. Korea to buy Patriot over S-300V,” Jan e’s Defense Weekly, 16 April, 1997, p. 3.
86 Bill Gertz, “Egypt wants to buy high-tech Russian SAMs; Use o f  U.S. aid for purchase would be 
illegal,” The Washington Times, 30 May, 1997.
87 In 1997, Russia accused the U.S. o f  sabotaging $1.8 billion sale o f  40 SU-30 fighter planes to India. 
See “U.S. Tried To Stop SU-30 Planes’ Sale,” 1997 Softline Information, INC. Ethnic N ew s Watch, 
News-India Times, 25 July, 1997.
88 A similar situation continued in connection with the proposed sales o f  the S-300 systems to Cyprus. 
See Anton Surikov, “A War Against Russian Arms,” Pravda Five, from Russia Information Inc.- 
RusData Dialine, Russian Press Digest, 16 January, 1997.
89 Ekspert, No. 35, September 2002, pp. 26-29; and 2002 Agency WPS (What The Papers Say), 26 
September, 2002.
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With the exception of the deals which formed part of the debt repayment scheme, 
Russia has also experienced difficulty in competing directly against US military 
equipment in the ‘open’ South Korean arms market in recent years. During the 
international jet fighter tender at Seoul in 2002, for example, Russia’s Sukhoi Su-35, 
Dassault’s Rafaele, and the Eurofighter Typhoon of a four-nation European consortium 
were regarded as the most promising three competitors. Sukhoi was very confident that 
it would win the tender, since it expected less than $3 billion for the aircraft, while 
Dassault asked $4.17 billion, Boeing $4.4 billion, and Eurofighter $5.5 billion.
However, thanks to US political pressure, US Boeing’s F-15K won the contract, which 
was not only an outdated 1972 vintage model but also about to stop production. The 
Russian arms export agency, Rosoboroneksport complained that the process o f selection 
was strongly biased towards the Boeing company.90
In fact, as a result o f US pressure, the South Korean Defence Minister organized 
a second round o f the tender and abruptly changed the terms. Price ceased to be the 
decisive factor; instead, the aircraft’s operational compatibility with existing South 
Korean military hardware and political considerations became the crucial criteria for the 
selection. These two criteria tended to favour the Boeing. However, the decision to 
buy the Boeing F-15K had repercussions in South Korea’s domestic politics, creating a 
clear division between the political and military elites. It was virtually impossible to 
create a national consensus in Seoul on the choice o f weapons at that time. 
Rosoboroneksport's  complaint was echoed by Yves Robin, a Dassault executive in 
Korea. He accused the Korean military of bias, claiming that political considerations 
were in conflict with the tender terms. A high ranking officer o f the Korean Agency of 
Defence Development admitted that Seoul was under enormous pressure from the US 
government and some senior Korean officers revealed that the US behaved extremely 
arrogantly, threatening Seoul indirectly with plans to stop further sales o f any 
technology to Seoul. There were spontaneous demonstrations in Seoul to protest the 
government’s decision to buy the relatively old US military hardware. It was reported 
that the Defence Minister was summoned to the parliament to explain and his 
subordinates were charged with corruption. US pressure led the South Korean 
government to arrest two members of the tender commission, one was the officer who 
had denounced US pressure, and the other was the person who had voted for the French
90 Hankook Ilbo, 11 April, 2002.
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proposal. Charged with taking bribes, both lieutenant colonels were imprisoned.91 
Despite the scandal, it was still Boeing that won the tender.
In short, there is no denying that the US does object to its strategic allies buying 
Russian military hardware. Russia’s success in its arms trade with South Korea has 
been dependent upon its ability to overcome US pressure on the South Korean 
government.
3.4. North Korean objections
Since 1996, North Korea has also harshly criticized Russia for delivering 
advanced military equipment to South Korea. Compared to US objections, North 
Korean protests are not a major impediment to the development o f the arms trade 
between Russia and South Korea. Nevertheless, Pyongyang has publicly criticized 
Moscow’s delivery o f weapons to Seoul as “a reckless act fanning the flames of war,” 
stating that “encouragement to crime is a double crime, and Moscow is no less hostile 
toward North Korea.”92 At the time of South Korea’s procurement of the T-80 tank, 
North Korea only possessed the T-72, an earlier version o f T-80. South Korea also 
showed a lot o f interest in the Su-35 jet fighter, a major North Korean weaponry system 
that was supplied by the Soviet Union.93 Moreover, South Korea’s acquisition of S- 
300PMU anti-tactical ballistic missile system was aimed at countering North Korea’s 
Scud ballistic missile. Pyongyang, therefore, contends that Moscow’s arms export 
policy toward South Korea is not based on commercial considerations but is instead a 
grave political and military issue threatening peace and security on the Korean 
Peninsula. Russia responded to Pyongyang’s criticism by arguing that North Korea was 
not a good market.94
91 Ekspert, No. 35, September 2002, pp. 26-29.
92 North K orea Central News Agency (KCNA), Pyongyang 08:13 gmt, 30 September, 1996 from BBC 
Summary o f  World Broadcasting Corporation, 1 October, 1996.
93 Han-Ruh Bangsan Hyupryuk Jaryojip, p. 24; “North Korea lashes at M oscow for weapons exports to 
South Korea,” Agence France Presse, 30 September, 1996.
94 Rosvooruzheniye Deputy General Manager, Mikhail Timkin, argued, “It is not our fault because North 
Korea is not a solvent country. We now proceed from the premise that we don’t have friends, only 
partners.” See Andrei Ivanov, “Disarmament: Russian Small Arms Sales Booming in Asia,” Inter Press 
Service (IPS), 19 November, 1996.
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4. Implications for Russian-South Korean security cooperation
This chapter has shown that Russian arms transfers to South Korea represent one 
of the more promising aspects o f their bilateral relationship. Compared with the other 
economic projects in which the two countries are involved, the arms trade has been by 
far the most active and substantial. The arms trade illustrates an interesting aspect of 
comprehensive security in that it is an element o f both traditional military and political 
security as well as non-traditional economic security. Apart from contributing to the 
traditional security interests of Russia and South Korea, the arms trade, like technology, 
credit, and energy transfers, contributes to their national economic security interests.
4.1. Economic security dimension
The arms trade between Moscow and Seoul has the potential to enhance their 
bilateral economic security relations. Many o f the factors that affect the arms trade, 
such as the availability of economic resources, the perceptions of prestige attendant 
upon obtaining high-technology oriented weapons programmes, and the debt repayment 
scheme, have little to do with traditional security interests.95 South Korea’s relations 
with Russia, for example, are oriented primarily toward acquiring the most up-to-date 
military hardware and space technologies that cannot be obtained elsewhere. The 
former director general o f Rosvoorouzhenie stated in 1996 that the Russian arms trade 
placed emphasis on exporting the most sophisticated state-of-the-art systems:
If previously the Soviet Union did not deliver, as a rule, the newest model of 
arms to other countries, today Russia sells modem, high-tech models. This 
is a major difference between Russia’s arms exporting policy and the US 
policy. The US often sells other than best weapons system abroad, and most 
often sells either used arms or arms which have been in the arsenal for many
96years.
This gives Seoul the opportunity to choose the most advanced arms and, at the same 
time, to end its total dependence on the US or West European countries. South Korea 
hopes to establish domestic production of at least some components o f Russian weapons.
95 Desmond Ball, “Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific Region,” International 
Security, Vol. 18, No. 3, Winter 1993-1994, p. 103.
96 Basu.
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South Korea can purchase these advanced weapons at competitive prices and this is why 
the arms trade with Russia enhances South Korea’s economic security.
From the Russian perspective, Russia’s economic security interests, including 
expanding its commercial opportunities and its urgent need to pay its debt to South 
Korea, have dominated its arms trade with South Korea. Russia’s domestic economic 
crisis since the collapse o f the Soviet Union has been a serious security concern and 
arms exports are one o f the instruments through which Russia’s economic interests have 
become securitized. Specifically, the economic security incentives of the Russian arms 
trade are to earn hard currency and improve the balance o f payments; to reduce 
domestic arms procurement costs with economies of scale in production; to sustain 
employment and maintain the defence industrial infrastructure; to reduce research and 
development costs for mass-produced arms; and to use military production spin-offs to 
catalyze other economic, scientific, and technological development.97
At a more basic level, arms transfers to South Korea have reduced the South 
Korean debt burden on the Russian economy. In fact, the Russian arms trade with 
South Korea, which meant abandoning Russia’s long-term international ally, North 
Korea, suggests that the economic burden had become so pressing that resolving it had 
become one o f Russia’s most urgent national security issues.
Moreover, South Korea represented a small, yet entirely new, market, which, in 
the longer term, has the potential to provide contracts for Russian high technology
Q O
plants, and make it possible to preserve their scientific and production potential. 
Furthermore, the sale of military know-how may turn out to be mutually advantageous. 
According to Russky Telegraf, the Russian Defence Ministry may find it more 
beneficial to use some components manufactured in South Korea in collaboration with 
Russian technology than organizing or maintaining their production in Russia itself. In 
addition, if  the arms trade with South Korea is successful, it could promote Russia’s 
high technology products in the South Asian markets too.99
Although the hard currency that can be earned from military-technical 
cooperation with South Korea cannot be compared to the hundreds of millions o f dollars 
that Russia may be able to earn from the realization of its natural gas and oil pipeline 
projects, gas and oil deliveries simply confirm Russia’s status as a major supplier of raw
97 Mikhail I. Gerasev and Viktor M. Surikov, “The Crisis in the Russian Defense Industry: Implications 
for Arms Exports,” in Andrew J. Pierre and Dmitri V. Trenin eds., Russia in the World Arms Trade 
(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, 1997), p. 19.
98 Interfax Russian News, 2 March, 2001.
99 Golotuk, S. and Golotuk, Y.
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materials. Arms and military technology exports, on the other hand, would categorize 
Russia as a highly technologically developed nation.100 This means that arms exports 
could diversify Russia’s national export marketing strategy from its energy and raw 
material orientation to a technology driven strategy.
4.2. Political and strategic security dimension
Russian arms sales to South Korea are also intriguing from a political and 
strategic security perspective. Political motives have clearly been subordinate to 
economic incentives, and are of relatively minor strategic significance. Yet arm sales 
are not negligible with respect to politics and security.
For South Korea, Russian weapons were clearly attractive from a strategic 
security perspective, since, although North-South relations have improved significantly 
in the last few years, North Korea remains South Korea’s primary enemy state and its 
potential adversary. The fact that South Korea and China both use the same weapons 
systems as North Korea places enormous psychological pressure on North Korea which 
is completely isolated in the Northeast Asian security framework, without any potential 
ally apart from China. Moreover, South Korea’s further acquisition of Russian weapons 
could present a major threat to North Korean national security
From the Russian perspective, even though arms transfers have been conditioned 
more by commercial than geopolitical considerations, Russia could use its arms 
relationships for political advantage. Military-technical cooperation with South Korea 
could develop into a long-term strategic partnership, which would create a new balance 
o f power in Northeast Asia favourable to Russia. According to Rossiskaya gazeta in 
1997, Russia regarded South Korea as a counterweight to Japan’s potential expansion of 
its armed capacity.101 In other words, the further development of military cooperation 
with Seoul provides Russia with a strategic counterweight to a number o f potential 
threats such as US hegemony, and the rise o f Japanese and Chinese power. In short, 
military cooperation between the two sides enhances not only bilateral economic 
security relations but also strengthens Russia’s relative traditional security position in 
the Northeast Asian region.
The acquisition of advanced Russian arms would be beneficial to South Korea in 
the long term because it facilitates its military modernization programme. This may 
make it possible for South Korea to reduce its conventional armed forces and
100 The Current D igest o f  the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. XIVII, No. 4 1 ,8  November, 1995, p. 24; and 
Izvestia, 10 October, 1995.
101 Rossiskaya gazeta, 26 April, 1997, p. 3.
211
concentrate on the development of advanced weapons. In this respect, the prospects for 
joint military research and development of high-tech weapons and aerospace technology 
projects are very promising.
4.3. Limits and threats
Despite the rapid development of military cooperation activities, however, the 
scale o f the arms trade between the two countries remains relatively small. As we have 
seen, there are a number o f obstacles and a strong military-based Russian-South Korean 
alliance is highly unlikely to emerge as their shared geopolitical and strategic interests 
are not urgent and are deterred by the neighbouring states in Northeast Asia.
The arms trade between Moscow and Seoul can hardly be considered traditional 
arms trading because it has been an integral part o f Russia’s debt repayment scheme, 
but this has meant that it has met the two sides’ immediate economic security interests 
by decreasing Russia’s debt to South Korea. It is not clear whether the two countries 
will continue to their arms trade once the Russian debt to South Korea is completely 
cleared.
Both Russia and South Korea have been extremely careful in gauging the 
reactions o f neighbouring countries, notably North Korea and the United States. For 
this reason, they have hesitated to announce their arms trade activities in their official 
diplomatic discourse to either the regional or the international community. Whereas 
Russia has been more concerned with North Korea’s reaction, South Korea has been 
equally concerned with both governments’ reactions. Neither North Korea nor the 
United States would be satisfied if large scale arms transfers were made from Russia to 
South Korea. In particular, since South Korea has been an important regular customer 
of American defence industries, the US government has put pressure on the South 
Korean government regarding the transfer o f Russian arms to Seoul. Moreover, some 
South Korean, North Korean, Chinese and US defence officials have been highly 
concerned that Moscow’s arms transfer to Seoul might threaten traditional military and 
political security in the region.
Several of the economic projects in which Moscow and Seoul are involved 
require North Korean participation, and the arms trade between Russia and South Korea 
does not facilitate trilateral economic cooperation involving Pyongyang. As a result, it 
is perhaps too early to say that the arms trade cooperation between Moscow and Seoul 
will continue to contribute to the two countries’ comprehensive security.
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Chapter 8. The North Korean Factor
Introduction
This chapter examines the role of North Korea in the bilateral relations between 
Russia and South Korea. The primary purpose of the chapter is to explore whether the 
North Korean factor has enhanced bilateral security relations between Moscow and 
Seoul, or whether it acts as a deterrent. To this end, the chapter assesses the evolution 
o f Russia’s policy toward North Korea from the Gorbachev to the Putin era, Russia’s 
stance on North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme, and its approach to the issue of 
Korean reunification.
The primary argument is that North Korea has both a direct and an indirect 
influence on Russian-South Korean bilateral relations because Russia’s relations with 
North and South Korea are interconnected. Perhaps one of the greatest failures of 
Russian foreign policy toward the Korean peninsula before Putin came to power was its 
two-track policy toward the two Koreas. Russian political leaders initially considered 
that there was no reason to link policy toward North and South Korea since they had 
different goals and approaches to each of the countries. This was a mistake; the 
assumption that reducing political, military, and economic ties with Pyongyang would, 
in the long term, improve relations with Seoul proved to be wrong. In fact, Russia’s 
gradual loss o f leverage over North Korea has not been beneficial to improving its 
relations with South Korea because Russia has lost a political card it could have used in 
formulating a diplomatic agenda toward South Korea.
The chapter also argues that North Korea has become both a security threat and  
a factor that can potentially boost Russian-South Korean comprehensive security 
relations. As we have seen in previous chapters, North Korea has sometimes acted as 
an obstacle to economic cooperation in projects such as the TSR-TKR link and the 
natural gas pipeline. On the other hand, in the long term, once the nuclear issue has been 
completely settled, North Korea has the potential to facilitate bilateral relations between 
Moscow and Seoul, for North Korea will have no option but to make the rational choice 
o f basing its policy on economic motives which would reap it much needed financial 
assistance. North Korea’s involvement in trilateral economic cooperation has the 
potential to contribute to both bilateral Russian-South Korean comprehensive security 
and to regional security more broadly. So far, however, North Korea has hindered the 
establishment of comprehensive security between Moscow and Seoul.
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The chapter also illustrates that Russia’s role in Northeast Asia is dependent 
upon the role it plays in North Korea’s nuclear crisis and the Korean unification process. 
Many Russians believe that a democratic, neutral, and unified Korea would meet 
Russia’s interests because it could act as a counterbalance to Japan or China, not only in 
terms o f political and strategic issues, but also as an economic ally. Thus Russia would 
clearly benefit more from the unification o f Korea than any other country surrounding 
the Korean peninsula.
1. The evolution of Russian policy toward Pyongyang
An understanding o f the evolution of Moscow’s North Korean policy since the 
1980s is essential to comprehend the trilateral relations between Moscow, Pyongyang, 
and Seoul. For Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and Putin each had different views about North 
Korea; indeed, in some cases, the same leader had different views at different times. 
Accordingly, the changes in Russian policy had diverse effects on the trilateral relations 
among the three countries. This section examines how the trilateral relations have 
developed under the three different Kremlin leaders.
1.1. Gorbachev’s approach
From 1945 to the end of the 1980s, Soviet Korean policy was pursued in the 
context o f the Cold War. However, Gorbachev’s New Political Thinking provided 
possibilities for normalizing relations with former enemy states, including South Korea. 
Gorbachev believed that Soviet-North Korean relations based on ideology were 
detrimental to Soviet economic interests, aggravated US-Soviet tension in Asia, and 
constricted Soviet diplomatic options, particularly with respect to South Korea, a 
potentially significant economic partner in Soviet economic restructuring.1 This 
changed the Soviet position towards North Korea and led to the reduction and 
discontinuation o f political, diplomatic, economic, and military assistance, as provided 
for in the 1961 Soviet-North Korean treaty.
Gorbachev perceived North Korea as an unsustainable economic burden. Sino- 
Soviet detente and the relaxation of US-Soviet tensions had brought an end to Sino- 
Soviet competition over Pyongyang and diminished North Korea’s strategic value to
1 Elizabeth Wishnick, “Russian- North Korean Relations: A  N ew  Era?” in Samuel S. Kim and Tai Hwan 
Lee, eds., North K orea and Northeast Asia  (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002), p. 142.
2 Gorbachev made this statement upon returning from his trip to Cheju Island, South Korea in April 1991. 
See “Developing Ties With Far Eastern Neighbours,” Kom som olskaya Pravda, 28 April, 1991.
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Moscow. This reduced Pyongyang’s leverage over its two major allies.3 Moreover, 
Soviet access to North Korean ports and airspace rights were no longer needed as the 
Soviet military reduced its forces in Vietnam’s Cam Ranh Bay and abandoned the goal 
o f power projection into the Pacific.4 In short, in the 1980s the Soviet alliance with 
Pyongyang was neither profitable, nor reliable, nor compatible with enhancing 
Moscow’s status in the Northeast Asian region.5
Gorbachev wanted to initiate rapprochement with South Korea. His 
conversations with a Korean Russian specialist, Kim Hak Joon, illustrate Russia’s 
difficult position within the complicated triangular relationship with the two Koreas 
particularly well. According to Kim Hak Joon, Gorbachev said that at his first meeting 
with Kim II Sung in October 1986:
Kim II Sung attempted to explain the Korean situation and the international 
relations of East Asia in the anachronistic Leninist terms, claiming that 
South Korea is a colony o f the American imperialists. Kim tried to 
persuade me not to move toward the cross-recognition o f the Korean 
peninsula.6
When Gorbachev asked what cross-recognition was, Kim called it a “notorious 
international scheme initiated by American imperialists.” It meant “the recognition of 
the South by the Soviet Union and China in exchange for the recognition o f the North 
by the United States and Japan.” Gorbachev defended the idea as reasonable and 
advised Kim to accept it. Kim was apparently surprised that Gorbachev would advise 
him to consider the idea favourably. He retorted that such a course would perpetuate 
the Korean division. Gorbachev sensed that Kim was in the “incurable, outmoded 
paradigm of dogmatism” and advised him to reform his party and state. Gorbachev 
told Kim Hak Joon that “Kim disappointed me, and I disappointed Kim.”7
3 Yoke T. Soh, “Russian policy Toward the Two Koreas,” in Peter Shearman, ed., Russian Foreign Policy  
Since 1990  (Boulder: W estview Press, 1995), p. 184.
4 Hongchan Chun, and Charles Ziegler, The Russian Federation and South K orea , prepared for 
presentation at the 27th National Convention o f  the American Association for the Advanced o f  Slavic 
Studies, Washington, D.C. 26-29 October, 1995, p. 3.
5 Suzanne Crow, “Soviet-South Korean Rapprochement,” Radio Liberty Report on the USSR, Vol. 2, No. 
25, 15 June, 1990, p. 5.
6 Hakjoon Kim, “The Process Leading to the Establishment o f  Diplomatic Relations Between South 
Korea and the Soviet Union” Asian Survey, Vol. 37, No. 7, July 1997, pp. 641-642.
7 Ibid.
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At the Kim-Gorbachev summit, Gorbachev also rejected “any effort to force 
people to join military blocs or groupings” and stressed that Soviet allies bore full 
responsibility for their own pressing economic problems.8 These messages were 
emphasized repeatedly in Gorbachev’s subsequent foreign policy speeches, including 
the foreign policy address to the 19th Party Conference in Moscow in June 1988.9
Consequently, Kim II Sung not only found himself under pressure to finance his 
own military and economic needs, but also to respond, defensively or otherwise, to 
Gorbachev’s perestroika. His response was to promise to guard his people against the 
ideological poison o f capitalism and revisionism.10 However, although he had faced the 
challenge o f radical alternative policies from the Communist giants before, the 
economic and (in the Soviet case) political and cultural transformations underway in the 
Soviet Union and China challenged the fundamentals of his regime.11
The 1988 Seoul Olympics became a further factor contributing to the 
deterioration o f relations between Pyongyang and Moscow. The Olympic Games 
provided a convenient opening for Moscow to pursue normalized relations with Seoul. 
The Soviet Olympic committee put together an elaborate cultural programme involving 
ethnic Korean artists to impress the South Koreans and during the Games, Seoul 
allowed port visits by Soviet tourist ships to Pusan and Inchon, and permitted Aeroflot
19to fly into Seoul. Opportunities for trade and cultural exchanges were substantially
11enhanced through Soviet-South Korean Olympic contacts. North Korea criticised 
Russia’s favourable public attitudes toward the South harshly.
Moreover, after Gorbachev and South Korean President Roh Tae Woo held three 
summit meetings and established diplomatic relations in 1990-1991, Pyongyang
8 Pravda, 25 October, 1986.
9 M oscow News, 10-17 July, 1988, supplement, pp. 1-13.
10 Herbert Ellison, The Soviet Union and Northeast Asia  (New York: University Press o f  America, 1989), 
p. 47.
Ellison, p. 47.
12 Roy U. Kim, “Olympics Could Open Soviet-South Korean Relations,” Christian Science Monitor, 20  
September, 1988, p. 11.
13 The Olympics dramatically altered Russian official, journalistic, and popular attitudes toward South 
Korea. Until the Gorbachev era, very little information about South Korea had appeared in the Soviet 
press, and nearly all o f  it was negative. However, in 1988 there were 195 stories in leading Soviet 
newspapers and magazines, most o f  them firsthand accounts by Soviet correspondents. In addition to 
sports news, the correspondents covered Korean economic achievements, culture, and lifestyle. Remarks 
by Soviet reporters illustrate the overnight change in attitudes toward South Korea. Vitaly Ignatenko, 
who served as leader o f  the Soviet Press at the Seoul games and later became Gorbachev’s press secretary 
and director general o f  Tass, the Soviet news agency, said his first visit to Seoul had been a shock to him. 
“Everything he had read before turned out to be outdated; he arrived into the 21st century.” Vitaly 
Umashev o f  Ogonyok said, “My vision o f  South Korea as a Third World country disappeared.” Pravda, 
which had previously depicted South Korea mainly as a bastion o f  American militarism, called the sports 
facilities in Seoul “the best in the world.” See Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas (Reading: Addison- 
Wesley, 1997), p. 200.
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criticized Gorbachev, quite often going beyond the limits of diplomatic etiquette.14 The 
third Gorbachev-Roh meeting took place on Cheju Island, South Korea in April 1991 
and was the first visit to either North or South Korea by a Soviet head o f state. At the 
meeting, Gorbachev supported Seoul’s unilateral admission into the United Nations 
even if  North Korea continued to reject a simultaneous entry. He also urged North 
Korea to open its nuclear facilities to international inspection and pledged to stop 
supplying its nuclear power plants with fuel until it took this step.15
The meeting o f the General Secretary of the Communist party o f the Soviet 
Union with the President o f South Korea meant the legitimization o f the Seoul 
government virtually everywhere and “the final collapse o f North Korea’s long-standing 
effort to wall off the southern regime from communist nations.”16 Pyongyang’s reaction 
was immediate and vitriolic. Soviet media representatives, who had increasingly 
criticized the North Korean regime, were forced to leave Pyongyang.17 Nevertheless, 
Gorbachev did not totally give up relations with North Korea. In response to the 
country’s economic difficulties, the Soviet government issued a moratorium on payment 
for oil deliveries to North Korea. In April 1991, Moscow and Pyongyang signed an 
agreement providing for a limited expansion of bilateral trade, new Soviet credits for 
North Korea, and the repayment of its debt to the Soviet Union in hard currency.18
1.2. Yeltsin's approach
The collapse of the Soviet Union further aggravated relations between Moscow 
and Pyongyang. North Korean leaders, who had openly supported the anti-Gorbachev 
coup, now had to deal with a new pro-Western regime in the Kremlin, which was 
overtly hostile to the North Korean model o f socialism.
Yeltsin’s initial approach was no different from Gorbachev’s. Before 1996 he 
pursued relations with South Korea, to the detriment of Russia’s ties with the North 
Korea, but was still hesitant to discard Russia’s ties with the North completely. During 
a visit to Seoul in 1992, he told South Korean leaders that the Soviet-North Korean 
treaty existed only on paper, offered to share documents about the Korean War, and
14 Alexander Zhebin, “Russia and North Korea: An Emerging, Uneasy Partnership,” Asian Survey, Vol.
35, No. 8, August 1995, p. 737.
15 Hakjoon Kim, 1997, p. 650.
16 Oberdorfer, p. 210.
17 Evgeniy Bazhanov and Natasha Bazhanov, “The Evolution o f  Russian Korean Relations,” Asian Survey, 
Vol. 34, No. 9, September 1994, p. 792.
18 Ziegler, 1993, p. 123.
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announced Russia’s intention to stop its military aid programme to the North.19 North 
Korea, in turn, criticized Yeltsin’s reforms, citing Russia to demonstrate to its own 
population “the fateful consequences of a capitalization o f society”.20 Yeltsin’s foreign 
policy was particularly resented by North Korean policy makers. His disarmament 
initiatives and proposals for a nuclear test moratorium coupled with the SALT II Treaty 
were dismissed in Pyongyang with stinging criticisms. According to a Russian Korea 
expert, North Korean propaganda portrayed Yeltsin as “a sort o f whipping boy, a 
negative example o f the horrors that deviation from socialism brings with it.”21 
Moreover, North Korean leaders did not respond at all to the measures for security and 
cooperation in Northeast Asia proposed by Yeltsin and the Russian Ministry o f Foreign 
Affairs, while North Korean newspapers enjoyed watching the general decline of 
Russia’s role in world affairs.
Russian authorities had not, in fact, disassociated themselves from what had 
been said in support of Pyongyang through the early years of fraternal friendship.22 On 
the contrary, recognizing the negative impact of the normalization of relations with 
South Korea on Russian-North Korean relations, Deputy Foreign Minister Georgii 
Kunadze travelled to Pyongyang in January 1993 to discuss the status of the Soviet- 
North Korean Treaty. Russian officials tried to reemphasize the importance o f the 
Russian-North Korean relationship without endorsing the treaty’s mutual defence clause. 
Consequently, the Yeltsin government chose to prepare a new treaty instead of 
renewing the 1961 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which was due to expire in 
September 1996.23
However, relations between Pyongyang and Moscow continued to deteriorate. 
Pyongyang was particularly annoyed by Russia’s attempts to apply political pressure to 
abandon North Korea’s nuclear scheme. In response, North Korea declared a 50-mile 
military zone in the Japan Sea that hurt Russia’s interests and was considered by the 
Kremlin to be illegal and liable to provoke military incidents between the two allies. 
Pyongyang also warned that it would block projects involving Russia and the two
19 Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Imperial Decline: R ussia’s Changing Role in Asia  (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 1997), p. 164.
20 Andrew A. Bouchkin, “Russia’s Far Eastern Policy in the 1990s: Priorities and Prospects,” in Adeed 
Dawisha and Karen Dawisha, eds., The Making o f  Foreign Policy in Russia and the New States o f  
Eurasia (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), p. 77.
21 Gorgi Bulichev, “Russia’s Korea Policy: Toward a Conceptual Framework,” Far Eastern Affairs, Vol. 
2, 2000, p. 7.
22 Bouchkin, p. 77.
23 The treaty had been renewed every five years since 1971, See Rubinstein, p. 165.
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Koreas and harshly criticized Russia’s discharges of nuclear waste in the East Sea.24 
Further tension arose over human rights issues. Having portrayed the statement by the 
Russian senior delegate at the forty-eighth session of the United Nations Human Rights 
Commission as “interference in the internal affairs o f North Korea,” the Pyongyang 
regime declared its intention of presenting counterclaims against Russia. Russia’s 
action in granting political asylum to a North Korean postgraduate student in June 1992 
and then extraditing him to South Korea was interpreted as contravening the existing
7Slegal assistance treaty.
Economic ties between Russia and North Korea declined significantly during the 
early 1990s. Trade decreased from $2.35 billion in 1990 to $222 million in 1993.26 
After 1990, Moscow demanded hard currency repayment for its energy deliveries to
77North Korea, effectively ending its aid to the country. The Yeltsin administration also 
ended transfers of military equipment and technology to Pyongyang, abandoned cultural 
and scientific ties, the intergovernmental commission on economic and scientific 
cooperation ceased to operate, and direct flights between the two countries were
7Rcancelled. In response, Pyongyang refused to repay a four billion rouble loan. As a 
result, Deputy Foreign Minister Panov travelled to Pyongyang in September 1994 in an 
effort to revive flagging economic ties and explain the Russian position on the renewal 
of the 1961 treaty.29
In 1996, however, Yeltsin’s policy toward the Korean peninsula changed 
dramatically. Yeltsin discovered that his pro-South policy did not enhance his bilateral 
relations with Seoul while it severely damaged relations with Pyongyang. The Kremlin 
decided to restore old ties with North Korea so as to balance relations between Seoul 
and Pyongyang. This clearly suggests that Russia was attempting to regain its regional 
power status on the peninsula, by manoeuvring between the two Koreas. In reality, 
however, this proved to be rather difficult because Moscow found itself in the awkward 
position o f having to simultaneously project its image toward the two hostile Koreas.
Yeltsin’s balancing act began with the change o f foreign minister from Andrei 
Kozyrev to Yevgeny Primakov in January 1996. Russian-North Korean relations began
24 Bazhanov, E. and Bazhanov, N., p. 793.
25 Bouchkin, p. 78.
26 Vadim Tkachenko, “Russian-Korean Cooperation to Preserve the Peace,” Far Eastern Affairs, Vol. 2, 
1999, p. 29.
27 Seth Singleton, “Russia and Asia: The Emergence o f ‘Normal Relations’?,” in Roger E. Kanet and 
Alexander V. Kozhemiakin eds., The Foreign Policy o f  the Russian Federation  (Houndmills: Macmillan 
Press, 1997), p. 118.
28 Tkachenko, p. 29.
29 Rubinstein, p. 168.
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to improve as Primakov sought to restore the balance in Russia’s relations with North 
and South Korea. Deputy Prime Minister Vitaly Ignatenko’s visit to Pyongyang in 
April 1996 contributed crucially to improving relations with North Korea. It was 
Russia’s highest-level official visit to Pyongyang since the collapse o f the Soviet Union. 
During his visit, Russia and North Korea signed three agreements on cooperation in 
agriculture; they also signed agreements on the North Korean debt problem, the 
presence o f North Korean workers in Siberia and the Russian Far East, and Russia’s
-j 1
balance o f trade with North Korea. Bilateral and regional economic relations were 
restored, political consultations resumed, and Russia also provided food aid to North 
Korea in 1997. When Igor Ivanov succeeded Primakov as Foreign Minister, he 
announced that “Russia wanted its voice to be heard in the resolution of the most 
explosive problem in the Asia- Pacific region... thanks to a balanced policy with respect 
to the two Koreas.” In turn, the North Korean Foreign Minister, Kim Young Nam, 
expressed satisfaction with the increasingly positive development of Russian-North 
Korean relations.
1.3. Putin’s policy
Putin adopted a triangular diplomacy towards both Koreas from the beginning. 
The normalization process gained substantial momentum when Putin’s pursuit of 
realpolitik coincided with Kim Jong IPs new diplomatic opening to the outside world.
In February 2000, Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov visited Pyongyang to sign a new 
“North Korea-Russia Treaty on Friendship, Good Neighbourliness, and Cooperation,” 
to replace the 1961 security pact that had expired in 1996. The new treaty provided 
political and legal guarantees to boost cooperation and exchange in all aspects of the 
North Korean-Russian relationship. The automatic military intervention clause (Article
1) o f the 1961 treaty was replaced by a more ambiguous clause which does not obligate 
Russia to automatic military involvement (Article 2):
In the event of the emergence of the danger of an aggression against one of 
the countries or a situation jeopardizing peace and security, and in the event
30 Alexander N ., Fedorovsky “Russian policy and interests on the Korean peninsula,” Stockholm  
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Conference Presentation Paper, International House o f  
Japan, Tokyo, Japan, 19-21, February, 1999.
31 Ibid.
32 Wishnick, p. 144 and Seung-Ho Joo, “DPRK-Russian Rapprochement and Its Implications for Korean 
Security,” International Journal o f  Korean Unification Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2000, pp. 198-199.
33 Igor Ivanov, “la Russie et l’Asie-Pacifique,” Politique Etrangere, February 1999, p. 310, quoted in 
Wishnick, p. 144.
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there is a necessity for consultations and cooperation, the two sides enter 
into contact with each other immediately.34
In April 2000, Russia also agreed to resume military cooperation with North 
Korea, although this was limited to upgrading weapons supplied during the Soviet era.35 
In July 2000, Putin became the first Russian or Soviet leader ever to visit North Korea 
and the first leader to be invited by Kim Jong II. His visit to Pyongyang, before he had 
paid official visits to Tokyo or Seoul, demonstrated Russia’s new priorities. Between
‘I /
2000 and 2003, Putin visited North Korea three times and South Korea once. During 
an official state visit to Moscow by North Korean Defence Minister Kim II Choi on 
April 27, 2001, the two governments signed two military technological cooperation 
agreements under which Moscow undertook to modernize North Korea’s aging Soviet- 
era weapons systems, provide regular security consultations, and train North Korean 
military personnel to upgrade and refurbish North Korean military facilities.37
Kim Jong Il’s visit to Moscow in August 2001 was the highlight in the newly 
improved relations between Moscow and Pyongyang. It was only the third overseas trip 
for the reclusive North Korean leader. Unwilling to travel by air, Kim Jong II made the 
six thousand mile journey via the Trans Siberian Railroad. The two leaders discussed 
international and bilateral issues such as the 1972 ABM Treaty, a new world order, the 
unification issue, and the pullout of US forces from South Korea and issued a joint 
Moscow Declaration on August 4, 2001.
As Samuel Kim notes, the declaration “included trenchant attacks against 
infringement of state sovereignty under the pretext of humanitarianism and against the 
US Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) and National Missile Defence (NMD) 
programmes.”39 It made front-page news when Putin announced that the North Korean 
leader had pledged to eliminate his country’s Taepodong missile programme — a key
34 Choruchinsun sunlin mit hyupchoe kwanhan choyack (North Korea-Russia Treaty on Friendship, Good 
Neighbourliness, and Cooperation), February 2002, Pyongyang, on
http://l00.empas.com/dicsearch/pentrv.html?i=217484. accessed on 4 January, 2006 ; and see also 
Samuel S. Kim, “North Korea and Northeast Asia in World Politics,” in Samuel S. Kim and Tai Hwan 
Lee, eds., North Korea and Northeast Asia  (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002), p. 37.
35 North Korean defence officials reportedly requested new weapons systems, including fighter aircraft 
and reconnaissance planes, worth $500 million, but M oscow refiised due to Pyongyang’s inability to pay 
in hard currency. See NewsMax.com Wires, 28 April, 2001, on
http://www.newsmax.eom/archives/articles/2001/4/27/193941.shtml. accessed on 15 February, 2003.
36 See A. Torkunov, “The Korean Issue,” International Affairs, Vol. 49, No. 4, 2003, p. 43.
37 Kim, S., p. 38.
38 The DPRK-Russia jo in t declaration  signed by General Secretary Kim Jong II and President V.V. Putin 
o f  the Russian Federation, M oscow, 4 August, 2001, on http://www 1 .korea-
np.co.ip/pk/166th issue/2001080701 .htm. accessed on 10 January, 2006.
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rationale for NMD ~  if the US would provide access to rocket boosters for peaceful 
space research. Putin also managed to put Kim Jong IPs ‘satellites for missiles’ offer 
on the agenda o f the G-8 summit meeting in Japan.40
During the summit Russia and North Korea agreed to participate in the TSR- 
TKR linking project. Russia also proposed building a nuclear reactor for North Korea 
in Primorskii Krai in order to resume its energy cooperation with Pyongyang, as well as 
modernizing the industrial plants built in North Korea with the help o f the former Soviet 
Union 41 However, Article 5 of the Moscow declaration noted that Russian 
participation in the restructuring of the Soviet-built enterprises was contingent on the 
availability o f external financial assistance. North Korea’s inability to repay its $4 
billion debt clearly remained an obstacle to any future Russian credits.42
In short, Putin’s approach towards North Korea suggested a radical new concept 
o f trilateral cooperation that was eventually accepted by both North and South Korea.
As a result, Russia currently enjoys more political credibility in North Korea than under 
President Yeltsin.43 More recently, Putin invited both Pyongyang and Seoul to join in 
the celebrations of the 60th anniversary o f the Second World War victory on 9 May, 
2005. It was also reported that Russia proposed to hold a summit between the North 
and the South.44
2. Russia and the North Korean nuclear weapons programme
North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons has posed a great challenge to 
Russia. The resolution o f the crisis is a precondition not only for enhancing bilateral 
relations between Russia and South Korea but also for successful triangular economic 
cooperation between Moscow, Pyongyang and Seoul, specifically on the potential oil 
and gas pipeline projects, and the railroad linking project which is already in the process 
o f development. According to Alexander Fedorovsky, Head o f the Pacific Studies at 
the Institute o f World Economy and International Relations, Russia has two main
40 Ibid.
41 Agence France-Presse, 2 August, 2001; and “Russia to Play Active Role in Settling Korea Peninsula 
Problem,” Xinhua, 10 October, 2000.
42 Itar Tass, 4  August, 2001.
43 The Current D igest, Vol. 55, No. 24, 16 July, 2003, p. 5.
44 South Korean government officials state that it is too early to say that a summit meeting between Kim 
Jong II and Roh M oo Hyun w ill happen. See Dong-A II bo, 16 January, 2005, on 
http://www.donga.com/fbin/output?from:=email&n==200501160136. accessed on 23 January, 2005.
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objectives in relation to North Korea’s nuclear programme: strong support for the Six- 
Party talks, and denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.45
On the whole, however, Russia’s approach toward the North Korean nuclear 
issue has been ambivalent. I would argue that Russian ambivalence arises from Putin’s 
pursuit o f a balancing policy between Pyongyang and Seoul. Russia has not wanted to 
jeopardize its relations with either Korea by taking a stance on one side or the other. 
Moreover, while in the long term, Russia has every interest in preventing North Korea 
from building nuclear weapons, in the short term, as in the cases o f Iran and Iraq, the 
sale o f nuclear technology, along with the export o f raw materials, is Russia’s best hope 
for hard currency earnings.
According to an article in the Japanese weekly Shukan Bunshun, which 
purported to be based on a secret Russian General Staff report, 160 Russian nuclear 
scientists and missile experts spent time unofficially in North Korea’s laboratories and 
specialized centres from 1987 to 1994, helping North Korea create a nuclear bomb. 
Many o f them allegedly changed their names and some took North Korean citizenship 46 
This put Seoul in a difficult position in dealing with Russia over the North Korean 
nuclear issue.
Russia’s stance on international sanctions against North Korea has also been 
ambivalent. In 1994, Moscow preferred to resolve the issue by political means and 
proposed convening an international conference on security problems on the Korean 
peninsula. With regard to imposing international sanctions on North Korea, Yeltsin 
insisted on waiting for a decision on his proposed conference. However, he agreed that 
“if  things reach the point where North Korea digs in its heels and moves toward 
withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, we will first warn them, and then 
impose sanctions.”47 At that time, Kozyrev also favoured waiting to see whether North 
Korea withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). If they did, he suggested the 
step by step introduction o f sanctions, arguing that “A list o f sanctions should be drawn 
up, and at the same time preparations should be made for an international conference on 
the Korean Peninsula’s problems that we have proposed.” In fact, North Korea did
45 Alexander Fedorovsky, Interview during the Chatham House conference “The North Korean Nuclear 
Issue: Non-Proliferation, South Korean and US Policy,” organized by the Asia Programme in association 
with the United States Discussion Group, 21 February, 2005, Chatham House, London.
46 See Sergei Agafonov, Izvestia, 27 January, 1994, pp. 1 and 4; and “Did Russia Help North Korea Build 
Nuclear Bomb?” The Current D igest, Vol. 46, No. 5, 1994, p. 12.
47 The Current D igest, Vol. 46, No. 22, 1994, p. 23.
48 See Andrei Kozyrev, Russia’s Minister o f  Foreign Affairs, interviewed by Izvestiya Correspondent 
Leonid Mlechin, Izvestia, 18 June, 1994, pp. 1-2, quoted in “Kozyrev Explains Go-Slow Policy on North 
Korea,” The Current Digest, Vol. 46, No. 24, 1994, p. 14.
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withdraw from the NPT in 1993. Immediately following its return to the NPT and the 
resolution o f the first crisis in October 1994, however, Kozyrev said that Moscow 
would not support any sanctions upon which it was not consulted.49 In 2003, Russian 
Defence Minister, Sergei Ivanov, also stated that “North Korea is a sovereign state, we 
reject any pressure on a sovereign state, and now is the time for active diplomacy.”50
Even after North Korea agreed on 19 September 2005 to end its nuclear 
weapons programme, Russian opinion is divided. For example, Konstantin Kosachev, 
chairman of the Duma’s International Affairs Committee, emphasizes Pyongyang’s 
long record o f unpredictability, whereas Major General Nikolai Bezborodov of the 
Duma Defence Committee openly supports North Korea’s right to a peaceful nuclear 
programme.51
As Singleton argues, Russia has little interest in becoming a “protagonist” in the 
dispute between the US and North Korea over international inspections of North Korean 
nuclear facilities. Nor does it want its policy to become hostage to the unpredictable 
relations between the two Koreas. On the other hand, Russian exclusion from the 
negotiation process during the 1993-1994 crisis had seriously undermined its already 
weak position in Northeast Asia. These concerns led Russia to propose an international 
multi-party conference on North Korean nuclear weapons of which Russia would be a 
co-sponsor, i.e. neither a main player nor an isolator. Russia’s ambivalence can be 
demonstrated by examining its response to the two North Korean nuclear crises in more 
detail.
2.1. The first crisis (1993-1994)
When North Korea’s first nuclear crisis broke out in 1993, Russia was 
absolutely opposed to the presence of any nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula. 
Moscow viewed the crisis not as a bluff, but as a serious potential threat to Northeast 
Asian regional security. Yet the Russian Chief o f Staff, Colonel General Mikhail 
Kolesnikov, warned that:
49 Stephen Blank, “Russian Policy and the Changing Korean Question,” Asian Survey, Vol. 35, No. 8, 
August 1995, p. 723.
50 Sergei Blagov, “Russia’s good graces with North Korea on Trial,” Asia Times, 15 February, 2003, on 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/EB 15DgQ 1 .html. accessed on 15 February, 2003.
51 Stephen Blank, “Russia Assesses the North Korea Six-Party Agreement,” Eurasia D aily Monitor, The 
Jamestown Foundation, Vol. 2, No. 175, 21 September, 2005.
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The DPRK must not be allowed to feel that its security is compromised at 
all. A policy o f pressuring North Korea and creating a vacuum around it 
can only have the opposite effect, and incite it to accelerate the creation of 
nuclear weapons. What is needed is dialogue with Pyongyang. And the 
way is clear. Not without the participation of Russian diplomacy, it was 
decided to place seven North Korean facilities under IAEA supervision.54
Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Panov, former ambassador to Seoul, also argued 
that the crisis should be resolved not by coercive measures such as sanctions, but by a 
conference.55
In April 1993 Russia had suspended its 1991 agreement to provide North Korea 
with three 660-megawatt light water reactors (LWRs), in response to increasing 
international concern over North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT.56 Construction on 
the $4 billion projects was nearly complete, and Russia suffered considerable financial 
loss when the North Koreans then refused to pay Russian firms for their previous work. 
Sharing an interest in preventing an increasingly weakened and isolated North Korea 
from acquiring nuclear capability, Moscow cooperated with Seoul and the United States 
in efforts to prevent proliferation in North Korea.57 North Korea reacted angrily to 
Russia’s open support for the American position on the Korean nuclear issue, and 
publicly accused Russia of dumping nuclear waste in the East Sea.58 In 1994, Yeltsin 
put his multi-party conference proposal to South Korean President Kim Young Sam and 
President Clinton.59 However, the proposal was not well received by any o f the relevant 
states. South Korean Foreign Ministry officials contended that a multi-party conference 
would only delay the process further and complicate negotiations.
Thus despite their tenacious efforts to participate in the North Korean nuclear 
negotiation process since the early 1990s, Russia remained a marginal player. During 
the 1993-1994 crisis, it had a secondary observer’s role and in the end, the crisis was 
resolved on an essentially bilateral basis between North Korea and the United States. 
According to the October 1994 US-North Korean Agreed Framework, the North
54 Rossiskiye vesti, 6 April, 1994; and Joint Publications Research Service, M ilitary Affairs, 94-013, 13 
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Koreans would give up their nuclear programme in exchange for access to energy 
technology and economic aid. The US, Japan, and South Korea joined together to 
create the Korea Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), which would 
be in charge of assistance to North Korea. Despite Russia’s involvement in North 
Korea’s energy sector, KEDO decided to send two South Korean light water reactors to 
Pyongyang.60 Moreover, in April 1996 the US and South Korea suggested holding four 
party talks on the North Korean problem including China, but not Russia.
Russia was reluctant to join KEDO not only because o f the financial obligations 
that accompany membership, but also because o f its past experience of failed 
involvement in North Korea’s nuclear power programme and perceptions that the US 
had purposely excluded Russia from playing its rightful role in the project.61 Moreover, 
as Snyder notes, Russians have been particularly sensitive to the perceived double 
standards whereby the US has backed provision o f light water reactors to North Korea 
as part o f the agreed framework, while opposing a very similar Russian commercial 
project with Iran on the grounds that it promotes the possibility of nuclear 
proliferation. The Russian government therefore decided not to join the KEDO 
project. However it did provide information from its earlier site surveys o f the area
ffXwhich had been conducted in the 1980s.
2.2. The second crisis (2002-2005)
The second North Korean nuclear crisis started in October 2002. This time, 
Russia generally took a relatively negative stance toward North Korea. In response to 
Pyongyang’s withdrawal from the NPT, the Russian Foreign Minister urged Pyongyang 
to honour its international obligations, and warned that without Moscow’s support, Kim 
Jong II could suffer the same fate as Saddam Hussein.64 Once again, however, Russia 
faced a dilemma: a hard line policy would undermine the current trusting relationship 
between Putin and Kim Jong II, while a soft line would make cooperation with other 
involved states, including South Korea, impossible.
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61 It was reported that Chinese reluctance to participate stems primarily from concerns that involvement in t 
the project might negatively influence China’s bilateral relationship with North Korea or that support for 
the project may indirectly support expanded US influence on the Korean peninsula. See Scott Snyder,
The Korean Peninsula Energy Developm ent Organization: Implications fo r  Northeast Asian Regional 
Security Cooperation , North Pacific Policy Papers 3, Program on Canada-Asia Policy Studies Institute o f  
Asian Research University o f  British Columbia, Vancouver, 2000, p. 16.
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There are currently three largely different approaches towards North Korea’s 
nuclear ambitions in Russia. One group supports the view that Moscow should join the 
US-led campaign of exerting pressure on North Korea to force it to rejoin the NPT and 
to agree unconditionally to abandon its nuclear arms programme. The advocates o f this 
approach emphasize the importance of maintaining the non-proliferation regime, the 
primacy o f international law, and the need to call to order a rogue that has gone too 
far.65 The second group contends that by fully associating itself with Washington’s 
policy, Moscow would leave North Korea no room to manoeuvre, drive it into a comer 
and fail to achieve the desired result o f persuading Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear 
programmes. Russia would give up its independence in dealing with Korean affairs and, 
unable to promote its own national security or economic interests, would be forced to 
accept the American initiatives. Something similar had happened during the first crisis, 
when Moscow was left out o f the Korean settlement. This group suspects that 
Washington’s real aim is regime change in North Korea.66
The third, prevailing approach is the view o f Russian diplomats that all the 
participant states should resolve the problem through negotiation, without becoming too 
obsessed with the question o f who is right and who is wrong. Russian diplomats 
believe that any attempt to persuade North Korea to return unconditionally to the NPT 
has little chance o f success. Furthermore, they claim that Russia must fight for 
something more than just a place at the negotiating table that will confirm its great 
power status. It is essential to direct the Six-Party talks toward a real compromise and 
not allow them to be turned into a diplomatic cover for preparations to bring down Kim
f\ 7Jong IPs regime. They believe that the collapse of his regime could have dire and
f\Runpredictable consequences, especially for North Korea’s neighbours.
Putin’s government has maintained the third position so far. The Russian 
government insists that North Korea should not be permitted to possess a nuclear bomb 
but that the issue must be settled in a way that meets the interests of all the parties 
concerned. The Russians strongly support the Six-Party Talks on the grounds that this 
multilateral framework will facilitate direct dialogue between Pyongyang and 
Washington. Russia has suggested the following specific steps for the Six-Party talks:
65 Georgy Bulychev and Aleksandr Vorontsov, Kommersant, 16 January, 2003, p. 9; and The Current 
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1) a mutual simultaneous declaration on North Korea’s return to a nuclear 
freeze and to US readiness to resume supplying heavy oil, continuing with 
bilateral consultations aimed at agreement on the current status o f the agreed 
framework;
2) The US and North Korea list their concerns and demands to each other 
and exchange views;
3) The other four states -- Russia, China, Japan and South Korea — might 
join in analyzing these lists and advising Pyongyang and Washington what 
to do.69
According to the Russian proposal, the following minimum requirements are 
essential for a settlement of the crisis. First, North Korea must return to the NPT. 
Second, it must also abandon possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). 
Third, the US must guarantee that it will not infringe North Korea’s sovereignty and 
security. The other four states can act as guarantors o f the strict fulfilment o f these 
obligations since neither the US nor North Korea has full confidence in the UN or 
international law. Finally, the US and North Korea could return to full normalization
70and end hostilities.
Since the beginning o f 2003, Putin and the Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov 
have actively discussed these options and possibilities with the US, North Korea, South
71Korea and other relevant world leaders. For example, the Russian and South Korean 
foreign ministries pledged joint efforts in defusing tension over North Korea’s nuclear 
bid on 3 January 2003. The two sides also agreed there was no need to submit the 
question to the UN Security Council before other possibilities for negotiation had been 
used up.72 During a telephone conversation with former South Korean President Kim 
Dae Jung on 25 January 2003, Putin reemphasized the importance o f continuing the
73inter-Korean process, such as ministerial-level talks in Seoul between the two Koreas. 
On 18-21 January, 2003, the Russian President’s special envoy A. Losuykov personally
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delivered a Six-Party Talk proposal to Kim Jong II. The proposal was also delivered to 
the US.74
The US began to recognize that Russia had a role to play in resolving the crisis. 
Nevertheless, little progress was made between the beginning o f the war in Iraq and 
February 2005. The North Koreans insisted that they would only pursue direct dialogue 
with the US, whereas the Americans insisted on dialogue in a multilateral format. Putin 
continues to support any kind of format that would lead to a constructive solution as 
long as Russia is part of the negotiation procedure.
However, it was China that set up the six part talks. In an effort to stabilize the 
rapidly escalating tension between Pyongyang and Washington in 2002-2003, the 
Chinese convened a trilateral meeting in Beijing among North Korean, US, and Chinese 
diplomats in April 2003. At that time, the Bush administration's firm refusal to meet 
bilaterally with the North Koreans created concern that the nuclear crisis would escalate 
out o f control. To engage Washington in subsequent negotiations, the Chinese 
expanded the talks to include South Korea, Japan, and Russia to reflect the Bush 
administration's view that the nuclear issue was a "neighbourhood problem" that should 
include countries from the region with a vested interest in a nuclear-free North Korea.75 
In August 2003, the Chinese hosted the first round of the Six-Party Talks in Beijing, 
which provided Russia with the opportunity to act as a potential middle man between 
the United States and North Korea. Moscow sees the Beijing Six-Party Talks primarily 
as an opportunity to promote its long-term economic, political, and security interests in 
Northeast Asia. Moscow's re-emergence as a key player in the Korean negotiations 
represents a major victory for President Vladimir Putin, who has steadily increased 
Moscow's attention to Pyongyang since entering office in 2000.
After the most recent episode in the North Korean nuclear crisis in February 
2005, Russia reiterated its strong support for Six-Party Talks. For example, in response 
to North Korea’s announcement on 10th February that it is withdrawing from the talks, 
the Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman, Aleksandr Yakovenko, stated that while 
“Moscow respects and understands Pyongyang's concerns about its 
security.. .nonetheless it wants the country to return to the negotiations." During the
74 Toloraya, pp. 49-50.
75 Office o f  the Press Secretary, The White House, “President Bush Optimistic About Multilateral Talks 
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Bush-Putin summit in Bratislava on 24 February 2005, Russia once again affirmed that 
North Korea should not be permitted to possess a nuclear bomb.77
In summary, Russia lacked clear-cut goals and a consistent stance with regard to 
the North Korean nuclear question. However, once Russia began to realize that its 
power in Korean affairs had been gradually waning, it understood that it had no choice 
but to follow the approach of the other states involved. As a result, Russia’s position on 
North Korea’s acquisition o f nuclear weapons has become almost identical to that of the 
world community. In general, Russia has been very cautious about publicly announcing 
its own policy and it has often adopted a ‘wait and see’ attitude while carefully 
watching what the Americans and Chinese had to say on the issue. This passive policy 
contributed to its isolation and exclusion from the main negotiations during the first 
crisis.
In my opinion, North Korea’s nuclear programme is aimed against the US or 
Japan, not Russia and primarily stems from its attempts to negotiate with the US, rather 
than a desire to achieve great military power status. Recently, during talks between 
Kim Jong II and the South Korean Unification Minister, Chung Dong Yong, Kim 
maintained that North Korea does not want any nuclear capability on the Korean 
peninsula. Thus North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons is not an immediate 
security threat to Russia because Putin and Kim Jong II have maintained relatively good 
relations. In any case, Russia has only limited influence on North Korea’s nuclear
<70
programme and it has little choice, therefore, but to pursue a wait and see policy.
3. Russia and K orean reunification
The role o f North Korea in Russian-South Korean relations cannot be considered 
without paying some attention to the question of Korean reunification. Russia may be 
in a better position than any other great power in the region to contribute to Korean 
reunification. After all, Japan is worried about the unification of Korea because of 
Korea’s potential military and economic strength, even though it publicly advocates 
Korean unification. And although the US military is highly likely to remain even in a 
reunified Korea, the United States might lose some o f its military bases in the Asia- 
Pacific region. As for China, a divided Korea gives it more influence in the region than
77 RFE/RL Headlines, 25 February, 2005.
78 Hanns W. Maull and Sebastian Hamisch, “Embedding Korea’s unification multilaterally,” The Pacific 
Review, Vol. 15 No. 1, 2002, p. 51.
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it would have if a strong, nationalistic and reunified Korea existed, especially one
70friendly to the US. Russia, on the other hand, has virtually nothing to lose if  Korean 
reunification takes place. Indeed, given that several of its joint economic projects with 
South Korea would be both quickly and efficiently achieved with North Korean 
participation, a reunified Korea could become a strong economic partner in the region. 
More importantly, a reunified Korea would counterbalance China and Japan from the 
Russian strategic perspective, since Russia clearly does not want either China or Japan 
to become a hegemonic power in the region. Moreover, Russian leaders have strongly 
objected to a foreign military presence on the Korean peninsula including the current 
US military presence in South Korea. Moscow believes that the foreign policy o f a 
reunified Korea would be independent o f the US, and thus more open to expanding 
cooperative relations with Russia.80
According to Grigory Karasin, Moscow believes that Korean unification must be 
resolved by North and South Korea themselves through dialogue and bilateral
Q  1
cooperation and without any foreign interference. Interestingly, this view is rather 
different from the views o f the two Korean leaders themselves. Both Kim Jong II and 
former South Korean president Kim Dae Jung have said that the United States is the 
most important actor in discussions about Korean reunification. It should also be noted 
that Russia also sometimes suggests that Korean reunification should be resolved 
through multilateral dialogue with the participation o f all concerned parties including 
Russia.
3.1. The Soviet Union and Korean reunification
Moscow’s support for Korean reunification predates the disintegration of the 
USSR. However, during the 1950s and early 1960s, Soviet public support for North 
Korean reunification efforts, by military means or by indigenous revolution in South 
Korea, was dependent upon the North Korean Workers Party (KWP) dutifully 
subordinating itself to Moscow. As the Kim II Sung regime gradually demonstrated its 
reluctance and then unwillingness to support Soviet policies, Soviet policy shifted; the 
Soviet Union would only support reunification pursued through bilateral negotiations
79 Kim, S., p. 39.
80 Jae-nam Ko, “Pyongyang’s Opening and North-South-Russia Cooperation,” K orea Focus, Vol. 9, No. 
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and compromise with South Korea. For example, the Soviet leadership insisted that 
bringing an end to military confrontation was in the interests of both Korean states, thus 
indirectly rejecting Pyongyang’s claim to be the only sovereign Korean state.
Moreover, to the chagrin o f the North Korean leadership, the Soviet government did not 
reject former Secretary o f State Kissinger’s proposal for a four power conference to
• JM
discuss the Korean problem. There was no Soviet support for revolutionary activities 
in the South, which, for Kim II Sung, had become a necessary prior condition to 
reunification.
By the 1970s, Soviet views about Korean unification had become very sceptical. 
As Zagoria argues, the Soviet Union had nothing to gain from a reunification war. A 
North Korean loss would have profound political and psychological consequences 
among other Soviet allies and treaty partners. On the other hand, a North Korean 
victory might lead to an unintended Soviet-American military confrontation, end 
detente, provoke Chinese intervention, and create Japanese pressure for its
Of
remilitarization, all o f which would threaten Soviet interests. Therefore, Moscow had 
no compelling reasons to support North Korean efforts to unify Korea, much less to risk 
a war in the process.
3.2. Russian perceptions and policy
In Russian academic circles today, there are three basic prognoses about Korean
RAreunification. The first group argues that Korean unification will never take place 
because both North and South Korean political leaders lack incentives for unification. 
North Korean leaders fear losing political power and social status, while South Korean 
leaders believe that the cost o f unification would shatter the South Korean economy.
The second group contends that Korean national identity, although it developed 
differently in North and South Korea in the last five decades, will be the driving force 
towards unification. They add that the form it will take is the gradual absorption of the 
North by the South through economic and human exchanges. The third group argues 
that the key variable in the problem of Korean unification is the death o f Kim Jong II. 
They suggest that North Korean leaders after Kim Jong II will advocate unification as a
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counter-policy against the previous regime and against party orthodoxy. They 
emphasize that the US role is crucial in supporting the next North Korean leaders’
ft 7policies while ensuring North Korea’s political and social future. However, Russian 
political leaders hope that Korean reunification will be achieved not through the sudden 
collapse o f Kim Jong Il’s regime or through military force, but through a peaceful and , 
orderly process of dialogue and cooperation between the two Koreas. The unexpected 
collapse of the North Korean regime would create a major upheaval on the Korean 
peninsula leading to immediate serious problems such as a massive exodus of North 
Korean refugees. It could also generate competition and confrontation among China, 
Japan, Russia and the US, which could destabilize the Russian Far East and Siberia.
Russia does not have the same stake in a divided Korea that the Soviet Union 
did. Moreover, neither Russia’s separate policy toward the two states nor its new 
balancing policy between Seoul and Pyongyang has provided any substantial benefit to 
Moscow. Many Russians believe that a democratic, neutral, and unified Korea would 
meet Russia’s interests both as a political and strategic counterbalance to Japan, China, 
and the US and as an economic power. They predict that Korean unification will be 
most likely to be achieved on South Korean terms because the gap in economic and 
military capabilities between the two Koreas is widening in South Korea’s favour and
ftftthe Stalinist regime in the North is doomed to collapse.
However, the Russian political elite tends to advocate the unification of Korea 
only under one circumstance, that is, the accommodation of Russia’s strategic and 
economic interests. They are willing to support Korean unification as long as a unified 
Korea is friendly to Russia and will cooperate with Russia in preventing Japan or China 
from achieving any kind of hegemony. In general, Russians see the following potential 
gains from Korean unification: the disappearance of a potential threat o f war near the 
Russian border; the reduction of the armed forces of the two Korean armies and the 
withdrawal o f American troops from the Asia-Pacific region; the elimination o f the need 
to manoeuvre between Pyongyang and Seoul; the creation o f more opportunities to 
solve regional security problems such as nuclear security, ecological security, terrorism, 
illegal emigration, drug trafficking, and human rights; and the opportunity to develop 
economic cooperation with a large Korean economy.
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4. The role of North Korea in Russian-South Korean relations
As this chapter illustrates, North Korean plays a significant role in bilateral 
security relations between Moscow and Seoul because Russia’s bilateral security 
relations with North and South Korea are interconnected both directly and indirectly.
The Russian leaders discovered that the implementation of its policy favouring 
the South but ignoring the North from Gorbachev to the early Yeltsin period not only 
diminished Russia’s influence over North Korea, but also failed to attract Seoul’s 
attention, while, at the same time, it undermined Russian influence in the Northeast 
Asian region. Russia curtailed its economic, political, and cultural relations with North 
Korea for almost a decade (from 1987 to mid 1990s), and this only served to ensure 
Russia’s complete isolation from the negotiation process over North Korea’s nuclear 
weapons programme until the recent nuclear Six-Party Talks in 2005.
In short, Moscow-Seoul relations were promising only as long as Russia had 
leverage over North Korea. Russian political leaders now know that the effectiveness of 
their Korean policy depends upon their ability to have normal relations with both Seoul 
and Pyongyang. It is also difficult to imagine how Russia, having uneasy relations with 
North Korea, could have hoped to cooperate with it, or possibly with a united Korea, 
actively and effectively to realize the multilateral economic cooperation projects that
O Q
were discussed in the previous chapters of this thesis. In this regard, I am strongly 
convinced that Putin’s efforts to renormalize relations with Pyongyang have contributed 
to enhancing Russian-South Korean relations.
Nevertheless, North Korea still sometimes serves as an obstacle to Moscow- 
Seoul relations both because of the traditional security consequences of Pyongyang’s 
nuclear weapons programme, and with regard to North Korea’s long term economic 
involvement in Russia-South Korean economic projects and the effect that this has on 
their economic security. More importantly, these two elements are interrelated: the 
economic aspect is contingent upon the political one.
4.1. The political and strategic dimension
Until 2001, both Moscow and Seoul considered the North Korean factor the 
single most important element in formulating their foreign policy priorities toward each 
other. In other words, the most frequently discussed political issue on the diplomatic 
agenda between Russia and South Korea was related to North Korea. As Toloraya
89 Zhebin, p. 738.
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argues, from the beginning of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Seoul, Seoul 
essentially viewed relations with Moscow mostly thorough the prism of confrontation 
with the North on the basis of a zero sum game.90 Seoul considered North Korea as its 
primary political and strategic security threat. This suggests that until South Korea 
launched its sunshine policy toward the North in 1998, Seoul hoped that the rupture of 
relations between Russia and South Korea would lead to Pyongyang’s further isolation. 
Seoul wanted to establish relations with Moscow for two reasons. First, in the short 
term, Seoul wanted to reduce the immediate “military security threat posed by North 
Korea by alienating it from its most important source of military support.” Second, in 
the long term, “Seoul wanted to enhance its international legitimacy, and eventually 
promote Korean national reunification by weakening North Korea and forcing it to 
negotiate on South Korean terms.”91 More specifically, Seoul hoped that Russian 
influence or pressure would be brought to bear on Pyongyang over the issue of 
International Atomic Energy Agency inspections.
Russia’s formal response has always been to promise to do this, in an attempt to 
demonstrate that it is a great power and to stimulate Seoul’s political interest in the 
continued pursuit o f a closer relationship. Yet in reality, this was not an easy task for 
Russia. The main obstacle was its 1961 Friendship Treaty with North Korea, under the 
terms of which Russia was committed to defend North Korea. The Russian government 
claimed that the 1990 amendments released Russia from any obligation to act except in 
case o f a direct invasion o f the North. It was generally expected that the treaty would be 
terminated when it came up for renewal on 10 September, 1996 yet it was not formally 
terminated. Moscow sent the North Koreans a draft o f a new treaty without a military 
assistance clause, but the old treaty remained in force until agreement was reached on a 
new treaty in 2000.92
A second obstacle to putting pressure on North Korea was the fact that Moscow 
had lost practically all leverage over Pyongyang. As a result, the overall image of 
Russia in South Korea was downgraded. Moscow was excluded from a number of high 
level negotiations in the Korean peninsula. In the spring of 1996, the joint South 
Korean-US announcement o f proposed four party talks with North Korea and China to 
deal with ongoing problems on the peninsula came as an insult to Moscow. The 
Russians believed that they had acted in good faith in normalizing relations with Seoul
90 Toloraya, p. 35.
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in 1990, and six years later, South Korea and the US wanted to exclude Russia from 
their own normalization of ties with Pyongyang.93 This clearly demonstrates that for 
Seoul, the strategic value of Russia was smaller than that o f the Soviet Union. 
Pyongyang has also claimed that Russia is incapable o f promoting the denuclearization 
of the peninsula.94 As Bouchkin notes, Russia’s present attempts to involve itself in the 
problems o f the Korean settlement might well be counterproductive.95
Thus relations with Russia have become less of a priority for both South and 
North Korea. By the end of the 1990s, North Korea appeared indifferent to the Russian 
role on the peninsula, preferring to pursue greater contacts with the US.96 South Korean 
leaders were also less enthusiastic about an expanded Russian role on Korean issues.
4.2. The economic security dimension
Nevertheless, in the late 1990s, South Korean and Russian perceptions toward 
North Korea gradually began to change. The economic aspect of the North Korean 
factor, or, in other words, North Korea’s willingness to participate in some of the 
economic projects that Russia and South Korea are currently engaged in, has gradually 
grown in importance. Since the South Korean government is pursuing a pro-North 
sunshine policy, improved relations between Pyongyang and Moscow do not 
necessarily have negative implications for Seoul any more. South Korea has realized 
that a stable triangular relationship would facilitate Russian-South Korean economic 
relations and contribute to the acceleration o f reunification in the long term. From the 
Russian perspective, the situation in the Korean peninsula is also critical to Russia’s 
economic and geo-strategic security and to the prospects for the development of the 
Russian Far East. In this sense, an untroubled North Korean regime is perhaps an 
important prerequisite for the development o f the region.
Furthermore, since Russia has lost most of its political leverage over Pyongyang, 
recent Russian policy towards North Korea, especially during Putin’s term, has been 
focused on economic rather than political aspects. There are already some indications 
o f Russian-North Korean regional economic cooperation, for example on the Tyumen 
River project, the proposed Kovykta gas pipeline project, possible plans to build a 
railroad line joining Khasan and to supply crude oil to an oil refinery in the North
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Korean port o f Raj in by rail, the use of North Korean labour force in the Russian timber 
industry in the Russian Far East, and the TSR-TKR linking project. Yet the progress of 
these projects depends on their ability to attract considerable outside investment,
07especially from South Korea. In short, South Korea’s capital and technology 
assistance is much needed.
From the South Korean perspective, the use of the cheap North Korean labour 
force clearly serves as a factor to boost economic cooperation. The use o f the North 
Korean labour force in various economic projects in the Russian Far East is also highly 
encouraged by the Russians, in particular because some o f them are sent as partial 
repayment of North Korea’s outstanding debt to Russia.98
Perhaps one of the most compelling arguments that may attract North Korea to 
become involved in Russian-South Korean economic cooperation is the potential 
construction of the Kovykta gas pipeline. In 2002 and 2003, there was a proposal that 
one alternative to the proposed gas pipeline route from Irkutsk would run through North 
Korea to South Korea instead of following the Yellow Sea route. This scheme was 
proposed by the new pro-North South Korean government, Russia, and the US as one 
incentive to discourage North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons.99 Since North 
Korea faces critical energy shortages but lacks the hard currency to import energy, 
Pyongyang welcomed the idea of a trans-Korean pipeline route which would also give it 
the benefit o f transit revenues. On the other hand, despite the improved political climate 
in North-South Korean relations, Russia, China and the United States have also been 
concerned that a trans-Korean route would provide Pyongyang with leverage over gas 
flows and enable it to threaten other receiving consumer states for political purposes. In 
addition to these political considerations, there still remain many outstanding questions 
in terms of the project’s economic viability and financing.100 As a result, this scheme 
has been put on hold.
4.3. Implications
This chapter has argued that one of the most serious concerns shared by Moscow 
and Seoul since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1991 has been the problem 
of North Korea. The interests of South Korea and Russia are not in conflict with regard 
to the North Korean issue. From the Russian and South Korean perspective, the North
97 Kim, S., p. 40.
98 Moltz, p. 203.
99 Interview with Keun-Wook Paik, Associate Fellow, Sustainable Development at Chatham House, the 
Royal Institute o f  International Affairs, London, UK, 25 February, 2005.
100 Wishnick, p. 155.
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Korean question involves much more than nuclear proliferation and it remains on 
various political and economic security agendas for both Moscow and Seoul. Yet, 
despite the importance o f North Korea in Russian-South Korean bilateral relations, the 
chapter has established that Moscow-Pyongyang relations are not as decisive a factor in 
Russian-South Korean relations as Moscow-Seoul relations were in Russian-North 
Korean relations, especially during the Gorbachev and early Yeltsin periods.
Despite Russia’s effort to correct and balance its foreign policy between the two 
Koreas after 1996, and particularly after 1999, neither o f the two Koreas nor Russia 
seem to be satisfied with the results of the development of their relations. Traditionally, 
South Korean leaders had considered Moscow a potential buffer against North Korea. 
However, as Russia’s ambivalence over North Korea’s nuclear crisis demonstrates, the 
Russians have encountered difficulties in deciding what policy they should pursue. This 
continues to feed South Korean suspicions of Russia.
Cooperation involving Russia and the two Koreas would facilitate the realization 
of the TSR-TKR and the gas pipeline project. It would undoubtedly strengthen Russia’s 
economic security, as well as that of both North and South Korea, and it would 
contribute to the stability of the Korean peninsula. However, the reality is that the 
complicated issue of the nuclear proliferation negotiations, and continued economic 
stagnation in North Korea have constituted a regional political and economic security 
threat to Northeast Asia, including Moscow and Seoul. They have also delayed the 
realization o f bilateral economic cooperation between Moscow and Seoul. As a result, 
the North Korean factor has not so far fulfilled its potential to contribute to the two 
countries’ economic security and to regional economic security more broadly.
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Chapter 9. Conclusion
This work has attempted to understand the progress made in, and the obstacles 
facing, Russian-South Korean bilateral relations and to consider whether the five 
aspects o f cooperation examined in the case studies contribute to building 
comprehensive security between Russia and South Korea. The thesis demonstrates that 
although Russia and South Korea have embarked on both traditional and non-traditional 
security cooperation, the focus o f the security building process has gradually changed 
from traditional military and strategic concerns such as Cold War confrontation and 
balance o f power politics in the region, to non-traditional economic dimensions. These 
economic security dimensions are concentrated in five cooperative projects: energy 
security related to the direction of oil and natural gas pipeline routes and LNG trade; 
railroad network linkages; the establishment of FEZ; the management o f maritime 
resources; and the transfer o f military weapons and space technology. Russia and South 
Korea intended to enhance their bilateral relations and establish their bilateral and 
regional economic security through cooperation in each o f the five projects. However, 
there is a considerable gap between what has been achieved and what was intended.
First, as chapter 3 illustrates, Russia and South Korea wanted to enhance their 
energy security by diversifying their energy export and import markets. Thus, they 
have been discussing energy cooperation since the early 1990s. A project to construct a 
cross-border gas pipeline, estimated to be able to provide a total of 20 million tons of 
natural gas to China, Russia, and Korea annually for 30 years, between Kovykta gas 
field and South Korea through China, was initiated in 1995. However, the project 
stalled and at present it seems highly unlikely to come to fruition in the foreseeable 
future. Moreover, although a deal was signed with Sakhalin Energy in July 2005 to 
supply KOGAS with 1.5 mt per annum of LNG for 20 years, the scale o f overall 
Sakhalin LNG gas trade between the two sides is still insignificant and it is far from 
sufficient to meet South Korea’s energy requirements.
Second, as far as railroad network linkages are concerned, the most immediately 
achievable transport project linking the TSR with the TKR would clearly provide both 
Russia and South Korea with the opportunity to meet their objectives to become great 
transit powers by maximizing their geo-strategic positioning. Chapter 4 explains how 
the realization of the railroad project would enable the two countries to diversify their 
commercial markets by improving resource allocation and increasing their trading 
volumes. Since the project envisages train shipments across North Korea, the Russian
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and South Korean governments also hoped that it would contribute to easing the tension 
in the Korean peninsula and would facilitate the reunification of Korea. So far a 
number o f proposals and feasibility studies have been conducted by both Russia and 
South Korea. Despite the obvious advantages to both countries and to the Northeast 
Asian region more generally, however, the project has virtually ceased to make progress 
since December 2004. Apart from the need to overcome a number of obstacles on both 
the Russian and South Korean sides, North Korea’s withdrawal from the project in 
December 2004 made it clear that the successful completion of the railroad link requires 
the prior resolution o f the North Korean nuclear problem.
Third, Chapter 5 argues that the successful operation of the Nakhodka FEZ has 
the potential to enhance the common regional economic security interests of Russia and 
South Korea, as well as o f other participating states, by establishing a market network 
and promoting regional economic integration. Since 1992, Moscow and Seoul have 
conducted feasibility studies and set up a number of agreements regarding the size and 
the lease terms for joint construction o f the industrial complex in the Nakhodka FEZ. 
However, the project has not been ratified by the Russian government. Moreover, the 
Nakhodka FEZ virtually ceased to exist after a new Russian law on special economic 
zones took effect on 27 August 2005 and it was excluded from the list o f six regions 
which won their bids to create special economic zones in Russia on 29 November 2005. 
Despite its potential, therefore, the Nakhodka FEZ project is perhaps the least likely of 
the cooperative projects examined in this thesis to be achieved.
Fourth, Chapter 6 establishes that fishery cooperation is one of the important 
aspects o f Russian-South Korean bilateral relations because o f its potential to meet the 
economic and food security interests of the two countries. Russia’s vast and rich marine 
products and fishery resources, specifically, its pollack, cuttlefish and saury resources, 
have been attractions for South Korea’s expanding fishing zones. Fishery activities, 
such as joint ventures between Russian and South Korean private fishing companies, 
have developed rapidly since 1990. However, the scale o f fishery trading between the 
two countries has remained small. In fact, there has been more conflict than 
cooperation in the fishery diplomacy between Moscow and Seoul. Crucial problems 
that have arisen include Russia’s reduction o f its pollack catch quotas, its unpredictable 
policy concerning fishing rights charges, and illegal fishing activities. Although some 
of the disputes have been resolved on an ad hoc basis, the issues have the potential to 
resurface in the future.
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The fifth aspect of cooperation between Russia and South Korea studied in this 
thesis is the arms trade. As Chapter 7 demonstrates, the two countries have been 
engaged in the arms trade since 1994. The initial impetus was Russia’s concern to 
repay its debt to South Korea and the serious setback that occurred in Russia’s defence 
industry after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The South Korean government was 
hesitant at first to purchase Russian arms due to political sensitivity both in the region 
and in its relations with the US. Nevertheless, the arms trade has enabled South Korea 
to acquire a number o f items of up-to-date military hardware from Russia at very 
competitive prices, particularly through the two Brown Bear arms trade projects.
Indeed, the arms trade between Moscow and Seoul has met the two countries’ mutual 
interests by decreasing Russia’s debt to South Korea since 1994. Despite the rapidly 
developing arms trade between the two countries, however, its scale remains relatively 
small, constituting only 0.8 percent o f total Russian arms exports from 1994-2004, as 
illustrated in Chapter 7. Moreover, it is questionable whether the two countries will 
continue their arms trade once the Russian debt to South Korea has been completely 
cleared.
The gap between the potentially substantial benefits that Russia and South Korea 
could derive from each o f the five projects and the limited progress that has been 
achieved suggests that although Russian-South Korean bilateral cooperation was 
motivated by economic security needs, the cooperative bilateral and regional economic 
security building process has encountered a number o f serious obstacles. In each o f the 
five case study chapters, I have identified the obstacles to hampering cooperation in that 
specific sector. In sum they comprise the following three factors: 1) problems 
concerning the Russian domestic situation, specifically regarding the course of 
transition in the Russian Far East; 2) the inexperience of the two states in implementing 
regional economic security measures and in cooperating in the Northeast Asian region; 
and 3) external factors such as the North Korean nuclear crisis. These three factors 
explain the limited progress in Russian-South Korean bilateral cooperation. Let us look 
at each o f the three factors in turn.
First, despite their potential for the economic development o f Northeast Asia, 
cooperation in energy, transport networking, fishery, and in establishing Free Economic 
Zones, have all been constrained by the unstable political and economic situation in the 
Russian Far East. Among the most serious problems o f the Russian Far East is the lack
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of adequate legislation to safeguard investments and ensure future profits. Furthermore, 
even when the laws exist, the lack o f legal enforcement in the region creates the climate 
for burgeoning illegal activities such as illegal fishing, illegal trade of stolen cars, arms 
and timber, drug smuggling, acts of contract killings in the Nakhodka FEZ, and cargo 
robbery on the railroad. Without a strong legal framework, the establishment of a FEZ 
in the Russian Far East seems to be extremely difficult, as the other cases o f FEZs in 
Russia illustrate. The criminalization o f fishery commerce is also rooted in the ill- 
defined and unenforced legal system, combined with the absence o f law enforcement 
agencies in the Russian Far East and a confiscatory tax regime. These factors have 
generated a boom in illegal fishing. And illegal fishing, in turn, has resulted in 
overfishing, causing Russia to reduce the fishing quotas for foreign vessels, sparking a 
fishery quota dispute between Moscow and Seoul.
The Russian domestic situation also affects centre-periphery relations between 
Moscow and the regions o f the Russian Far East which makes the building up of 
regional economic security cooperation between the Russia and South Korea 
problematic. As Chapters 5 and 6 explained, excessive politicization o f the FEZs 
delayed the development o f the Nakhodka project and finally reduced the scope of 
cooperation related to the territorial parameters and the financial and investment scale. 
As a result, the Nakhodka FEZ barely existed by the time the new law was adopted. 
Similarly, the highly politicized fishery quota allocation system in the Russian Far East 
ultimately led to illegal fishing. Moreover, even though the central government 
believes that the development o f the Russian Far East is essential to its long-term 
economic prosperity, it remains suspicious o f close relations between local governments 
and Northeast Asian countries. Any attempt by regional leaders to seek economic 
prosperity, such as establishing a FEZ or making local energy deals, is regarded as 
something that could enhance the independence of local governments from Moscow, 
decentralize the national economy, and redistribute power. In fact, the power struggle 
between the centre and periphery over fishery resources created considerable 
opportunities for corruption and illegal fishing, as illustrated in Chapter 6.
As a result o f this suspicion, the central government in Moscow has used several 
tactics to ensure that the regions are unable to sustain economic cooperation with 
Northeast Asian countries including South Korea. For example, Moscow’s high 
railroad tariffs, and its inconsistent and unpredictable tax policy in the FEZ, as well as 
the high tax levied on the energy trade resulted in fundamental questions being asked in 
South Korea as to whether these economic projects could be economically beneficial in
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comparison to alternative options. Finally, and not unexpectedly, these conditions 
generate sceptical views among potential investors about the benefits of investing in the 
Russian Far East.
The second factor accounting for the limited progress in Russian-South Korean 
bilateral cooperation is the relative inexperience of the two states with regard to the 
concept o f regional economic security cooperation, resulting both in South Korea’s 
reluctance to invest in long term economic projects, and in Russia’s hesitancy to open 
its markets fully to foreign investors. Long-term economic projects require substantial 
finance, investment and technologies. But the two sides have both experienced 
difficulties in dealing with sensitive issues such as tax privilege negotiations and 
making the conversions of military weapons systems necessary for the arms trade. The 
lack o f mutual confidence is still very much rooted in the Cold War legacy, and it has 
resulted in both sides’ reluctance to either offer concrete initiatives, or display a spirit of 
cooperativeness in seeking a compromise during the process o f negotiating major 
projects. For example, each side lodged vociferous complaints against the other about 
not providing detailed information about the weapons during the arms trade negotiation 
process.
As a result o f the two governments’ inexperience in regional economic security 
cooperation, South Korean business circles have been reluctant to invest in regional 
projects. The lack o f experience also generated a great deal of fear among Russian 
policy makers who believe that an increase in Northeast Asian influence in the Russian 
Far East threatens Russia’s security. This has led to protectionist thinking among 
Russian policy makers. As illustrated in Chapter 5, for example, even though the two 
sides recognized that the establishment of a FEZ in Nakhodka would create enormous 
job opportunities for regional populations and diversify markets, the Russians and South 
Koreans remain cautious about developing long-term economic projects.
External factors are also important in explaining the limited progress in Russian- 
South Korean bilateral cooperation. Chapter 8 illustrates that the North Korean nuclear 
issue has had a negative impact on economic security cooperation between Russia and 
South Korea. For example, one of the possible Kovykta gas pipeline routes planned to 
run through North Korea is highly unlikely to come into existence at this stage. 
Moreover, although the railway linkage project still seems to be moving in the right 
direction, it would be facilitated if North Korea were to open up its market and society
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further. At the same time, from the traditional military security perspective, North 
Korean protests against Russia transferring arms to South Korea remains an obstacle to 
further military cooperation between Moscow and Seoul. Although its protest has no 
direct effect on arms trade cooperation between Moscow and Seoul, the bilateral arms 
trade provides a potential excuse for Pyongyang to withdraw from trilateral economic 
relations among the three countries. In short, trilateral cooperation among Moscow, 
Pyongyang and Seoul is the most important factor which would promote the further 
development o f multi-dimensional security cooperation between Russia and South 
Korea. In fact, the reunification of Korea would be a primary contribution to 
consolidating multi-dimensional security cooperation between Russia and a unified 
Korea. Because o f this, Russia’s stance on Korean unification is one of the most 
important issues in redefining Russian foreign policy in this region.
To a lesser degree, the US has had an indirect influence on Moscow-Seoul 
relations, particularly with regard to the arms trade and the North Korean factor. The 
US has had some impact on constraining military cooperation between Moscow and 
Seoul, such as in the arms trade, naval exercises, and the transfer o f space technology. 
However, it is in relation to the North Korean issue that the US has had the greatest 
effect. In short, the trilateral relations among Pyongyang, Moscow, and Seoul have 
primarily been affected by the US Administration’s policy towards Kim Jong II. Indeed, 
North Korean leaders are more interested in improving relations with Washington than 
with Moscow. In other words, Moscow-Seoul relations depend in many ways on 
whether President George W. Bush pursues a tough or a soft policy towards North 
Korea.
In short, South Korea’s active investment, Russia’s continued reform in the 
Russian Far East, and improvements in the political and economic situation in North 
Korea are the key factors which would facilitate the comprehensive security building 
process between Moscow and Seoul. Nevertheless, the reality is that the 
implementation of the projects has been delayed and that some of the projects have 
ceased to function as a result o f the obstacles and the delays. In sum, the obstacles have 
prevented Russia and South Korea from fulfilling their potential for creating a 
cooperative comprehensive security relationship. It is, perhaps, even premature to 
declare that bilateral economic security has been established.
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Each of the five cooperative projects not only has the potential to contribute to 
Russian-South Korean bilateral economic security. They could also contribute to 
building regional economic security, since Russian-South Korean bilateral relations are 
an integral part of both traditional and non-traditional regional security issues in 
Northeast Asia. A regional security system in Northeast Asia would include 
maintaining a regional balance of power, building regional economic security through 
integrating markets and establishing a regional energy security framework and a 
regional fishery regime, and constructing a regional transport network. Given that there 
have been relatively few imperative diplomatic issues on the agenda between Russia 
and South Korea, and their respective low priority in one another’s foreign policy 
profile, the Northeast Asian political situation influences Russian-South Korean 
bilateral relations. In addition to North Korea’s role in trilateral relations among 
Moscow, Seoul and Pyongyang, and the indirect influence of the US, Japan and China 
also both simultaneously create opportunities and act as constraints in the regional 
economic security building process between Moscow and Seoul. The energy project, 
for example, and the formation of the FEZs require multilateral cooperation from China, 
Japan and the US. Moreover, as illustrated in chapter 6, fishery has become a new 
regional security concern, as onshore fishery production and deep sea fishing quotas 
have steadily decreased due to the reduction of fishing grounds, illegal fishery, and the 
difficulty in securing new fishing grounds.
Thus, the obstacles that prevent the development of Russian-South Korean 
bilateral relations also clearly hinder the establishment of regional economic security. It 
is important to understand that the delay in the bilateral cooperative projects cannot 
simply be explained by the fact that they have only recently been launched. The 
problems cannot be understood without paying attention to the three factors outlined 
above. Even though there have been many talks and proposals among the participating 
countries since the collapse of the Soviet Union, none o f the cooperative projects have 
produced substantial benefits or concrete outcomes. The energy, railroad, and 
Nakhodka FEZ projects have not succeeded in attracting Chinese, Japanese, or North 
Korean participation. Trust and confidence among participating countries seem to be 
extremely difficult to establish and none of the projects have produced the infrastructure 
development that would generate prosperity in the region. Whether Russian energy 
could be reliable and affordable still remains questionable among Northeast Asian 
countries and, as a result, the energy projects have not produced the diversification that 
might resolve the Northeast Asian energy problem. Nor has the TSR and TKR linking
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project created a physical network between the states; the border remains closed, 
blocking cross-border interaction. The Nakhodka FEZ project failed to attract foreign 
investment from the Northeast Asian regional economy. And the fishery conflict 
among Northeast Asian states over catch quotas, fishing rights charges, and territorial 
fishery zones persists, along with illegal fishing, because o f the absence o f a multilateral 
regime to control or mediate disputes. Moreover, as chapter 7 described, the arms trade 
between Moscow and Seoul may satisfy the immediate economic security interests o f 
Russia and South Korea, but it does not really have any positive implications for 
regional security. On the contrary, from the traditional regional security perspective, 
the arms transfers made North Korea feel less secure and, since they act as a counter­
balance to Japan, the US and China, they also make them feel less secure and, as a result, 
they could destabilise the balance o f power in Northeast Asia. In short, despite their 
great potential for enhancing regional economic security, the cooperative projects 
between Russia and South Korea have not enhanced economic security of the region.
What steps would be necessary to establish bilateral and regional economic 
security between Russia and South Korea and lay the foundations for regional economic 
security in Northeast Asia? First, cooperation at the bilateral and multilateral level is, of 
course, vital. But although this thesis concentrated primarily on bilateral Russian-South 
Korean relations, a broader Northeast Asian regional economic security system and 
regional integration would require Chinese, Japanese, and North Korean participation 
and cooperation among all regional players.
More specifically, Russia would have to ensure that the prices it charged for oil 
and gas were competitive with those charged by Northeast Asia’s existing primarily 
Middle Eastern oil and gas suppliers. Furthermore, foreign direct investment is the key 
instrument in developing the energy project and bringing the shared prosperity which 
would result from the efficiencies produced by a joint energy infrastructure and energy 
policies. Multilateral cooperation is also essential to enhance energy security in the 
region. As for the gas pipeline project, the attitude of Gazprom is crucial to the 
development of a future gas pipeline project; the question is whether Russia would open 
the gas fields to Northeast Asian countries even though Gazprom does not have any 
assets in the Kovykta gas fields.
As for the railroad project, the pivotal task for Russia is to make sure that the 
service and management o f the TSR are improved; TSR traffic must move quickly, be
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dependable, and be capable of dealing with railroad bandits.1 On the Korean side, the 
reconstruction and reconnection of the TKR is essential. More importantly, relations 
between Pyongyang and Seoul must be improved, as well, o f course, as relations 
between Pyongyang and Washington. The result o f the Six-Party talks on North 
Korea’s nuclear programme is the most important element to determining the pace of 
this project. For this reason, instead o f switching shipping completely from sea routes 
to the TSR, it would be more realistic for South Korea to consider using the Russian 
land corridor in addition to sea travel for European-bound goods and Russian natural 
resources, or as a means to develop markets in Siberian regions.
Even though the Russian pipeline scheme in the Northeast Asian region would 
clearly help Russia to become a regional player, oil and gas exports will not be enough 
to solidify Northeast Asian ties. To play an active role in the new regionalism, Russia 
should propose an all around strategy for the region. In this regard, the Nakhodka FEZ 
project would be very useful. The South Korean government should also adopt a more 
aggressive policy toward the Nakhodka FEZ industrial park project, not so much 
because o f the economic benefits o f the project itself, but for the sake of enhancing 
bilateral relations.
The growing acceptance of the concept o f comprehensive security would clearly 
be a positive development for fishery diplomacy. Comprehensive security for fishery 
would mean that security could be achieved through a web of interdependence which 
would include cooperation in fishery disputes, in combating illegal fishing and in 
scientific fishery research. Proposals for maritime cooperation should be formulated 
not against an adversary, but rather to deal with common problems of illegal fishing and 
overfishing. Indeed, successful cooperation in one endeavour would build the 
confidence to undertake further cooperation. For this reason, the fishery diplomacy 
between Moscow and Seoul requires a coordinated response by authorities on both sides 
of the maritime border. The establishment o f a cooperative mechanism within 
Northeast Asia is essential. Networking between Moscow and Seoul, such as enhancing 
the Interpol network, is essential to curtail illegal fishing. States should set up sanctions 
against illegal vessels, such as the adoption o f a civil sanction regime based on an 
administrative penalty scheme. Above all, the system of quota allocations in Russia 
must be converted from the current opaque lobbying process to the transparent sale and 
enforcement of rights to fish. As Supian and Nosov note, it would help if  Japanese and
1 Startseva, M oscow Times, 10 June, 2003.
2 Judith Thornton, “The Exercise o f  Rights to Resources in the Russian Far East,” in Michael J. Bradshaw 
ed., The Russian Far East and Pacific Asia: unfulfilled potential (Richmond: Curzon, 2001), p. 117.
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Korean authorities were to demand that Russian fishermen show their licenses for 
fishing and export.3
In terms of regional security, the arms trade issue remains rather contradictory, 
since the objectives of bilateral economic security do not always correspond to those of 
traditional regional military security. This means that the more the arms trade between 
Moscow and Seoul develops, the more military security in the region is at risk. As 
discussed in chapter 7, large scale joint military exercises or the conclusion of a military 
alliance is highly unlikely between Russia and South Korea. However, the arms trade, 
particularly in the form o f joint military research, defensive military hardware, dual-use 
technology, or aerospace technology projects should be actively pursued, not so much 
because o f the economic benefits of the arms trade itself, but for its diplomatic 
contribution to enhancing bilateral relations.
Russia’s primary objective in the Korean peninsula has been to maintain or 
enhance its prestige, and to play a major role in Northeast Asia. In the course of history, 
Kremlin leaders have always faced the dilemma o f whether they should be 
traditionalists who emphasize the importance o f power and military strength in foreign 
policy, or integrationists who promote harmonious relations with major regional and 
global actors within the international system. In fact, neither the traditionalists’ nor the 
integrationists’ strategy has allowed Russia to play a major role in the Korean peninsula. 
The reasons for this lie primarily in Russia’s relatively weak position in the region, its 
inconsistent policies, its lack of policy resources, and the low priority of Korea in 
Russian foreign policy. As a result, Russia’s policy has been circumscribed by the 
external environment. For example, Nicholas II’s imperial penetration o f the peninsula 
was checked by Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, while Stalin’s 
ambition to expand Soviet power in the Korean peninsula was thwarted by the US 
policy o f containment. Soviet policy toward Korea was paralyzed during the Cold War. 
Moscow refused to acknowledge South Korea’s existence, and yet was unable to 
maintain truly cordial relations with the North, distracted as it was by China.
Gorbachev attempted to participate in the Asia-Pacific region with more peaceful 
strategies, yet this clearly created little more than the image o f a weak Soviet Union. 
Under President Yeltsin, Russia was also sidelined by its two rivals, China and the US, 
especially over North Korea’s nuclear crisis talks. In short, so far Russia’s policy has 
failed to prevent the US from remaining the main actor in the region.
3 “Granitsa vostoka” (Eastern border), pogranichnik, March 1998, p. 15.
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Hence, throughout history Russia’s policy has been reactionary and limited. 
Russia’s position in Korea was based on prestige rather than power, and it has been seen 
as a problem because it is a potential source of instability, proliferation and pollution in 
the region. Neither Gorbachev nor Yeltsin had specific policy objectives and plans 
concerning Korea.
Nevertheless, the new energy deals that Putin has offered to his Northeast Asian 
neighbours represent more than energy itself, considering that energy security is the 
primary concern for Northeast Asian regional economic security these days. The 
energy projects, along with the other large scale economic projects that Russia currently 
seeks to develop in the region, clearly indicate that the Kremlin leaders themselves 
understand the importance of regional economic security, and that Russia is willing to 
be part o f the Northeast Asian regional economic community.
Considering that the North Korean nuclear issue and the problem of a divided 
Korea mean that traditional security concerns still remain important in Northeast Asia, 
Russia’s role in the peninsula is not negligible. Russia could pursue a ‘wait and see’ 
policy towards unification or it could actively support unification by playing a crucial 
mediating role between Seoul and Pyongyang. Russia’s drive for influence in the Asia- 
Pacific region requires it to be proactive, constructive, responsible and dynamic with 
regard to unification and economic cooperation.
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